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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WASATCH COUNTY, a body politic of
the State of Utah,
Case No. 20080988-CA

Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
E. RAY OKELBERRY, BRIAN
OKELBERRY, ERIC OKELBERRY,
WEST DANIELS LAND
ASSOCIATION, UTAH DIVISION OF
WILDLIFE RESOURCES,
Defendants-Appellants.

OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The trial court issued its ruling on October 23, 2008.1 Okelberrys timely filed their
notice of appeal on November 20, 2008.2 The supreme court had jurisdiction under Utah
Code § 78A-3-102(3)(j). This Court has pour-over jurisdiction under Utah Code § 78A-4103(2)(j).
Although the appeal is timely with respect to the October 23, 2008, ruling, that ruling
may not have been a final order. Based on the case of Guisti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp.,3

1

R. 676-668.

2

R. 680-679.

3

2009 UT 2, 201 P.3d 966.
1

decided after Okelberrys’ appeal, it is arguable that Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure required Wasatch County to submit an order implementing the trial court’s ruling.
Okelberrys is filing a separate motion addressing this potential jurisdictional issue.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Where the trial court found gates had been locked, did the court act contrary

to the Utah Supreme Court’s direction in finding the locked gates did not interrupt public
use?
a.

Standard of appellate review: Whether a trial court on remand correctly

interpreted the appellate court’s decision is a question of law. The appellate court applies
a correction of error standard.4
b.

Preservation below: Okelberrys argued below that a “locked gate is

clearly an interruption” and that “it is the act of blocking, not the result, that is important.” 5
2.

Did the trial court rule based on a misunderstanding of the law and thus abuse

its discretion in holding that Okelberrys did not interrupt use by stopping persons who were
using their private roads?
a.

Standard of review: “An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal

interpretation of the Dedication Statute for correctness and its factual findings for clear error.
But whether the facts of a case satisfy the requirements of the Dedication Statute is a mixed
question of fact and law that involves various and complex facts, evidentiary resolutions, and

4

Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 874 P.2d 840, 842 (Utah 1994).

5

R. 630.
2

credibility determinations. Thus, an appellate court reviews a trial court's decision regarding
whether a public highway has been established under the Dedication Statute for correctness
but grants the court significant discretion in its application of the facts to the statute.” 6
Where the court exercises its discretion based on a misunderstanding of the law, however,
that constitutes an abuse of discretion.7
b.

Preservation below: The issue was raised in Okelberrys’ Memorandum

Opposing Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.8
3.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Okelberrys’ motion to allow

presentation of additional evidence addressing intent and other factors made relevant by the
Utah Supreme Court’s decision?
a.

Standard of appellate review: “Like the motion for a new trial on the

ground of newly discovered evidence, a motion to reopen the case to take additional
testimony is normally addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and its discretionary
denial or grant of the motion will be interfered with by an appellant court only for abuse.” 9
b.

Preservation below: Okelberrys sought this relief in their motion for

new trial for presentation of additional evidence.10
6

Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, ¶ 8, 179 P.3d 768.

7

Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130, 1134 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

8

R. 621.

9

Pozzolan Portland Cement Co. v. Gardner, 668 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah 1983) (citation
omitted).
10

R. 616-614.
3

4.

Did the trial court err in concluding that the maintenance of unlocked gates did

not interrupt use of the road as a public thoroughfare?
a.

Standard of review: Because the testimony concerning the maintenance

of gates was essentially undisputed, the only issue for decision is a question of law. Review
is for correctness.
b.

Preservation below: This issue was raised in Okelberrys’ Memorandum

Opposing Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.11
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
Utah Code § 72-5-104(1) (2006) is determinative of this appeal: “A highway is
dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been continuously used as a
public thoroughfare for a period of ten years.”
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case & Course of the Proceedings Below
This is a civil case seeking a declaration that certain privately owned roads have

become public under Utah Code § 72-5-104(1) (2006).
This is an appeal from the trial court’s decision on remand. Wasatch County appealed
and Okelberry cross-appealed from the original trial court decision in this case. The Court
of Appeals decision on that appeal is reported at 2006 UT App 743, 153 P.3d 745, and the
Utah Supreme Court opinion is reported at 2008 UT 10, 179 P.3d 768. A copy of the
supreme court opinion is attached in the Appendix to this brief.

11

R. 627-622.
4

Wasatch County filed suit on August 24, 2001.12 The case was tried in a bench trial
from June 28-30, 2004.13 The trial court ultimately entered an order determining that the
roads had become public14 but that the county was estopped from asserting an ownership
interest in the roads.15 Wasatch County appealed, and Okelberrys cross-appealed. The Court
of Appeals issued its opinion November 30, 2006, sustaining Wasatch County’s appeal and
rejecting the Okelberrys’ cross-appeal.16 On Okelberrys’ petition for writ of certiorari, the
Utah Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings.
On remand, Wasatch County filed a motion for further findings.17

Okelberrys

responded18 and filed a cross-motion for further findings.19 Okelberrys’ motion included a
motion for new trial or for leave to present additional evidence addressing the new test
adopted by the supreme court.20 The trial court held oral arguments on the motion on

12

R. 10.

13

R. 357-353.

14

R. 424.

15

R. 482.

16

Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2006 UT App 473, 153 P.3d 745, rev’d, 2008 UT 10,
179 P.3d 768.
17

R. 605-597.

18

R. 636-617.

19

R. 616-611.

20

Id.
5

September 26, 2008.21 The court did not expressly rule on Okelberrys’ motion for new trial
or to present additional evidence, but issued a ruling on October 23, 2008, finding the issues
in favor of Wasatch County.22
B.

Statement of Facts
The roads in question run across several thousand acres of rural, undeveloped property

that is owned by the Okelberrys in Wasatch County. Ray Okelberry, his brother Lee
Okelberry, and their father first purchased this property in 1957.23 The Okelberrys ran a
sheep business and bought the mountainous property in order to relocate their herds to a
higher, cooler elevation.24 Ray and Lee Okelberry ultimately bought out their father’s
interest in the land, and, after Lee decided to retire from the business, Ray’s sons Eric and
Brian Okelberry then bought out Lee’s interest.25 At the present time, Ray, Eric, and Brian
Okelberry own the land in question and continue to use it in their own livestock operations.
The Okelberrys’ property is crisscrossed by a series of unimproved dirt roads. A
color-coded map of the properties in question was attached as an exhibit during the pretrial
proceedings, 26 and, for convenience, is reproduced and attached as an exhibit to this brief.

21

R. 667; Transcript of Oral Argument September 26, 2008.

22

R. 676-668.

23

Trial Transcript, June 30 at 61-62.

24

Trial Transcript, June 30 at 61.

25

Trial Transcript, June 30 at 62.

26

R. at 371.
6

Evidence was presented at trial indicating that the County has not done any work to improve
the physical condition of the roads.27 The evidence presented at trial also indicated that, due
to weather, the roads are only open for travel from Mid-May or June through November of
each year.28 To the extent that these roads can actually be referred to as “roads,” the evidence
showed that they are rough, steep, rocky, and often obstructed by naturally falling trees.29
As indicated at trial, there are four ways in which the landowners have controlled
access to the roads since 1957: (1) by granting permission to some people to use the roads,
and then by expelling persons who were found on the roads without permission; (2) by
maintaining a series of closed gates that cross each of the roads; (3) by periodically locking
those gates; and (4) by posting no-trespassing signs along the roads.
Permission and Expulsion 30
From the time that the Okelberrys purchased the property, they treated it and the roads
that crossed it as private ground that was subject to their control. One of the chief ways in

27

Findings of Fact, R. at 419, ¶4; Supplemental Findings, R. at 489, ¶2; Trial
Transcript, June 28 at 25-26; Trial Transcript, June 29 at 57; Trial Transcript, June 30 at 80.
28

Findings of Fact, R. at 419, ¶5; Trial Transcript, June 28 at 61.

29

See, e.g., Trial Transcript, June 28 at 285 (testimony of County witness Ed Sabey,
describing recurrence of falling trees); Trial Transcript, June 29 at 97 (testimony of County
witness Benny Gardner, describing the roads as “rough” and “steep”); Trial Transcript, June
29 at 238-39 (testimony of Shane Ford, describing roads as “rocky” and “rough”); Trial
Transcript, June 30 at 26 (testimony of Brian Okelberry, describing need for yearly tree
removal).
30

The evidence relating to this factor presented at trial appears to have been exclusive
to the Okelberry roads, and does not apply to the West Daniels roads.
7

which the Okelberrys protected their private property rights was by granting permission to
friends or neighbors to use the roads, and by expelling persons whom they found using the
roads without permission. Ray Okelberry testified that as far back as 1957, he, Lee, and their
father were granting permission–both orally and in writing–to friends and neighbors to use
the roads.31 Brian Okelberry offered similar testimony regarding the Okelberrys’ attempt to
limit access to these roads by granting or withdrawing permission.32 Brian testified that he
and his family would routinely grant permission to people they knew to come up and “use
the roads and to hunt” on their property.33
Several witnesses supported the assertion that the Okelberrys had been controlling
access to the roads by granting permission and then expelling non-permissive users. Bruce
Huvard, a longtime friend of the Okelberrys, testified that he has been using the roads with
their specific permission since 1966.34 Mr. Huvard also affirmatively testified that, between
1966 and 1990, he was asked by the Okelberrys to “kick people off” the property if he came
upon them and learned that they did not have permission to be there.35 During one exchange
at trial, Mr. Huvard testified about his role as follows:
Q: During this period of time from 1966 to 1990 do you know
if other people obtained permission to use those roads?
31

Trial Transcript, June 30 at 81.

32

See Trial Transcript, June 30 at 35-36.

33

Trial Transcript, June 30 at 35.

34

Trial Transcript, June 29 at 252, 261.

35

Trial Transcript, June 29 at 266.
8

A: They did.
Q: Do you know if other people used those roads that did not
have permission?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you know if they were asked to leave?
A: When I was personally hunting there I would ask them to
leave if they didn’t have permission.36
Mel Price similarly testified. He stated that he has been using the roads since 1974.37
He also specifically stated that he has asked for permission to use the roads during every year
since then, and then authenticated a permission slip that he had received from Ray Okelberry
granting him permission to “access all of my private roads on my private land.” 38 He further
testified that his uncles and nephew have also received permission to use the roads from the
Okelberrys, and that he had always understood that “a person needed permission to use the
roads.” 39
Jeff Jefferson testified regarding the permission/expulsion protocols as well. Mr.
Jefferson started working for the Okelberrys on their property in 1977, and has worked there
every summer since then.40 Mr. Jefferson stated that the Okelberrys had a policy that when
36

Trial Transcript, June 29 at 256.

37

Trial Transcript, June 29 at 153.

38

Trial Transcript, June 29 at 163-65.

39

Trial Transcript, June 29 at 166.

40

Trial Transcript, June 29 at 130, 143.
9

one of their employees saw someone on the property, the employee was to approach the
person, ask if they had permission, and then ask them to leave if they didn’t have
permission.41 In fact, Mr. Jefferson specifically testified that he had had to ask one of the
County’s witnesses, Mark Butters, to leave the property on two different occasions.42 As to
the question of whether the expulsion policy was for the Okelberry roads and property, or
whether it just applied to the Okelberry property itself, Mr. Jefferson was unequivocal that
it applied to the property and the roads. On cross-examination, the following exchange
occurred:
Q: You indicated that any time you saw people on the property
you’d ask them to leave; is that correct?
A: That’s correct.
Q: Is that any time you saw people driving on the roads?
A: Well, I’d ask if they, they had permission to be on there,
‘cause I was informed that it wasn’t a public access, you know,
for people to be on there. So if they didn’t have permission I
would ask them to leave.
Q: When you say on there, do you mean on the roads or on the
property?
A: Well, most of the time when people came on there they
wouldn’t stay on the road.
Q: So people you talked to were people that were off the road on
property, is that what you’re saying?

41

Trial Transcript, June 29 at 141.

42

Trial Transcript, June 29 at 141.
10

A: No–I’d run into people like that and on the road. And I’d
ask them if they’re supposed to be on there.
Q: Would you chase them down with your horse–
A: No.
Q: –or how would you talk to them?
A: Just as I was coming up the road I’d run into them. Try to
do it nice, polite.43
In further support of this assertion, Glen Shepherd testified that he has specifically
asked for and received written permission from the Okelberrys to use their roads.44 Similarly,
Shane Ford testified that he and his extended family have routinely used the roads and the
property, with specific permission from the Okelberrys for both.45
Fences and Gates
At the time that the Okelberrys purchased the property in 1957, it was bordered by
fences.46 These border fences have remained in place throughout the Okelberrys’ period of
ownership. It was undisputed that there have also been wire gates across the contested roads
since at least 1957.47
43

Trial Transcript, June 29 at 148-49 (emphasis added).

44

Trial Transcript, June 29 at 212, 220.

45

Trial Transcript, June 29 at 230-31.

46

See, e.g., Trial Transcript, June 28 at 147 (testimony of James Bessendorfer); Trial
Transcript, June 29 at 174 (testimony of Lee Okelberry); Trial Transcript, June 30 at 62
(testimony of Ray Okelberry).
47

R. 672 ¶ 20 (“The Court finds that there were gates at the entrances to each of the
roads from 1957 to 2004.”) See also, e.g., Trial Transcript, June 28 at 39, 43, 48, 62, 64
11

As indicated by the Okelberrys, the purpose of these gates was twofold. First, the
gates were used as a means of controlling the movement of the sheep and cattle within the
Okelberry property.48 Second, the gates were also kept closed by the Okelberrys and their
employees as a means of controlling vehicular and pedestrian traffic. In a pretrial affidavit
that was filed with the Court, for example, Lee Okelberry testified that the family had
attempted to control access to the roads through “fences and gates.” 49 At trial, Brian
Okelberry also specifically testified that “one of the purpose[s] of the gates” was “to control
vehicles from going up and down the roads,” 50 and then later expressed his belief that the
gates had been a sufficient means of asserting private control over the roads:
Q: Based upon your recollection and experience up there, do
you have an opinion whether those roads have been open to the
public and have been used continually during these summer
months?
A: Not–Not–In my time we haven’t opened them. We closed
the gates and tried to put a little control on it.51

(testimony of Dee Sabey that there have “always” been gates); Trial Transcript, June 29 at
174 (testimony of Lee Okelberry); Trial Transcript, June 30 at 24 (testimony of Brian
Okelberry indicating that there are both internal “pasture gates” and external gates “at each
place that [the roads] goes on and off West Daniels” land); Trial Transcript, June 30 at 62,
137 (testimony of Ray Okelberry).
48

See Trial Transcript, June 30 at 25 (testimony of Brian Okelberry); Trial Transcript,
June 30 at 138 (testimony of Ray Okelberry).
49

R. at 192, ¶5.

50

Trial Transcript, June 30 at 25.

51

Trial Transcript, June 30 at 43.
12

This assertion that there was a dual purpose for the gates was also backed up by Glen
Shepherd, who at the time of trial had used the roads for 35 years and has been a neighbor
of the Okelberrys for the past 14 years.52 At trial, Mr. Shepherd testified that the gates have
been kept closed “as far back as [he could] remember” and that his understanding was that
the gates were kept closed, in part, to restrict the flow of persons.53 This assertion was also
backed up by Jeff Jefferson, who worked as a rancher for the Okelberrys every summer from
1977 through 2003.54 He testified the purpose of the gates was to control both the livestock
and the public.55
As for the West Daniels roads, the above testimony has obvious applicability to those
roads with respect to the points at which Ridge Line runs onto and off of the West Daniels
property. Additionally, testimony at trial also indicated that there were gates across Parker
Canyon as well.56
Locks on the Gates
The Okelberrys presented testimony that they have been locking the gates on a
periodic basis. Admittedly, there was some question at trial regarding the frequency and

52

See Trial Transcript, June 29 at 208.

53

Trial Transcript, June 29 at 219.

54

Trial Transcript, June 29 at 130, 143.

55

Trial Transcript, June 29 at 135.

56

See Trial Transcript, June 28 at 46-47 (testimony of Dee Sabey that there were gates
on Parker Canyon); Trial Transcript, June 28 at 278 (testimony of Ed Sabey that there were
gates across Parker Canyon).
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scope with which those gates have been locked. Ray Okelberry affirmatively testified, for
example, that he had begun locking the exterior gates as early as 1958 or 1959, and that the
interior gates within his property have been locked for approximately the past 20 years.57
More importantly, Ray Okelberry testified that he had made a habit of locking at least some
of the gates every year while the sheep were being moved.58 This was supported by Mel
Price. Mel Price began accessing the property in approximately 1972, Trial Transcript, June
29 at 154, and testified that the gates had “always been locked” as far back as he could
remember.59
Conversely, Brian Okelberry testified that, at least according to his memory, the
exterior gates had only been locked since the 1980s,60 while Lee Okelberry could not
remember ever having personally locked the gates himself.61 Additionally, the County
presented testimony from several persons who indicated that they had never encountered a
locked gate.62
In the initial set of findings, the trial court accepted Ray Okelberry’s contention that
the gates were periodically locked while the sheep were being moved. The court thus found

57

Trial Transcript, June 30 at 135-37.

58

Trial Transcript, June 30 at 138-39.

59

Trial Transcript, June 29 at 160, 170.

60

Trial Transcript, June 30 at 54.

61

Trial Transcript, June 29 at 196.

62

See, e.g., Trial Transcript, June 28 at 35, 40, 43, 48 (Dee Sabey); Trial Transcript,
June 28 at 112, 119, 125 (James Bessendorfer).
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that the Okelberrys have “locked those gates for periods of time” prior to “completely
controll[ing] access” through constant locking in 1989.63

On remand, the trial court

reiterated the position, finding that Okelberrys had “locked some of the gates at some points
between the 1950s and 1990.” 64
Signs
Finally, the evidence also indicates that the Okelberrys placed no trespassing signs
along their roads as a means of informing the public that use was restricted. Ray Okelberry
testified that he had started putting these signs up almost immediately upon purchasing the
property in the late 1950s.65

Other witnesses confirmed the existence of these signs

throughout the relevant period. Bruce Huvard, for example, specifically remembered seeing
the no trespassing signs up as of 1966.66 Mel Price, who has been using the roads since the
early 1970s, stated that there had been no trespassing signs posted along the roads as far back
as he could remember.67 Brian Okelberry similarly testified that there are signs on each of
the boundary gates.68 Jeff Jefferson also testified that “all entrances” were marked with a

63

Supplemental Findings, R. at 486.

64

R. 672 ¶ 24. The trial court concluded that this didn’t restrict travel on the roads.

65

Trial Transcript, June 30 at 137.

66

Trial Transcript, June 29 at 257-58, 268-69.

67

Trial Transcript, June 29 at 160.

68

Trial Transcript, June 30 at 25.
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sign stating “no trespassing or keep out.”69 Evidence also indicated that the West Daniels
roads were marked with no trespassing signs as well.70
Following trial, the trial court concluded that the County had met its § 72-5-104
burden with respect to the contested roads. Specifically, the trial court concluded that there
had been uninterrupted public use of the roads from 1960 until 1989. R. at 413, ¶8.71

69

Trial Transcript, June 29 at 135.

70

See Trial Transcript, June 29 at 161; Trial Transcript, June 29 at 212.

71

Although the trial court did specifically determine that there had been “no public use
of the various roads in the 1940s or before and also that no evidence of vehicular use prior
to the 1950s existed,” Findings of Fact, R. at 417, ¶10, the Court was somewhat ambiguous
regarding the exact years for which the court believed § 72-5-104 had been satisfied. For
example, in its discussion of the continuous use factor, the court determined that individuals
had begun “using the roads beginning in the late 1950s until the late 1980s or early 1990s.”
R. at 415, ¶4. In its discussion of the public thoroughfare requirement, the court was less
specific, indicating simply that, “prior to the locking of the gates in the early 1990s, the roads
were used as public thoroughfares.” R. at 414, ¶6. Finally, with respect to the ten year
public use requirement, the court determined that the roads had been used “starting in 1960
until the early 1990's.” R. at 413, ¶7.
In its conclusory paragraph, however, the Court shortened the period somewhat with
respect to the cutting off date. Specifically, the court determined that the roads had been
used continuously “for a period of well over ten years prior to 1989 when the Okelberrys
began locking the gates.” R. at 413, ¶8. Thus, the court specifically concluded that “the
public has been effectively cut off from use of these public roads since 1989.” R. at 413, ¶8.
As discussed below, there is a presumption in favor of the property owner in cases
brought under § 72-5-104. This brief will accordingly assume that the narrowest dates
prevail and that the trial court’s ruling was that the roads had been continuously used from
1960 until 1989. As will be set forth below in the Argument section, however, the slight
difference that may exist between 1957, 1958, 1959, or 1960 as a starting point, and 1989,
1990, or 1991 as an ending point will become meaningless given the years ultimately covered
by the Okelberrys’ evidence.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Utah Supreme Court remanded this case for a determination in accordance with
a new bright-line test, under which a single interruptive act is sufficient to prevent a private
road from becoming public. This is true even if there exists extensive uninterrupted use.
Although the fact of even frequent uninterrupted public use is thus irrelevant to determining
whether use was interrupted on one occasion, the trial court’s decision focuses on the
occasions of public use. The trial court found gates were locked or shut and users stopped,
but “found” these were not interruptive acts because there was no evidence of a general or
regular policy of stopping users. The trial court misapplied the law established by the Utah
Supreme Court. Because the trial court’s own findings establish interruptions, the case
should be remanded with instructions to enter judgment for Okelberrys.
Also, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Okelberrys’ motion to reopen to
present evidence addressing the a new test established by the Utah Supreme Court. The new
test focused on the intent of the landowner, whereas prior cases had held intent was
irrelevant. The trial court ruled against Okelberrys because they had failed to present
evidence of their intent in placing signs and locking gates. Because intent was not relevant
at the time of the first trial, fairness demands that the evidence be reopened to allow
Okelberrys to present testimony on this issue.

17

ARGUMENT
I:

THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HELD THE LOCKING OF
GATES WAS AN INTERRUPTION AS A MATTER OF LAW,
REGARDLESS OF INTENT OR IMPACT.

The trial court stated: “The Court finds that while there may have been occasions in
which Mr. Okelberry locked the gates in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, these were few and
far between, were not intended to restrict public access, and were not reasonably calculated
to interrupt public use of the roads.” 72

In making this conclusion, the trial court

misinterpreted the supreme court’s mandate. The supreme court clearly held that if gates
were locked at all, that constituted an overt act sufficient to enter a public use; there was no
additional requirement that the locking be “reasonably calculated to interrupt public use.”
The court established a bright line test based primarily on intent:
An overt act that is intended by a property owner to interrupt the
use of a road as a public thoroughfare, and is reasonably
calculated to do so, constitutes an interruption sufficient to
restart the running of the required ten-year period under the
Dedication Statute.73
With respect to the locking of gates, however, the court held such an act per se
establishes the required intent. If the gates were locked during the relevant time periods, the
supreme court held that was a sufficient interruption: “The locking of gates for several days
at a time constitutes an overt act intended to interrupt public use and reasonably calculated

72

R. 670.

73

Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, ¶ 15, 179 P.3d 768, 774.
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to do so.” 74 The only issue for the trial court to decide, therefore, was whether the gates were
locked; the trial court was not asked to decide Okelberry’s intent in locking the gates nor
whether the locked gates constituted an interruption of public use.
The trial court found that there were occasions in which Mr. Okelberry locked the
gates in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s. It follows that the use of the road as a public thoroughfare
was interrupted. The trial court’s conclusion that the roads were dedicated to the public must
be reversed with instructions to enter judgment that the roads remain private.
Even if the intent and impact of the locked gates had been an issue to be decided by
the trial court, its decision demonstrates a misunderstanding concerning what a landowner
must establish to retain the private character of his or her land. It is important to remember
the context in which this issue arises. While Utah Code section 72-5-104(1) provides that
a road can become “dedicated and abandoned” to the public by ten years continuous public
use, that law must be interpreted to avoid conflict with the private property rights guaranteed
by both the Utah and United States constitutions.75 Section 22 of Article I of the Utah
Constitution declares: “Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without
just compensation.” The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution similarly states:
“nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.” The only
interpretation of section 72-5-104(1) consistent with these constitutional protections is that

74

Id. ¶ 19.

75

Thurnwald v. A.E., 2007 UT 38, ¶ 4, 163 P.3d 623; Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate
of S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46, ¶ 26, 144 P.3d 1083, 1091.
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a landowner may, through inaction, dedicate or abandon his or her property, but the public
cannot take that property without compensation if the owner takes reasonable measures to
retain its private character. The public authority can not “take” a road unless the landowner’s
knowing acquiescence in public use and maintenance “amounts to a tacit dedication by the
landowner – a giving by the landowner rather than a taking by the public authority.”76
Prior to the supreme court decision in this case, several cases held that the intent of
the landowner was not relevant.77 The supreme court in this case, however, implicitly
overruled these prior cases and held that intent is the determining factor. The court
established a bright line test, quoted above, based primarily on intent.
The importance of intent rather than the impact is illustrated in Town of Leeds v.
Prisbrey,78 decided by the supreme court as a companion case to the instant matter. Joanne
George, Prisbrey’s predecessor in title, had erected barricades across the claimed road once
every seven years, but the evidence showed that the barricades did not actually interrupt the
use of the road by anyone. “Mrs. George testified that she never encountered anyone
attempting to travel on West Center Street during her roadblocks and knows of no one who
was actually prevented from using the road because of her blockades.”79 The supreme court

76

Vaughn v. Williams, 345 So. 2d 1195, 1199 (La. Ct. App. 1977).

77

“[R]ecent cases have definitively stated that owner intent is now irrelevant to
determining whether a road has been dedicated and abandoned to public use.” Campbell v.
Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 n. 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
78

2008 UT 11, 179 P.3d 757.

79

Id. ¶ 3.
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held that this evidence was nonetheless sufficient to interrupt use of the road as a public
thoroughfare: “Although she did not block the public's actual use of the road because her
roadblocks occurred during intermissions in the road's use, Mrs. George's intent and conduct
were nevertheless sufficient to interrupt West Center Street's continuous use as a public
thoroughfare for purposes of the Dedication Statute.” 80
In the instant case, the supreme court also emphasized that actual impact was
unimportant:
We emphasize here, however, that the action necessary by the
landowner to establish an interruption in public use does not
vary depending on the level of public use. An overt act intended
and reasonably calculated to interrupt public use restarts the
statutory period, and the effectiveness of such act is not tied to
the level of public use. In other words, an act by a landowner
sufficient to interrupt public use of a road used on a daily basis
by the public is also sufficient to interrupt public use of a road
used on a monthly basis by the public.81
Therefore, the trial court here erred by focusing on the impact of the locked gates. The
trial court found there were “occasions in which Mr. Okelberry locked the gates,” but
discounted this because “these were few and far between” and did not restrict public access.82
But, as in Prisbrey, Mr. Okelberry was not required to show that he actually restricted any
access. If Ray Okelberry locked the gates at all in the early years, as the trial court found,

80

Id. ¶ 7 (italics by the court).

81

Okelberry, ¶ 17.

82

R. 670.
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that by definition constituted an interruption of public use regardless of whether any person’s
actual use was interrupted.
Finally, the trial court’s finding that the locked gates were not intended to restrict
public access is not supported by the evidence. The trial court noted that Brian Okelberry
testified “that one of the purposes of the gates was to control vehicles ‘from going up and
down the roads.’” 83 Okelberrys acknowledge, as noted by the trial court, that there were
witnesses who testified that they had not locked the gates and other witnesses who testified
they had never seen any locked gates during the early years.84 But this testimony goes only
to whether the gates were locked in all, not to Okelberrys’ intent in locking the gates. If the
gates were locked, there was no other purpose for locking the gates but to restrict public use
of the roads. Locking the gates is not necessary for controlled livestock; sheep are restrained
as effectively by a gate that is wired shut. The only possible purpose for locks was to keep
people out. The trial court’s finding that the locks were not intended to restrict public access
must be reversed.
II:

LEE OKELBERRY AND OTHERS INTERRUPTED USE OF
THE ROAD AS A PUBLIC THOROUGHFARE BY STOPPING
PERSONS TO JUDGE WHETHER THEIR PURPOSE IN USING
THE ROADS WAS ACCEPTABLE.

Lee Okelberry testified they maintained gates at each entrance to their private
property, and stopped and questioned anyone who used to roads, to determine if they had

83

R. 674.

84

Id.
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what Lee believed was a legitimate reason for using the roads. He testified he stopped
individuals on the roads to inquire about their reason for using the roads, and let them
continue if he approved of the business.85 Lee Okelberry testified he made such stops
starting in 1957 when Okelberrys purchased the property.86
As the trial court acknowledged, other witnesses testified to stopping people using the
roads.87 Bruce Huvard testified he used the roads by permission beginning in 1966, but also,
at the request of Okelberrys, would ask people to leave if they had not obtained permission.88
Jeff Jefferson, who started working for the Okelberrys in 1977, also testified he asked people
to leave the roads if they did not have permission.89
This evidence is corroborated by the many individuals who testified they recognized
the property as private and asked permission to use it. Mel Price testified he obtained
permission to use the roads.90 Lee Okelberry testified he gave permission to the Taylors,
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Transcript June 29, 2004, at page 209; transcript June 30, 2004, pages 180, 185.
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Transcript June 29, 2004, pages 183-85.
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R. 672-671.
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Transcript June 29, 2004, pages 254-56.

89

Transcript June 29, 2004, pages 140-41, 149.

90

Transcript June 29, 2004, page 163; Exhibit 20.
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Thompsons, Youngs, and others.91 Shane Ford testified his mother, whose family had
previously owned the property, would ask permission.92
Okelberrys acknowledge that there were many people who were not stopped. Mark
Butters testified that he used the Ridgeline road twenty times per summer.93 Several
individuals testified they had never been asked to leave the road.94 Similar testimony was
given concerning the other roads.
The trial court noted the evidence that individuals had been stopped when using the
roads, but held that such actions did not constitute interruptions of public use because they
did not interrupt public use of the roads “generally,” nor show there was a “regular” policy
of requiring permission or approval to traverse the roads.95 The trial court’s holding
demonstrates a misunderstanding of the evidence necessary to prove an interruption of use.
There is no requirement that the overt act interrupt use of the roads “generally” or that there
be any “regular” policy of interrupting use or requiring permission. In fact, just the opposite
was true in the Prisbrey 96 case. There the interruptive acts occurred only once every seven
years, and never actually interrupted any use whatsoever.
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Transcript June 29, 2004, page 202.
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Transcript June 29, 2004, page 231.
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Trial Transcript, June 29 at 103.
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Factually, public use was

Dee Sabey, Trial Transcript, June 28 at 40; Martin Wall, Trial Transcript, June 28
at 197; Ed Sabey, Trial Transcript, June 28 at 271.
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Id.
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Town of Leeds v. Prisbrey, 2008 UT 11, 179 P.3d 757.
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unrestricted. But, the Utah Supreme Court nonetheless held that these actions were legally
sufficient to interrupt use of the road “as a public thoroughfare.”
The meaning of using a road “as a public thoroughfare” was explained by the Utah
Supreme Court in Morris v. Blunt97 as follows:
A "thoroughfare" is a place or way through which there is
passing or travel. It becomes a "public thoroughfare" when the
public have a general right of passage. Under [the identically
worded predecessor statute to section 72-5-104(1),] the
highway, even though it be over privately owned ground, will be
deemed dedicated or abandoned to the public use when the
public has continuously used it as a thoroughfare for a period of
10 years, but such use must be by the public. Use under private
right is not sufficient. If the thoroughfare is laid out or used as
a private way, its use, however long, as a private way, does not
make it a public way; and the mere fact that the public also
make use of it, without objection from the owner of the land,
will not make it a public way. Before it becomes public in
character the owner of the land must consent to the change.98
In Heber City Corp. v. Simpson,99 the Utah Supreme Court stated that the last
requirement, that “the owner of the land must consent to the change” from private to public
character, had been abandoned.100 But, given the clear language of Okelberry focusing on
the intent of the landowner, this Court must conclude that consent of the landowner is still
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49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127 (Utah 1916).
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Id. at 251, 161 P. at 1131, as quoted in Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307,
311 (Utah 1997), but with an updated reference to the current statute.
99

942 P.2d 307 (Utah 1997).
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Id. at 311.
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a requirement. Indeed, any other rule would be unconstitutional for the reasons set forth in
Point I above.
The act of stopping a traveler to judge whether the traveler’s business is legitimate is
an overt act consistent only with asserting control over the roads. Such acts show the
landowner still regards the roads as private and has not consented to any change to a public
character. Thus, Lee Okelberry’s overall testimony is very consistent with that of Ray
Okelberry: the roads were private and the Okelberrys took overt actions to interrupt use as
a public thoroughfare on several occasions.

This is sufficient to defeat the claimed

dedication to the public. The trial court erred in holding they were required to “generally”
or “regularly” restrict access. This Court should hold that the actions of the Okelberrys and
their employees in stopping people who were using the roads constituted an overt act which
was intended to and did interrupt use of the roads as a public thoroughfare.
III:

BECAUSE INTENT WAS NOT RELEVANT AT THE TIME OF
THE FIRST TRIAL, OKELBERRY WAS ENTITLED TO A NEW
TRIAL TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF INTENT ADDRESSING
THE NEW TEST ADOPTED BY THE SUPREME COURT.

Prior to the supreme court decision in this case, several cases held that the intent of
the landowner was not relevant. In 1998, this Court commented that “recent cases have
definitively stated that owner intent is now irrelevant to determining whether a road has been
dedicated and abandoned to public use.” 101 The supreme court in this case, however,
implicitly overruled these prior cases and held that intent is the determining factor. The court
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Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 n. 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
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established a bright line test that focuses on the intent of the property owner.102 In remanding
this case, the court again focused on intent: “it remains a factual question whether the
Okelberrys intended the signs to interrupt public use of the roads.” 103
In light of the new test adopted by the supreme court, Okelberrys moved for a new
trial or for leave to present additional evidence addressing the new standard. The trial court
did not rule or comment on the motion, but impliedly denied it by entering a final ruling
without allowing additional evidence.
The Utah Supreme Court has directed “[a] court should consider a motion to reopen
to take additional testimony in light of all the circumstances and grant or deny it in the
interest of fairness and substantial justice.” 104 In contrast to a motion for new trial, “a motion
to reopen does not require that the evidence be newly discovered or that it could not have
been discovered during the pendency of the trial by a party acting with due diligence.” 105
The case law controlling at the time of trial held intent was not relevant. Okelberrys
accordingly did not present evidence of intent. Where the case was remanded for decision
under a new standard, fairness demanded that Okelberrys be permitted to supplement the
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Okelberry, ¶ 15.
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Id. ¶ 18.
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Lewis v. Porter, 556 P.2d 496, 497 (Utah 1976). Accord A.K. & R. Whipple
Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 1999 UT App 87, ¶ 23, 977 P.2d 518.
105

12-59 Moore's Federal Practice - Civil § 59.13. The Utah Supreme Court cited
approvingly to the predecessor of this section in Lewis v. Porter, 556 P.2d 496, 497 (Utah
1976).
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record to add the missing evidence of intent. The trial court denied that opportunity, but in
its decision repeatedly faulted Okelberrys for failing to present evidence of intent regarding
the no trespassing signs on the property. The trial court stated: “Yet none of Defendants'
witnesses at trial specified their intent when putting up the signs in the years prior to the
1980s and 1990s.” 106 The court concluded: “Without credible evidence showing that the
signs were meant to apply to the roads themselves, the Court cannot infer an intent to
interrupt the use of the roads from the posting of signs in the 1950s, 1960s, or 1970s, nor can
it conclude that the earlier signs were "reasonably calculated" to interrupt public road use
prior to the late 1980s or 1990s.” 107
The trial court also claimed a lack of evidence of intent regarding locking of gates:
“While Ray Okelberry testified that he locked gates beginning either in 1957 or 1958, he did
not testify that he intended to keep the public from accessing the roads at this time.” 108 (Of
course, there would be no other possible reason to lock gates than excluding the public from
the property.)
Wasatch County acknowledged and the trial court concurred 109 that the test adopted
by the Utah Supreme Court was a new test. The Utah Supreme Court remanded “for further
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R. 671.
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Id.
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R. 673 ¶ 24.

109

Id. 672, 669.
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proceedings consistent with this opinion.” 110

There was no restriction against taking

additional evidence relevant to the new standard. Denying the request to present additional
evidence resulted in Okelberrys being judged against a standard that did not exist at the time
of trial. The unfairness is obvious. This Court should hold the trial court abused its
discretion in denying Okelberrys’ motion for leave to present additional evidence.
IV:

MAINTENANCE OF UNLOCKED GATES CONSTITUTED AN
INTERRUPTION.

The trial court held that “the simple existence of gates clearly does not constitute an
overt act,” noting the gates were there before Okelberrys took control of the property.111 This
ignores the undisputed evidence that Okelberrys maintained and frequently replaced the
gates.
It was undisputed that there have always been unlocked gates across these roads
during the time considered by the Court.112 Although individuals were able to open the gates
and still use the roads, the presence of those gates created a presumption that the use was
permissive and therefore interrupted use of the road “as a public thoroughfare.” Use by
permission does not count as “public use” under the dedication statute.113
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Okelberry, ¶ 20.
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R. 672.
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Transcript June 29, 2004, page 158.
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Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995).
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Other states have ruled that an unlocked gate creates a presumption that any use was
permissive. As stated by one court, “where a landowner places gates across a road through
his land, it is notice to the public that they thereafter are passing through the land by
permission and not by right, so that no prescriptive right to the use of the road can be
acquired.” 114 Another court similarly held, in a case dealing with unlocked gates: “The
erection of a gate across a road tends to evidence an intention on the part of the owner to
assume and assert ownership and possession of the land over which the road runs.” 115 The
court said such obstruction “is a strong indication that the use by others is permissive only.116
Another court holds that unlocked gates “conveys the clear message that any public use of
that road is with the landowner's permission only,” although that presumption is not
conclusive.117
This presumption of permissive use is consistent with Utah cases. The question under
the continuous use requirement is whether the public's right to use the road was interrupted
or “limited.” 118 Although some cases have considered the impact of locked gates on the
continuous use inquiry,119 it is significant that a number of the cases have also considered the
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Berger v. Berger, 88 N.W.2d 98, 103 (N.D. 1968).
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Williams v. Prather, 196 So. 118, 120 (Ala. 1940).
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McIntyre v. Board of County Commissioners, 86 P.3d 402, 412 (Colo. 2004).
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Heber City, 942 P.2d at 311 n. 9.
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See, e.g., Campbell, 962 P.2d at 809.
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presence of gates as an interruptive force without deeming it necessary to even note whether
those gates were locked.120
There are strong policy reasons for allowing a gate to act as an interruptive force, even
in the absence of any evidence showing that that gate was locked. As indicated above, the
Utah courts have long sought to achieve a balance between the competing interests that are
at work in the § 72-5-104 cases. On the one hand, the government clearly has an interest in
preserving the public's right to use roads that have been left to the public for a lengthy period
of time. But, it is instructive that the statute itself only calls for public dedication where the
landowners have “abandoned” the road.121
Where the landowner has taken some recognizable steps to assert some control over
the roads, the public will be under no illusion that the roads are public. For example, in a
case involving rural roads that are crossed by unlocked gates, a member of the public who
wished to use the roads would still have to physically stop their car, get out, open the gate,
drive through the gate, and then get out again to close the gate before proceeding onward.
This is precisely what happened here, for example, with many of the County's own witnesses
testifying that the gates were always kept closed as a means of keeping the Okelberrys'

120

See, e.g., Draper City, 888 P.2d at 1100; AWINC Corp. v. Simonsen, 2005 UTApp
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livestock within the property.122 As such, the members of the public who used these roads
were always presented with a reminder upon both ingress and egress that these roads
belonged to some other party, and that use of these roads was solely at the pleasure of that
owner.
As indicated above, the law does not lightly allow the public takeover of a private
property owner's land. The statute at issue in this case does not require a landowner to come
up with an expensive, elaborate, or foolproof system for keeping out all trespassers. Instead,
the statute allows the property owner to preserve his or her rights by simply creating some
interruptive obstacle that limits the public's access to the private roads “as a public
thoroughfare.” Given the large number of rural ranches and farms in this state that are
separated from the highways by nothing more than a wire fence or gate, this Court should
reject the trial court's decision to read into the statute a heretofore non-existent requirement
that all of those gates and fences actually be locked. Instead, this Court should affirm the
obvious, common-sense reading of the statute, thereby holding that a landowner who has
preserved and maintained a gate or fence across his or her road cannot be said to have
“abandoned” that road under § 72-5-104. For this reason, this Court can and should conclude
that there was not clear and convincing evidence showing that the roads involved in this
appeal were ever abandoned to the public.
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See. e.g., Trial Transcript, June 28 at 40 (testimony of Dee Sabey); Trial Transcript,
June 28 at 314 (testimony of Dick Baum); Trial Transcript, June 29 at 119, 123 (testimony
of Mark Butters).
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The presumption of permissive use is also mandated by constitutional considerations.
A landowner may, through inaction, dedicate or abandon his or her property, but the public
cannot take that property without compensation if the owner takes reasonable measures to
retain its private character. A public authority can not take a road unless the landowner's
knowing acquiescence in public use and maintenance “amounts to a tacit dedication by the
landowner — a giving by the landowner rather than a taking by the public authority.”123 A
gate, even an unlocked gate, clearly communicates to the public that the property is private.
The public constitutionally cannot take the property where the landowner takes reasonable
measures to communicate and retain its private character.
And, if the rule is that closed but unlocked gates do not interrupt use as a public
thoroughfare, the result is that the public is taking more than the landowner gave–a violation
of the constitutional prohibition against taking private property without compensation. If the
road is public, presumably the public authority can prohibit the maintenance of gates.124
Where the use Okelberrys supposedly permitted or abandoned to the public was a use that
was always restricted by gates, it would be unconstitutional for the public to take more,
without compensation. Indeed, a holding that the road is public and cannot be restricted by
gates impacts the whole of the property – without gates, Okelberrys cannot use the property

123

Vaughn v. Williams, 345 So. 2d 1195, 1199 (La. Ct. App. 1977).

124

Utah Code § 72-7-104(4) provides that "the highway authority having jurisdiction
over the right-of-way may" remove from the right-of-way of any highway any structure
installed by any person or "give written notice to the person . . . to remove the installation
from the right-of-way." Utah County v. Butler, 2008 UT 12, ¶ 24, 179 P.3d 775, 784.
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for livestock as they have always done. It follows that the constitutional protections of
private property require that either unlocked gates be considered an interruption, or that the
gates be permitted to remain even if the road is public.
CONCLUSION

The trial court erred in again requiring proof that Okelberrys "generally" or
"regularly" excluded members of the public from the roads. One intentional act every ten
years is sufficient to preserve private property, regardless of whether anyone's access was

actually restricted.

Because there was unrebutted evidence of purposeful blocking by

Okelberrys, their roads were not "continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of
ten years." The decision of the trial court should be reversed with instructions to enter
judgment for Okelberrys.

DATED this _Zf day of April, 2009.

LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:

HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C.
Attorneys for Petitioners
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On
DURRANT,

Certiorari

to

the Utah Court

of Appeals

Justice:
INTRODUCTION

Hi

In this case and two companion cases that we also

decide today,1 we consider the operation of Utah Code section 725-104(1)
(the "Dedication Statute"), which provides as follows:
"A highway

is

dedicated and abandoned to

when it has been continuously used as

1 Town of
County v.

Leeds v.

Butler.

2008

Prisbrey,
UT

12,

the use

a public

2008 UT
P.3d

11,
.

of

the public

thoroughfare

P.3d

for a

period of ten years."2
We granted certiorari in this case to
consider whether the court of appeals erred in its application of
the standard for ascertaining continuous use as a public
thoroughfare under this statute.
We conclude that it did so err.
We reverse and remand for the entry of specific findings of fact
relevant to the standard we announce today and for an application
of

that

standard.
BACKGROUND

H2
In 1957, Roy Okelberry and his sons, E. Ray and Lee,
purchased a large tract of land (the "Property") in Wasatch

County near Wallsburg, Utah.
E. Ray and Lee later acquired their
father's interest in the Property.
Sometime thereafter, Lee sold
his interest in the Property to E. Ray and E. Ray's sons, Brian
and Eric.
E. Ray, Brian, and Eric Okelberry (the "Okelberrys")
currently own the Property and use it for their livestock
operations.

1)3
Several unimproved mountain roads cross the Property,
all of which begin and end (or connect with roads that begin and
end) at points outside of it.
Four of these roads are at issue
in this case:
Circle Springs Road, Thorton Hollow Road, Parker
Canyon Road,

and Ridge Line Road

(collectively,

the

"Four

Roads").3
When Roy, E. Ray, and Lee Okelberry purchased the
Property in 1957, fences on its east and south sides separated it
from United States Forest Service property, and wire gates along
these fences controlled access to the Four Roads, requiring
persons entering or exiting the Property to open the gates before
proceeding.

f4

In 2001,

Wasatch County filed a Complaint for

Declaratory Judgment and Quiet Title against the Okelberrys, the
Utah Division of Wildlife Resources,4 and West Daniels Land
Association,5 seeking to have the Four Roads declared dedicated

2 Utah Code Ann.

§

72-5-104(1)

(2001).

3 The underlying lawsuit also included Maple Canyon Road.
The trial court found that this road had not been dedicated and

abandoned to the public.
and we

do not

address

it

Neither party appealed this decision,
here.

4 Wasatch County settled its dispute with the Utah Division
of Wildlife Resources

in 2003.

5 Portions of Ridge Line Road and Parker Canyon Road
(continued...)
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and abandoned

to the

use

of

the public pursuant

to Utah Code

section 72-5-104.6
During a three-day bench trial, Wasatch
County presented several witnesses who testified that they had
used the Four Roads

without the Okelberrys' permission for
recreational purposes during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.
These

witnesses

also

testified that

although there were gates

on the

roads, their use of the roads was unrestricted.
The Okelberrys
presented evidence and testimony that members of the public had
not had unrestricted access to the roads, but that the gates on
the roads had been locked, at least occasionally, as early as the
late 1950s and that "No Trespassing," "Keep Out," or "Private"
signs

were posted.

The Okelberrys

testified that

permission to a large number of people

they had given

in the community to use

5 (...continued)
traverse property owned by West Daniels Land Association (the
"Association") immediately adjacent to the Property.
The
Okelberrys are members and shareholders in the Association and
use the Association's land, together with their own, for grazing
livestock.
The Association initially made an appearance through
counsel, but counsel later withdrew and no successor was
appointed.
Wasatch County thereafter sought default summary
judgment against the Association.
The Okelberrys opposed this
motion, arguing that as members of the Association they had "a
vested interest to see that no judgment is entered in this matter
on behalf of the plaintiff" and that, at trial, they "will
present evidence that there are no established roads across the
property of [the] Association."
For reasons that are unclear
from the record, the trial court did not enter a ruling on
Wasatch County's default judgment motion prior to trial.
In its
posttrial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court
noted that the Association's "default was entered," but that the
Okelberrys had been allowed to submit "[e]vidence regarding the
use of those portions of the roads at issue which are located in
[the] Association's property" at trial.
The trial court made its
determinations regarding the Four Roads without distinguishing
between the Okelberrys' property and the Association's property.
We likewise do not distinguish between the properties and refer
only to the interests of the Okelberrys because the parties have

not appealed this

issue.

6 An earlier version of this statute was

in effect at the

time Wasatch County claims the Four Roads were dedicated and
abandoned to the use of the public.
See Utah Code Ann. § 27-1289 (1995).
A 1998 amendment to the earlier version renumbered
this section but made no substantive changes to it.
1998 Utah
Laws 861.
We therefore refer to the current version of the
statute throughout this opinion.
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their roads and Property and had sold trespass and hunting
permits.
And witnesses testified that the Okelberrys, in the
mid-1990s, placed their Property in a cooperative wildlife
management unit for use as a private hunting unit.
The
Okelberrys and their employees testified that when they
encountered persons on the Property or roads without express
permission to be

U5

there,

they asked them to

leave.

At the conclusion of the bench trial,

the trial

court

entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and, later,
supplemental findings of fact.
The trial court found "that there
was no public use of the various roads in the 1940s or before and
also that no evidence of vehicular use prior to the 1950s

existed."
The court recognized that there were gates on the
roads that the Okelberrys or their employees locked " [a]t various
times in the past," but found that they were locked "on a more
permanent basis" beginning in the early 1990s.
In addition, the
court found that "[p]rior to the gates being locked, the
existence of the gates did not interrupt the public's use of the
roads."

f6

In its Conclusions of Law,

the trial court stated as

follows:

Taking even the [Okelberrys'] factual
assertions as true, it is clear that
individuals using the roads beginning in the
late 1950s until the late 1980s or early
1990s used the roads without interruption,
they used the roads freely, and though not

constantly, they used the roads continuously
as they needed.
Therefore, [the] Court finds
that prior to the interrupting mechanisms
being put in place the roads in question were
subject to continuous use ....

The trial court also found that the majority of those using the
roads were nonpermissive users and members of the general public.
Thus, the court determined that " [p]rior to the locking of the
gates in the early 1990s the roads were used as public
thoroughfares."
And the court found "that the continuous use as
a public thoroughfare continued for at least ten years, if not
much longer, or for multiple periods of ten years."
The court
therefore concluded that Wasatch County had established by clear
and convincing evidence that the Four Roads had been abandoned
and dedicated to the public.
The court decided, however, that
Wasatch County was equitably estopped from opening the roads to

public use because the Okelberrys had,

private control over the roads.
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since

1989,

asserted

The court stated that

"[t]o

allow

the

County now

roads would cause

^7

to

assert

an ownership

the Okelberrys

injury

interest

[and]

in these

would be unjust."

Wasatch County appealed the trial court's equitable

estoppel determination, and the Okelberrys cross-appealed the
court's decision that the Four Roads had been dedicated to the
public.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's
equitable estoppel decision and upheld its decisions regarding
the public dedication of the Four Roads.7
We granted certiorari
to determine whether the court of appeals applied the correct
standard for determining whether a road has been continuously
used as

a public

thoroughfare

pursuant

104.
The parties do not challenge,
equitable estoppel issue.
STANDARD

f8
of

the

"On certiorari,
court of

appeals,

to Utah Code

and we

section

do not address,

72-5-

the

OF REVIEW

we review for correctness the decision
not

the

decision of

the

district

court."9
"The correctness of the court of appeals' decision
turns on whether that court correctly reviewed the trial court's
decision under the appropriate standard of review."9
An
appellate court reviews a trial court's legal interpretation of
the Dedication Statute for correctness and its factual findings

for clear error.10

But whether the facts of a case satisfy the

requirements of the Dedication Statute is a mixed question of
fact and law that involves various and complex facts, evidentiary
resolutions, and credibility determinations.11
Thus, an
appellate court reviews "a trial court's decision regarding
whether a public highway has been established under [the
Dedication

Statute]

.

.

.

for

7 See Wasatch County v.
153

Okelberrv.

grant [s]

the

2006 UT App 473,

court

1 33,

P.3d 745.

8 D.J.

62,

correctness but

1

10,

Inv.

Group.

L.L.C.

v.

DAE/Westbrook.

L.L.C.,

2006 UT

147 P.3d 414.

9 State v.

Dean.

10 See State v.

2004 UT 63,
Levin.

11 Heber City Corp.

v.

H

7,

95 P.3d 276.

2006 UT 50,
Simpson.

942

H

20,

144

P.2d 307,

P.3d 1096.
309-10

(Utah

1997) .
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significant discretion in its

application of the

facts

to the

statute."12
ANALYSIS

1|9

Both the United States and Utah Constitutions prohibit

uncompensated takings of private property.13
circumstances,

Yet,

under certain

Utah statutory law allows property to be

transferred from private to public use without compensation.
Dedication Statute at issue in this case allows for such a

The

transfer.
The statute provides that "[a] highway is dedicated
and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been
continuously used as

a public

thoroughfare

for a period of

ten

years."14
In light of the constitutional protection accorded
private property, we have held that a party seeking to establish
dedication and abandonment under

this

statute bears

the burden of

doing so by clear and convincing evidence.15
In a number of our past

cases,

we have

sought

to

interpret the phrase "continuously used as a public
thoroughfare."
We have explained that such use occurs when "the
public, even though not consisting of a great many persons,
[makes] a continuous and uninterrupted use" of a road "as often

as they

[find]

it convenient or necessary."16

The court of

appeals, borrowing language from one of our cases dealing with
the doctrine of right-of-way by prescription, has added to this
definition as follows:
"*[U]se may be continuous though not
constant[]
. . . provided it occurred as often as the claimant
[. . .]
Mere intermission is not
had occasion or chose to pass.
interruption.' "17

12

Id.

at

13 U.S.

310.

Const,

amend.

V

("[N]or shall private property be

taken for public use, without just compensation."); Utah Const,
art. I, § 22 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation.").

14 Utah Code Ann.

§

72-5-104(1)

15 See Draper City v.
1099

(Utah

1995);

(2001).

Estate of Bernardo.

Bonner v.

P.2d

888 P.2d 1097,

Sudburv.

417

646,

648

326 P.2d 107,

109

(Utah 1958).

Box Elder County.

962

P.2d 806,

(Utah

1966) .

16 Bover v.

Clark.

17 Campbell v.

809

(Utah Ct.

(continued...)
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Despite the best efforts of this court and the court of
appeals, a workable interpretation of "continuous use" in the
context of the Dedication Statute has remained elusive.
We have
described ourselves as "hard-pressed to establish a coherent and
consistent statement of the law on a fact-intensive, case-by-case

review of trial court rulings."18

In reviewing the case now

before us, the court of appeals thoughtfully sought to bring some
coherency and consistency to this area of the law by articulating
a balancing test:
In deciding whether a locked gate acted as an
interruptive force sufficient to restart the

running of the statutory ten-year period,
trial court should weigh the evidence

the

regarding the duration and frequency that the
gate was
volume of

locked against the

frequency and

if there is
clear and convincing evidence that public use
of the road was continuous.19

17
App.

public use

to determine

(. . .continued)

1998)

(quoting Richards v.

949 (Utah 1977)).
extracted reads as

Pines Ranch.

The entire passage
follows:

Inc..

from which

559

this

P.2d

948,

quote was

"A way may be established by
prescription without direct evidence of its
actual use during each year.
A use may be
continuous though not constant.
A right of
way means a right to pass over another's
land, more or less frequently, according to
the nature of the use to be made by the
easement;

and how

frequently is

immaterial,

provided it occurred as often as the claimant
had occasion or chose to pass.
It must
appear not to have been interrupted by the
owner of the land across which the right is
exercised, nor voluntarily abandoned by the
claimant.
Mere intermission is not
Richards.
464

interruption."
559 P.2d at 949

(quoting

1

Thompson on Real

Property

§

(1924)).

18 Heber City Corp.

v.

Simpson.

942

P.2d 307,

310

(Utah

1997) .

19 Wasatch County v.
P.3d 745.

The balancing

Okelberrv.

2006 UT App 473,

test articulated by the

H

18,

court of

153
appeals

(continued...)
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We

find the court of appeals'

approach problematic.

The proposed test could be read to suggest that the elements of
the Dedication Statute are met where the duration and frequency

of continuous use as a public thoroughfare simply outweigh the
duration and frequency of interruption during a ten-year period.
Under this standard, it could be argued that even where there is
a significant interruption in the use of a road, if the period of
use is greater than the length of the interruption, the
requirements of the Dedication Statute would be satisfied.
We
think it unlikely that this is what the Legislature intended when
it required that a road be "continuously used."
Indeed, to
balance interruptions in use against frequency of use in order to
determine whether a road was continuously used is inconsistent
with the very notion of continuous use--any sufficient
interruption in use necessarily makes use noncontinuous.
Moreover, we think that this balancing test fails to remedy the
lack of predictability from which this

area of

the

law suffers.

Thus, while we reject the court of appeals' interpretive
approach, its careful review of our case law and attempt to bring
coherence to that case law highlights for us the need for a
clear, workable standard.
We take this opportunity to articulate
such a

standard.

In interpreting a statute, our goal is to ascertain the
Legislature's intent.20
We do so by first evaluating "the 'best
evidence' of legislative intent, namely, 'the plain language of

the statute itself.'"21
We give the words of a statute their
"plain, natural, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, in
the absence of any statutory or well-established technical
meaning, unless it is plain from the statute that a different
meaning is intended."22
Hl4
The word "continuously" is neither defined in the
Dedication Statute nor imbued with technical meaning.
Thus, we
understand "continuously" to have its plain meaning of "without

19 (. . .continued)
applies only to locked gates,
other types of interruptions,
broad application here.
20

See Duke v.

21 Id.

Graham.

but it could arguably apply to
and we consider its potentially

2007 UT 31,

(quoting State v. Martinez.

H 16,

158 P.3d 540.

2002 UT 80,

H 8,

1276).
22 State v.
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Navaro.

26

P.2d 955,

956

(Utah 1933).

52 P.3d

interruption."23

A party claiming dedication must

establish by clear

and convincing evidence

that

a

therefore
road has been

used without

interruption as a public thoroughfare for ten years
for the road to become dedicated to public use.

in order

Hl5

The lack of clarity in this area of the law stems

largely from the fact that we have never set forth a standard for
determining what qualifies as a sufficient interruption to
restart the running of the required ten-year period under the
Dedication Statute.

We

do

so now by

setting

forth a bright-line

rule by which we intend to make application of
Statute more predictable:

the Dedication

An overt act that is intended by a property
owner to interrupt the use of a road as a
public thoroughfare,

calculated to do so,
interruption

running of
the

and

is reasonably
constitutes an

sufficient

to restart

the

the required ten-year period under

Dedication Statute.

This rule does not change the burden of the party claiming
dedication.
For a highway to be deemed dedicated to the public,

the party claiming dedication must establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the road at issue was continuously used
as

a public

thoroughfare

for a period of

ten years;

credible

evidence of the type of interruption defined above--an overt act
intended to and reasonably calculated to interrupt use of a road
as a public thoroughfare--simply precludes a finding of
continuous use.

fl6
helpful

In order to elucidate this standard,
to distinguish between an

intermission
conduct of

in use.

The

distinction

the property owner.

As

we think it

interruption
lies

in

in use and an
the

noted above,

a

intent

and

road may be

used continuously even if it is not used constantly or
frequently.24
For example, a road may be used by only one person
once a month, but if this use is as frequent as the public finds

23 Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines
"continuous" as "marked by uninterrupted extension in space,
time,

or

(11th ed.

24
Ct.

sequence."

Merriam-Webster's

See Campbell v.

App.

Collegiate Dictionary

270

2003) .

Box Elder County.

962

P.2d 806,

809

(Utah

1998) .
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it "convenient or necessary,"25 and the landowner has taken no
action intended and reasonably calculated to interrupt use, the
use is continuous.
The one-month period of time between usages
is a mere intermission, not an interruption.
Likewise, a road

may be heavily traveled by the public during certain times of the
year but impassable because of weather-related conditions at
other times.
Though the use is not constant, if it occurs as
often as the public finds it convenient or necessary, and the
landowner has taken no action intended and reasonably calculated
to interrupt use, the use is continuous.
The period of
impassability due to weather is a mere intermission, not an
interruption.

Continuous use may be established as to heavily or
lightly used roads, as long as the use is as frequent as the
public finds it convenient or necessary.
We emphasize here,
however, that the action necessary by the landowner to establish
an interruption in public use does not vary depending on the
level of public use.
An overt act intended and reasonably

calculated to interrupt public use restarts the statutory period,

and the effectiveness of such act is not tied to the level of
public use.
In other words, an act by a landowner sufficient to
interrupt public use of a road used on a daily basis by the
public is also sufficient to interrupt public use of a road used
on a monthly basis by the public.

^
We now apply our newly articulated test to the facts of
the case at hand.
The Okelberrys asserted at trial that there
were signs on the roads

indicating

"No Trespassing,"

"Keep Out,"

or "Private," and that trespassers were at times asked to leave.
Wasatch County conceded that such signs were posted, but argued
that they referred only to property adjoining the roads and not
the roads themselves.
While the trial court assumed the

Okelberrys'

assertions to be true for purposes of its analysis,

it made no actual findings as to when the signs were posted, what
they appeared to reference, or whether trespassers were asked to
leave.
Thus, while it is clear that the posting of the signs
constituted an overt act, it remains a factual question whether
the Okelberrys intended the signs to interrupt public use of the
roads and whether the posting of

the signs was reasonably

calculated to do so.
Questions also remain as to when the signs
were posted and whether trespassers were asked to leave, and if
so,

when and how many.

Hl9

The Okelberrys also claimed at

trial

that the gates

were periodically locked for several days at a time beginning in

25 Bover v.

No.

20070011

Clark,

326

P.2d 107,

10

109

(Utah 1958)

the late

1950s.

claim to be

factual

true

Here again,

while

for purposes

finding on

this

issue.

of

the trial court assumed this

its

The

analysis, it did not make a
locking of gates for several

days at a time constitutes an overt act intended to interrupt
public use and reasonably calculated to do so.
But factual
questions remain as to whether and when such an event or events
occurred.
We therefore remand this
these factual determinations.

case

for the

trial

court

to

make

CONCLUSION

f20

Utah Code section 72-5-104(1)

provides that

w [a]

highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when
it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a
period of ten years."
We hold today that an overt act that is
intended by the property owner to interrupt the use of a road as
a public thoroughfare, and is reasonably calculated to do so, is
an interruption in continuous use sufficient to restart the
running of the ten-year period under this statute.
If a party
produces credible evidence of such an interruption, this evidence
will preclude a finding of continuous use.
Because the trial
court did not make specific findings of fact regarding the
Okelberrys' evidence of interruption in the use of the Four Roads
as public thoroughfares, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins,
Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Durrant's
opinion.
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APPENDIX B
Ruling, August 27,2004, R. 407-397

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

#< i •

WASATCH COUNTY, a body public of
the State of Utah,
Plaintiff,

RULING

v.

E. RAY OKELBERRY, BRIAN
OKELBERRY, ERIC OKELBERRY,

Case No. 010500388

Judge Donald J. Eyre

UTAH DIVISION OF WILDLIFE

RESOURCES, WEST DANIELS LAND
ASSOCIATION, and JOHN DOES 1-25,

Defendants.

This matter was last heard by the Court during a trial on July 28,29, and 30,2004, where the

parties were directed to prepare proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Court has

reviewed the file, considered the memoranda filed by the parties, heard oral arguments, and being
fully advised in the premises issues the following ruling.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

1.

The Plaintiff Wasatch County (hereinafter "County") is a political subdivision of the

State of Utah.

2.

The Defendants E. Ray Okelberry, Brian Okelberry, and Eric Okelberry (hereinafter

"Okelberrys") are the owners of real property located east and north of the town of Wallsburg in
Wasatch County, Utah.

\

3.

Several roads or portions of roads cross through portions of this property. These roads

have been designated as Maple Canyon Road, Circle Springs Road, Thorton Hollow Road,
Parker Canyon Road, and Ridge Line Road.

7.

All of these roads are mountain roads and, except for keeping the roadway clear, have had

little maintenance, if any. Specifically, the County has never maintained the roads. These roads
are typically accessed by pickup truck, snowmobiles, and all-terrain vehicles.

15.

The property in question where the roads are located is generally not accessible until mid-

May or later and is generally not accessible after November 15*.
4.

All of these roads begin and end at points outside of the defendants' property or connect

with other roads which begin and end at points outside of the Okelberry and West Daniels Land
Association property.
5.

West Daniels' Land Association is a record owner of certain parcels of real property

located in Wasatch County over which the Ridge Line Road and the Parker Canyon road

traverse. West Daniels Land Association property adjoins the Okelberry property. West

Daniel's Land Association initially appeared through counsel who later withdrew.
No successor counsel was appointed. West Daniel's Land Association failed to respond to
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and its default was entered. Evidence regarding the use

of those portions of the roads at issue which are located in West Daniel's Land Association
property was submitted at trial.
6.

Circle Springs Road, Parker Canyon Road, and the portion of the Ridge Line Road from

where it enters the Okelberry property on the southeast to where it connects with Parker Canyon

Road are designated as Forest Service Roads on the map currently sold to the public by the Forest
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Service. Circle Springs Road, Thorton Hollow Road, and Parker Canyon Road cross thorough

into forest land some distance before they end.
8.

Utah Division of Wildlife Resources is a record owner of a certain parcel of real property

located in Wasatch County in Township 5 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Pursuant to a stipulation entered into between the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources and the
property owners, certain portions of a road known as Ridge Line Road and Fish and Game Road

were abandoned and dedicated to the use of the public subject to certain restrictions. As of the
date of trial on June 28,29 and 30,2004, gates along said road were still locked and access was
obstructed by barricades that had been placed there by the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources.

9.

There are signs on the property of the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources stating that no

motorized vehicles are allowed on the property. The evidence is such that in certain areas, it is

extremely steep and rocky and only accessible by a 4-wheel-drive vehicle. Portions of the Ridge
Line Road over property owned by the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources were built after
1957. The road, at best, cen be described as narrow, rocky and very difficult to traverse.

10.

At the time of the purchase of the property by the Okelberry's in 1957, the property was

bordered on the east and the south by fences separating the Okelberry property and the United
States Forest public property. There were also multiple gates along the roads: two gates
controlled access from the "Big Glade" area, one gate controlled access to the Circle Springs
Road, and one gate controlled access to the Ridge Line Road, the gates were wire gates; whoever
went through the gates had to open them and close them behind them.
11.

At trial the Court specifically found that there was no public use of the various roads in

the 1940s or before and also that no evidence of vehicular use prior to the 1950s existed.
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12.

At trial the County presented testimony of various individuals who allegedly used the

roads for many more than ten years for recreational purposes. These individuals testified that
even though there were no-trespassing markers they were able to freely use the roads. They also
stated they were members of the general public without any private right to use the roads.

13.

Plaintiff presented evidence that there were gates located on the roads, but they were

not locked until the early 1990's. Prior to the gates being locked, the existence of the gates did
not interrupt the public's use of the roads.
14.

Plaintiff concedes that occasionally between the late 1950's and late 1980's the

Okelberry's or their agents informed members of the general public who had left the subject
roadways and were using the surrounding Okelberry property that they were trespassing,
however, not until the 1990's did they impede traffic on the road themselves.
17.

At trial the Okelberrys presented testimony of individuals that Ridge Line Road and

Parker Canyon Road were never at any time open to public use.

18.

The Okelbenys testified that there were large numbers of people in the community who

asked for permission to use the roads or their property, thus indicating that the roads were not
generally recognized as public.

19.

At trial the Okelberrys presented testimony of various individuals, including employees

who testified that there was not continuous use of the roads and that if they saw someone using
the roads, they asked them to leave.
16.

At trial the Okelberrys testified that improvements made to the roads were for the sole

purpose of facilitating their sheep and cattle operation, that the gates were generally closed from

the beginning of their ownership to control their sheep and cattle and to restrict travel on the
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roads.

20.

In the early 1990's the Okelberry's started selling trespass permits to persons wanting to

use the Okelberry property for wood gathering, camping, or hunting.
21.

In the mid 1990's the Okelberry's allowed their land to be placed into a Cooperative

Wildlife Management Unit "CWMU" (a.k.a. a Private Hunting Unit "PHU"). Said property is
currently still part of a CWMU.
RULING

As provided by statute, a private road must meet a three part test to become dedicated and
abandoned to a public highway. The three requirements are (1) continuous use, (2) as a public
thoroughfare, (3) for a period often years. Ut. Code Ann. 72-5-104(1) (2003). The three

elements must be proved by "clear and convincing evidence" by the party claiming the road has
been abandoned to public use. Thomas v. Condas, 493 P.2d 639 (1972). Once established, a
public road continues to be a public road until it is "abandoned or vacated by order of the
highway authorities having jurisdiction or by other competent authority." Utah Code Ann. 72-5105(1) (2004).

First, the road must have been subject to "continuous use." Utah Courts have interpreted
"continuous use" in various instances to mean the public has used the roads "extensively,"
Bertagnole v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211 (Utah 1981), "frequently and freely,"
Thurman v. Bryant, 626 P.2d 447 (Utah 1981). However, continuous does not mean constant.

The supreme court has stated that "use may be continuous though not constant... provided it
occurred as often as the claimant had occasion or chose to pass. Mere intermission is not

interruption." Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 809 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting
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Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d 948 (Utah 1977). Similarly, in Boyer v. Clark, 326 P.2d
107,108 (Utah 1958), the supreme court found as a matter of law that a public highway existed
even though "the use of the road was not great because comparatively few people had need to
travel over it, but those of the public who had such need, did so."

The Okelberrys have argued that use was not constant because at the time of purchase in
1957 there were gates in place, concededly though, they were not always locked and did not

prevent travel. The Okelberrys claim that beginning in the 1960s the gates were periodically

locked for several days at a time and that signs were also posted on the gates and property which
stated "No Trespassing-Private Property." Thus, they argue that any interruption of public access

during the relevant periods is enough to prevent use from being continuous. Plaintiffs deny the
Defendant's factual assertions claiming that while there were gates on the roads, they were not
locked until the 1990's and that once signs were posted, they seemed to refer only to the property
abutting the roads and not the roads themselves.

This Court finds the facts of the present case similar to the facts of Boyer v. Clark

wherein at issue was Middle Canyon Road that had been used for wagon and horse traffic. As
previously stated, the Boyer court noted that the public, "though not consisting of a great many

persons, made a continuous and uninterrupted use of middle canyon road... as often as they
found it convenient or necessary." Taking even the Defendant's factual assertions as true, it is
clear that individuals using the roads beginning in the late 1950's until the late 1980's or early
1990's used the roads without interruption, they used the roads freely, and though not constantly,
they used the roads continuously as they needed. Therefore, that Court finds that prior to the

interrupting mechanisms being put in place the roads in question were subject to continuous use
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and Plaintiffs met their burden proving the first element of the statute.

Second, the continuous use must have been as a "public thoroughfare." The Supreme

Court of Utah has stated that a place becomes a public thoroughfare when the public has a
"general right of passage." Heber City v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307 (Utah 1997).

It is sufficient to

show that the road was used freely by the general public. Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447,449

(Utah 1981).

The general public, however, does not include adjoining land owners or

individuals with permission of adjoining land owners. Draper City v. Estate ofBernardo, 888
P.2d 1097,1099 (Utah 1995). "Use under a private right is not sufficient" to establish a public
right. Heber City v. Simpson, 942 P.2d at 311. Also, as once was the case, it is no longer
necessary to prove the land owner's intent or consent to offer the road to the public. See
Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d at 449.
In making the public thoroughfare determination, trial courts are "permitted some reign to

grapple with the multitude of fact patterns that may constitute a public thoroughfare." Kohler v.
Martin, 916 P.2d 910,913 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996). The defendants claim they gave permission to

individuals to use the roads and unauthorized individuals were removed. Plaintiffs claim that
while some individuals who have used the roads were permissive users, the majority were using
the roads without permission from the land owners. None of the individuals who testified on

behalf of the Plaintiff own property adjacent to or along the roads. The Court finds that the
individuals who have used the roads have been members of the general public who used the
roads as a thoroughfare to public lands and/or for recreation. Prior to the locking of the gates in
the early 1990's the roads were used as public thoroughfares.

Third, and lastly, the continuous use as a public thoroughfare must have lasted for a
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period often years. From the facts that have been presented, it is clear to the Court that the

continuous use as a public thoroughfare continued for at least ten years, if not much longer, or for
multiple periods often years. Starting in 1960 until the early 1990's when the Okelberry's began

locking the gates and selling hunting permits the roads were accessible and used by the general
public as they found necessary and convenient. It is clear that the third statutory element has
been easily met.

The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Plaintiff has not met their
burden in regards to Maple Canyon Road. The Court finds that there was evidence that Maple
Canyon Road had been locked at the Wallsburg end prior to the locking of the other roads, and
that it has a history of washing out and therefore, there was no evidence of continuous use for ten
years. The Court also finds that the Plaintiff has in fact met their burden as to Ridge Line Road,
Circle Springs Road, Thorton Hollow Road, and Parker Canyon Road, that they were used

continuously by the public as a public thoroughfare for a period of well over ten years prior to
1989 when the Okelberry's began locking the gates. Finding that there were abandoned to public
roads, the Court finds the width of the roads to be two-track, approximately ten feet in width.
The Court also finds that the public has been effectively cut off from use of these public roads
since 1989.

After finding the roads to be public roads, the Court now turns to the issue of whether
they continue as public roads after a twelve year period of nonuse and private control exerted by
the defendants over the roads.

The court finds that while public roads once dedicated can be abandoned or vacated only

"by order of the highway authorities having jurisdiction or by other competent authority." Ut.
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Code Ann. 72-5-015 (2004). Prior to 1911 a public road could be vacated after a five-year period
of nonuse. The statute has since been amended by deleting that provision. The Court held that
the legislature clearly intended to limit the method of vacating public roads to the specific

statutory requirements and no longer allow forfeiture through nonuse. Henderson v. Osguthorpe,
657 P.2d 1268,1270-1271 (Utah 1982). However, this Court finds the principle of estoppel is
dispositive in the present case.
In Premium Oil v. Cedar City 187 P.2d 199 (Utah 1947), the supreme court held that a
strip of land once dedicated as a public road had been used in a manner directly in conflict with

the land's dedication as a public road. The court stated that "the manner in which the city used
the strip was openly hostile to the public use as a street and should have been notice to all that

any dedication, if previously intended, has been abandoned. Under the facts of the case, the court
held that the Plaintiff would be estopped to claim an improper abandonment or vacation, this
Court finds that while the roads at issue were properly abandoned to public use by compliance
with the statutory requirements, the Defendants for a period of twelve years exerted control and

used the roads in an openly hostile manner to the public use of the streets. Applied to the present
case, the County having failed to bring an action for twelve years must now be estopped from
doing so.

As further stated in Premium Oil, "in many cases where cities attempt to open dedicated

street for the benefit of the public, the courts have estopped the city from enforcing a dedication
because the city authorities and the public itself has taken no action over a period of years, to
prevent the erection of valuable improvements." 187 P.2d at 204. Allowing the County to open

the roads as public roads now would ruin the Okelberry sheep and cattle operation as well as
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eliminate the hunting unit now being operated by Shane Ford. Admittedly little improvements
have been made to the roads themselves, but doubtless large amounts of time and money has

been expended on behalf of these business operations and the Defendants have relied on their
private use of the road to sustain and build their businesses. It would be inequitable to now,

after twelve years of clearly private use of the roads, to allow the County to open the roads to the
Defendants' detriment.
CONCLUSION

By clear and convincing evidence the Court finds that the roads in question were

abandoned to public roads, but the County is now estopped from opening them to public use
because of their failure to bring an action against the Okelberrys who asserted private control
over the roads for twelve years in opposition to their public status. The Court directs counsel for

the Defendants to prepare findings of fact, conclusions of law, and final order consistent with this
ruling, and directs counsel to submit the order to opposing counsel ro review and to the Court for
final approval.

.. 1

DATED this ^7 day of August, 2004.
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Our File No.

Attorneys for Defendants Okelberry

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASATCH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

WASATCH COUNTY, a body public of
the State of Utah,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

Case No. 010500388
Judge Donald J. Eyre

vs.

E. RAY OKELBERRY, BRIAN
OKELBERRY, ERIC OKELBERRY,
UTAH DIVISION OF WILDLIFE
RESOURCES, WEST DANIELS LAND
ASSOCIATION, and JOHN DOES 1-25,
Defendants.

This matter came on for trial on July 28, 29 and 30, 2004.

The Court heard the

testimony of various witnesses and received various exhibits. Counsel was directed to prepare
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

The Court has now reviewed the file,

considered the memoranda filed by the parties, heard oral arguments and now, being fully advised
in the premises, makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Plaintiff Wasatch County (hereinafter "County") is a political subdivision

of the State of Utah.

2.

The Defendants E. Ray Okelberry, Brian Okelberry, and Eric Okelberry

(hereinafter "Okelberrys") are the owners of real property located east and north of the town of
Wallsburg in Wasatch County, Utah.
3.

Several roads or portions of roads cross through portions of this property. These

roads have been designated as Maple Canyon Road, Circle Springs Road, Thorton Hollow Road,
Parker Canyon Road, and Ridge Line Road.
4.

All of these roads are mountain roads and, except for keeping the roadway clear,

have had little maintenance, if any. Specifically, the County has never maintained the roads. These
roads are typically accessed by pickup truck, snowmobiles, and all-terrain vehicles.
5.

The property in question where the roads are located is generally not accessible

until mid-May or later and is generally not accessible after November 15'h
6.

All of these roads begin and end at points outside of the defendants' property

or connect with other roads which begin and end at points outside of the Okelberry and West
Daniels Land Association property.

7.

West Daniels' Land Association is a record owner of certain parcels of real

property located in Wasatch County over which the Ridge Line Road and the Parker Canyon road

traverse. West Daniels Land Association property adjoins the Okelberry property. West Daniel's
Land Association initially appeared through counsel who later withdrew. No successor counsel
was appointed. West Daniel's Land Association failed to respond to Plaintiff's motion for

summary judgment and its default was entered. Evidence regarding the use of those portions of
the roads at issue which are located in West Daniel's Land Association property was submitted
at trial.

6.

Circle Springs Road, Parker Canyon Road, and the portion of the Ridge Line

Road from where it enters the Okelberry property on the southeast to where it connects with

Parker Canyon Road are designated as Forest Service Roads on the map currently sold to the
public by the Forest Service. Circle Springs Road, Thorton Hollow Road, and Parker Canyon
Road cross thorough into forest land some distance before they end.

7.

Utah Division of Wildlife Resources is a record owner of a certain parcel of real

property located in Wasatch County in Township 5 South, Range S East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian. Pursuant to a stipulation entered into between the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources
and the property owners, certain portions of a road known as Ridge Line Road and Fish and Game
Road were abandoned and dedicated to the use of the public subject to certain restrictions. As of

the date of trial on June 28, 29 and 30, 2004, gates along said road were still locked and access
was obstructed by barricades that had been placed there by the Utah Division of Wildlife
Resources.

8.

There are signs on the property of the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources

stating that no motorized vehicles are allowed on the property. The evidence is such that in certain
areas, it is extremely steep and rocky and only accessible by a 4-wheel-drive vehicle. Portions of
the Ridge Line Road over property owned by the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources were built

after 1957. The road, at best, can be described as narrow, rocky and very difficult to traverse.
9.

At the time of the purchase of the property by the Okelberry's in 1957, the

property was bordered on the east and the south by fences separating the Okelberry property and
the United States Forest public property. There were also multiple gates along the roads: two

gates controlled access from the "Big Glade" area, one gate controlled access to the Circle Springs

Road, and one gate controlled access to the Ridge Line Road, the gates were wire gates; whoever
went through the gates had to open them and close them behind them.

10.

At trial the Court specifically found that there was no public use of the various

roads in the 1940s or before and also that no evidence of vehicular use prior to the 1950s existed.

11.

At trial the County presented testimony of various individuals who allegedly used

the roads for many more than ten years for recreational purposes. These individuals testified that
even though there were no-trespassing markers they were able to freely use the roads. They also
stated they were members of the general public without any private right to use the roads.
12.

Plaintiff presented evidence that there were gates located on the roads, but they

were not locked until the early 1990's. Prior to the gates being locked, the existence of the gates
did not interrupt the public's use of the roads.

13.

Plaintiff concedes that occasionally between the late 1950's and late 1980's the

Okelberry's or their agents informed members of the general public who had left the subject
roadways and were using the surrounding Okelberry property that they were trespassing,
however, not until the 1990's did they impede traffic on the road themselves.

14.

At trial the Okelberrys presented testimony of individuals that Ridge Line Road

and Parker Canyon Road were never at any time open to public use.
15.

The Okelberrys testified that there were large numbers of people in the

community who asked for permission to use the roads or their property, thus indicating that the
roads were not generally recognized as public.
16.

At trial the Okelberrys presented testimony of various individuals, including

employees who testified that there was not continuous use of the roads and that if they saw
someone using the roads, they asked them to leave.
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17.

At trial the Okelberrys testified that improvements made to the roads were for

the sole purpose of facilitating their sheep and cattle operation, that the gates were generally

closed from the beginning of their ownership to control their sheep and cattle and to restrict travel
on the roads.

18.

In the early 1990s the Okelberrys started selling trespass permits to persons

wanting to use the Okelberry property for wood gathering, camping, or hunting.
19.

In the mid 1990s the Okelberrys allowed their land to be placed into a

Cooperative Wildlife Management Unit "CWMU11 (a.k.a. a Private Hunting Unit "PHU"). Said

property is currently still part of a CWMU.
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact, now makes and enters the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

As provided by statute, a private road must meet a three part test to become

dedicated and abandoned to a public highway. The three requirements are (1) continuous use, (2)

as a public thoroughfare, (3) for a period often years. Ut. Code Ann. 72-5-104(1) (2003). The

three elements must be proved by "clear and convincing evidence" by the party claiming the road
has been abandoned to public use. Thomas v. Condas. 493 P.2d 639 (1972). Once established,
a public road continues to be a public road until it is "abandoned or vacated by order of the
highway authorities having jurisdiction or by other competent authority." Utah Code Ann.
72-5-105(1) (2004).

2.

First, the road must have been subject to "continuous use." Utah Courts have

interpreted "continuous use" in various instances to mean the public has used the roads

"extensively," Bertaenole v. Pine Meadow Ranches. 639 P.2d 211 (Utah 1981), "frequently and
freely," Thurman v. Bryam. 626 P.2d 447 (Utah 1981). However, continuous does not mean

constant. The supreme court has stated that "use may be continuous though not constant ...
provided it occurred as often as the claimant had occasion or chose to pass. Mere intermission is
not interruption." Campbell v. Box Elder County. 962 P.2d 806, 809 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998)

(quoting Richards v. Pines Ranch. Inc.. 559 P.2d 948 (Utah 1977). Similarly, in Bover v. Clark.
326 P.2d 107,108 (Utah 1958), the supreme court found as a matter of law that a public highway
existed even though "the use of the road was not great because comparatively few people had need

to travel over it, but those of the public who had such need, did so."
3.

The Okelberrys have argued that use was not constant because at the time of

purchase in 1957 there were gates in place, concededly though, they were not always locked and
did not prevent travel. The Okelberrys claim that beginning in the 1960s the gates were

periodically locked for several days at a time and that signs were also posted on the gates and
property which stated "No Trespassing-Private Property." Thus, they argue that any interruption
of public access during the relevant periods is enough to prevent use from being continuous.

Plaintiffs deny the Defendant's factual assertions claiming that while there were gates on the

roads, they were not locked until the 1990s and that once signs were posted, they seemed to refer
only to the property abutting the roads and not the roads themselves.
4.

This Court finds the facts of the present case similar to the facts of Boyer v.

Clark wherein at issue was Middle Canyon Road that had been used for wagon and horse traffic.
As previously stated, the Boyer court noted that the public, "though not consisting of a great many
persons, made a continuous and uninterrupted use of middle canyon road ... as often as they
found it convenient or necessary." Taking even the Defendants' factual assertions as true, it is

clear that individuals using the roads beginning in the late 1950s until the late 1980s or early
1990s used the roads without interruption, they used the roads freely, and though not constantly,

f

they used the roads continuously as they needed. Therefore, that Court finds that prior to the

interrupting mechanisms being put in place the roads in question were subject to continuous use
and Plaintiffs met their burden proving the first element of the statute.

5.

Second, the continuous use must have been as a "public thoroughfare." The

Supreme Court of Utah has stated that a place becomes a public thoroughfare when the public has

a "general right of passage." Heber City v. Simpson. 942 P.2d 307 (Utah 1997). It is sufficient
to show that the road was used freely by the general public. Thurman v. Bvram. 626 P.24 447,

449 (Utah 1981). The general public, however, does not include adjoining land owners or
individuals with permission of adjoining land owners. Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo. 888
P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995). "Use under a private right is not sufficient" to establish a public

right. Heber City v. Simpson. 942 P.2d at 311. Also, as once was the case, it is no longer
necessary to prove the land owner's intent or consent to offer the road to the public. See Thurman
v. Bvram. 626 P.2d at 449.
6.

In making the public thoroughfare determination, trial courts are "permitted some

reign to grapple with the multitude of fact patterns that may constitute a public thoroughfare."
Kohler v. Martin. 916 P.2d 910, 913 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996). The defendants claim they gave
permission to individuals to use the roads and unauthorized individuals were removed. Plaintiffs
claim that while some individuals who have used the roads were permissive users, the majority
were using the roads without permission from the land owners. None of the individuals who

testified on behalf of the Plaintiff own property adjacent to or along the roads. The Court finds
that the individuals who have used the roads have been members of the general public who used

the roads as a thoroughfare to public lands and/or for recreation. Prior to the locking of the gates
in the early 1990s the roads were used as public thoroughfares.
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7.

Third, and lastly, the continuous use as a public thoroughfare must have lasted

for a period often years. From the facts that have been presented, it is clear to the Court that the
continuous use as a public thoroughfare continued for at least ten years, if not much longer, or
for multiple periods of ten years. Starting in 1960 until the early 1990s when the Okelberrys

began locking the gates and selling hunting permits the roads were accessible and used by the
general public as they found necessary and convenient. It is clear that the third statutory element
has been easily met.

8.

The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Plaintiff has not met

their burden in regards to Maple Canyon Road. The Court finds that there was evidence that

Maple Canyon Road had been locked at the Wallsburg end prior to the locking of the other roads,
and that it has a history of washing out and therefore, there was no evidence of continuous use
for ten years. The Court also finds that the Plaintiff has in fact met their burden as to Ridge Line

Road, Circle Springs Road, Thorton Hollow Road, and Parker Canyon Road, that they were used
continuously by the public as a public thoroughfare for a period of well over ten years prior to
1989 when the Okelberrys began locking the gates. Finding that there were abandoned to public

roads, the Court finds the width of the roads to be two-track, approximately ten feet in width. The
Court also finds that the public has been effectively cut off from use of these public roads since
1989.

9.

After finding the roads to be public roads, the Court now turns to the issue of

whether they continue as public roads after a twelve year period of nonuse and private control
exerted by the defendants over the roads.

10.

The Court finds that while public roads once dedicated can be abandoned or

vacated only "by order of the highway authorities having jurisdiction or by other competent

authority." Ut. Code Ann. 72-5-015 (2004). Prior to 1911, a public road could be vacated after
a five-year period of nonuse. The statute has since been amended by deleting that provision. The
Court held that the legislature clearly intended to limit the method of vacating public roads to the
specific statutory requirements and no longer allow forfeiture through nonuse. Henderson v.

Oscuthorpe. 657 P.2d 1268, 1270-1271 (Utah 1982). However, this Court finds the principle of
estoppel is dispositive in the present case.

11.

In Premium Oil v. Cedar Citv. 187 P.2d 199 (Utah 1947), the supreme court

held that a strip of land once dedicated as a public road had been used in a manner directly in
conflict with the land's dedication as a public road. The court stated that "the manner in which
the city used the strip was openly hostile to the public use as a street and should have been notice

to all that any dedication, if previously intended, has been abandoned. Under the facts of the case,
the court held that the Plaintiff would be estopped to claim an improper abandonment or vacation,
this Court finds that while the roads at issue were properly abandoned to public use by compliance
with the statutory requirements, the Defendants for a period of twelve years exerted control and

used the roads in an openly hostile manner to the public use of the streets. Applied to the present
case, the County having failed to bring an action for twelve years must now be estopped from
doing so.

12.

As further stated in Premium Oil, "in many cases where cities attempt to open

dedicated street for the benefit of the public, the courts have estopped the city from enforcing a

dedication because the city authorities and the public itself has taken no action over a period of
years, to prevent the erection of valuable improvements." 187 P.2d at 204. Allowing the County
to open the roads as public roads now would ruin the Okelberry sheep and cattle operation as well
as eliminate the hunting unit now being operated by Shane Ford. Admittedly little improvements

i\

have been made to the roads themselves, but doubtless large amounts of time and money has been
expended on behalf of these business operations and the Defendants have relied on their private

use of the road to sustain and build their businesses. It would be inequitable to now, after twelve
years of clearly private use of the roads, to allow the County to open the roads to the Defendants1
detriment.

13.

By clear and convincing evidence the Court finds that the roads in question were

abandoned to public roads, but the County is now estopped from opening them to public use
because of their failure to bring an action against the Okelberrys who asserted private control over
the roads for twelve years intfpposition to tkeir public status.

DATED this ffi day ©f September, 2C
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

SCOTT H. SWEAT, ESQ.
Deputy Wasatch County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY
TO:

SCOTT H. SWEAT, ESQ.

You will please take notice that the undersigned, attorney for Defendants Okelberry, will
submit the above and foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Court for
signature upon the expiration of the time permitted for the filing of a written objection pursuant
to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this

day of September, 2004.

DON R. PETERSEN, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Defendants Okelberry
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed,

postage prepaid, and also transmitted by facsimile to the fax number listed below this |^
of September, 2004, to:

Scott H. Sweat
Deputy Wasatch County Attorney

114 South 200 West

Heber City, UT 84032

G:\DRP\OKELBERY.FOF

12

day

APPENDIX D
Order, October 22,2004, R. 428-421

.ft
DON R. PETERSEN (2576), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C.
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Our File No. 25774

Attorneys for Defendants Okelberry

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASATCH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

WASATCH COUNTY, a body public of
the State of Utah,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

Case No. 010500388
Judge Donald J. Eyre

vs.

E. RAY OKELBERRY, BRIAN
OKELBERRY, ERIC OKELBERRY,
UTAH DIVISION OF WILDLIFE
RESOURCES, WEST DANIELS LAND
ASSOCIATION, and JOHN DOES 1-25,
Defendants.

This matter came on for trial on July 28, 29 and 30, 2004.
testimony of various witnesses and received various exhibits.

The Court heard the

Counsel was directed to prepare

proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Court reviewed the file, considered the
memoranda filed by the parties, heard oral arguments, and now having heretofore entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and being fully advised in the premises, makes and
enters the following:

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

As provided by statute, a private road must meet a three part test to become

dedicated and abandoned to a public highway. The three requirements are (1) continuous use, (2)
as a public thoroughfare, (3) for a period of ten years. Ut. Code Ann. 72-5-104(1) (2003). The
three elements must be proved by "clear and convincing evidence" by the party claiming the road
has been abandoned to public use. Thomas v. Condas. 493 P.2d 639 (1972). Once established,

a public road continues to be a public road until it is "abandoned or vacated by order of the
highway authorities having jurisdiction or by other competent authority." Utah Code Ann.
72-5-105(1) (2004).

2.

First, the road must have been subject to "continuous use." Utah Courts have

interpreted "continuous use" in various instances to mean the public has used the roads
"extensively," Bertagnole v. Pine Meadow Ranches. 639 P.2d 211 (Utah 1981), "frequently and
freely," Thurman v. Brvam. 626 P.2d 447 (Utah 1981). However, continuous does not mean
constant. The supreme court has stated that "use may be continuous though not constant ...

provided it occurred as often as the claimant had occasion or chose to pass. Mere intermission is

not interruption." Campbell v. Box Elder County. 962 P.2d 806, 809 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998)
{quoting Richards v. Pines Ranch. Inc.. 559 P.2d 948 (Utah 1977). Similarly, in Bover v. Clark.

326 P.2d 107, 108 (Utah 1958), the supreme court found as a matter of law that a public highway
existed even though "the use of the road was not great because comparatively few people had need
to travel over it, but those of the public who had such need, did so."

3.

The Okelberrys have argued that use was not constant because at the time of

purchase in 1957 there were gates in place, concededly though, they were not always locked and

did not prevent travel. The Okelberrys claim that beginning in the 1960s the gates were
periodically locked for several days at a time and that signs were also posted on the gates and
property which stated "No Trespassing-Private Property." Thus, they argue that any interruption
of public access during the relevant periods is enough to prevent use from being continuous.
Plaintiffs deny the Defendant's factual assertions claiming that while there were gates on the
roads, they were not locked until the 1990s and that once signs were posted, they seemed to refer
only to the property abutting the roads and not the roads themselves.
4.

This Court finds the facts of the present case similar to the facts of Boyer v.

Clark wherein at issue was Middle Canyon Road that had been used for wagon and horse traffic.
As previously stated, the Boyer court noted that the public, "though not consisting of a great many
persons, made a continuous and uninterrupted use of middle canyon road ... as often as they

found it convenient or necessary." Taking even the Defendants' factual assertions as true, it is
clear that individuals using the roads beginning in the late 1950s until the late 1980s or early
1990s used the roads without interruption, they used the roads freely, and though not constantly,
they used the roads continuously as they needed. Therefore, that Court finds that prior to the

interrupting mechanisms being put in place the roads in question were subject to continuous use
and Plaintiffs met their burden proving the first element of the statute.

5.

Second, the continuous use must have been as a "public thoroughfare." The

Supreme Court of Utah has stated that a place becomes a public thoroughfare when the public has
a "general right of passage." Heber City v. Simpson. 942 P.2d 307 (Utah 1997). It is sufficient
to show that the road was used freely by the general public. Thurman v. Byram. 626 P.2d 447,

449 (Utah 1981). The general public, however, does not include adjoining land owners or
individuals with permission of adjoining land owners. Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo. 888

P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995). "Use under a private right is not sufficient" to establish a public
right. Heber City v. Simpson. 942 P.2d at 311. Also, as once was the case, it is no longer
necessary to prove the land owner's intent or consent to offer the road to the public. See Thurman
v. Bvram. 626 P.2d at 449.

6.

In making the public thoroughfare determination, trial courts are "permitted some

reign to grapple with the multitude of fact patterns that may constitute a public thoroughfare."
Kohler v. Martin. 916 P.2d 910, 913 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996). The defendants claim they gave

permission to individuals to use the roads and unauthorized individuals were removed. Plaintiffs
claim that while some individuals who have used the roads were permissive users, the majority
were using the roads without permission from the land owners. None of the individuals who

testified on behalf of the Plaintiff own property adjacent to or along the roads. The Court finds
that the individuals who have used the roads have been members of the general public who used
the roads as a thoroughfare to public lands and/or for recreation. Prior to the locking of the gates
in the early 1990s the roads were used as public thoroughfares.

7.

Third, and lastly, the continuous use as a public thoroughfare must have lasted

for a period often years. From the facts that have been presented, it is clear to the Court that the

continuous use as a public thoroughfare continued for at least ten years, if not much longer, or
for multiple periods of ten years. Starting in 1960 until the early 1990s when the Okelberrys

began locking the gates and selling hunting permits the roads were accessible and used by the
general public as they found necessary and convenient. It is clear that the third statutory element
has been easily met.

8.

The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Plaintiff has not met

their burden in regards to Maple Canyon Road. The Court finds that there was evidence that

Maple Canyon Road had been locked at the Wallsburg end prior to the locking of the other roads,
and that it has a history of washing out and therefore, there was no evidence of continuous use

for ten years. The Court also finds that the Plaintiff has in fact met their burden as to Ridge Line
Road, Circle Springs Road, Thorton Hollow Road, and Parker Canyon Road, that they were used
continuously by the public as a public thoroughfare for a period of well over ten years prior to
1989 when the Okelberrys began locking the gates. Finding that there were abandoned to public
roads, the Court finds the width of the roads to be two-track, approximately ten feet in width. The
Court also finds that the public has been effectively cut off from use of these public roads since
1989.

9.

After finding the roads to be public roads, the Court now turns to the issue of

whether they continue as public roads after a twelve year period of nonuse and private control
exerted by the defendants over the roads.

10.

The Court finds that while public roads once dedicated can be abandoned or

vacated only "by order of the highway authorities having jurisdiction or by other competent
authority." Ut. Code Ann. 72-5-015 (2004). Prior to 1911, a public road could be vacated after

a five-year period of nonuse. The statute has since been amended by deleting that provision. The
Court held that the legislature clearly intended to limit the method of vacating public roads to the
specific statutory requirements and no longer allow forfeiture through nonuse. Henderson v.

Oseuthorpe. 657 P.2d 1268, 1270-1271 (Utah 1982). However, this Court finds the principle of
estoppel is dispositive in the present case.

11.

In Premium Oil v. Cedar City. 187 P.2d 199 (Utah 1947), the supreme court

held that a strip of land once dedicated as a public road had been used in a manner directly in
conflict with the land's dedication as a public road. The court stated that "the manner in which
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the city used the strip was openly hostile to the public use as a street and should have been notice
to all that any dedication, if previously intended, has been abandoned. Under the facts of the case,
the court held that the Plaintiff would be estopped to claim an improper abandonment or vacation,
this Court finds that while the roads at issue were properly abandoned to public use by compliance

with the statutory requirements, the Defendants for a period of twelve years exerted control and
used the roads in an openly hostile manner to the public use of the streets. Applied to the present
case, the County having failed to bring an action for twelve years must now be estopped from
doing so.

12.

As further stated in Premium Oil, "in many cases where cities attempt to open

dedicated street for the benefit of the public, the courts have estopped the city from enforcing a
dedication because the city authorities and the public itself has taken no action over a period of
years, to prevent the erection of valuable improvements." 187 P.2d at 204. Allowing the County
to open the roads as public roads now would ruin the Okelberry sheep and cattle operation as well
as eliminate the hunting unit now being operated by Shane Ford. Admittedly little improvements

have been made to the roads themselves, but doubtless large amounts of time and money has been
expended on behalf of these business operations and the Defendants have relied on their private

use of the road to sustain and build their businesses. It would be inequitable to now, after twelve
years of clearly private use of the roads, to allow the County to open the roads to the Defendants'
detriment.

13.

By clear and convincing evidence the Court finds that the roads in question were

abandoned to public roads, but the County is now estopped from opening them to public

use because of their failure to bring an action against the Okelberrys who asserted private control
over the roads for twelve years in opposition to their public status.

DATED this 22 day of September, 2004. ,
COURT

w

CQURT JUDG

if

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

SCOTT H. SWEAT, ESQ.
Deputy Wasatch County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY

TO:

SCOTT H. SWEAT, ESQ.

You will please take notice that the undersigned, attorney for Defendants Okelberry, will

submit the above and foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Court for
signature upon the expiration of the time permitted for the filing of a written objection pursuant
to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 1^ day of September, 2004.

DON R. PETERSEN, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Defendants Okelberry

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed,

postage prepaid, and also transmitted by facsimile to the fax number listed below this 1M day
of September, 2004, to:

Scott H. Sweat
Deputy Wasatch County Attorney
114 South 200 West
Heber City, UT 84032

O:\DRP\OKELBERY.ORD

APPENDIX E

Supplemental Findings of Fact and Ruling on Motion to Amend Judgment,
February 23, 2005, R. 489-481

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WASATCH COUNTY, a body public of
the State of Utah,
Plaintiff,

SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF

FACT AND RULING ON MOTION
TO AMEND JUDGMENT

V.

E. RAY OKELBERRY, BRIAN

OKELBERRY, ERIC OKELBERRY,
UTAH DIVISION OF WILDLIFE
RESOURCES, WEST DANIELS LAND

Case No. 010500388
Judge Donald J. Eyre

ASSOCIATION, and JOHN DOES 1-25,
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on December 17,2004, on Plaintiff's Motion To Alter
Judgment or Amend Findings of Fact. Plaintiff was represented by Scott H. Sweat, Deputy

Wasatch County Attorney. Defendants were represented by Don R. Petersen and Ryan D.

Tenney. The Court has reviewed the file, considered the parties memoranda, heard oral
arguments, and being fully advised on the premises issues the following supplement:
FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Testimony was presented at trial showing that though the roads at issue in this case are

in many places rough and difficult to traverse, Wasatch County (the County) has not made any
efforts in the past to pave, grade, or otherwise improve the condition of these roads.

2. Testimony was also presented at trial indicating that Wasatch County currently has no
plans to improve these roads in the future.

KZ

3. Due to the rough nature of these roads, the Okelberrys and their employees have at

certain times in the past made efforts to improve the conditions of these roads. Specifically, they
have used heavy equipment to grade and level certain sections of the roads and have spent
considerable time and energy removing fallen trees.

4. The Okelberrys and their employees have constructed and maintained gates that are
placed at various points along the contested roads. Due to problems with vandalism, the

Okelberrys have found it necessary to repair and maintain some of these gates. Their repair
efforts have included the use of concrete as a means of permanently securing the fence posts.
5. At various times in the past, the Okelberrys and their employees have locked these
gates. Beginning in the 1990's, the Okelberrys began locking these gates on a more permanent

basis. Prior to the filing of this suit, Wasatch County had taken no official action to prevent the
Okelberrys from locking these gates.

6. The Okelberrys and their employees have posted "no trespassing" signs at various

places along these roads. Prior to the filing of this suit, Wasatch County had taken no official
action to prevent the Okelberrys from posting such signs.
7. Testimony was presented at trial indicating that the Okelberrys and their employees

have at various times asked persons to leave the property surrounding the roads. Beginning in
the 1990's, the Okelberrys began restricting access to the roads. Prior to the filing of this suit,

Wasatch County had taken no official action to prevent the Okelberrys from restricting the access
to these roads.

8. The Okelberrys and their employees have sold trespass permits to members of the
public, thereby granting those members permission to use the Okelberry property and

surrounding roads. Prior to the filing of this suit, Wasatch County had taken no official action to

prevent the Okelberrys from selling these trespass permits.
9. Beginning in the mid-1990's, the Okelberrys entered into a contractual relationship
that allowed private hunters to access their land in return for a significant monetary payment.
These hunting contracts were administered as part of a Cooperative Wildlife Management Unit
(CWMU).
10. Shayne Ford is currently the operator of the CWMU that has access to the Okelberry

property. At trial, Shayne Ford testified that his CWMU would no longer use the Okelberry
property if the contested roads were made open to the public.
11. No evidence was provided at trial to suggest the Wasatch County had ever
affirmatively represented to the Okelberrys or anyone that it intended to abandon the public roads
at issue or to otherwise not enforce the public's right to access these roads.
RULING

Under Utah law, in order to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel, a party must meet

three elements: (1) a statement, admission, act, orfailure to act by one party inconsistent with a
claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on the basis of the

first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to the second party that
would result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission,
act, or failure to act. The View Condo. Owners Assn. v. MSICO, L.LC, 2004 UT App 104, 33,
90 P.3d 1042 (quoting Eldredge v. Utah State Ret. Bd.y 795 P.2d 671,675 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(emphasis added)).
First, the Court finds that for at least ten years the County failed to act as if the roads were

public and that failure to act is inconsistent with their present assertion that those roads are
public. Though the County is claiming to have had an ownership interest in the roads, they failed

to act in any way as owners until the filing of this action. Specifically, the Okelberrys placed
gates across these roads, locked those gates for periods of time, asked persons to leave,

completely controlled access to the roads since 1989, and have even sold trespass permits to

persons wishing to use these roads. Each of these activities are clearly hostile to any claim of
ownership by any other entity. If a private citizen constructed a toll booth across a residential
road, for example, it would clearly be expected that the municipality would take immediate steps
to reassert control. Here, the Okelberrys have controlled access to these roads for over a decade
and have in fact actually received money from persons who wished to gain access.

In further support, the Okelberrys have expended some effort in the past to maintain and
improve these roads, while the County has not expended any efforts in this regard. See Premium
Oil v. Cedar City, 187 P.2d 199,203 (Utah 1947) (holding that it was "important" that "[n]o

attempt was made by the city or the public to improve the property so as to indicate the presence

of a street"); Wall v. Salt Lake City, 168 P. 766, 768 (Utah 1917) (noting that the private
landowner had made certain "improvements" by "leveling and filling in low places" in partial
reliance on the municipality's own inaction). No witness at trial even suggested that the County

had undertaken any specific action during the time periods to assert the public' rights to those
roads (such as forcibly removing gates or locks, or by taking any efforts at all to maintain or
improve those roads), nor was there any suggestion that any previous action had been filed in any
court to obtain a declaration that the roads were in fact public. Thus, the Court finds the first
prong of the estoppel analysis has been met.

Second, the Court finds that the Okelberry's have taken reasonable actions based on the

County's failure to assert any ownership interest in these roads. Specifically, the Okelberrys
have constructed and maintained gates across the roads, have spent time and energy improving

and maintaining the roads (rather than calling on county personnel to do so), and have developed
and maintained a livestock operation that incorporates and uses all of the roads in question

(rather than purchasing and moving their livestock operations). Also, the Okelberrys have
entered into a business relationship with the CWMU that is operated by Shayne Ford. This

business relationship has continued for almost a decade, and is by Shayne Ford's testimony,
expressly predicated on the Okelberrys' continued control over these roads. The Court concludes

that the Okelberrys would not have undertaken these activities had the County asserted any
ownership rights over these roads, thus satisfying the second prong of the estoppel analysis.
Third, the Court finds that the Okelberrys would suffer injury if the County were now

allowed to assert ownership rights over these roads. The most significant injury would be the

loss of income due to the expected departure of the CWMU. The Okelberrys also testified at trial
that they would suffer certain injuries to their own ongoing livestock operation if these roads

were opened to the public. Opening the roads to the public would in effect destroy the
Okelberrys' sheep and cattle operation. These losses clearly satisfy the third estoppel factor.

The Plaintiff, County, asserts that estoppel may not be found against a government entity.
The Supreme Court of Utah did state that the "general rule is that estoppel may not be asserted

against a governmental entity." Weese v. Davis County Comm 'n, 834 P.2d 1,4 (Utah 1992)
(emphasis added). However, the Supreme Court of Utah has applied the principle of estoppel in
pais "to exceptional cases where the elements calling for its exercise appear to have been an
abandonment to the public use for the prescriptive period, inclosure and expensive
improvements, such as large and costly buildings, acts of the municipality inducing the abutter to

believe that there is no longer any street, and the expenditure of money in reliance upon the acts
of the municipality." The Court further stated that "the absolute bona fides of the abutter or

adverse possessor is a most important factor where is estoppel in pais is claimed. The acts relied
on must be of such character as to amount to a fraud, if the city were permitted to claim
otherwise." Wall 168 P. at 772. This Court finds the present case to be exceptional so as to
invoke the exception.

The Court finds it significant that the roads in question are located on private property

and the roads themselves were private property prior to their abandonment to public use by their
constant use. Prior to the filing of this action, the County has never asserted any type of
ownership control over the roads. The County has never made any improvements on the roads.
The County has itself treated the roads as the Okelberrys' private property by collecting property
taxes on the land. The Walls court stated that the property in dispute in that case had been

recognized by the county as private "not only by the plat, but by assessing it and enriching its
own coffers by tribute exacted in theform oftaxes" Wall at 771 (emphasis added).
Relying on the "bona fides of the abutter," the Court finds that the Okelberrys absolutely
believed the roads in question were their private property and as such asserted their ownership
control by erecting fences and issuing trespass permits onto the property and these actions were

uninterrupted by the County for over a decade. Clearly the Okelberrys' reasonably believed the
roads were their property and acted consistent with that belief and the County did not challenge

their belief for a substantial period of time. While erecting fences does not rise to the level of
erecting "large and costly buildings," the Court finds the Okelberrys' improvements and more
importantly their business investments on the land to be significant. Thus, this Court finds that
estoppel may properly asserted against the County.

The County then asserts that the exception to applying estoppel to a governmental entity
is limited to situations where allowing the government to disavow its own affirmative act would

cause grave injustice to the other party and where estoppel may result in the loss of a public road,
the courts have also required substantial conflicting improvements on what has been the road by
the relying land owner. It is true that some cases have indicated that an affirmative action is

required in order to assert estoppel against a government entity. See The View Condo. Assn.,
2004 UT APP 104 at 34, n.2; See also Wall v. Salt Lake City, 168 P. 766, 769 (Utah 1917).
However, this requirement does not appear to have been universally applied by the courts.1
In Premium Oil v. Cedar City 187 P.2d 1999 (Utah 1947), the Utah Supreme Court held
that it is a "general rule" that a "municipality may be estopped to assert a dedication by acts and
conduct which have been relied upon by others to their prejudice." Id. at 203. The Premium Oil
Co. court further held that "in many cases where cities attempt to open dedicated streets for the
benefit of the public, the courts have estopped the city from enforcing a dedication because the
city authorities and the public itself has taken no action over a period of years" to prevent the
private landowner from acting in an otherwise hostile manner. Id. at 204. The Premium Oil
court made no mention of an affirmative action requirement.
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court held in Western Kane County Special Service District
No. I v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987), that estoppel against the government is
appropriate where the landowner has "substantially altered his position to his detriment in

1 This view is well-supported by the commentators. One respected commentator has thus
noted that though "the application of estoppel doctrines against municipal corporations is not
favored," a municipal corporation is "[nonetheless ... subject to the rules of estoppel in those

cases where equity and justice require their application." 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver
Section 152. Further, "a municipality may be estopped to open or use a street theretofore created,

still existing in point of law, and never opened, or, if once opened in use since fallen into disuse
and seemingly abandoned." 39 Am. Jur. 2d Highway and Streets, and Bridges Section 179; See
Also 11A McQuillen The Law ofMunicipal Corporations Section 33.62 ("The municipality itself
may be stopped to assert a dedication by acts and conduct which have been relied on by others to
their prejudice.").

reliance on the asserted nonuse of the roadway by the public." Id. at 1378. In Western Kane the
Utah Supreme Court refused to apply equitable estoppel against the government because the
"landowner had not substantially altered his position to his detriment in reliance on the asserted

nonuse of the roadway by the public." Id. The roads in Western Kane were located on the edges
of the property and no more than ten feet wide. The Court did not discuss any evidence that the
landowners had made any improvements, but the Court did mention that the County paid 75
percent of the cost of the land into the court.

Here, the Court finds that "equity and justice" do require the application of estoppel to the
present case. The Okelberrys have acted as if they owned the roads in question for over a decade.

In addition to the time and labor that they have personally spent on these roads, they have also
developed a business relationship with a CWMU-thereby potentially passing on other business
or land development opportunities that may have existed in the interim. To allow the County
now to assert an ownership interest in these roads would cause the Okelberrys injury, would be
unjust, and therefore cannot be sanctioned by this Court.

As such, the Court holds that the County is hereby estopped from asserting an ownership

interest over these roads, and the County's Motion to Amend Judgment is hereby DENIED.
Counsel for the Defendants shall prepare an order consistent with this ruling.

DATED this /K day ofFebruary, 20©5f
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APPENDIX F

Order, April 8,2005, R. 492-490

I"?

DON R. PETERSEN (2576), and
RYAN D. TENNEY (9866), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C.
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248

Our File No. 27754

Provo, Utah 84603

Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASATCH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

WASATCH COUNTY,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
Case No. 010.500388

vs.

Judge Drma:d J. Iivre
E. RAY OKELBERRY. et. al.,

Defendants.
This Court hereby (I) supplements its findings of fact as was set forth in the

Supplemental Findings of Fact and Ruling thai weie signed on Februaiy 18th, 20C5, and (II)

denies Plaintiffs Motion to Alter »r Amenll Judgment.

DATED this _TL-dsy%p5£eh, 2005.

Approved as to Form:

Scott H. Sweat

Deputy Wasatch County Attorney

MAILING CERTIFICATE

1 hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following,

postage prepaid, this

(_ day of March, 2005.

Scott H. Sweat
Wasatch County Attorney

805 West 100 South
Heber City, UT 84032

SECRETARY

NOTICE PURSUANT TO RULE 7 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, notice is hereby given to
Plaintiff, that this proposed order prepared by Defendants shall be the Order of the Court unless
Petitioner files an objection in writing within five (5) days from the date of the service of this
notice.

DATED this jj- _ day of March, 2005.

0.

RYAN D. TENNEY
Attorney for the Defendants

i

APPENDIX G

Further Specific Findings of Fact and Ruling on Defendants' Motion for Entry of

Supplemental Findings and Conclusions; or Alternatively for New Trial or Presentation
of Additional Evidence, R. 676-668.

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

*****

03 G." .'..

FURTHER SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF
FACT AND RULING ON DEFENDANTS'

WASATCH COUNTY,

MOTION FOR ENTRY OF

Plaintiff,
V.

WEST DANIELS LAND ASSOCIATION et al,

SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS; OR ALTERNATIVELY
FOR NEW TRIAL OR PRESENTATION
OF ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE

Respondent.
Case No. 010500388 PR

Judge Donald Eyre, Jr.

This matter comes before the Court on remand from the Utah Supreme Court. In a ruling
filed February 12,2008 {Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT10), the Supreme Court instructed
this Court to enter "specific findings offact regarding the Okelbenys* evidence ofinterruption in the
use ofthe Four Roads as public thoroughfares." 2008 UT 10 U 20. The Court has reviewed the file,
reviewed trial transcript, considered the memoranda of both parties, heard oral argument, and now
issues the following findings of fact and ruling:
SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Several ofPlaintiffs witnesses testified at trial that they used some or all ofthe four roads
(Circle Springs Road, Ridge Line Road, Thorton Hallow Road, Parker Canyon Road) at issue here
during various periods between 1957 and 2004.
2. Deon Sabey testified that he used all four roads several times beginning in the 1950s. He
testified that when using the roads he never saw "no trespassing" signs on any of the roads, but did
see gates on the roads. He never saw or encountered locks on any of the gates. He saw no markers
on the gates. He saw others using the roads at various times, and was never asked to leave the roads,
nor did he get permission to use any of the roads.

3. Moroni Besendorfer testified that he used all four roads several times beginning in the
1960s. He testified that he saw others on the road every year from the 1960s through the 1980s. He
testified that he saw others use the roads and camp on adjoining property with their vehicles. He did
not see any "no trespassing" signs until 1999. He saw no locked gates until "a few years" prior to
the trial. He was never kicked offthe roads or asked to leave, and never obtained permission to use

the roads.

4. Martin Wall testified thai he used Circle Springs Road and Ridge Line Road regularly
beginning in the 1950s, for hunting and gathering firewood. He testified that he never saw "no
trespassing" signs. He saw gates on the roads, but they were not locked. He never received
permission to traverse the roads.

5. Jake Thompson testified that he has used Circle Springs Road and Ridge Line Road
regularly since the 1950s, and Thorton Hallow Road since at least the 1970s. He testified that he
never saw "no trespassing" signs on the roads. He saw gales, but they were not locked. He never
received permission to travel the roads, and was never kicked off the roads.

6. Ed Sabey testified that he has used all of the roads regularly since about the 1960s. He
testified that he never saw "no trespassing signs," nor signs on Parker Canyon Road saying "no
motorized vehicles." He saw gates, which were not locked. He had seen others on the roads. He
never got permission to use the roads. He testified that about "15 years ago" (which would have
been 1989), people were stopped from using Ridge Line Road.

7. Richard Baum testified that he used Ridge Line Road for biking about "20 years ago"

(1984). He was never kicked offthe road, and never saw "no trespassing signs." He did see "orange
painted wood signs" on the road.

8. Brandon Richins testified thai he has used Circle Springs Road, Ridge Line Road, and
Parker Canyon Road starting in the late 1980s. He testified that he first saw "no trespassing" signs
about 15-16 years ago (1988-89) on Circle Springs Road. He saw locked gates on Ridge Line Road
since 2001. He never saw locked gates on Parker Canyon road, but saw "no motorized vehicle"
signs. He never had permission to use the roads, and saw others on them.

9. Benny Gardnertestified that he started using Circle Springs Road, Thorton Hallow Road,
and Parker Canyon Road in about 1966. He testified that he did not see "no trespassing" signs until
the 1990s. He saw the gates on the roads, but testified that they were not locked until "more
recently." He testified that he saw others on the roads, was never kicked offthe roads, and never got
permission to use the roads.

10. Mark Buttars testified that he used all the roads starting in the 1960s, except Parker
Canyon Road, which he started using in 1972. He testified that he saw "partial trespassing" signs
on Thorton Hallow Road and Circle Springs Road starting in about 1992. He saw no signs prior to
1992. He never received permission to use the roads, and saw others on the roads. While he saw
gates on the roads, he testified that they were never locked.

1}. Defendants called several witnesses who also testified regarding public access to the
roads between 1957 and 2004.

12. JeffJefferson mainly testified regarding the condition ofthe roads. He testified that each
of the roads was rocky and would require a 4-wheel drive vehicle to pass, bul that sometimes gates

were left open. He testified that he asked Mark Buttars to leave the roads twice sometime after 2000.
He also testified that the sign on a tire at the start of Circle Springs Road was put up in about 1992.
13. Melvin Price also testified about the condition ofthe roads: that they were only passable
by 4'Wheel drive vehicles. He testified that there have been locked gates and "no trespassing" signs
on Ridge Line Road for at least 20 years. He testified that there were signs and locked gates on the
other roads at some point, but did not specify a time frame. He testified that he got permission from
the Okelberrys each year he used the roads, and (hat there was not much traffic or many others on
the roads.
14. Lee Okelberry testified that his father purchased property surrounding the roads in 1957.
He testified that the roads had gates and fences. He testified that Thorton Hallow Road and other
roads were "better than a trail," but that the public was not there much in the 1950s. He testified that
he occasionally he stopped and talked to people on Parker Canyon Road in the 1950s. He stated that
"as the years went by there was a little more traffic" on the roads. He testified that in 1957 there was
no need for "no trespassing" signs because H[t]here was no, not that much trespass up there." He
further stated that there were no locks on the gates in 1957, but instead "[w]e put fasteners on them
and we wired them to a post." "We never did lock anybody out of there," he stated. He testified that
he asked wood gatherers to get offprivate land on occasion. He also testified that he "never locked"

the gates. He testified that a locked gate shown to him as an exhibit was "put there after I left"
Finally, he testified that "I think we stood up for the public quite a bit. Ifthere was any that needed
to go through there in any way, shape or form they could ask or they could go through there. We
never turned nobody down that had any business down in there."

15. Glen Shepherd testified that there are now signs on all of the roads. He said he had
permission for years from the Okelberrys to use the roads, who are "pretty free" with giving
permission. He stated that the roads are generally seen as private rather than public roads, and that
there have always been gates of some sort on the roads.

16. Shane Ford testified that the condition ofthe roads is pretty similar now (in 2004) to their
condition in 1994. He testified that gates are now locked during hunting season. He believed that
the roads have not been open to the public for continuous use.
17. Bruce Huvard testified that the roads were "very rough." He testified thai he first went

to the property in 1966, and saw "keep out" and "private" signs on the property at that time. He
testified that he obtained permission from the Okelberrys each year from 1966 to 1990 to use the

roads. He testified that there were always gates upon entering the roads between 1966 and 1990.
He testified that there were others who used the roads without permission, but that they were not

very numerous. He kicked people off the Okelbeny properly who were noi "supposed to be on

there" between 1966 and 1990. He testified that "some" ofthe gates were locked between 1966 and
1990, but did not specify exact dates.

18. Brian Okelberry testified that he started working on the property around the roads in the

early 1970s. He testified that there have always been gales on the road since he's been there, and
that one of the purposes of the gates was to control vehicles "from going up and down the roads."

He has given people permission to use roads at limes. He testified that Aere were keep out signs

on s>me of the gates He testified that some of the gates have been locked "over^periodsof time

He testified that he started taking an active role in preventing trespassing around the late 1980s, and

began putting up signs then. He testified that the first boundary locks were placed on the gales «n
the 1980s.

19 Ray Okclbeny testified that there were gates on the roads beginning in 1957, and that as
lime passed more people came. He has told people to leave the roads "on occasion." He gave

permission to Brian Gardner and others to use the roads. He began charging people for trespass

permits" beginning in the 1990s. He testified that there were locks on the gates in the 1990s and
2000s. He testified that the sign on the tire at the entrance to the Circle Springs Road was there
"about 20 years." He testified that they started locking the Circle Springs and "1080 gale (going
into the Ridge Line Road) either the first or second year he was there. He testified that people may
have cut the locks from gates at some points. He testified that he began putting up signs in 1957-59,
but that "they didn't stay up," and hypothesized that the "wind blew them away." He also testified:
Tin not saying the gate was opened or locked all summer, but when I was getting ready to get those
sheep out of there I locked those gates. And I've always had trouble keeping locks there."
20. The Court finds that there were gates at the entrances to each of the roads from 1957 lo
2004.

21. The Court also finds that there may have been signs at various locations reading "keep

out" and "private" beginning in the 1960s. However, the evidence shows that these signs did not

restrict travel on the roads themselves, and it is unclear whether they were intended to refer to
keeping offthe roads or the surrounding property. None ofDefendants' witnesses clarified whether
the signs were intended to refer to the roads or the property. Ray Okelberry testified that the signs
he placed "didn't do any good" anyway. More signs were placed by Brian Okelberry and others
beginning in the late 1980s and 1990s.

22. The Court finds that occasionally persons may have been told to leave the property

beginning in the 1950s, but this did nol restrict travel on the roads. Restrictions on use ofthe roads
began in the 1980s at the earliest There was no evidence presented that the Okelberrys regularly
kicked people offthe roads at any time before the 1980s; the evidence instead shows that they freely
intended to let others use the roads.

23. The Court finds that while some people obtained permission lo use the roads, getting
specific permission was not enforced, and many used the roads from 1957 to the 1990s without
permission.

24. The Court finds that though the Okelberrys may have locked some of the gates at some

points between the 1950s and 1990s, this did nol restrict travel on the roads. There was no credible

evidence presented that the Okelberrys intended to or actually did restrict travel prior to the 1990s
due to the locking ofgates. While Ray Okelberry testified that he locked gates beginning either in
1957 or 1958, he did not testify that he intended to keep the public from accessing the roads at this
lime Lee Okelberry and Brian Okelberry, both Defendants' witnesses, testified that the boundary

gates at the entrances of the roads were never locked until at least the 1980s. Several or Plaintiffs
witnesses also testified to this effect.
RULING

The issue before the Court here is a fairly narrow one, though it must be decided based on
a large amount oftestimony and evidence. The Utah Supreme Court, on February 12,2008, issued
a written decision ordering this Court to enter "specific findings of fact regarding the Okelbcrrys'
evidence of interruption in the use of the Four Roads as public thoroughfares." Wasatch County v.
Okelberry, 2008 UT10 U 20. This Court has reviewed the evidence and made those specific findings
of fact above, and will presently apply those findings to the now-applicable law.
In its February 12 decision, the Supreme Court articulated a "bright-line rule" to determine
whether a road is dedicated and abandoned for use to the public under Utah Code Annotated § 72-5104. This rule is as follows:
An overt act that is intended by a property owner to interrupt the use of a road as a
public thoroughfare, and is reasonably calculated to do so, constitutes an interruption
sufficient to restart the running of the required ten-year period under the Dedication
Statute.
Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10 J 15.
The new rule thus contains three requirements: 1) there must be an overt act; 2) there must be a show
of intention by a property owner to interrupt the public use of a road; 3) the overt act must be
reasonably calculated to interrupt road use by the public. The Supreme Court explained that
"credibleevidencc" which meets these three requirements "simply precludes a finding ofcontinuous
use." Id
Defendants argue that they have presented evidence of "at least four types of acts" which
would satisfy the above standard: "locked gates, unlocked gates, asking trespassers to leave, and

posting signs." (Memorandum Opposing Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law ("Opp. Memo"), at 2.) The Court now addresses each of these.
The evidence at trial showed clearly that there were unlocked gates at the entrances to the
roads (boundary gales) as well as some interior gates during all the years relevant to this issue. The
question is whether unlocked gates would satisfy the requirements explained above. The Court holds
that they do not Defendants argue, using language from various cases in other states, that an
unlocked gate creates a "presumption that any use was permissive." (Opp. Memo, at 11.) But the
testimony at trial shows otherwise. Several witnesses testified ofunlocked wire or metal gates which

were used to control cattle, but none testified that this interrupted their use of the roads, or that they
supposed that their use was permissive based on the presence of the gates. Perhaps most
importantly, the simple existence of gates clearly does not constitute an overt act. The gates were
apparently there even before Defendants took control of the property, and the requirement that
travelers open and close such gates for the purpose ofcontrolling livestock does not show intent to

interrupt public use. The gates themselves "were not meant to restrict public travel on the Road[s]."
Utah County v. Butler, 2008 UT 12 fl 16.

Defendants claim that "asking people to leave the roads" constitutes an overt act under the
Supreme Court's standard. Indeed, multiple witnesses, including Bruce Huvard, Melvin Price, and
Glen Shepherd testified that they obtained permission to use the roads. Some testimony was also
presented at trial that, on occasion, the Okelberrys and others asked people to leave property

surrounding the roads. The evidence did not show, however, that this interrupted public use of the
roads generally. Several of Plaintiff's witnesses testified that they used the roads freely during the
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s without any resistance. Lee Okelberry testified thai the Okelberrys "never
turned nobody down" who had legitimate business using the roads. None of Defendants* witnesses
testified that there was a regular policy of requiring permission or approval to use the roads during
that period, nor that asking persons to leave the property was intended lo restrict public access to the
roads themselves. As the Supreme Court stated in Utah County v. Butler, when individuals are not
removed from the roads themselves, simply removing them from the adjoining property is not

sufficient to constitute an overt act reasonably calculated to interrupt continuous use. See 2008 UT
12 U17. The evidence shows that it was not until the late 1980s and 1990s that the Okelberrys began
requiring hunting permits and other permission to use the roads. As a result, the Court finds that
these instances ofasking persons lo leave the property do not rise to the level ofan overt act intended
to interrupt public use of the roads prior to the 1990s.
Another possible interruptive act alleged by Defendants was the posting of "keep out" and
"no trespassing" signs on the gates and the property surrounding the roads. The Utah Supreme Court

has held that "it is clear that the posting ofthe signs constituted an overt act," but that less clear was
whether posting the signs showed an intent to interrupt public use of the road and whether the act
was reasonably calculated to do so. Wasalch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10 ^ 18. It appears that
a majority of the "no trespassing" and "keep out" signs on the property at the time of trial were
placed there in the late 1980s and 1990s. Ray Okelberry testified that he began putting up signs as
early as 1957 or 1958, but that it "didn't do any good" lo put the signs up. He also testified that the
early signs "didn't stay up." Bruce Huvard testified that he saw signs as early as 196*6 saying "keep
out" and "private." Yet none ofDefendants' witnesses at trial specified their intent when putting up
the signs in the years prior to the 1980s and 1990s. Further, many of Plaintiffs witnesses testified
that they never saw "no trespassing" signs until the late 1980s or 1990s, and that none ofthem were
deterred in their travels along the roads by signs. The Utah Supreme Court held, in Utah County v.
Butler, that "[s]igns posted against travel on property adjacent to the Road do not constitute an
interruption oftravel on the Road itself." 2008 UT 12 U 17. Without credible evidence showing that
the signs were meant to apply to the roads themselves, the Court cannot infer an intent to interrupt
the use ofthe roads from the posting ofsigns in the 1950s, 1960s, or 1970s, nor can it conclude that
the earlier signs were "reasonably calculated" to interrupt public road use prior to the late 1980s or
1990s.

Finally, Defendants submit that evidence of locked gates constitutes an overt act sufficient

to satisfy the Supreme Court's standard. The Supreme Court held that "[t]he locking of gates for
several days at a time constitutes an overt act intended to interrupt public use and reasonably

calculated to do so." Wasalch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10 U19. However, the Court also held
that "factual questions remain as to whether and when such an event or events occurred." Id Ray
Okelberry testified that he started locking the Circle Springs and "1080 gate" (going into the Ridge
Line Road) either the first or second year he was on his property. He testified thai "when I was
getting ready to get those sheep out of there I locked those gates." (Transcript of Bench Trial, June

30,2004, at 138.) He also stated that "I've always had trouble keeping locks there," but that "I was
there I might have been there a week or ten days that I had those gales locked." Id at 138-39.
The Utah Supreme Court explained that evidence of an overt act must be "credible" to
preclude a finding of continuous use under the dedication statute. Wasatch County v. Okelberry,
2008 UT 10115. That Court has previously held that a trial court has "the prerogative to judge the

credibility of the witnesses and to determine the Tacts." Casida v. Deland, 866 P.2d 599,602 (Utah
1993) (citing Hanks v. Turner, 508 P.2d 815,816 (Utah 1973)). In making this determination, the
Court is "not obliged to believe the self-serving testimony" of the witness. Id. Further, while a trial
judge "should not arbitrarily reject competent, credible, uncontradtcted testimony, nevertheless he
is not compelled to believe evidence where there is anything about it which would reasonablyjustify
refusal to accept it as the facts, and this includes the self-interest of the witness." Id. (citing Strong
v. Turner, 452 P.2d 323,324 (Utah 1969)).
Though the Court properly takes into account Ray Okclberry's self-interest in assessing the

credibility of his testimony, that alone is not dispositive. The main problem with Ray Okelberry's
trial testimony regarding locked gates is that it contradicts not only the testimony of several of
Plaintiffs' witnesses (specifically, Deon Sabey, Moroni Besendorfer, Martin Wall, Jake Thompson,
Ed Sabey, Brandon Richins, Benny Gardner, and Mark Buttars), it also contradicts the testimony of
Defendants' own witnesses, Brian and Lee Okelberry. Plaintiffs' witnesses who testified on the
issue testified that they encountered no locked gates while using the roads until at least the late 1980s
or 1990s, and some not until the 2000s.

Brian Okelberry testified that the first boundary locks were placed on gates in the 1980s. Lee
Okelberry testified that "(w]e never did lock anybody out ofthere," that he personally never locked
any gates, and that any locks on gates shown to him as exhibits were put there "after I left." which
would have been in the 1990s, as he testified he stopped going to the area "about six years ago."
(Transcript ofBench Trial, June 29,2004, at 198.) He specifically testified that locks were not put
on the gates in 1957, but instead u[w]e put fasteners on them and we wired them to a post." These
statements by Brian and Lee Okelberry are especially significant because they are statements against
interest. Brian Okelberry is a party to this case, and both were witnesses called by Defendants.
Plaintiffs witnesses also contradict Ray Okelberry's testimony. Defendants argue that
Plaintiffs witnesses are "sporadic users" ofthe road and that their testimony regarding locked gates
should not be given as much weight as a result (Opp. Memo, at 9.) But the Supreme Court
explained that "a road may be used continuously even if it is not used constantly or frequently."
Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10 fl 16. "For example, a road may be used by only one
person once a month, but if this use is as often as the public finds it 'convenient or necessary,' and
the landowner has taken no action intended and reasonably calculated to interrupt use, the use is
continuous. The one-month period oftime between uses is a mere intermission, not an interruption."
Id.

The Court finds that while there may have been occasions in which Mr. Okelberry locked the
gates in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, these were few and far between, were not intended to restrict
public access, and were not reasonably calculated to interrupt public use of the roads. The Court
finds that his testimony, to the extent it contradicts the testimony ofLee Okelberry, Brian Okeiberry,
and several of Plaintiffs witnesses (that the gales were not locked with that intent until at least the
1980s), is not credible evidence under the Supreme Court's standard. Defendants' other witnesses

testifying about the existence of locked gates did not specify timefromes in which the gates were

locked; therefore the testimony ofthe Okelberrys are Defendants' only evidence on this subject As
in Utah County v. Butter, the Court finds here that between the 1950s and at least the 1980s "the
gates ... were not erected or locked with the requisite intent and therefore did not interrupt the
public's continuous use of the Road." 2008 UT 12 U 16.
CONCLUSION

This Court ruled previously that "it is clear that individuals using the roads beginning in the
late 1950s until the late 1980s or early 1990s used the roads without interruption, they used the roads
freely, and though not constantly, they used the roads continuously as they needed." (Findings of
Fact and Conclusions ofLaw, 22 September 2004, at 6-7.) Plaintiffs at trial made a showing by clear
and convincing evidence that Circle Springs Road, Ridge Line Road, Thorton Hallow Road, and
Parker Canyon Road were abandoned to the public. Defendants have offered no credible evidence
ofovert acts sufficient to change this determination under the Utah Supreme Court's newly created
standard. Therefore the Court holds that under Utah Code Annotated § 72-5-104(1) each ofthe four
roads was "dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public" by continuous use as a public
thoroughfare for over 10 years.

Signed this_2£?ay of October, 2008.

DON
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Court Judge
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OPINION
[**520] OPINION
WILKINS, Presiding Judge:
[*P1] Appellant Aspen Construction (Aspen)
appeals from a judgment awarding appellee A.K. & R.
Whipple Plumbing and Heating (Whipple) $ 3,943 for
heating, venting, and air conditioning (HVAC) work it
performed, and allowing Whipple to foreclose on three
separate mechanics' liens. Aspen also appeals the trial

court's decision to award Whipple $ 7,500 in attorney
fees. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BACKGROUND
P 2 In 1993, Aspen, a general contractor, entered
into an agreement with Whipple, a licensed plumbing
contractor, to provide [***2] labor and materials for
HVAC and plumbing work on three separate properties.
When problems arose with the HVAC work on one of the
properties, Aspen discharged Whipple and refused to
remit any further payment until corrections were made.
Whipple responded by filing mechanics' liens on all three
properties and commencing three separate foreclosure
actions that were later consolidated for purposes of trial.
[*P3] Before trial, Aspen filed a motion to dismiss
the HVAC portion of Whipple's mechanics' lien claim on
the basis that Whipple lacked proper HVAC licensure as
required by Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-604 (1998). The
trial court granted Aspen's motion, however, it invoked
common law principles of equity [**521] and
determined that because Whipple had conferred a benefit
upon Aspen, Whipple should be awarded the value of that
benefit. The court further determined that there were
deficiencies in Whipple's HVAC work and therefore,
awarded Whipple the value of this work, less the cost
Aspen would incur in correcting the deficiencies.
[*P4] In June 1995, the trial court issued a
scheduling order which required Whipple to disclose all

Page 2
1999 UT App 87, *P4; 977 P.2d 518, **521;
365 Utah Adv. Rep. 3; 1999 Utah App. LEXIS 31, ***2
witnesses by August 1, 1995, and respond to all
discovery requests [***3] by August 31, 1995. On
September 22, 1995, Aspen filed another motion to
dismiss alleging Whipple had violated the scheduling
order by failing to disclose witnesses and respond to
Aspen's discovery requests. The trial court denied
Aspen's motion, ruling that Aspen was not sufficiently
prejudiced because Whipple provided Aspen with a
complete list of witnesses it intended to call at trial.
[*P5] During trial, which took place in early
October 1995, the court heard evidence concerning the
value of the work Whipple had performed on the various
properties. Aspen also pursued its counterclaim seeking
damages for the allegedly defective HVAC work. The
trial did not conclude as scheduled and was continued
until November.
[*P6] When the trial resumed in late November, the
trial court allowed Ken Whipple to testify as an HVAC
expert witness. Mr. Whipple, although not a licensed
HVAC contractor during the earlier part of the trial, had
obtained his HVAC license before the trial resumed. In
response to Mr. Whipple's testimony, Aspen attempted to
introduce the testimony of its expert regarding defects in
the HVAC work. However, the trial court restricted the
scope of this testimony because [***4] Aspen failed to
list its expert as a potential expert witness.
[*P7] At the close of trial, Aspen argued that
Whipple had failed to meet the threshold requirement of
establishing valid mechanics' liens. In its minute entry
dated November 30, 1995, the trial court requested that
Aspen prepare findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a
judgment, and concluded that, because neither party
clearly prevailed, any award of attorney fees would be
improper.
[*P8] Aspen's counsel prepared a monetary
judgment in favor of Whipple along with proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Whipple objected
to the proposed findings because they did not include an
order specifying foreclosure of the three liens and
prepared separate findings which included an order of
foreclosure. Aspen's counsel objected to Whipple's
proposed findings, arguing there was insufficient
evidence to support a foreclosure order. Whipple then
filed a motion to reopen the case to take additional
evidence regarding its compliance with the mechanics'
lien foreclosure statute. The trial court granted Whipple's
motion "in the interests of justice."

[*P9] On September 19, 1996, the trial court held a
supplemental hearing [***5] and received evidence of
the mechanics' liens and also took under advisement
Whipple's request for reconsideration of an award of
attorney fees. Whipple asserted that now having
"prevailed" it was entitled to attorney fees as the
"prevailing party." Aspen also requested attorney fees,
arguing it prevailed at the outset on the claim for
defective HVAC work. On March 31, 1997, the trial
court entered formal findings of fact and conclusions of
law and a judgment awarding Whipple $ 3,943 for its
HVAC work. The trial court also denied Aspen's fee
request, instead awarding Whipple $ 7,500 in attorney
fees. In addition, the trial court allowed Whipple to
foreclose on the three mechanics' liens and valued a
portion of Whipple's plumbing work for sewer laterals at
$ 3,200. This appeal followed.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[*P10] Aspen raises several arguments on appeal.
First, Aspen contends Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-604
(1998) barred Whipple from maintaining this action and
that the trial court erred in granting Whipple recovery on
equitable grounds. This issue turns on the trial court's
interpretation of a statute, which we review for
correctness, without deference to the trial court's [***6]
conclusions. See Butterfield Lumber, Inc. v. Peterson
Mortgage Corp., 815 P.2d 1330, 1332 (Utah Ct. App.
1991). Second, Aspen argues the trial court abused its
discretion in granting [**522] Whipple's motion to
reopen on grounds not provided in Rule 59 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. "Consideration of a motion to
grant a new trial or open a judgment for additional
evidence under . . . [Rule 59] is a matter left to the
discretion of the trial judge, and that decision will be
reversed only if the judge has abused that discretion by
acting unreasonably." Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78,
81 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citation omitted).
[*P11] Third, Aspen claims there is insufficient
evidence to support the trial court's determination that
Whipple adequately complied with section 38-1-7 of the
mechanic's lien statute or its valuation of Whipple's
plumbing work for sewer laterals. "We review the trial
court's findings of fact for clear error and its legal
conclusions for correctness." Smith v. Batchelor, 934
P.2d 643, 646 (Utah 1997). Fourth, Aspen argues the trial
court erred in denying its request for attorney fees and
failed to properly allocate Whipple's attorney fee award
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[***7] according to its underlying claims. Whether
attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question of
law, which we review for correctness. See Robertson v.
Gem Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Finally, Aspen argues the trial court abused its discretion
by refusing to dismiss Whipple's case for noncompliance
with the scheduling order, permitting Ken Whipple to
testify as an HVAC expert, and in limiting the testimony
of Aspen's expert witness. Trial courts have broad
discretion in managing the cases before them and we will
not interfere with their decisions absent an abuse of
discretion. See Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R.
Co., 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
ANALYSIS
1. Licensing Requirements
[*P12] Aspen contends that Whipple's failure to
comply with the licensing requirements of section
58-55-604, precludes Whipple from maintaining this
action and that the trial court erred in allowing Whipple
to recover on equitable grounds. We agree.
[*P13] Section 58-55-604 of the Utah Code
provides that "no contractor may . . . commence or
maintain any action . . . for collection of compensation
for performing any act for which a license [***8] is
required . . . without alleging and proving that he [or she]
was a properly licensed contractor when the contract sued
upon was entered into, and when the alleged cause of
action arose." Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-604 (1998). Our
Legislature has determined that proper licensure is of
paramount importance and that if a contractor performs
work without the requisite license, it should be denied
compensation. Thus, the statute serves the dual purpose
of protecting the public from incompetent contractors,
while sanctioning contractors who fail to obtain proper
licensure.
[*P14] However, this statutory bar is not without
exception. We have recognized that the statutory bar
"does not preclude the application of the previous
common law exceptions to the general rule of
non-recovery." Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen,
801 P.2d 163, 169 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Thus, a court
addressing the issue of whether an unlicensed contractor
may maintain an action for quantum meruit must: (1)
determine whether the contractor is properly licensed or
whether its status as an unlicensed contractor places it

within the purview of section 58- 55-604; and (2)
determine whether the contractor is entitled [***9] to
relief under common law principles despite its
non-licensure and support that conclusion with
appropriate findings of fact. In other words, if the court
concludes the claim falls within the purview of section
58-55-604, but the common law exceptions apply, then
the statutory bar will not preclude suit. However, if the
court determines section 58-55-604 applies but the
common law exceptions are inapplicable, then section
58-55-604 absolutely bars the action.
[*P15] Here, the trial court stated "section 58-55-604
U.C.A. is controlling in this case . . . . [and Whipple's]
failure to comply with the statute is sufficient grounds for
the Motion to Dismiss to be granted as a matter of law . .
. ." The trial court then proceeded to allow Whipple to
maintain its action below and ultimately recover under
"principles of equity." The court failed to adequately
explain which common law rules, if any, it applied in this
case, or support its [**523] decision with appropriate
findings of fact. Nevertheless, because of our obligation
to affirm the trial court on any available basis, see White
v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1376 (Utah 1994), we
address whether any of the common law exceptions
[***10] allow Whipple to maintain its action.
[*P16] The Utah common law exceptions are premised
on the theory that rigid insistence on proper licensure is
unnecessary as long as the public is otherwise protected
from the harm the statute is designed to prevent. See
American Rural Cellular v. Systems Communication
Corp., 890 P.2d 1035, 1040 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Utah
courts have generally allowed unlicensed contractors to
recover for quantum meruit in four instances where,
notwithstanding the contractor's lack of proper licensure,
the licensing statute's purpose is met.
[*P17] First, unlicensed contractors have been allowed
to recover when the party for whom the work is to be
done possesses skill or expertise in the field. See id. Here,
there is no evidence showing Aspen was knowledgeable
or skilled in HVAC work. We cannot infer from Aspen's
general contracting status that it possessed special skill or
expertise sufficient to protect itself from incompetent
HVAC work. See Wilderness Bldg. Sys., Inc. v.
Chapman, 699 P.2d 766, 768 (Utah 1985) (rejecting
unlicensed contractor's argument that contracting party's
reservation of plumbing work for itself rendered it
knowledgeable [***11] in that field).
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[*P18] Second, an unlicensed contractor may recover if
the work it performed was supervised by a licensed
contractor. See American Rural Cellular, 890 P.2d at
1040. The cases in which this principle has been applied
have all involved supervision or labor by a properly
licensed third party thereby protecting the original
contracting party from the unlicensed contractor's
incompetence. See Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236
(Utah 1983) (refusing to apply statutory bar where
unlicensed contractor was supervised by licensed
contractor and therefore, original contracting party
"received whatever protection is afforded by compliance
with the licensing statute"); Motivated Management Int'l
v. Finney, 604 P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1979) (allowing
unlicensed contractor to recover where "at least part of
the construction was performed by a licensed contractor"
because the licensed party's involvement adequately
protected original contracting party); Fillmore Prods. v.
Western States Paving, Inc., 561 P.2d 687, 690 (Utah
1977) (providing when general contractor hired
unlicensed subcontractor to provide plumbing work,
unlicensed subcontractor could recover because [***12]
entire project was supervised by licensed project engineer
who ensured job was done properly). In this case, Aspen
did not have the added protection of a properly licensed
contractor to ensure the HVAC work was adequately
completed. Instead, Whipple performed the work on its
own without the supervision of someone with proper
licensure. Thus, we conclude Whipple's HVAC work was
not adequately supervised to invoke this exception to the
statutory bar.
[*P19] Third, if the reason a contractor fails to obtain
proper licensure is minor and does not undermine its
ability to perform its work, the unlicensed contractor may
recover. See American Rural Cellular, 890 P.2d at 1040;
see also Loader v. Scott Constr. Corp., 681 P.2d 1227,
1229-30 (Utah 1984) (permitting recovery where
contractor mistakenly, but in good faith, believed he
could perform work under partner's license); Lignell v.
Berg, 593 P.2d 800, 804-05 (Utah 1979) (allowing
recovery where otherwise properly qualified contractor
mistakenly allowed license to lapse for nonpayment of
renewal fee). Here, the record shows Whipple has
provided HVAC work for many years without proper
licensure. Although Mr. Whipple claims he [***13]
believed in good faith his general plumbing contractors
license allowed him to install HVAC forced air heating
systems, the fact is, it did not. Until trial in this case,

Whipple had never complied with licensing requirements
showing he possessed the technical competence or
financial qualifications for licensure. Equally important,
the trial court heard extensive evidence about the
inadequacies of Whipple's HVAC work and ultimately
concluded the HVAC work was deficient. Based on the
foregoing, we conclude Whipple's failure to obtain proper
HVAC licensure [**524] precludes application of this
common law exception.
[*P20] Finally, courts have considered whether the
contracting party relied on the subcontractor's
representations that he was properly licensed and whether
the subcontractor has posted a performance bond. See
American Rural Cellular, 890 P.2d at 1041. Here,
Whipple actively solicited and engaged in HVAC work
for more than sixteen years. As a result, Whipple
implicitly represented to its customers that it was
properly licensed and qualified to perform such work. In
addition, although Whipple claims it maintained liability
insurance to protect its customers, Whipple has offered
[***14] no evidence of a performance bond. Therefore,
we conclude Whipple does not fall within this final
exception to the statutory bar.
P21
In sum, we have determined the trial court
properly applied section 58-55-604 to this case because
Whipple performed HVAC work without proper
licensure. We also conclude, however, that the trial court
erred in allowing Whipple to recover for HVAC work
under "principles of equity" because the common law
exceptions to section 58-55-604 are inapplicable in this
case. We therefore reverse the trial court's ruling
regarding this issue, and vacate any award to Whipple
based on the HVAC work.
2. Motion to Reopen
[*P22] Aspen next argues the trial court abused its
discretion in granting Whipple's motion to reopen "in the
interests of justice." We disagree.
[*P23] The Utah Supreme Court has stated that it lies
within the sound discretion of the trial court to grant a
motion to reopen for the purpose of taking additional
testimony after the case has been submitted but prior to
entry of judgment. See Lewis v. Porter, 556 P.2d 496,
497 (Utah 1976). Furthermore, the court has directed
lower courts to consider such a motion "in light [***15]
of all the circumstances and grant or deny it in the
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interest of fairness and substantial justice." Id.

(Utah Ct. App. 1995).

[*P24] Here, the trial judge stated "[I am g]oing to
grant the motion to reopen and in the interests of justice, I
think there [are] some glaring misunderstandings in the
presentation of the evidence; and the Court is going to
allow the plaintiff to re- open as requested in their
motion." (Emphasis added.) In addition, the mechanics'
lien claims in this case were actually litigated and the
court granted Whipple's motion to address the parties'
basic disagreement over the validity of the liens at issue.
Testimony of the filing, service, and content of the liens
had already been received into evidence. The documents
sought to be introduced by the motion to reopen were
exhibits to Whipple's complaint served on Aspen to
commence the actions. Nothing unexpected was allowed
into evidence as a result of the motion to reopen being
granted. The trial court's decision did not deprive Aspen
of a full and fair consideration of the issues regarding the
mechanics' liens. Therefore, we conclude the trial court
did not abuse its discretion.

[*P27] Here, Aspen has simply failed to meet this
burden. It did not marshal all the evidence supporting the
trial court's findings or show that, viewing the evidence
in a light favorable to the court's rulings, the findings
were clearly erroneous.

3. Compliance with Mechanics' Lien Statute [***16] and
Value of Lateral Work
[*P25] Aspen also argues there is insufficient evidence
to support two factual determinations by the trial court:
(1) that Whipple complied with section 38-1-7 of the
mechanics' lien statute; and (2) that the value of
Whipple's plumbing work for sewer laterals was $ 3,200.
In contesting the trial court's ultimate conclusions
regarding Whipple's compliance with the mechanic's lien
statute and the value of its plumbing work, Aspen must
show either that the conclusions are incorrect given the
findings or that the "factual findings underlying . . . [the
trial court's] determinations are clearly erroneous."
Cellcom v. Systems Communication Corp., 939 P.2d 185,
189 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). On appeal, Aspen attacks the
findings themselves.
[*P26] To challenge the trial court's findings,
Aspen must "marshal the evidence in support of the
findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence,
the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be
against the clear weight of the evidence[,]" thus making
them clearly erroneous. Id. (citations omitted). We will
uphold the trial court's findings of fact if the party
[**525] challenging the findings fails [***17] to
appropriately marshal all the evidence supporting the
findings. See Allred v. Brown, 893 P.2d 1087, 1090

Aspen ignores, for example, the fact that Whipple
offered copies of the mechanics' liens into evidence
which the court accepted into evidence as being
authenticated documents. Aspen also disregards the
extensive evidence presented at trial regarding the value
of Whipple's plumbing work. Rather, Aspen merely
restates those facts favorable to its position or in the
alternative argues there was insufficient evidence to
support the trial court's findings.
[*P28] Although Aspen maintains it adequately
marshaled the evidence in an addendum to its brief, the
Utah Supreme Court has denounced the practice of
marshaling evidence in an appendix stating that "this
does not comply with the requirement to marshal
evidence. It is improper for counsel to attempt to enlarge
the page limit of briefing by placing critical [***18]
facts in appendices." DeBry v. Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d
1353, 1360 n.3 (Utah 1994). Worse yet, the addendum
does not include a properly focused marshaling of the
evidence supporting particular findings under attack, but
rather is a comprehensive catalogue of all testimony in
the record. Thus, we must assume the evidence supported
the findings underlying the trial court's determination that
Whipple complied with section 38-1-7 of the mechanics'
lien statute and that it adequately valued Whipple's
plumbing work. Accordingly, Aspen's argument fails.
[*P29] We note however, that the trial court's
Conclusion of Law No. 5 includes Whipple's HVAC
work as part of the order of foreclosure. As previously
discussed, Whipple is precluded by section 58-55-604
from recovering for its HVAC work. Thus, to the extent
Conclusion of Law No. 5 is inconsistent with this
opinion, it, and any part of the judgment that follows
therefrom, is vacated.
4. Attorney Fees
[*P30] Aspen next asserts the trial court erred in
denying its request for attorney fees arguing that because
it prevailed against Whipple on the HVAC portion of
Whipple's mechanics' lien claim, it is the prevailing party.
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In light [***19] of our disposition of the preceding
issues, this contention may have merit.
[*P31] The Utah mechanics' lien statute provides
"in any action brought to enforce any lien under this
chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover
reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which
shall be taxed as costs in the action." Utah Code Ann. §
38-1-18 (1997). In this case, although the trial court
initially granted Aspen's motion to dismiss the HVAC
portion of Whipple's mechanics' lien claim because of
improper licensure, it went on to award Whipple the
value of the work performed on Aspen's property. Based
in part on this finding, the trial court concluded that
Whipple was the prevailing party and entitled to an award
of attorney fees. However, this conclusion may be
erroneous in light of our determination that section
58-55-604 precludes Whipple from recovering for its
HVAC work. Based upon our review of the record, it
appears the HVAC claim was the single most important
issue in this case and Aspen, having fully prevailed on
the HVAC claim in this appeal, may now be entitled to
prevailing party status under section 38-1-18. If on
remand the trial court determines Aspen [***20] is the
prevailing party 1 under section 38-1-18, then Aspen
must be given the opportunity to present evidence
regarding attorney fees incurred in pursuing its claim. We
therefore remand this issue to the trial court for a
redetermination of the attorney fees award consistent
with this opinion and the entry of findings necessary to
support the revised award.
1
On remand, the trial court may find helpful
the guidance on this issue offered by Mountain
States Broad. Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555-58
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
[**526] P32 Aspen also asserts the trial court erred
in failing to properly allot Whipple's attorney fees award
according to its underlying claims. We agree. The Utah
Supreme Court has required a party seeking attorney fees
to allocate its request for fees according to its underlying
claim. See Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998).
The party must differentiate between the fees and time
expended for "(1) successful claims for which there may
be an entitlement to attorney fees, (2) [***21]
unsuccessful claims for which there would have been an
entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been
successful, and (3) claims for which there is no
entitlement for attorney fees." Cottonwood Mall Co. v.

Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269-70 (Utah 1992). This
requirement also obligates the trial court to make findings
which closely resemble the requesting party's allocation
of fees on each claim. See Foote, 962 P.2d at 55. Finally,
the trial court must clearly identify and document the
factors it considered dispositive in calculating the award.
See id. Absent such an allocation and documentation, this
court cannot adequately review the trial court's decision.
See 962 P.2d at 57.
[*P33] Here, Whipple submitted an affidavit requesting
attorney fees. However, the affidavit did not differentiate
between the work done that was subject to a fee award
and work that was not. The court acknowledged that it
"had difficulty, based on [Whipple's] attorney fee
affidavit, in separating the amount of time involved with
the mechanics' liens as opposed to the amount of time
spent on other matters." Although Whipple's failure to
apportion attorney fees was a sufficient basis for the trial
court [***22] to deny its fee request, see Utah Farm
Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 66 (Utah 1981),
the court went on to state that "in consideration of the
complexity of the case and the total amount involved,
plaintiff should be awarded . . . $ 7,500 in attorney fees . .
. ."
[*P34] Because the trial court failed to properly
categorize the fee request or detail the factors it
considered in computing the award, see Foote, 962 P.2d
at 56 (concluding "where the parties' evidentiary
submissions in support of a request for attorney fees are
deficient, so will be the court's evaluation of those fees"),
we reverse and remand the issue of fees to the trial court
for a redetermination of the prevailing party, and, based
on that determination, an award of attorney fees
consistent with this opinion.
5. Scheduling Order and Expert Testimony
[*P35] Finally, Aspen contends the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to dismiss Whipple's case
for noncompliance with the scheduling order, permitting
Ken Whipple to testify as an HVAC expert, and in
limiting the scope of testimony provided by Aspen's
expert witness.
A. Scheduling Order
[*P36] Aspen asserts the trial court abused [***23] its
discretion in allowing Whipple to proceed with its case
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despite its failure to comply with the trial court's
scheduling order. Because the trial judge deals directly
with the parties and the discovery process, he or she has
great latitude in determining the most efficient and fair
manner to conduct the court's business. See Utah Dep't of
Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995). As a
result, trial courts have broad discretion in determining
whether a violation of a scheduling order warrants
sanction. See id. The purpose behind a scheduling order
is to allow the parties to properly prepare for trial and to
save the parties from unnecessary expenses. See DeBry,
879 P.2d at 1361.
[*P37] Here, the trial court determined that although
Whipple failed to adequately comply with the scheduling
order, Aspen was provided with sufficient information to
prepare for trial. The court noted that in Whipple's
response to Aspen's interrogatories, Whipple had
specified the witnesses it was going to call at trial and the
substance of their testimony. Thus, the trial court
determined Aspen was not prejudiced by Whipple's
violation of the scheduling order. Because Aspen
obtained [***24] the information necessary to
adequately prepare for trial, we conclude the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss
Whipple's case.
[**527] B. Expert Testimony
[*P38] Aspen also asserts the trial court abused its
discretion in allowing Ken Whipple to testify as an expert
regarding the cost and adequacy of Whipple's HVAC
work and in limiting the scope of testimony provided by
Aspen's expert witness. We conclude that any errors in
this regard were harmless.
[*P39] In order to prove its entitlement to relief on
appeal, Aspen must show it was prejudiced or harmed by
the trial court's action. See Astill v. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081,
1088 (Utah 1998). Because we have determined section
58-55-604 precludes Whipple from maintaining an action
to recover the cost of its HVAC work, the expert
testimony regarding the valuation of Whipple's HVAC
work is irrelevant. In other words, the cost Whipple

incurred in performing the HVAC work is no longer an
issue. Furthermore, Aspen does not contest the court's
finding concerning the cost Aspen will incur in repairing
the defective HVAC work and therefore, we assume its
accuracy. See Cellcom, 939 P.2d at 189. Thus, the trial
[***25] court's rulings regarding the admission of expert
testimony could not have harmed or prejudiced Aspen in
any way and therefore, we affirm the trial court's ruling
on this ground.
CONCLUSION
[*P40] Because Whipple failed to comply with the
licensure requirements of section 58-55-604 and none of
the common law exceptions to the statutory bar apply,
Whipple is precluded from recovering for its HVAC
work. Further, we have determined the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in granting Whipple's Rule 59 motion
"in the interests of justice." Also, because Aspen failed to
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's
findings regarding Whipple's compliance with the
mechanics' lien statute and the value of Whipple's sewer
lateral work, we decline to disturb those findings. We
also remand the issue of attorney fees to the trial court for
a redetermination of the prevailing party and a proper
allocation of attorney fees to that party. Finally, Aspen
was not prejudiced by the trial court's actions in failing to
dismiss Whipple's case for noncompliance with the
scheduling order, permitting Ken Whipple to testify as a
HVAC expert, or in limiting the scope of testimony
provided [***26] by Aspen's expert witness.
[*P41] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Michael J. Wilkins,
Presiding Judge
[*P42] WE CONCUR:
James Z. Davis, Judge
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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OPINION
[*840] On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
RUSSON, Justice:
This case came to us on petition for a writ of
certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals. We granted
certiorari to review the court of appeals' conclusion that
Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax Commission,
796 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1990) (Amax I), requires the Utah

On January 2, 1987, Amax Magnesium Corporation
(Amax) petitioned the Utah [*841] State Tax
Commission (Tax Commission) for a formal hearing
concerning the 1986 [**2] ad valorem tax assessment on
Amax's property located in Tooele County, Utah. Amax
argued that its property should have been assessed by
Tooele County, not the state property tax division, and
thus, Amax was entitled to a twenty percent discount
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-4.5(1) (Supp. 1986). 1
Alternatively, Amax asserted that even if it was proper
for the state tax division to assess its property, Amax was
still entitled to a twenty percent discount to avoid
unconstitutional taxation. Following formal hearings, the
Tax Commission found that (1) it was proper for the state
property tax division to assess the property, and (2) the
twenty percent reduction prescribed by section 59-5-4.5
did not apply to state-assessed property. Based on these
findings, the Tax Commission concluded that the twenty
percent reduction required by section 59-5-4.5 did not
apply to Amax's property. Amax subsequently filed a
petition for reconsideration, which the Tax Commission
denied.
1
Section 59-5-4.5(1), which has since been
repealed, provided:

Page 2
874 P.2d 840, *841; 238 Utah Adv. Rep. 6;
1994 Utah LEXIS 34, **2

When the county assessor uses
the comparable sales or cost
appraisal method in valuing
taxable property for assessment
purposes, the assessor is required
to recognize that various fees,
services, closing costs, and other
expenses related to the transaction
lessen the actual amount that may
be received in the transaction. The
county assessor shall, therefore,
take 80% of the value based on
comparable sales or cost appraisal
of the property as its reasonable
fair cash value for purposes of
assessment.

[**3] On June 29, 1988, Amax petitioned this court
to review the Tax Commission's decision. We reversed
the Tax Commission, holding that the state's use of a tax
valuation method identical to the county's on Amax's
property without applying the county's twenty percent
reduction as provided by section 59-5-4.5 violated article
I, section 24 and article XIII, sections 2 and 3 of the Utah
Constitution. Amax I, 796 P.2d at 1262. Accordingly, we
remanded the case "for the purpose of calculating the
reasonable fair cash value of Amax's real and personal
property pursuant to the formula set out in Utah Code
Ann. § 59-5-4.5." Id.
After a formal hearing on remand, the Tax
Commission found that Amax I required property owners
to "'bear an equal portion of the tax burden in proportion
to the amount of property owned'" (quoting id. at 1260).
The Tax Commission therefore concluded that the twenty
percent reduction set forth in section 59-5-4.5 "should be
applied to that portion of the 1986 AMAX taxable
property which was valued using the same methodology
as was used on the same type of property by the Tooele
County Assessor [**4] in 1986." Accordingly, on
February 25, 1992, the Tax Commission ordered that
"further proceedings be held before the Utah State Tax
Commission to ascertain which properties located within
Tooele County received the application of Utah Code
Annotated § 59-5-4.5 in 1986 and to apply said statute to
the same class of property owned by [Amax] as of
January 1, 1986."

On March 26, 1992, Amax filed a second petition for
review, asserting that the Tax Commission had failed to
implement this court's remand order in Amax I by not
giving Amax an across-the-board tax reduction on all of
its assessed property. We transferred the case to the court
of appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4)
(Supp. 1993) and Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 42. 2
On March 3, 1993, the court of appeals issued Amax
Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 848
P.2d 715 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (Amax II), in which it held
that the Tax Commission "failed to follow the directives
of Amax I when it refused to apply section 59-5-4.5 to all
Amax's property." Id. at 719. Tooele County petitioned
for a writ of certiorari, which we granted. [**5]
2
Section 78-2-2(4) provides, "The Supreme
Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of
the matters over which the Supreme Court has
original appellate jurisdiction, except [matters
within
the
Supreme
Court's
exclusive
jurisdiction]." Similarly, Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 42(a) states, "At any time before a case
is set for oral argument before the Supreme Court,
the Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals
any case except those cases within the Supreme
Court's exclusive jurisdiction."
The sole issue before us is whether Amax I requires
the Tax Commission to grant a [*842] twenty percent
reduction for all of Amax's property, whether real or
personal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case presents a question of law, namely,
whether the Tax Commission and the court of appeals
correctly interpreted this court's decision in Amax I.
Therefore, we apply a correction of error standard. Allen
v. Utah Dep't of Health, 850 P.2d 1267, 1269 (Utah
1993).
ANALYSIS
The Utah Constitution provides: [**6]
All tangible property in the state, not
exempt under the laws of the United
States, or under this Constitution, shall be
taxed at a uniform and equal rate in
proportion to its value, to be ascertained as
provided by law.

Page 3
874 P.2d 840, *842; 238 Utah Adv. Rep. 6;
1994 Utah LEXIS 34, **6

Utah Const. art. XIII, § 2(1). Further, section 3 of article
XIII states in part:
The Legislature shall provide by law a
uniform and equal rate of assessment on
all tangible property in the state, according
to its value in money, except as otherwise
provided in Section 2 of this Article. The
Legislature shall prescribe by law such
provisions as shall secure a just valuation
for taxation of such property, so that every
person and corporation shall pay a tax in
proportion to the value of his, her, or its
tangible property.
Utah Const. art. XIII, § 3(1). Pursuant to these sections,
property taxation must be uniform and equal according to
the property's value.
To meet these requirements, the legislature has
provided that "all tangible property in this state . . . shall
be taxed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to its
value," Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-1 (Supp. 1986), and that
"all taxable property, except as otherwise provided by
law, shall be [**7] assessed at 100% of its reasonable
fair cash value." Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-1(1)(a) (Supp.
1986). In these code provisions, the legislature has
recognized the necessity of uniformity and equality in
property taxation and set the assessment rate at one
hundred percent of the property's reasonable fair cash
value.
However, the legislature, realizing that various
transaction costs will increase the assessed value under
some methods, created an exception to the requirement
that property be taxed at one hundred percent of its
assessed value. Specifically, it provided that when the
county assessor uses either the comparable sales or the
cost appraisal method, the county must discount the
appraised value by twenty percent. Utah Code Ann. §
59-5-4.5 (Supp. 1986). This exception was created in
recognition that these valuation methods are particularly
sensitive to inflation. Board of Equalization v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n ex rel. Benchmark, Inc., 864 P.2d 882,
885 (Utah 1993); Amax I, 796 P.2d at 1260; Rio Algom
Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184, 190 (Utah
1984).
Given both the constitutional [**8] and statutory
requirements of uniformity and equality in property

taxation, this court reasoned in Amax I that it was
unconstitutional to apply a reduction to only
county-assessed property when state property was
assessed using identical assessment methods. Amax I,
796 P.2d at 1261-62. Accordingly, we held that when
either the county or the state uses the comparable sales or
cost appraisal method of assessment, the property owner
is entitled to a twenty percent reduction in valuation
pursuant to section 59-5-4.5 and the Utah Constitution.
Id. at 1260; see also Board of Equalization, 864 P.2d at
886 ("We held [in Amax I] that because the properties
had been assessed by the same method, applying the 20
percent discount to one and not to the other violated the
constitutional requirement of uniform and equal
taxation.").
Amax nonetheless argues that because the last
sentence of Amax I states that "we reverse and remand to
the Tax Commission for the purpose of calculating the
reasonable fair cash value of Amax's real and personal
property pursuant to the formula set out in Utah [**9]
Code Ann. § 59-5-4.5," Amax I, 796 P.2d at 1262, its
personal property is necessarily entitled to a twenty
percent discount pursuant to section 59-5-4.5. We
disagree.
Amax I provides that when identical methods of
property valuation are used by [*843] both the county
and the state to assess taxable property, it is
unconstitutional to give county property a reduction
without giving state property the same reduction. 796
P.2d at 1260. However, when different methods of
property valuation are used, the law does not mandate a
reduction. Rio Algom, 681 P.2d at 194. Likewise, when
neither the comparable sales nor the cost appraisal
method of assessment is used, no such reduction is
appropriate to either county- or state-assessed property,
be it real or personal. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-4.5
(Supp. 1986) (requiring reduction only when comparable
sales or cost appraisal method of assessment used).
Accordingly, when the Tax Commission ordered that
"further proceedings be held before the Utah State Tax
Commission to ascertain which properties located within
Tooele County received the application [**10] of Utah
Code Annotated § 59-5-4.5 in 1986 and to apply said
statute to the same class of property owned by [Amax] as
of January 1, 1986," it did not violate either the reasoning
or the holding of Amax I. Rather, it acted properly in
seeking to determine which of Amax's properties were
assessed by using either the comparable sales or the cost
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appraisal method.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the court of appeals' decision in Amax II
and remand this matter to the Tax Commission for further
proceedings as outlined in its February 25, 1992, order.
WE CONCUR:

Michael D. Zimmerman, Chief Justice
Richard C. Howe, Justice
I. Daniel Stewart, Associate Chief Justice
Christine M. Durham, Justice
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OPINION
[**1229] BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
[*P1] Defendant Randy T. Simonsen (Simonsen)
appeals from the trial court's determination that an
unimproved mountain road which crosses Simonsen's
property and leads to AWINC Corporation's property
(AWINC) is a public road under Utah Code section
72-5-104(1). See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) (2004).
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
[*P2] AWINC and Simonsen own property on
adjacent parcels in the Uinta National Forest. 1 Both
properties are accessed by an unimproved mountain road
(Middle Fork Road).
1

AWINC has failed to adequately brief his

[***2] [*P3] Simonsen attempted to block access
to Middle Fork Road. In 1996 or 1997, Simonsen placed
a metal gate (the Gate) across Middle Fork Road and
constructed a fence which extended 200 feet on each side
of the Gate. Also in 1997, a fence wire drop gate (the
Livestock Gate) was constructed across Middle Fork
Road. The gates prevented use of that part of the road by
AWINC.
[*P4] From the 1960s until 1995, portions of what
is now Simonsen's property were leased for sheep grazing
purposes. One or more of the lessees placed rocks and
tires along a neighboring road called Left Fork Road with
words declaring "No Trespass." Signed rocks were also
placed in the general area where Middle Fork Road
accessed Left Fork Road, but these signs did not halt
public use of Middle Fork Road.
[*P5] At least four individuals testified that their
friends and family used Middle Fork Road for
recreational purposes on a regular basis. Cullen Goodwin,
David Ellis, Fred Addis, and Kenneth Earle testified for
AWINC as to their use of Middle Fork Road by
themselves, friends, and members of their respective
families over a period of many years. They testified that
they did not own property in [***3] the vicinity of
Middle Fork Road nor in the Soldier Summit mountain
area, that they used Middle Fork Road without ever
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asking permission or having been given permission for its
use, and that while operating motor vehicles on the road,
it was common for them to encounter other people not
part of their group or party who were also operating
motor vehicles on the road. These individuals testified
that they were never asked not to use the road, nor were
they told that they could not use the road. Moreover, they
testified that none of them at anytime had seen a gate
across Middle Fork Road prior to the recent construction
of the Gate and the Livestock Gate.
[*P6] AWINC initiated litigation against Simonsen
claiming a prescriptive easement, including a claim for
trespass, damages for the erection of the Gate across
Middle Fork Road, a request for permanent injunction
requiring the opening of the Gate, and a request for a
declaratory judgment that Middle Fork Road be
determined a public road. The trial court dismissed
AWINC's claims for a prescriptive easement, damages,
and an injunction to remove the Gate. However, at the
conclusion of the trial, the court determined [**1230]
that, pursuant [***4] to Utah Code section 72-5-104(1)
and its predecessor, Utah Code section 27-12-89, Middle
Fork Road was a public road and directed Simonsen to
remove the lock from the Gate blocking the road.
Simonsen appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[*P7] First, Simonsen argues the trial court erred in
concluding Middle Fork Road was a public road because
there was not sufficient evidence to sustain the clear and
convincing burden of proof. To establish the dedication
of a public road, we require clear and convincing
evidence. See Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 493
P.2d 639, 639 (1972). It is well established that we
review findings of fact under the clearly erroneous
standard. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah
1994). To find clear error, this court "must decide that the
factual findings made by the trial court are not adequately
supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's
determination." Id. at 935-36.
[*P8] Second, Simonsen argues that the trial court
erred as a matter of law by determining that Middle Fork
Road is a road abandoned to the public. We [***5]
review application of law for correctness. See id. at 936
(stating that in reviewing "a trial court's determination of
the law[,] . . . [an] appellate court decides the matter for
itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's

determination of law").
ANALYSIS
I. Marshaling
[*P9] Simonsen argues that the court's factual
findings were not supported by clear and convincing
evidence. Because Simonsen challenges the factual
findings, he "'must marshal the evidence in support of the
findings and then demonstrate that despite this
evidence,'" the trial court's findings are not supported by
clear and convincing evidence. Young v. Young, 1999 UT
38, P15, 979 P.2d 338 (quoting In re Estate of Bartell,
776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) (other citation omitted)).
To properly marshal the evidence, Simonsen must first
list all of the evidence supporting the challenged finding.
See, e.g., Tingey v. Christensen, 1999 UT 68, P7, 199
Utah 68, 987 P.2d 588. Simonsen must then show that
the marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to support
the findings when viewing the evidence and inferences in
a light most favorable [***6] to the decision. See id.
[*P10] Simonsen has failed to properly marshal the
evidence to show that the findings are not supported by
clear and convincing evidence. Simonsen failed to, "in
comprehensive and fastidious order, [present] every scrap
of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports
the very findings the appellant resists." West Valley City
v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) (emphasis added). Rather, Simonsen provided an
incomplete list of evidence supporting the factual
findings and then claims that the findings are not
supported by clear and convincing evidence. Simonsen
not only failed to provide a comprehensive list of
evidence, but he also failed to "ferret out a fatal flaw in
the evidence," and thus Simonsen fails "to convince [us]
that the court's findings . . . [are] clearly erroneous." Id.
Accordingly, we "assume[] that the record supports the
findings of the trial court and proceed[] to a review of the
accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the
application of that law in the case." Heber City Corp. v.
Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 312 (Utah 1997) (alterations
[***7] in original) (quotations and citations omitted).
II. Highway Abandoned to Public
[*P11] Utah Code section 72-5-104(1) provides
that in order to declare a highway dedicated and
abandoned to the public, it must be established that the
highway "has been continuously used as a public
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thoroughfare for a period of ten years." Utah Code Ann. §
72-5-104(1) (2004). The Utah Supreme Court has
determined that continuous use of a road exists when "the
public, even though not consisting of a great many
persons, made a continuous and uninterrupted use" not
necessarily every day, but "as often as they found it
convenient or necessary." Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395,
326 P.2d 107, 109 (1958); see Heber City, 942 P.2d at
311 [**1231] (determining as a matter of law that a road
was used continuously where the evidence demonstrated
that "the public made a continuous and uninterrupted use
of" the road "as often as they found it convenient or
necessary"). Similarly, in Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc.,
the Utah Supreme Court stated that "use may be
continuous though not constant. . . . provided it occurred
as often as the claimant had occasion [***8] or chose to
pass. . . . Mere intermission is not interruption." 559 P.2d
948, 949 (Utah 1977) (quotations and citation omitted).

use the road whenever they find it "necessary or
convenient." Id. This evidence supports the trial court's
determination that "the public used the road whenever
they found it necessary or convenient and use was limited
only by prevailing weather conditions."

[*P12] Simonsen argues that use of Middle Fork
Road was not continuous because use was blocked by the
Gate, the Livestock Gate, and "No Trespass" signs that
both he and previous lessees installed. In Campbell v.
Box Elder County, this court determined that there was
not continuous use of a road because landowners
generally locked a gate that crossed the road, and several
witnesses testified that they were prevented access to the
road due to the locked gate. See 962 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah
Ct. App. 1998). However, Campbell is distinguishable
from the instant case because the evidence demonstrates
that members of the general public used Middle Fork
Road significantly more than ten years before Simonsen
erected the gates in 1996 and 1997.

[*P16] We also agree with the trial court that
Middle Fork Road was used as a public thoroughfare. To
satisfy this requirement, there must be passing or travel
by the public without permission. 2 See Heber City Corp.
v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 311 (Utah 1997). It is
undisputed that there was travel over Middle Fork Road
without permission.

[*P13] For example, Earle, his family, and his
friends used the road every year starting around July 4th
through late October as early as the 1940s or early 1950s.
Goodwin, Addis, their families, and their friends used
Middle Fork Road every year during May and through
October or [***9] November starting in 1965. Further,
Middle Fork Road was used as recently as either 1977 or
1978 by Ellis, who, along with family and friends, also
used the road every year starting in May ending in
November. Each witness testified that he used the road
every year until the erection of the Gate in 1996 or 1997.
[*P14] Moreover, each witness testified that he did
not use the road every day, but that he used the road for
recreational purposes on a regular basis so long as the
weather permitted. Under Utah law, the public need only

[*P15] Simonsen argues that the "No Trespass"
signed rocks and tires placed in the area in the 1960s
prevent a conclusion that the public used the road
continuously. However, after reviewing the record, we
are persuaded that the signs conveyed, and were intended
to convey, the message that travelers should stay off of
what is now Simonsen's property, not that travelers
should stay off of [***10] Middle Fork Road in
particular. Further, it is undisputed that this was the
understanding of those using the road during this period.
Therefore, we agree that there was continuous use of
Middle Fork Road.

2 The Utah Supreme Court noted that "we have
subsequently abandoned . . . the requirement that
the owner must consent to the dedication." Heber
City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 311 (Utah
1997).
[*P17] In addition, the Utah Supreme Court has
defined "public" in stating that adjoining property owners
cannot be considered members of the public generally
"because adjoining owners may have documentary or
prescriptive rights to [***11] use the road or their use
may be by permission of the owners of the fee of the
road." Id. at 312 (quoting Draper City v. Estate of
Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995)). Here, the
users of Middle Fork Road were not adjoining property
owners. Each of the four users testified that he had never
owned or leased property in the area of Middle Fork
Road and used the road for recreational hunting, fishing,
and camping. The trial court found the four users were
members of the general public. We [**1232] agree that
the users were members of the public.
[*P18] Finally, Simonsen contends that Middle
Fork Road was not a public thoroughfare because the
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users were given permission. The individuals who used
Middle Fork Road testified that they obtained permission
to hunt and paid a fee from time to time originally from a
previous owner of a portion of what is now AWINC
property and then later from AWINC. However, this
permission was not for use of Middle Fork Road, but for
use of what is now a portion of AWINC property. In
addition, the hunting privileges were requested and
secured in 1991 to 1993 at the earliest. As of that time,
Ellis had been using Middle Fork [***12] Road for at
least thirteen years and Goodwin, Addis, and Earle for at
least twenty-five years. Thus, we agree that any
permission that was given "did not pertain to the
[Simonsen property] or that portion of Middle Fork Road
coursing across the [Simonsen property]" and was given
long after the ten year statutory time period was fulfilled.
[*P19] Finally, the evidence supports the trial
court's determination that use of Middle Fork Road
occurred for at least ten years. For example, Earle, his

family, and his friends used the road as early as the 1940s
or early 1950s. Goodwin and Addis testified that their
family and friends used Middle Fork Road starting in
1965. Thus, the evidence shows that continuous use by
the public took place as early as the 1940s or 1950s--at
least forty years before the erection of any gate or fence.
CONCLUSION
[*P20] We conclude that Middle Fork Road was
abandoned to public use. Accordingly, we affirm.
Judith M. Billings,
Presiding Judge
[*P21] WE CONCUR:
James Z. Davis, Judge
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

Page 1

LEXSEE 88 NW2D 98
Frank X. BERGER, also known as Frank Berger, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ray
F. BERGER, also known as Raphael F. Berger; Susan Berger, also known as Susie
Berger, and Eugene Berger, Defendants and Appellants
No. 7742
Supreme Court of North Dakota
88 N.W.2d 98; 1958 N.D. LEXIS 64

February 13, 1958
SYLLABUS
[**1] Syllabus by the Court
1. To establish a highway by prescription, there
must have been general, continuous, uninterrupted and
adverse use of the same as such by the public under a
claim of right for a period of 20 years. Section 24-0701,
NDRC 1943.
2. Mere user by the public of a highway is
insufficient of itself to establish a highway by
prescription or long use. The user must be adverse and
hostile to the rights of the owner.
3. Regardless of how long it is continued, user by
permission or license of the owner of the land sought to
be impressed with a public easement of travel is not
adverse and affords no basis for prescription.
4. Where before prescriptive rights have accrued to
the public, a landowner places gates across a road
through his land, it is notice, or at least a strong
indication, to the public that thereafter they are passing
through the land by permission and not by right.
5. If the evidence is equally as consistent with
permissive use of a road, as with adverse use thereof, the
plaintiff has failed to sustain the burden of proof resting
upon him to show a use under a claim of right.
6. To establish a road over the land of another by
prescription, [**2] the evidence should be clear and

convincing.
7. The evidence is examined and it is held, in the
case at bar, that it is more consistent with permissive use
or license of the road in question than with adverse use or
claim of public right, the use of the road having been
always obstructed by gates and the plaintiff and the
public having acquiesced in its use as thus obstructed.
COUNSEL: Floyd B. Sperry, Golden Valley, Baird &
Baird, Dickinson, for appellants.
Reichert & Reichert, Dickinson, for respondent.
JUDGES: GRIMSON, C. J., and SATHRE, MORRIS
and BURKE, JJ., concur.
OPINION BY: JOHNSON
OPINION
[*99] JOHNSON, Judge.
This is an action in which the plaintiff asserts that there
has been established by user or prescription a public road
across the E 1/2 SE 1/4 of Section 30-141-91; that said
road has been open and in use as a public highway for
more than twenty years and that the public has
established such prescriptive highway under the terms of
Section 24-0701, NDRC 1943. He also asks that the
defendants be enjoined and restrained from fencing and
plowing up the alleged highway or in any manner
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interfering with or obstructing the plaintiff and the public
in the use thereof. The [**3] defendants generally
denied the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint; they
assert that in 1947 a new road was built across the E 1/2
SE 1/4 and that the defendant, Ray F. Berger, paid the
county for its construction; that the plaintiff is not denied
access to his real property; that he has a way out; and
asks for a dismissal of the action.
The case was tried to the court without a jury. The
trial court held for the plaintiff and determined that the
road in question had been established by user or
prescription across the E 1/2 SE 1/4 Section 30-141-91,
that is across defendants' land; that the action of the
defendants in plowing [*100] up the road and fencing if
off in June of 1956, was illegal, and that they were
enjoined and restrained from obstructing or interfering
with the use of said highway by the plaintiff and the
general public.
The defendants made a motion for a new trial on
various grounds. This motion was denied by the trial
court. They also made a motion to amend the answer in
this action to conform to the proof. This was denied by
the trial court.
With the motion for a new trial the defendants served
extended specifications of error and alleged insufficiency
[**4] of the evidence.
The defendants appeal to this court and demand a
trial de novo. In view of our disposition of this case it
will not be necessary to discuss the specifications of error
on the motion for a new trial, or the motion to amend the
answer to conform to the proof.
We will determine the facts from the record anew
without specific reference to the alleged specifications of
error.
In Berger v. Morton County, 57 N.D. 305, 221 N.W.
270, this court held, following Burleigh County v. Rhud,
23 N.D. 362, 136 N.W. 1082, that since the adoption of
Chapter 112 of the 1897 Session Laws, the common law
rule with respect to the establishment of a highway by
prescription is in force in this state.
The common law rule with reference to the
acquisition of a road by prescription is embodied in
Section 24-0701, NDRC 1943 which provides:

'All public roads and highways within this state
which have been or which shall be open and in use as
such, during twenty successive years, hereby are declared
to be public roads or highways and confirmed and
established as such whether the same have been laid out,
established, and opened lawfully or not.'
A highway may be established by long public user
[**5] regardless of whether this mode of establishment is
denominated user, prescription, or the acquisition of the
right by limitation, it being, in any case, the adverse
possession and use which establishes the highway. 39
C.J.S. Highways § 3, page 921.
The fundamental requirements for the establishment
of a public highway by prescription are well defined.
Prescriptive rights under our law accrue only if the
fundamental rules laid down by the courts apply to the
existing facts.
To establish a highway by prescription, there must
have been general, continuous, uninterrupted, and
adverse use of the same as such by the public under a
claim of right, for a period equal to that for the limitations
of real actions. It is unquestioned that a general,
continuous, uninterrupted and adverse user of a highway,
as such, by the public, under a claim of right, for a period
equal to that of the limitation of real actions, in this state
20 years, Section 24-0701, NDRC 1943, will establish a
highway by prescription, and bar the owner of the soil.
See 57 Am.St.Rep., Highways by User, page 748 and
cases cited.
Mere user of land by the public as a highway is
insufficient of itself to establish a highway [**6] by
prescription or long use. The user must be adverse and
hostile to the rights of the owners; and mere travel by the
public does not of itself constitute adverse use of the
property by the public. Regardless of how long it is
continued, a user by license or permission of the owner of
the land sought to be impressed with the public easement
of travel is not adverse and affords no basis for
prescription. 39 C.J.S. Highways § 9, page 929; Harrison
v. Harvey, 202 Ark. 486, 150 S.W.2d 758; People ex rel.
Mayer v. San Luis Valley Land & Cattle Co., 90 Colo.
23, 5 P.2d 873; Van Wieren v. Macatawa Resort Co., 235
Mich. 606, 209 N.W. 825. See also Stickley v. Sodus Tp.,
131 Mich. 510, 91 N.W. 745, [*101] 59 L.R.A. 287; 57
Am.St.Rep. pages 757-758.
Many cases hold that to establish a prescriptive right
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to a road or street the user must be open, adverse, and
under a claim of right, and with the knowledge and
acquiescence of the owner or owners of the land in or
over which the easement is claimed. See 57 Am.St.Rep.,
page 749.
Permissive use has reference to the conduct of the
landowner in acquiescing and consenting that the road be
traveled by the public while adverse user imports [**7]
an assertion of right on the part of those traveling the
road, hostile to that of the owner. 39 C.J.S. Highways §
9, page 929. The hostile use of a road over privately
owned land necessary to establish a prescriptive right
means a use inconsistent with the owner's right to
exclusive use. It does not imply enmity or ill will and is
consistent with friendly relations between user of the road
and landowner. King County v. Hagen, 30 Wash.2d 847,
194 P.2d 357.
With these fundamental general rules in mind, it
remains to set forth the essential facts disclosed by the
record to see whether such user as is here shown of the
road in question, meets the necessary requirements to
establish it as a highway by user or prescription.
The plaintiff and the defendants are neighbors. The
buildings of the plaintiff are located on the W 1/2 SE 1/4
Section 30-141-91. The buildings of the defendants are
located in the E 1/2 SE 1/4 of the same section, township
and range. Preceding the occupancy of the W 1/2 SE 1/4
of Section 30 by the plaintiff, his father, Charles Berger,
had lived there for 48 years. He had homesteaded the
place about 1902. He or his son, Frank X. Berger, had
occupied the W [**8] 1/2 SE 1/4 from that time until the
trial the W 1/2 SE 1/4 from that time until the trial had
existed over the E 1/2 SE 1/4 Section 30-141-91. This
trail came in from the north going south for a
considerable way and then turned east across the E 1/2 SE
1/4 of Section 30 to the east section line of that section.
This trial probably originated in either 1912 or 1913. A
bridge on the east section line of Section 30 was washed
out about that time, so it was impossible to go over the
section line and it appears that this trail was created
shortly after that time. Some of the trail was on the
plaintiff's place and crossed the entire E 1/2 of the SE 1/4
of the defendant Ray Berger's place. Both the plaintiff,
Frank Berger, and his father, Charles Berger, claim that
the trail was graded in 1920 or 1921. This work was
done, it is claimed, by Charles Berger and his brother,
John Berger, the father of Ray F. Berger, one of the

defendants in this action. Whether the trail was graded or
graveled in the years specified is immaterial. It remained
in about the same place from the time it began to be
traveled until 1947. In 1947 the location of the trail was
straightened and changed across [**9] the E 1/2 SE 1/4.
In that year the evidence shows that Ray F. Berger paid to
Elling Helmer, one of the county commissioners of Stark
County, the sum of $ 20, for grading a private road on
Section 30-141-91.
The road was used not only by Frank X. Berger, the
plaintiff, but also by Ray F. Berger and by some people
coming in from the north.
The evidence discloses that a gate was put in where
the trail entered the section line at the east of Section 30,
and had been maintained there by John Berger and Ray
Berger, from about 1902, the time that the land was
settled by his father John Berger. To use the trail it was
necessary to go through this gate. It also appears that
Frank, the plaintiff, had a gate on the east of his land, that
is on the east line of the W 1/2 SE 1/4. It was put there
either by his father, Charles Berger, or with his consent
and acquiescence. So far as the evidence discloses there
were gates on the east line of the W 1/2 of the SE 1/4 and
on the east line of Section 30, where the trail entered
[*102] the section line there after crossing the E 1/2 of
the SE 1/4 of Section 30.
Some third parties who testified in this action
remembered the gates that were [**10] on the trial.
Some also remembered a cattle crossing on the east line
of the W 1/2 of the SE 1/4 of Section 30. The witnesses
that testified to having used the trail admitted that when
they went through if the gates were closed, they also
closed them.
It is significant that on cross-examination Frank X.
Berger, the plaintiff, testified with reference to a gate as
follows:
'Q. Now, Mr. Berger, have you ever talked to Ray
about using this road?
'Mr. Reichert: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant
and immaterial.
'The Court: Overruled.
'A. Yes, I have.
'Q. Did Mr. Ray Berger say anything to you like
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'Frank, would you please remember to keep that gate
closed?'

adverse user for a period of 20 years so as to come within
the terms of Section 24-0701, NDRC 1943. The travel
over the trail has always been obstructed by gates.

'Mr. Reichert: This is objected to as immaterial.
'Mr. Baird: It is very material to the case, your
Honor, to establish the point of the use of this road.
'The Court: Overruled.
'A. Keep it closed.
'Q. And didn't you agree to keep it closed? A. I
did.'
It thus appears that not only did Frank have
knowledge of a gate, but had agreed with the defendant,
Ray Berger, to keep it closed. This testimony is revealing
as it bears upon the intent of the defendant, Ray F.
Berger, to retain control, possession and dominion [**11]
of his property. It is also evidence of the plaintiff's
acquiescence of Ray Berger's attempt to retain control,
possession and dominion of his land. It tends to negative
the plaintiff's claim of adverse and hostile use of the trail
as a basis for establishing a public right to its use.
In April 1947, Frank Berger went to see Ray about
building a road across the E 1/2 SE 1/4 from its east line
to the east line of the W 1/2 SE 1/4. It appears that the
road was to be built with the understanding that the gates
would be kept closed. The road as built in 1947 covered
in part the trail road that had been across this property. It
was paid for by Ray F. Berger. The fence was left on the
E 1/2 of the SE 1/4 and the gate was moved to the
location of the road as constructed.
In 1956 some trouble arose between the parties. The
defendant, Ray F. Berger claims that his cattle got out
into some silage and became bloated. At any rate in May
1956 the defendant, Ray F. Berger, in the presence of two
witnesses, told the plaintiff that he was going to close the
road and plow it up.
No one is claiming any public right to the road over
the defendant, Ray Berger's place, except the plaintiff.
[**12] He has a way out to the north.
A close analysis of the evidence discloses no facts
that show unequivocal and satisfactory proof of the
intention of the defendants to grant an easement to the
public or to relinquish dominion, possession and control
of their property so as to establish a trail by continued

It must be conceded that placing obstructions across
a road, such as a gate, is a strong indication that the use
by others is permissive only, and that erection of a gate or
gates across the road tends to evidence an intention on the
part of the owner to assume and assert ownership and
possession of the land over which the road runs.
Williams v. Prather, 239 Ala. 524, 196 So. 118.
[*103] In Pierce v. Jones, 207 Ark. 139, 179
S.W.2d 454, it was held that where a landowner places
gates across a road through his land, it is notice to the
public that they thereafter are passing through the land by
permission and not by right, so that no prescriptive right
to the use of the road can be acquired. See Elliott, Roads
[**13] and Streets, 4th Ed., Section 198, page 243.
The plaintiff never made any claim that the road in
question had become a public highway until after the
defendant gave him notice that he was going to close the
gates. It is apparent from the evidence that the plaintiff
until the spring of 1956 was perfectly satisfied with the
arrangement to pass over the defendant's land through the
gates; he had acquiesced therein. These gates had been
placed on the land so that the defendant could keep his
cattle on the farm.
To establish a public way by prescription it is
necessary for the plaintiff to prove an adverse use of the
land which had continued for more than 20 years under a
claim of right and with the acquiescence of the
defendants or their predecessor in title. The mere fact of
the user by the public for the period required to establish
a public way, raises no presumption that such use is
adverse. To establish such a use a further fact must be
proved, or admitted, that the general public used the way
as a public right; and that it did, must be proved by facts
which distinguish the use relied on from rightful use by
those who have permissive right to travel over the private
way. Bullukian [**14] v. Inhabitants of Town of
Franklin, 248 Mass. 151, 142 N.E. 804; Sprow v. Boston
& A. R. Co., 163 Mass. 330, 339, 39 N.E. 1024, 1025. In
this last case it is said:
'If all the evidence which was introduced was equally
consistent with the view that the uses relied on were of
the latter character, (permissive use), the plaintiff failed
to sustain the burden of proof resting upon him to show a
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use under a claim of right.'
The burden of proof was upon the plaintiff. He has
not sustained it by clear and convincing or satisfactory
evidence such as establishes a public highway by
prescriptive use.
The establishment of a public highway by
prescription must be shown by preponderance of the
evidence; and sometimes it is said that the evidence must
be satisfactory, clear and definite or clear and convincing.
39 C.J.S. Highways § 23 c. pages 944, 945; Burk v.
Diers, 102 Neb. 721, 169 N.W. 263; Violet v. Martin, 62
Mont. 335, 205 P. 221; Maynard v. Bara, 96 Mont. 302,
30 P.2d 93.
In Burk v. Diers, supra, it was held that passive
permission by the owner of the land of the use of it by the
public is not alone evidence of intent to dedicate to such
use. It was further held that if a road claimed [**15] as a
highway was a mere neighborhood road, much stronger
evidence of a dedication or of a prescriptive right would
be required than if it was a thoroughfare or a part of an
acknowledged highway.
In Violet v. Martin, supra [62 Mont. 335, 205 P.
223], the court said:
'In the case at bar, the public never assumed any
jurisdiction or exercised any rights over the road in
question; nor did it regard the travel there as adverse;
there has always been a gate at one end, and since 1913
there has been a gate at the other end, both of which have
been recognized by the plaintiffs and such other persons
as occasionally passed over it. The evidence
preponderates against the use of the road as followed
since 1902 by the public * * *. To charge the owner with
abandonment and dedication or to credit the user with an
adverse intent would penalize generosity and destroy
neighborhood accommodation.' (Emphasis supplied.)
For similar remarks see Burk v. Diers, supra.
[*104] The Violet v. Martin case presents a very
similar situation to the one involved in the case at bar.
While undoubtedly some third parties used the
alleged public highway, which the plaintiff is claiming,
the road was [**16] mostly used by the plaintiff and the

defendant, Ray Berger. It was not in any sense a
thoroughfare or part of an acknowledged highway.
In Burk v. Diers, supra, it was also held that the facts
and circumstances must be such as to indicate an
unequivocal intent to devote the strip of land to a public
use. No such intent can unequivocally be ascertained
from the evidence presented in the case at bar. In
Maynard v. Bara, 96 Mont. 302, 30 P.2d 93, the court
held that before a road may be established by prescription
over the land of another, the evidence must be clear and
convincing that the use of the road by the public was
adverse and not merely permitted by the landowner.
When the road in question here was changed in 1947
it was with the apparent acquiescence of the plaintiff. No
user of the trail up to that time, from about 1912 or 1913
to 1947, indicated anything more than the permission of
the defendant, Ray Berger, to allow the plaintiff and
those of the public that wanted to use the trail, to pass
over it through the gates on the E 1/2 SE 1/4 of Section
30-141-91. We believe that the evidence in this case is
more consistent with permissive use or license to use the
trail than [**17] it is with the plaintiff's claim that it was
adverse user which after 20 years established a
prescriptive public highway. The facts shown by the
plaintiff are not so unequivocal, or clear and convincing,
as to warrant us in determining that the use of the trail in
question amounts to a prescriptive right with which the
defendants may not now interfere or terminate.
Nor does the evidence show that the plaintiff has
acquired any easement in the defendants' land. He had
access to the trail by the permission of the owner of the
land, and it appears that that permission was always
dependent upon the closing of the gates so that the
defendants' cattle would not stray from his land. A
permissive use of a right of way over another's land will
not become an easement by prescription no matter how
long continued unless it has been changed into an adverse
use. 28 C.J.S. Easements § 18 d, Permissive Use, page
666. The defendant, Ray F. Berger, had a right to revoke
the permissive use of the trail when the plaintiff no longer
was willing to close the gates.
Accordingly the judgment of the trial court is
reversed and the injunction is dissolved.
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LEXSEE 962 P2D 806
Norma Campbell; Lamont Campbell; and The Campbell Cattle Company, a Utah
general partnership, Plaintiffs and Appellees, v. Box Elder County, Defendant and
Appellant. Box Elder County, Third-party Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Norma
Campbell; Lamont Campbell; The Campbell Cattle Company, a Utah general
partnership; Paul D. Barnes; Evelyn Barnes; Coleen Barnes; Eldon M. Barnes;
Wanda Barnes; Burke Heaton; and The Heaton Limited Family Partnership,
Third-party Defendants and Appellees.
Case No. 970587-CA
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH
962 P.2d 806; 346 Utah Adv. Rep. 9; 1998 Utah App. LEXIS 46

June 25, 1998, Filed
PRIOR HISTORY:
[**1] First District, Brigham
City Department. The Honorable Ben Hadfield.
DISPOSITION: Affirmed.

that a section of "Ridge Road" owned by the Campbells
and their co-appellees, the Barneses and Heatons, was not
a public thoroughfare under Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89
(1995). We affirm.
FACTS

COUNSEL: Jon J. Bunderson and John D. Sorge,
Brigham City, for Appellant.
Bruce R. Baird, Salt Lake City, for Appellees.
Jan Graham, Norman K. Johnson, and Daniel G.
MoQuin, Salt Lake City, for Amicus Curiae State of
Utah.
JUDGES: Before Judith M. Billings, Judge. WE
CONCUR: James Z. Davis, Presiding Judge, Michael J.
Wilkins, Associate Presiding Judge.
OPINION BY: JUDITH M. BILLINGS
OPINION
[*807] OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
Box Elder County appeals a trial court determination

Ridge Road begins on the Campbells' property and
continues many miles over property owned by the other
appellees and by the United States Forest Service.
Because the land ownership is in a checker board pattern,
the road crosses back and forth between private property
and Forest Service land. Other public roads cross the
Forest Service land and join Ridge Road [**2] after it
traverses appellees' properties, and members of the public
can access the Ridge Road either through the Campbells'
property or through higher altitude Forest Service land.
The trial court found that the use of all privately
owned segments of the road was identical because a gate
on the Campbell section blocked access from the main
road. However, at all relevant times there was a gate
where Ridge Road turned off the main county road and
onto the Campbell property. The gate on the Campbell
property was generally locked, and several witnesses
testified that they had been prevented from accessing
Ridge Road by the locked gate. However, the Campbells
customarily opened this gate during the October deer
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hunt so that hunters could cross their property to access
the Forest Service land. Based on these facts, the court
concluded that Ridge Road had not become a public
thoroughfare. Box Elder County appeals.
ANALYSIS
Box Elder County argues the trial court erred as a
matter of law when it concluded that Ridge Road had not
been abandoned and dedicated as a public thoroughfare
under Utah's public use dedication statute. 1
1
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89 (1995) (Public
use constituting dedication) states:
a highway shall be deemed to have been
dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public
when it has been continuously used as a public
thoroughfare for a period of ten years.
[**3] In deciding whether a road has been
dedicated to public use under section 27-12-89, a trial
court must make initial fact [*808] findings and then
apply the law to those fact findings to determine whether
they meet the statutory guidelines for public dedication.
"We review this ultimate determination, which is a mixed
question of fact and law, for correctness." Heber City
Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1997) (citing
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)). However,
we grant the trial court significant discretion in its
application of the facts to section 27-12-89 requirements
because "its legal requirements, other than the ten year
requirement, are highly fact dependent and somewhat
amorphous." 942 P.2d at 309 (citation omitted). Finally,
because "the law does not lightly allow the transfer of
property from private to public use," the county bears the
burden of proving dedication to the public by "clear and
convincing evidence." Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo,
888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995)(citation omitted).
I. Were the Trial Court's Findings of Fact Clearly
Erroneous?
Box Elder County assigns error to several of the trial
court's fact findings. However, [**4] Box Elder County
has failed to marshal the evidence supporting these
findings or to establish that the findings are clearly
erroneous.
To successfully challenge a trial court's findings of
fact on appeal, "an appellant must marshal the evidence

in support of the findings and then demonstrate that
despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so
lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the
evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'"
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 1997 Utah LEXIS 105, 331 Utah
Adv. Rep. 68, 70 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). When a
party fails to marshal the evidence supporting a
challenged fact finding, we reject the challenge as
"'nothing more than an attempt to reargue the case before
[the appellate] court.'" Promax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson,
943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), cert denied, 943
P.2d 247 (Utah 1997) (quoting Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida
Cold Storage & Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1053
(Utah Ct. App. 1994)). Thus, we "'assume[] that the
record supports the findings of the trial court and
proceed[] to a review of the accuracy of the lower court's
conclusions of law and the application of that law in the
case.'" Heber City Corp., [**5] 942 P.2d 307, 312
(quoting Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah
1991)). Because Box Elder County has failed to marshal
the evidence in support of the challenged fact findings
and prove that they were clearly erroneous, we accept the
trial court's fact findings for the purpose of our analysis. 2
2 Box Elder County argues the trial court erred
in finding that all three privately owned segments
of Ridge Road were used identically. However,
Box Elder County has not properly challenged the
trial court's factual finding that the use was the
same for all segments, and we therefore accept
this key factual finding.
II. Did the Trial Court Err in Concluding that Ridge Road
Was Not a Public Thoroughfare under Section
27-12-89?
Under section 27-12-89, a road "shall be deemed to
have been dedicated and abandoned to the use of the
public when it has been continuously used as a public
thoroughfare for a period of ten years." Utah Code Ann. §
27-12-89 (1995). Three factors must be present for a road
[**6] to become a public highway by dedication under
section 27-12-89: "there must be (i) continuous use, (ii)
as a public thoroughfare, (iii) for a period of ten years."
Heber City Corp., 942 P.2d at 310. "Once the technical
provisions of [section 27-12-89] have been satisfied, the
road is a 'public highway.' The court has no discretion to
ignore that fact." Id. at 313. 3
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Appellees also appear to argue that
abandonment and dedication cannot take place
unless the owner intended to dedicate the road to
public use. This requirement appears in early
cases. See, e.g., Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243,
252, 161 P. 1127, 1131 (Utah 1916). However
more recent cases have definitively stated that
owner intent is now irrelevant to determining
whether a road has been dedicated and abandoned
to public use. See Draper City, 888 P.2d at 1099
(citations omitted) ("It is not necessary to prove
that the owner of the private road had the intent to
offer the road to the public. Rather, under section
27-12-89, the owner's intent may be inferred by
the mere acquiescence in allowing the public to
use the road.").
[**7] In this case, the trial court found that Ridge
Road has been used by the public for [*809] over ten
years. However, it concluded the road had not been
dedicated to public use because it had not been used
continuously as a public thoroughfare. The trial court
based this conclusion on two fact findings: 1) Ridge Road
was generally used only during the deer hunting season,
and was frequently closed to the public at other times,
and; 2) the use of Ridge Road during the hunting season
was by permission of the Campbells, who removed the
lock from the gate "and knowingly permitted hunters to
use the road." Thus, we examine for correctness the trial
court's conclusion that the pattern of use described in its
findings of fact was not "continuous" use as a "public
thoroughfare."
A. Continuous Use
We first address whether the trial court erred in
concluding that the public's use of Ridge Road outside
deer hunting season was not continuous. In Boyer v.
Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395, 326 P.2d 107 (Utah 1958), the
supreme court concluded there had been continuous and
uninterrupted use of a road over ten years where "the
public, even though not consisting of a great many
persons, made a continuous [**8] and uninterrupted use.
. . as often as they found it convenient or necessary." 326
P.2d at 109. Similarly, in Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc.,
559 P.2d 948 (Utah 1977), the supreme court stated that,
"use may be continuous though not constant. . . .
provided it occurred as often as the claimant had
occasion or chose to pass. Mere intermission is not
interruption." Id. at 949 (Emphasis added) (citation

omitted). Finally, in Heber City Corp., 942 P.2d at 311,
the supreme court found continuous use of a road where
the evidence at trial demonstrated that the public "made a
continuous and uninterrupted use of" the road "as often as
they found it convenient or necessary." Based on this
evidence, the court concluded "as a matter of law that
[the road] . . . was used continuously." (Citation and
footnote omitted).
Under Utah law, use need not be regular to be
continuous. Even infrequent use can result in dedication
of a road as a public thoroughfare. However, under the
continuous use requirement, members of the public must
have been able to use the road whenever they found it
necessary or convenient. Here, the trial court explicitly
found the public had not been able to use [**9] Ridge
Road as often as they found it necessary or convenient.
On the contrary, the trial court found Ridge Road was
generally barred by a locked gate, and several members
of the public testified that they had been unable to use the
road because of the gate. Thus the trial court concluded
that the use of the road outside of deer hunting season
was at the Campbell's convenience, rather than at the
convenience of the public. The trial court correctly
interpreted the statute when it determined that the county
had not shown continuous public use of Ridge Road.
B. Use as a Public Thoroughfare
We next address whether the trial court correctly
concluded that deer hunters' use of the road during
hunting season was not use "as a public thoroughfare"
because it was with the Campbell's permission. It is
firmly established under Utah law that permissive use
cannot result in either adverse possession or dedication of
private property to the public. See, e.g., Heber City Corp.,
942 P.2d at 311-12; Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447,
449-50 (Utah 1981).
In this case, the trial court concluded that the deer hunters
used Ridge Road with the Campbells' permission. The
trial court based [**10] this conclusion on testimony at
the hearing that the Campbells had unlocked the gate
every year except 1994 for deer hunting season and had
relocked it at the end of each hunting season. The trial
court correctly concluded that permissive use of Ridge
Road could not result in dedication as a public
thoroughfare.
CONCLUSION

Page 4
962 P.2d 806, *809; 346 Utah Adv. Rep. 9;
1998 Utah App. LEXIS 46, **10
The trial court correctly concluded Ridge Road was not
dedicated to public use because it had not been
continuously used as a public thoroughfare. We therefore
affirm.
Judith M. Billings, Judge

WE CONCUR:
James Z. Davis, Presiding Judge
Michael J. Wilkins, Associate Presiding Judge
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Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; Draper Irrigation Company; Estes
Homes; Roberta M. and Grant E. Kirkham; Little Willow Irrigation Company;
Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City; Edward E. and Caroline B. Morgan;
Town of Riverton; Traverse Associates; Utah Valley Land; and Duane B. and
Shaunna M. Woodmansee, Plaintiffs by Election and Appellees, v. Estate of Fannie
Bernardo, deceased; Paul L. Bernardo, an individual and personal representative of
the Estate of Fannie Bernardo; Jimmy T. Bernardo, an individual; John A.
Bernardo, an individual; and John Does 1-20, Defendants and Appellants, and
Randy H. and Joelene D. Charlton; Harold A. and Mary G. Daw; Earl J. and
Vaunnal Garfield; and Ruth Gordon, Defendants by Election and Appellants, and
Corner Canyon Water Company, Intervening Defendant.
No. 930502
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January 19, 1995, FILED
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
Publication February 9, 1995.

[**1] Released for

OPINION BY: HOWE
OPINION

PRIOR HISTORY: Third District, Salt Lake County.
The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis.
[*1098] HOWE, Justice:
COUNSEL: Michael Z. Hayes, Lisa G. Romney, Salt
Lake City, for all appellees, with the exceptions of
Thomas D. Walk, Salt Lake City, for LDS Church. David
L. Church, Salt Lake City, for Metropolitan Water
District of Salt Lake City.
Dean W. Sheffield, Salt Lake City, for all appellants.
JUDGES: HOWE, Justice: WE CONCUR: Michael D.
Zimmerman, Chief Justice, I. Daniel Stewart, Associate
Chief Justice, Christine M. Durham, Justice, Leonard H.
Russon, Justice

Draper City and several individuals commenced this
action to have what is known as the Lower Corner
Canyon Road, which lies within the City's limits,
declared to have been dedicated and abandoned to the use
of the public pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89
(1989) on the ground that it had been continuously used
as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years.
Defendant Paul L. Bernardo, personal representative of
the Estate of Fannie Bernardo, Jimmy T. Bernardo, and
John A. Bernardo, along with thirty others, own property
adjacent to the road, which is 14,000 lineal feet, or 2.65
miles, long. The trial court ordered each of the other
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property owners whose [**2] property "adjoined,
abutted, or was crossed by" the road to join the action as
either defendants or plaintiffs. Each owner consequently
joined either as a plaintiff by election or as a defendant
by election.

have been dedicated and abandoned to the
use of the public when it has been
continuously used as a public thoroughfare
for a period of ten years.
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89 (1989).

Both sides moved for summary judgment. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs
and plaintiffs by election. Defendants and defendants by
election appeal.
FACTS
The trial court determined that there were no
disputed issues of material fact and entered findings of
fact to the following effect: In the southeast corner of the
Salt Lake Valley in Draper City lies Corner Canyon.
Since at least 1910, there has been a narrow and unpaved
Lower Corner Canyon Road that connects with Upper
Corner Canyon Road, which leads up over a mountain
crest and down to the city of Alpine, Utah, a total
distance of about nine miles. People used Lower Corner
Canyon Road during the 1920s to mine and haul silica
from a pit in the area. During the 1920s and 1930s,
ranchers used the road to transport and graze livestock.
During the depression years of the 1930s, people used the
road to collect firewood in the canyon area. In the 1940s,
the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City [**3]
constructed an aqueduct and tunnel in the Corner Canyon
area and used the road to transport equipment and
laborers up the canyon. Employees of the District have
continued to use the road to perform maintenance checks
and to read meters and other measuring devices. In the
1950s, a natural gas pipeline was installed which crosses
the road in several places, and the road was used to
access this pipeline. Through the 1950s, '60s, and '70s,
Salt Lake County graded the road and added road base
when needed. Critical to this case, the court found that
the road has been used by the general public, including
boy scout groups, for recreational hiking, camping,
horseback riding, and picnicking from the 1920s to the
present time and for riding motorized vehicles, including
cars, trucks, 4 x 4s, motorcycles, and all-terrain vehicles,
since the 1930s.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs brought their action pursuant to section
27-12-89, which provides:
[*1099] A highway shall be deemed to

It is not necessary to prove that the owner of [**4]
the private road had the intent to offer the road to the
public. Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447, 449 (Utah
1981). Rather, under section 27-12-89, the owner's intent
may be inferred by the mere acquiescence in allowing the
public to use the road. Id.; Leo M. Bertagnole, Inc. v.
pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211, 213 (Utah 1981).
The law does not lightly allow the transfer of
property from private to public use. The public's taking of
property in such circumstances as this case presents
requires proof of dedication by clear and convincing
evidence. Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 130, 493
P.2d 639, 639 (1972); Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d
376, 377-78, 438 P.2d 545, 548 (1968). This higher
standard of proof is demanded since the ownership of
property should be granted a high degree of sanctity and
respect. Petersen, 438 P.2d at 548-49 (Crockett, C.J.,
dissenting). In addition, "'the presumption is in favor of
the property owner; and the burden of establishing public
use for the required [**5] period of time is on those
claiming it.'" Bertagnole, 639 P.2d at 213 (quoting
Bonner v. Sudbury, 18 Utah 2d 140, 143, 417 P.2d 646,
648 (1966)). Clearly, plaintiffs bear the burden of
demonstrating dedication to the public of Lower Corner
Canyon Road.
Summary judgment is proper only when there are no
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jackson v.
Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982); Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c). We have carefully reviewed the many affidavits
filed by the parties in support of and in opposition to the
motions for summary judgment. Our analysis reveals a
number of disputed issues of material fact. For discussion
purposes, we will discuss use of the road prior to 1960
and then use after that year.
The main thrust of the affidavits filed by defendants
is that people using the road as described in the court's
findings of fact prior to about 1960 did so with the
permission of the landowners over whose property the
road coursed. For example, the people using the road
during the 1920s and the 1930s to extract [**6] silica
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from a pit, to gather firewood, and to transport and graze
cattle and sheep were either owners of land adjacent to
the road, their employees, or people to whom permission
had been given by the landowners. Access to the silica pit
required use of only the lower part of the road. The
general public did not use the road for hiking, picnicking,
camping, horseback riding, or riding motor vehicles. The
road was used for those purposes only by landowners,
their family members, and people to whom express
permission had been given. Boy scout groups using the
road did so with permission and were ordered off the
property when permission had not been given. The
Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City is the
owner of 10.87 acres in Corner Canyon, and its use of the
road to reach its property was by permission or "by
grant," although a District employee denied that it had a
grant to use the road.
It is important here to note that our case law has
distinguished between use of a road by owners of
adjoining property and by the general public. "Such
property owners cannot be considered members of the
public generally, as that term generally is used in
dedication by user statutes." Petersen, 438 P.2d at 546.
[**7] This is because adjoining owners may have
documentary or prescriptive rights to use the road or their
use may be by permission of the owners of the fee of the
road. In Thompson v. Nelson, 2 Utah 2d 340, 345, 273
P.2d 720, 723 (1954), we made this point clear by
quoting the following from Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243,
251, 161 P. 1127, 1131 (1916):
Under this statute the highway, even
though it be over privately owned ground,
will be deemed dedicated or abandoned to
the public use when the public has
continuously used it as a thoroughfare for
a period of 10 years, but such use must be
by the public. Use under private right is
not sufficient.
[*1100] Although the trial court found that there was no
documentary evidence that people using the road had any
private right, that finding does not preclude those users
from having a right by prescription or that their use was
by permission. Thus, we find that there is a material issue
of fact as to whether people using the road prior to 1960
were members of the general public whose use could
ripen into a public way or whether they were landowners
[**8] in the area who had either a private right to use the

road or permission of the owners over whose land the
road coursed.
We turn now to use of the road since 1960. The trial
court found that since that year (and prior thereto),
members of the general public had used the road for
hiking, camping, horseback riding, and riding motorized
vehicles. This finding was based on affidavits filed by
plaintiffs and by people who lived near the road and had
opportunity to observe use of the road by the public. One
affiant, Ronald E. Allen, averred that he had observed
people using the road for recreational purposes in the
1950s and 1960s. These users are not identified, and the
affidavit is silent as to whether they had permission to use
the road. He avers only that he was not denied access to
the road until 1990. The same infirmities exist with the
affidavits of Marlon Parkin and Alan Summerhays.
Parkin averred that he had seen many people use the road
for recreational purposes since 1966. Summerhays
averred that from 1960 to the present time, there has been
continual use of the road by people for recreational
purposes. The affidavits of all three affiants are silent as
to whether these recreational [**9] users used the full
length of the road (2.65 miles) or whether they traveled
only part way to reach their desired recreational
destinations.
Defendants filed several affidavits which
controverted the findings of fact and the averments made
in plaintiffs' affidavits. These affiants generally
acknowledged the following: Since the early 1960s,
people who may properly be called members of the
general public have used or attempted to use the road for
recreational purposes or to reach private property on
which they would recreate; these people were trespassers;
some of them were stopped and asked to leave;
sometimes, some of them were given permission to
remain; owners posted "no trespassing" signs at the
entrance to the road; on occasions, they have called the
county sheriff or the Draper police to remove trespassers;
and in the 1970s and 1980s, they blocked the road
through means which varied from digging trenches to
stacking concrete blocks and to piling dirt, rocks, and
snow to prevent trespassing. It is unclear how successful
these attempts at blocking were. Finally, in 1990, a gate
was erected at the entrance to the road.
The affidavits filed by defendants also disputed the
extent [**10] of the road which may have been traversed
by these recreational users. The affiants averred that for
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the past twenty to twenty-five years, the road above the
silica pit has been impassable by any vehicle because the
road has been covered with vegetation, undergrowth,
rocks, mud, and dirt. One affiant described this portion of
the road as "no more than several unconnected paths." An
engineer's inspection of the road made at the request of
Draper City disclosed that an 800-foot section of the road
was impassable due to a 4-foot gully. Because of this
condition, a vehicle could not be driven to the end of the
lower road where it connects with the upper road.
Plaintiffs counter that any possible obstruction of the
road by defendants came too late since there had been
public use for nearly sixty years prior to any obstruction
attempts. However, neither they, the trial court in its
findings, nor we have been able to pinpoint any ten-year
period during which public use, as we have defined it, of
the full length of the road is undisputed. Continuous use
for ten years is required by section 27-12-89.
In granting summary judgment, it is apparent that the
trial court gave more weight to some [**11] affidavits
than to others. This was inappropriate at this stage of the
litigation. On a motion for summary judgment, a trial
court should not weigh disputed evidence, and its sole
inquiry should be whether material issues of fact exist.
W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Nat'l Resources Co., 627 P.2d
56, 59 (Utah 1981).
[*1101] It is not the purpose of the
summary judgment procedure to judge the
credibility of the averments of parties, or
witnesses, or the weight of evidence.
Neither is it to deny parties the right to a
trial to resolve disputed issues of fact. Its
purpose is to eliminate the time, trouble
and expense of trial when upon any view
taken of the facts as asserted by the party
ruled against, he would not be entitled to
prevail.
Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975).
We have additionally held that "it only takes one sworn
statement under oath to dispute the averments on the
other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact."
Id.
Due to conflicting sworn statements, clouds of doubt
yet remain over the possible dedication of the road to the
public. At this initial stage, plaintiffs have fallen [**12]

short of presenting undisputed evidence which warrants
summary judgment in their favor. Their affidavits
certainly fail to clearly and convincingly prove their
position. See Petersen, 438 P.2d at 548. "Summary
judgment procedure is generally considered a drastic
remedy," Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1181 (Utah
1993), and is appropriate only when the facts are clear
and undisputed. We therefore reverse the trial court's
conclusion that as a matter of law the road was dedicated
to the public. Fact-sensitive cases such as this case do not
lend themselves to a determination on summary
judgment.
We distinguish the instant case from Thurman v.
Byram, 626 P.2d at 450, where we upheld the dedication
of a private road to the public under section 27-12-89. In
Thurman, the general public had never been asked not to
use the road, and the county sheriff had not been asked to
prevent trespassing. Id. at 449. In contrast, there are
averments in the instant case that trespassers were
directed to leave and that the county sheriff and the
Draper City police [**13] were often asked to prevent
this illegal activity. In Thurman, the road provided the
sole access to certain public property, and state and
county crews had assisted in the installation of a bridge in
the road." Id. That is not the case for Lower Corner
Canyon Road. It does not lead to any public property.
According to several affiants, the road past the silica pit
has been impassable for the past twenty to twenty-five
years, making travel over the mountain crest to Alpine no
longer possible. In addition, affiants denied that Salt Lake
County had ever performed anything but minimal
maintenance on the road except on a few isolated
occasions. They also averred that Draper City, soon after
its incorporation in 1978, affirmatively renounced any
responsibility to maintain the road and posted a sign near
its entrance to that effect. Cf. Bertagnole, 639 P.2d at
212-14 (upholding dedication of road to the public where
numerous trespassers had never been ordered off the
property and approximately 500 lots and 120 cabins were
accessed by the road).
As part of the summary judgment, the trial court also
found that "the worn surface of the [road] averages
[**14] between ten (10) to twenty-five (25) feet." It then
concluded, "The reasonable and necessary right of way
width for the [road] is thirty (30) feet." Since we hold that
summary judgment was improper, we also hold that any
legal determination of the necessary and reasonable width
of the road was premature. Such a determination depends
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upon the full adjudication of the relevant facts that will be
unearthed at trial. We therefore also reverse the trial
court's conclusion that the reasonable and necessary
width for Lower Corner Canyon Road is thirty feet.
The summary judgment is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

WE CONCUR:
Michael D. Zimmerman, Chief Justice
I. Daniel Stewart, Associate Chief Justice
Christine M. Durham, Justice
Leonard H. Russon, Justice
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[*1132] OPINION
On April 16, 1984, Fay Gaw was turning left from a
side street onto Highway 6 in Helper, Utah. Gaw
apparently drove across a merge lane and into the through
lane of traffic when she was hit by a truck driven by
Jimmy Wray Lingle and owned by Roadrunner Trucking.
Gaw was paralyzed from the chest down as a result of the
accident. She brought suit against Lingle claiming that he
had negligently operated the truck and against
Roadrunner as the employer of Lingle. She also brought
suit against the State of Utah claiming that the
intersection was negligently designed, constructed and
maintained. 3
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3 Gaw brought suit against other defendants, but
they were dismissed from the case and are not
parties to this appeal.
[*1133] On January 30, 1986, Gaw's deposition
was taken at the instance of Lingle. The court reporter
transcribed the testimony and delivered a copy of the
deposition to Gaw's [**3] attorney. On March 14, Gaw
received a sheet from the reporter on which to make
appropriate corrections to her deposition. In May, Gaw's
attorney sought and obtained an extension of time to
correct the deposition and file it with the court. Gaw
made approximately fifty changes to her deposition,
which were filed with the deposition in June 1986.
In July 1986, defendants moved to suppress the
changes in Gaw's deposition, claiming that the
corrections were not made in compliance with Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 30(e), that Gaw had given a false
excuse for making substantial changes to the deposition,
and that the changes would prejudice the defendants. In
February 1988, the court granted defendants' motions and
suppressed the changes to Gaw's deposition.
In March 1988, the state filed a motion for summary
judgment. Gaw filed a motion in opposition along with
her own affidavit and the affidavits of two engineers who
stated their opinions that the intersection was faultily
designed. The trial court granted the state's motion for
summary judgment, finding that Gaw had failed to
produce any evidence that the intersection was faultily
designed or that such design had caused the accident.
[**4] In September 1988, a jury trial was held to
determine the liability of Lingle and Roadrunner. On
special verdict, the jury found Gaw 75% liable for the
accident and Lingle 25% liable.
During the trial, Gaw attempted to admit testimony
from a "human factors" expert to the effect that Gaw had
behaved in a reasonable and prudent manner and that
Lingle had not behaved reasonably under the
circumstances. The trial court did not allow the expert to
testify in conclusory legal terms about the reasonableness
of the parties' actions. It did, however, allow the expert to
testify extensively about the misleading nature of the
intersection, the likelihood that Gaw was confused by the
intersection markings, and the distinction between her
subjective and objective confusion.
Defendants

submitted

three

proposed

jury

instructions, each of which stated that the conduct
described in the instructions "is negligence." Gaw
objected to these instructions because they effectively
incorporated a standard of per se negligence contrary to
Utah law. 4 The court noted Gaw's objection but gave the
instructions as tendered.
4 Gaw also objected to one of the instructions
because it did not state Lingle's duty of reasonable
care within the instruction. Lingle's duty was
adequately defined in other jury instructions and,
therefore, we find this argument to be without
merit.
[**5] On appeal, Gaw raises three arguments. First,
Gaw argues that the court improperly limited the
testimony of her human factors expert. Second, Gaw
challenges the jury instructions to which she objected
below. Finally, Gaw argues that the court improperly
granted summary judgment to the state, primarily due to
the court's decision to suppress the changes Gaw sought
to make to her deposition. We affirm in part, reverse in
part, and remand for a new trial.
EXPERT TESTIMONY
Gaw challenges the trial court's decision prohibiting
the human factors expert from testifying that Gaw's
actions before the accident constituted reasonable,
prudent conduct. 5 In order to prevail on this issue, Gaw
must demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion
in excluding the expert testimony. Ostler v. Albina
Transfer Co., 781 P.2d 445, 447 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Moreover, she must demonstrate [*1134] that "the
excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial
influence in bringing about a different verdict."
Redevelopment Agency v. Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296,
1303-04 (Utah 1987).
5 Gaw also argues that the trial court excluded
testimony concerning the reasonableness of
Lingle's conduct. However, the court made no
specific ruling on that aspect of the expert's
testimony. Thus, nothing in the record suggests
that Gaw's expert was prohibited from discussing
the reasonableness of Lingle's conduct. Gaw
cannot challenge a ruling the court did not make.
[**6] The Utah Rules of Evidence provide that a
witness who has been qualified as an expert may testify
"[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
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will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue." Utah R. Evid. 702.
Moreover, that testimony may embrace "an ultimate issue
to be decided by the trier of fact." Utah R. Evid. 704.
As a general rule, it is within the discretion of the
trial court to determine whether a particular expert is
qualified and whether particular testimony would be
helpful and suitable in a particular case. Ostler, 781 P.2d
at 447. However, the trial court does not properly
exercise that discretion where its decision is based upon a
misconception of law. In re Carmaleta B., 21 Cal. 3d
482, 579 P.2d 514, 523, 146 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1978) (en
banc). See also Kirkham v. 4.60 Acres of Land, 100 Idaho
785, 605 P.2d 959, 962 (1980) (court abuses discretion
when it fails to apply the law). Cf. Naranjo v. Naranjo,
751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (though trial
court has considerable discretion in adjusting financial
interests of divorced parties, appellate court will overturn
decision if based [**7] upon misunderstanding or
misapplication of the law).
In this case, the court based its decision to exclude
the expert's testimony in large part upon its erroneous
view that it was obligated to give the jury per se
negligence instructions. The court stated with our
emphasis:
[O]ne of the problems you have is this jury
instruction that says: "If you violate the law, that's
negligence. That's not what a reasonable person would
do." How does that conform with [expert testimony that
certain behavior is reasonable] if there is a violation of
the law? . . . It's just inconsistent with what the jury has to
determine. In other words, even though she may have
been mis[led] and drove across, and the law says she
won't drive across, I have to tell the jury if she does that,
regardless, she is negligent. So that would make it
inconsistent. I instruct them, and then [the expert
testimony] would be inconsistent with my instructions.
To me that creates a doubtful situation; doesn't help the
jury at all[;] just confuses them.
Because the court based its decision to exclude the
expert testimony on a misconception of the law, we hold
that the decision was necessarily an abuse of discretion.
[**8] Although we conclude that the court
erroneously excluded the testimony, that error is harmless
because the inclusion of that testimony would not have
resulted in a different verdict. It is true that the court

prohibited the expert from specifically stating his opinion
that Gaw's conduct was reasonable. However, the expert
testified at length that the intersection was very
confusing, that many drivers would have been confused
by the intersection, and that Gaw was very likely
confused by the intersection. The obvious conclusion
from the expert's testimony was that Gaw acted
reasonably under all the circumstances. Though the court
should not have excluded those specific words, the
message was clearly communicated in the expert's
testimony. Consequently, we hold that even though the
court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony, the
abuse does not constitute reversible error.
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The trial court, in three jury instructions, advised the
jury that certain actions on the part of a driver constituted
negligence. Gaw argues that these types of "per se"
negligence instructions are inappropriate and constitute
reversible error. We agree with Gaw's position, at least as
[**9] to one of the court's instructions, and therefore
reverse the trial verdict against her.
The parties disagree about whether the violation of a
statute or ordinance, such as occurred when Gaw made
her illegal turn onto Highway 6, constitutes "per se" or
"prima facie" negligence in Utah. [*1135] Their
confusion is not surprising because Utah appellate courts
have also occasionally confused these terms. 6 However,
though the terminology has been confused, the concept
has remained the same and was succinctly stated in
Intermountain Farmers Ass'n v. Fitzgerald, 574 P.2d
1162 (Utah 1978).
[T]he violation of a statute does not necessarily constitute
negligence per se and may be considered only as
evidence of negligence . . . . [The violation] may be
regarded as "prima facie evidence of negligence, but is
subject to justification or excuse . . . ."
Id. at 1164-65 (quoting Thompson v. Ford Motor
Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62, 64 (1964)) (emphasis
added). "Prima facie" negligence is the correct standard
and a trial court commits prejudicial error when it gives a
jury instruction which provides that the violation of a
statute is negligence without the possibility for
justification [**10] or excuse. 7 Id. at 1164.
6 Compare, e.g., Jorgensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d 80,
82 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (using "per se"
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terminology) with Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848,
850-51 & n.1 (Utah 1981) (using "prima facie"
terminology) (cited in Jorgensen, 739 P.2d at 82).
7 Trial courts need not and probably should not
use the technical term "prima facie" in their jury
instructions, at least not without clear explanation
of the term. It is sufficient to state that the
violation of a statute is evidence of negligence but
"subject to justification or excuse if the evidence
is such that it reasonably could be found that the
conduct was nevertheless within the standard of
reasonable care under the circumstances."
Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 395
P.2d 62, 64 (1964). Moreover, as long as the
concept is clear from the instructions, the
terminology used will not invalidate the
instruction.
The trial court in this case did not contemplate that
the standard in Utah is "prima facie." During the [**11]
trial, at a conference in chambers, the court stated with
our emphasis:
Because one of the problems you have is that we
give this jury an instruction that says: "If you violate the
law, that's negligence. That's not what a reasonable
person would do." . . . I have to tell the jury if she
[violates the law], she's negligent.
Based upon this mistaken view of the law, the court
gave three jury instructions which Gaw challenges on
appeal.
Instructions 14 and 18 provided:
[Instruction No. 14]: When the law makes it the duty
of a driver of one vehicle to yield the right of way to a
second vehicle, that duty arises as soon as the two
vehicles are close enough to each other to constitute an
immediate hazard. Such a hazard exists whenever a
reasonably prudent person in the position of the driver of
the first vehicle, would apprehend the probability of
colliding with the second vehicle if the driver of the first
vehicle attempted to proceed on the intended course of
travel. Failure to yield the right of way under such
circumstances is negligence.
[Instruction No. 18]: A vehicle may not be operated
over, across, or within any painted or other dividing
space, median or barrier of [**12] a divided highway, if
such space or median is clearly visible to a reasonably

observant person, except where authorized by an official
traffic control device or peace officer.
Failure to operate a vehicle in accordance with the
foregoing requirement of the law is negligence on the
part of the driver.
These instructions, though not framed as "prima
facie" instructions, allowed the jury to consider some
limited justifications and excuses for the conduct which
may be a technical violation of the law. For example, if
Gaw could prove that she reasonably did not apprehend
the probability of the collision when she proceeded into
the intersection, her failure to yield might have been
excused under instruction 14. Moreover, her failure to
stay off the median strips and painted lines might have
been excused under instruction 18 if she could prove that
the lines in the intersection were not clearly visible to the
reasonably observant person.
It is easy to envision facts not encompassed by the
language in instructions 14 and 18 which would
nevertheless tend to [*1136] justify or excuse the
prohibited conduct described in those instructions,
making those instructions inappropriate in a range of
cases. [**13] However, the instructions appear, under
the totality of the facts before us, to sufficiently
encompass any justifications and excuses that Gaw
actually offered at trial for her conduct. Consequently, we
hold that instructions 14 and 18 were sufficient, if barely
so, under the circumstances of this case. 8
8 Although we hold that instructions 14 and 18
were sufficient in this case, we do not mean to
suggest that they were in any way ideal
instructions which could not be improved upon on
remand to more fully explain the role and range of
justifications and excuses for the proscribed
conduct.
Unlike instructions 14 and 18, however, jury
instruction number 17 does not provide for any
justification or excuse. That instruction states:
The operator of a vehicle intending to turn left shall
turn onto the roadway being entered, in the extreme left
hand available lane for traffic moving in the new
direction of travel.
Failure to operate a vehicle in accordance with the
foregoing requirements of the law is negligence on the
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[**14] part of the driver.
If the jury found that Gaw had turned left into any
lane other than the extreme left lane, the jury had to find
Gaw negligent under this instruction. Neither this
instruction, nor any other instruction read in conjunction
with this instruction, allowed the jury to consider
justifications or excuses for the improper turn. This was a
strict "per se" instruction and we must therefore reverse
on the basis of this instruction.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Finally, Gaw argues that the court erred when it
granted the state's summary judgment motion. Summary
judgment is only appropriate when the moving party has
demonstrated "that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c);
Transamerica Cash Res., Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water,
Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990). Because a challenge to
summary judgment presents only questions of law, we
review the trial court's decision for correctness, id., and
"analyze the facts and inferences in the light most
favorable to the losing party." Provo City Corp. v. State,
795 P.2d 1120, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (1990).
The trial court gave two [**15] reasons for granting
the state's motion. First, it found the affidavits from
Gaw's experts were conclusory and without foundation
and therefore did not support the conclusion that the
intersection was faultily designed. Second, the court
found that Gaw had unambiguously stated in her
deposition as initially transcribed that she was not
confused by the intersection. The court refused to
consider the numerous changes she made to her
deposition and ordered them suppressed. The court also
refused to consider the assertions in her subsequent
affidavit that she was confused, concluding she had not
adequately explained the discrepancy on that issue which
appeared from her deposition. Consequently, the court
found that the design of the intersection was not a cause
of the accident.
On appeal, Gaw argues that genuine issues exist as to
both the inadequate design of the intersection and to her
own confusion. She argues that the experts' affidavits
sufficiently demonstrated that the intersection was
faultily designed. Moreover, she argues that her original
deposition, her amended deposition, and her affidavit all
asserted the position that she was confused by the

intersection and all should [**16] have been considered
by the trial court. We now consider each of these
arguments.
A. Expert Opinion Concerning Faulty Design
The trial court ruled that the affidavits of Gaw's
experts concerning the faulty design of the intersection
were inadequate because they were "without foundation
as to the highway design and they do not specify what
standards the State did not follow or should have
followed in this instance." [*1137] On appeal, Gaw
argues that the court's conclusions were incorrect.
Although we are not sure precisely what the trial court
found missing from the experts' affidavits, 9 we hold that
they adequately complied with the standard we set forth
in American Concept Ins. Co. v. Lochhead, 751 P.2d 271
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).
9 The court's two stated concerns were that the
affidavits stated "conclusions without foundation
as to the highway design" and that they failed to
specify the standards which the state did not
follow. Having reviewed the affidavits, we find
that they contained both of these elements. As to
foundation, both experts identified particular
aspects of the intersection and surrounding area
which made the intersection misleading and
dangerous. As to the applicable standard, one
expert stated that the design was "totally in
conflict with normal engineering practices." The
other expert identified and quoted from two
publications dealing with highway safety and
design. Consequently, we fail to perceive the
deficiencies about which the trial court was
concerned.
[**17] In Lochhead, we articulated a standard for
determining the sufficiency of an expert's affidavit in the
summary judgment context. First, we stated that Utah
Rule of Evidence 704 allowed the expert to state his
opinion concerning the ultimate issue in the case. Id. at
273. We then recognized that "[a]n expert affidavit must
also contain a sufficient factual basis for the opinion
proffered." Id. at 274. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). 10 To
determine the extent of the factual basis required, we
looked to Utah Rule of Evidence 703 which allows an
expert to base an opinion on admissible evidence and
inadmissible evidence of the kind that experts in the field
use. Id. We concluded that the affidavit was sufficient if
it articulated the facts upon which the opinion was based
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and if the facts were of the "type usually relied upon by
experts in the field." Id.
10 The rule requiring an expert affiant to state
the factual basis for his or her opinion appears to
be at odds with Utah Rule of Evidence 705, which
allows an expert to give his or her opinion without
stating the facts and data upon which he or she
relied. However, Rule 705 also recognizes that the
expert may have to divulge the basis for his or her
opinion if the court requires and if requested upon
cross examination. Since an affiant is not subject
to cross examination, it makes some sense to
require the expert affiant to divulge at least part of
the basis for his or her opinion. Stated another
way, Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e)'s explicit requirements
that affidavits "be made on personal knowledge"
and "set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence," together with its implicit recognition
that statements in an affidavit must not be
conclusory in form, Norton v. Blackham, 669
P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983), and that affidavits not
contain unsubstantiated opinions, Treloggan v.
Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985) (per
curiam), control in the summary judgment context
over Utah R. Evid. 705.
[**18] In Lochhead, the expert was a licensed
property and casualty claims manager. Id. at 273. His
opinion was that American Concept had breached its
duties of good faith and fair dealing. Id. That opinion was
based upon an examination of American Concept's
adjuster's files. Id. We held that because the adjuster's
files were the type of materials upon which experts in the
field relied, the affidavit was sufficient and, therefore, we
reversed the summary judgment. Id. at 274.
Under the Lochhead analysis, the affidavits in this
case were sufficient. Gaw's experts each averred to be
engineers with some expertise in the area of traffic and/or
highway design. Both experts stated in their affidavits
that the intersection was dangerous and/or failed to meet
safety standards in the industry. The basis for one expert's
opinion was his examination of the intersection site. The
other expert based his opinion on a diagram of the
intersection, police reports and photographs, Gaw's
deposition, and traffic court data. Clearly, the facts
articulated in the affidavits are the type relied upon by
experts in the field. Thus, we hold that the affidavits were
sufficient and should not [**19] have been disregarded

by the trial court. They raise an issue of material fact as
to the negligent design of the intersection.
B. Evidence that Gaw was Confused by the Intersection
The state argued that even if the intersection was
negligently designed, there was no evidence that Gaw
was actually confused by the intersection and thus the
intersection's design was not a proximate [*1138] cause
of the accident. The trial court agreed. Gaw argues that
her original deposition, amended deposition, and affidavit
all created an issue of fact concerning her confusion and
all should have been considered by the court. We will
treat each of these three sources separately.
1. Original Deposition
First, Gaw argues that her original deposition alone
was sufficient to raise an issue concerning her confusion.
We disagree. Gaw was repeatedly asked during her initial
deposition whether she was confused by the intersection.
She repeatedly stated that she was not. 11
11
The following excerpts are illustrative of
Gaw's initial deposition testimony:
Q: Mrs. Gaw, when you entered the
intersection on the day of the accident, were you
confused by anything?
A: No, cause I had driven that two or three
times or more.
....
Q: . . . Do you have any memory or do you
feel that you were confused by any of these lines
in this intersection?
A: Not that I remember. There was -- They
didn't ever bother me before and I don't
remember.
[**20] The only testimony from her initial
deposition relied upon by Gaw to demonstrate that she
was confused by the intersection is as follows:
Q: Is there anything about the intersection markings
or signs that you were unable to understand?
A: Well, it was always confusing there, the way they
had the lines going that way, this way, and which way.
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Q: What was the confusion?
A: Well, you really just had to watch what you're
doing and stay in the lane and watch where you're going,
because they were always marked crazy.
This testimony only demonstrates that the
intersection required extra attention to successfully
navigate it. It does not demonstrate that Gaw was in fact
confused on the day of the accident, especially in light of
her many statements that she had not been confused. See
note 11, supra, and accompanying text. Thus, we hold
that Gaw's initial deposition testimony was not sufficient
to raise an issue of material fact concerning whether she
was confused on the day of the accident.
2. Changes to Deposition Testimony
Gaw attempted to change her deposition testimony in
over fifty places. She did so by means of "correction
sheets," prepared by herself outside the presence [**21]
of the court reporter who took the deposition. The
reporter filed the sheets along with the deposition as
initially transcribed. Some of the changes were merely to
clarify and to correct typographical errors but many were
substantive. For example, Gaw was asked during the
deposition: "Do you have any memory about whether or
not, at the time of the accident, you were confused by the
lane markings?" In her original deposition, she
responded: "No, I don't." In her corrected answers she
stated "Yes, I was confused for the lines were changed
often." A few lines later she was asked: "That answer you
gave to the previous question is, 'No, You don't know
whether you were confused?'" Initially she responded:
"Uh-huh." In her corrected answers she stated: "Yes I was
confused, that place is very confusing to anyone."
Finally, she was asked: "I want to make sure you're clear
on that last question he was asking you. At this time,
okay, do you have any memory or do you feel that you
were confused by any of these lines in this intersection?"
She responded: "Not that I remember. There was -- They
didn't ever bother me before, I don't remember." She
corrected the response to state "Yes, it is very [**22]
confusing for anyone."
Defendants moved to suppress the changes to Gaw's
deposition. The court granted the motion to suppress and
consequently did not consider the changed answers in its
decision to grant the summary judgment motion. The
basis for the court's decision was "that changes to the
substance [of] the deposition testimony were entered by

plaintiff upon the deposition and not by the officer before
whom the deposition was taken as required in Rule
30(e)." [*1139] On appeal, Gaw asserts that the court
erred in suppressing the deposition changes. We disagree.
Initially, we note that Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
30(e) is drafted very broadly to allow "changes in form or
substance which the witness desires to make." Although
some commentators have puzzled over the liberality of
this rule, see, e.g., Scully, A Brief History of Deposition
Editing, 15 Litigation 43 (Spring 1989), courts have
generally not limited the number and kinds of changes a
deponent can make. See, e.g., Lugtig v. Thomas, 89
F.R.D. 639, 641 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (mem.) (69 changes
including many substantive changes); Allen & Co. v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 49 F.R.D. 337, 339
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (mem.) [**23] (377 changes of which
73 were substantive); De Seversky v. Republic Aviation
Corp., 2 F.R.D. 113, 114 (E.D.N.Y. 1941) (34 substantive
changes). But see Barlow v. Esselte Pendaflex Corp., 111
F.R.D. 404, 406 (M.D.N.C. 1986) ("manner and number
of changes disclose a lack of good faith"). Thus, though
defendants grouse about the kinds of changes Gaw made
to her deposition testimony, that argument does not
support suppression of the changes.
The question before us is whether the court should
have suppressed the changes for Gaw's failures to comply
with the requirements of Rule 30(e). Rule 30(e) requires
that changes "be entered upon the deposition by the
officer with a statement of the reasons given by the
witness for making them." Utah R. Civ. P. 30(e).
Although courts have allowed liberal changing of
deposition testimony, they have been fairly strict in
requiring compliance with the technical requirements of
Rule 30(e). See, e.g., Sanford v. CBS, Inc., 594 F. Supp.
713, 715 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (mem.) (requiring specific
reasons for each change); Lugtig, 89 F.R.D. at 642
(requiring changes to be written in deposition after
original answer, specific reasons for changes, [**24]
and changes to be made by the reporter). That strictness
has been tempered somewhat by the willingness of trial
courts to permit deponents a further opportunity to
comply with the technical requirements of Rule 30(e)
rather than simply striking or suppressing attempted
changes not in compliance with the rule. In Sanford and
Lugtig the courts required the deponent to amend the
depositions as per the rule, with the proviso this be done
at the deponents' expense. 594 F. Supp at 715; 89 F.R.D.
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at 642. Moreover, where changes have been extensive,
courts have allowed the opposing party to reopen the
deposition for further examination, costs to be paid by the
deponent whose changes, after all, created the problem.
See, e.g., 594 F. Supp. at 715; 89 F.R.D. at 642. The
patience of trial courts in this regard is not, however,
boundless. In Barlow, the deponent made over a hundred
changes to the deposition, including the deletion of large
blocks of the deposition, and failed to provide any
reasons for the changes. 111 F.R.D. at 406. Moreover,
the changes were so extensive that it was "virtually
impossible for the [court] reporter to enter the changes
upon the deposition as [**25] he is required to do." Id.
The court found the Barlow deponent's actions to be "at
variance with the letter and spirit of Rule 30(e)" and
declared the attempted changes a "nullity." Id.
The facts before us do not warrant the same remedy
reached by the Barlow court. Although there were
numerous changes to the deposition in this case, many of
which were admittedly substantive, Gaw offered some
semblance of a specific reason for each. The reporter
would not have had difficulty entering them on the
deposition. Moreover, the method for making changes
employed by Gaw, while at variance with the clear
requirements of Rule 30(e), was consistent with the
reporter's instructions on the correction sheet given to
Gaw. 12 Suppression [*1140] of the changes was a
drastic remedy which courts usually reject in the absence
of bad faith. 13
12
The instructions on the correction sheet
stated:
After reviewing the transcript of your
deposition, please fill out this correction sheet
indicating any changes you deem necessary.
This is a verbatim record of what was
actually said and no grammatical corrections
should be made. If there are corrections or,
insertions, please initial the correction sheet and
briefly state your reasons therefor. For example,
spelling error, clarification, transcriber error, et
cetera.
Please do all corrections with typewriter or
black ink.
Complying with the instructions on this sheet
can hardly be viewed as "bad faith" of the sort

which concerned the court in Barlow. See 111
F.R.D. at 406.
[**26]
13 The only evidence of bad faith which appears
from the record was the false representation to the
court that Gaw was suffering from an
undiagnosed and untreated diabetic condition
during the initial deposition. It is noteworthy that
this excuse was not offered on the correction sheet
completed by Gaw herself nor in her subsequent
affidavit, but appears only in Gaw's memorandum
in opposition to defendants' motion to suppress,
which was prepared and signed by counsel.
Though we do not condone such a false
representation to the court, it is better sanctioned
under Utah R. Civ. P. 11 where made by an
attorney rather than a party. Such an after-the-fact
mischaracterization by counsel should not be the
basis for the suppression of deposition changes
which rule 30(e) so liberally allows. See also note
12, supra.
However, Gaw's response to the motion to suppress
did not include, even in the alternative, a request for an
opportunity to comply with the requirements of Rule
30(e) and an offer to reopen the deposition at her
expense. She only argued that she was entitled to make
the changes in the [**27] manner she did. Moreover, on
appeal she does not contend she was entitled to
alternative relief but steadfastly continues to argue only
that her changes were validly made despite her
non-compliance with Rule 30(e). The matter being
presented in this posture, where appellant did not seek the
more moderate response of the Sanford and Lugtig courts
either at the trial court nor on appeal, we reject her
argument that her deposition changes were properly made
and affirm the trial court's decision to suppress them for
failure to comply with Rule 30(e). It follows that nothing
in her corrected answers was effective to create a factual
dispute.
3. Gaw's Affidavit
Gaw submitted an affidavit, along with her
memorandum in opposition to the state's motion for
summary judgment. The trial court stated that Gaw's
deposition demonstrated she was not confused by the
intersection and that "the Court will not allow her to
change those statements by affidavits . . . since she has
offered no explanation as to why she would be mistaken
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at the time of the deposition." Gaw asserts that the
affidavit contained an adequate explanation which raised
a genuine issue concerning her confusion. We agree.
[**28] The general rule in Utah is that an affiant
may not "raise an issue of fact by his own affidavit which
contradicts his deposition, unless he can provide an
explanation of the discrepancy." Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d
1170, 1173 (Utah 1983). In Webster, the Utah Supreme
Court affirmed a summary judgment because the
contradictory affidavit "wholly failed to explain the
discrepancy between the deposition and the affidavit." Id.
In this case, unlike Webster, Gaw did not wholly fail
to explain the discrepancy. According to the affidavit, she
had previously thought, including at her deposition, that
she was turning into the merge lane of the highway and
not into the through lane as was ultimately established.
She thought she was properly following the lines through
the intersection. She thought the lines had taken her
correctly into the merge lane. Moreover, she assumed that
the accident had occurred in the merge lane. At her
deposition, she understood the questions to reflect these
same assumptions, responded to them under these
assumptions, and accordingly had no subjective sense of
being confused. Only later, according to defendant, did
she discover her assumptions were [**29] incorrect and
that she had actually driven into the through lane
meaning to have driven into the merge lane. Therefore, at
her deposition, she truly did not believe that she was
confused by the intersection, although obviously she was
thoroughly confused, having completely misapprehended
her route of [*1141] travel and what lane she ended up
in. 14
14 Gaw's human factors expert gave at trial the
following explanation for Gaw's confusion and
the discrepancy in the deposition:
[A] person can be mis[led], in which case
they're not aware. And if they're not aware they're
mis[led], that in that sense, they're really not
confused . . . . [S]omeone on the outside looking
at what happened [would say]: "Well, if she did
that, it's very likely she was confused but didn't
know it." You see, that's the difference. I'm more
comfortable with the term 'mis[led],' than I am
'confused;' because some connotations of the
word 'confused' would indicate that the person
was aware they were confused. But -- There's
some differences between those two terms.

[**30] This case is similar to the case of
Kennett-Murray Corp. v. Bone, 622 F.2d 887 (5th Cir.
1980). In Bone, there was a discrepancy between the
affiant's affidavit and his earlier deposition. The court
noted that the "affidavit did not purport to raise a new
matter, but rather to explain certain aspects of his
deposition testimony." Id. at 894. Namely, the affiant
explained that certain responses were given under the
mistaken assumption that the questions concerned one
document when they in fact concerned another. The court
was satisfied with the explanation in the affidavit because
it was "at least plausible." Id. Cf. Camfield Tires, Inc. v.
Michelin Tire Corp., 719 F.2d 1361, 1364-65 (8th Cir.
1983) (opposite result reached where "affidavit was
inherently inconsistent with his prior deposition [and] not
plausible").
Although the trial court in this case apparently did
not believe Gaw's explanation for the discrepancies, we
find her explanation is not inherently inconsistent with
the responses in her initial deposition. 15 We do not have
to be persuaded by the explanation or even find it
compelling. As long as it is plausible, the fact finder
should be allowed [**31] to weigh the credibility of the
explanation. See Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949,
953 (11th Cir. 1986) ("A definite distinction must be
made between discrepancies which create transparent
shams and discrepancies which create an issue of
credibility."). Gaw's affidavit raised a genuine issue of
fact concerning whether she was confused by the
intersection.
15
Many of Gaw's deposition responses are
consistent with the explanation in her affidavit of
the apparent discrepancies. The following
exchange is illustrative:
Q: On the date of the accident, did you use
that merge lane?
A: Well, I always did before, but, sir, I don't
know. I can't remember whether I went there or
what. I pulled out into the center and he was
coming and I stopped. That's it. I don't remember
after that. I wish to God I did.
Q: What you are telling me, then, is you do
not know whether you used the merge lane that
you used on prior occasions in driving this same
route on the day of the accident?
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A: I always had before, so why would I change it
for one time?
[**32] C. Summary
The trial court erred in granting the state's summary
judgment motion. The expert affidavits adequately raised
a genuine issue of fact concerning the negligent design of
the highway. Gaw's affidavit raised an issue of fact
concerning whether Gaw was in fact confused by the
intersection. The credibility of Gaw's final position was
one for the trier of fact and not properly disposed of on
summary judgment. We accordingly reverse the summary
judgment and remand for a trial or other appropriate
proceedings.
CONCLUSION

Although the court should have allowed Gaw's
human factors expert to testify on the reasonableness of
Gaw's conduct prior to the accident, the error was not
prejudicial because the expert effectively conveyed his
message even without using those magic words. The trial
court gave jury instructions under the mistaken
assumption that the violation of a statute or ordinance
constitutes negligence "per se." It was reversible error to
give an instruction to that effect. Finally, the trial court
improperly granted the state's summary judgment motion
because material issues of fact existed concerning the
negligent design of the intersection and concerning
whether Gaw [**33] was in fact confused by the
intersection.
[*1142] We reverse and remand for a new trial or
other proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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good faith and fair dealing, (4) promissory estoppel
(claims two through four, collectively, the "contract
claims"), (5) tortious interference and defamation, and (6)
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
[*P2] Between January 2001 and November 2006,
all of Giusti's claims were resolved. Giusti voluntarily
dismissed his claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The district court dismissed defendant SunGard
for lack of personal jurisdiction and, in a series of orders,
granted SWC's motion for [***2] summary judgment on
each of Giusti's remaining claims. The court then denied
SWC's motion for attorney fees and limited its recovery
of costs to $ 55.
[*P3] Giusti appeals, claiming that the district court
erred in dismissing SunGard for lack of personal
jurisdiction and in granting summary judgment to SWC
on each of his claims.

OPINION BY: DURRANT
OPINION
[**969] DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice:

[*P4] SWC asserts that Giusti's appeal was
untimely and that we therefore lack jurisdiction to
consider it. SWC also cross-appeals, claiming that the
district court erred in denying it attorney fees and in
limiting its recovery of costs to $ 55.

INTRODUCTION
[*P1] Sterling Wentworth Corporation ("SWC")
terminated Stephen A. Giusti's employment. Giusti sued,
asserting six claims against SWC and its parent
corporation SunGard: (1) fraudulent inducement, (2)
breach of contract, (3) breach of the implied covenant of

[**970] [*P5] We conclude that Giusti's appeal
was timely. We also hold that the district court was
correct in granting summary judgment to SWC on each
of Giusti's claims, and therefore, we do not reach the
issue of whether SunGard was properly dismissed for
lack of personal jurisdiction. We further conclude that the
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district court correctly denied SWC's claim for attorney
fees and correctly limited its request for costs. We thus
affirm each of the district court's decisions.
BACKGROUND
[*P6] In reviewing a grant of summary judgment,
we view the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. 1 Applying that standard, we recite the
facts [***3] as follows. In February 1999, SunGard, a
computer software and services company incorporated in
Delaware, purchased, as a wholly owned subsidiary,
SWC, a Utah corporation located in Salt Lake City.
During the fall of 1999, John Hyde and Paul
Erickson--SWC's President and Vice President of
Operations, respectively--recruited Giusti for the position
of Vice President of Sales.
1 See Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp.,
784 P.2d 1181, 1182-83 (Utah 1989).
[*P7] At the time of his recruitment, Giusti was
employed as Senior Vice President of Marketing at
Cambric Corporation in Salt Lake City. He had an annual
base salary of $ 125,000, which was due to increase to $
135,000 on January 1, 2000. He also had an $ 800 per
month car allowance, other benefits, and had received the
first $ 25,000 of a $ 100,000 performance bonus, the
remainder to be paid in installments based on Cambric's
financial performance and Giusti's performance.
[*P8] Giusti claims that, during negotiations, he and
Hyde orally agreed that Giusti would be guaranteed
twelve months of employment at SWC and that this
guaranty was incorporated into an offer letter
("November offer letter"). Giusti signed and returned the
November offer letter [***4] to SWC and began work as
Vice President of Sales on December 1, 1999.
[*P9] According to Giusti, a few days after
beginning work, Pat Black, the Human Resources
Director at SWC, brought into Giusti's office the Sterling
Wentworth Employment Agreement ("SWC employment
agreement" or "employment agreement") for him to sign.
The SWC employment agreement provided that Giusti's
employment could be terminated at any time "with or
without cause." Giusti claims that he told Black that this
provision did not apply to him per his agreement with
Hyde, and that, in reply, Black informed him that she had
no knowledge of such an arrangement and that he was
required to sign the form so she could process his benefit

enrollment. Giusti signed the
agreement on December 6, 1999.

SWC

employment

[*P10] Giusti claims that, within his first two weeks
of employment at SWC, he observed a high level of
organizational chaos within the company and confronted
Hyde, questioning him about his previous representations
that SWC and its client revenue base were strong. Giusti
asserts that, in response, Hyde promised him a new level
of compensation. Hyde amended the November offer
letter to reflect this change, and the change appeared
[***5] in a letter dated December 13, 1999 ("December
contract"). Where the November offer letter provided that
Giusti would receive a "1% override of revenue produced
by the sales people you manage," the December contract
provided that he would receive "1% on corporate
revenue." This change was handwritten on the December
version of the November offer letter. Both parties
initialed the change.
[*P11] On April 26, 2000, Giusti indicated to
SWC's financial personnel that he might exercise his
one-time election to move from the monthly subsidy plan
to the commission and override plan whereby he would
receive a 1% override on all corporate sales as promised
to him in the December contract. Within a few days, and
after only five months of employment at SWC, Giusti's
employment was terminated.
[*P12] Giusti filed suit on July 10, 2000, claiming
six causes of action against SWC and SunGard: (1)
fraudulent inducement of employment, (2) breach of
contract, (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith
[**971] and fair dealing, (4) promissory estoppel, (5)
tortious interference and defamation, and (6) intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
[*P13] Between January 2001 and November 2006,
all six of Giusti's claims were [***6] resolved in SWC's
favor. In January 2001, the district court dismissed
defendant SunGard for lack of personal jurisdiction. In
March 2002, the court granted SWC's motion for
summary judgment on Giusti's three contract claims. 2 In
April 2003, Giusti voluntarily dismissed his claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. In September
2005, the court granted SWC's motion for summary
judgment on Giusti's tortious interference and defamation
claims. In November 2006, the court dismissed Giusti's
claim for fraudulent inducement, his only remaining
claim. The November 2006 order ("November order")
was entitled "Order Granting Summary Judgment and
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Dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint with Prejudice" and
contained the following language:
[H]aving made a Minute Entry/Order
dated April 21, 2006, containing the
Court's thinking and its decision on the
matter, now, the Court HEREBY FINDS,
ADJUDGES, and ORDERS AND
DECREES that: Summary Judgment is
GRANTED on Plaintiff's claim for
fraudulent inducement and Plaintiff's
Complaint, in its entirety, is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.

2 This ruling was confirmed in an order dated
September 3, 2003.
[*P14] The November order also provided that
SWC could submit [***7] a request for attorney fees. In
December 2006, SWC submitted its motion for attorney
fees, and the court denied the request in a final order
dated June 8, 2007 ("June order"). A separate judgment,
combining the November and June orders, was entered
on July 10, 2007 ("July judgment").
[*P15] The parties dispute some of the events that
followed the entry of the June order and led up to the
entry of the July judgment. 3 It is undisputed that Giusti's
counsel prepared for entry a final judgment combining
the contents of the November and June orders. The
district court entered that judgment on July 10, 2007.
Giusti filed his notice of appeal on August 6, 2007.
3 Giusti's counsel, Kathryn Collard, submitted
an affidavit with her brief. In it, she recounts her
conversations with the district court clerks who,
according to Collard, informed her that the judge
wanted Collard to prepare the July order for entry.
SWC claims that this affidavit should be stricken
as beyond the record on appeal. In reaching our
conclusion that Giusti's appeal was timely, we did
not rely on the contents of that affidavit. Nor does
the existence of the affidavit or its contents affect
our analysis in any way. Thus, we decline [***8]
to reach the issue of whether the affidavit was
beyond the record on appeal.
[*P16] SWC argues that Giusti's appeal was ripe as
of June 8, 2007, the date of the final order denying

attorney fees, because "Plaintiff's Complaint had already
been dismissed in its entirety . . . and Defendants' fee
request had been denied." According to SWC, Giusti's
appeal, filed on August 6, 2007--well over 30 days
later--is therefore untimely. 4
4
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)
requires appeals to be filed "within 30 days after
the date of entry of the judgment or order
appealed from."
[*P17] Giusti, on the other hand, contends that his
appeal was timely because, according to Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 7(f)(2), the July judgment was necessary
and the appeal period did not begin running until the July
judgment was entered on July 10, 2007.
[*P18] Because the parties dispute which
decision--the June order or the July judgment--triggered
the appeal period, as a threshold matter, we must address
that question to determine whether Giusti's appeal was
timely. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
section 78A-3-102(3)(j) (2008).
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[*P19] "We review a district court's decision to
grant summary judgment for [***9] correctness," giving
no deference to the court below. 5 Summary judgment is
appropriate if there is "no genuine issue as to any
material [**972] fact and . . . the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law." 6
5 Swan Creek Vill. Homeowners Ass'n v. Warne,
2006 UT 22, P 16, 134 P.3d 1122 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fenn
v. Mleads Enters., Inc., 2006 UT 8, P 2, 137 P.3d
706.
6 Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
[*P20] We review a district court's denial of
attorney fees for correctness, 7 while we review a district
court's denial of costs for abuse of discretion. 8
7 Paul deGroot Bldg. Servs., LLC v. Gallacher,
2005 UT 20, P 18, 112 P.3d 490.
8 Young v. State, 2000 UT 91, P 4, 16 P.3d 549.
ANALYSIS
[*P21] We [***10] first discuss whether Giusti's
appeal was timely. Because we conclude that it was, we
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then discuss Giusti's claim that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment to SWC on Giusti's (1)
contract claims, (2) fraudulent inducement claim, and (3)
tortious interference claim. We affirm the district court's
grant of summary judgment on all issues, and we
therefore do not reach Giusti's claim that the district court
erred in dismissing SunGard for lack of personal
jurisdiction.
[*P22] Finally, we discuss the issues raised in
SWC's cross-appeal: that the district court erred in
denying SWC attorney fees and in limiting its recovery of
costs to $ 55. We affirm the district court's decision on
this issue as well.

11 Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2).
[*P25] Giusti argues that because "no order in
conformity with the district court's [June order] was
submitted by either party," the appeal period was not
triggered until the entry of such an order in the form of
the July judgment. The plain language of the rule, along
with our decision in Code, support Giusti's argument.
[*P26] Rule 7(f)(2) provides in pertinent part that
"[u]nless [***12] the court approves the proposed order
submitted with an initial memorandum, or unless
otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall
. . . serve upon the other parties a proposed order in
conformity with the court's decision." 12

I. GIUSTI'S APPEAL WAS TIMELY
12 Id.
[*P23] In arguing that his appeal was timely, Giusti
relies on rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. That rule, along with our recent holding in
Code v. Utah Dep't of Health, 9 establish that the July
judgment was necessary, and therefore, Giusti's appeal
was timely. 10
9 2007 UT 43, P 4, 162 P.3d 1097.
10 Giusti also argues that rule 54(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure applies to save his claim
from a challenge to its timeliness. Because we
[***11] hold that rule 7(f)(2) controls this issue,
we do not address Giusti's arguments based on
rule 54(b).
[*P24] Giusti contends that under rule 7(f)(2) his
appeal was timely because the rule requires that a
separate order--in addition to the November and June
orders--be entered. Rule 7(f)(2) provides that
[u]nless the court approves the proposed
order
submitted
with
an
initial
memorandum, or unless otherwise
directed by the court, the prevailing party
shall, within fifteen days after the court's
decision, serve upon the other parties a
proposed order in conformity with the
court's decision. Objections to the
proposed order shall be filed within five
days after service. The party preparing the
order shall file the proposed order upon
being served with an objection or upon
expiration of the time to object. 11

[*P27] The rule is clear. A prevailing party shall
prepare for entry a proposed order in conformity with the
court's decision. There are only two exceptions to this
mandate. First, if the court approves a proposed order that
is submitted with an initial memorandum, then no
additional order is necessary. Second, if the court directs
that no additional order is necessary, then none is.
[*P28] In this case, neither exception was satisfied.
No proposed order was submitted with an initial
memorandum, and the court did not direct the parties that
no additional order was necessary. The court did not, for
example, tell the parties that its June order was final for
purposes of appeal and that no [**973] additional order
need be prepared. In the absence of such a directive, rule
7(f)(2) could only be satisfied if one of the parties
prepared an order for entry. The burden was on SWC, as
the prevailing party, to prepare the order. When SWC
failed to meet its burden, Giusti [***13] acted
appropriately in preparing the order, 13 and the court
entered it on July 10. Because the entry of the July
judgment satisfied the requirements of rule 7(f)(2), the
July judgment triggered the appeal period, and Giusti's
appeal, taken on August 6, was timely.
13 Code, 2007 UT 43, P 7, 162 P.3d 1097 (when
the prevailing party fails to prepare an order for
entry according to rule 7(f)(2), "any party
interested in finality--generally, the nonprevailing
party--may submit an order").
[*P29] This result is supported by our recent
decision in Code, 14 in which we explained the correct
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application of rule 7(f)(2). In Code, the district court
issued a memorandum decision in January dismissing
plaintiff's claim. 15 When defendants, the prevailing
party, failed to prepare a separate order for entry as
required by rule 7(f)(2), plaintiff prepared the order, and
the court entered it in February. 16 Plaintiff appealed in
March, and the court of appeals dismissed her case for
lack of jurisdiction, holding that her appeal was untimely.
17 We reversed and held that "the [February] order, and
not the [January] memorandum decision, constituted the
district court's entry of judgment for appeal purposes." 18
14
15
16
17
18

Id.
Id. P 1.
Id.
Id. P 2.
Id. P 4.

[*P30] [***14] In our opinion, we emphasized the
broad and mandatory nature of rule 7(f)(2): "[a] court
should include [an] explicit direction whenever it intends
a document--a memorandum decision, minute entry, or
other document--to constitute its final action. Otherwise,
rule 7(f)(2) requires the preparation and filing of an order
to trigger finality for purposes of appeal." 19
19 Id. P 6 (emphases added).
[*P31] Because the issue in Code turned on
whether a memorandum decision constituted a final
judgment, SWC argues that our holding "is limited to
memorandum decisions or minute entries where finality
is not discernible." SWC thus argues that our mandate in
Code does not apply to Giusti because (1) the district
court issued a final order rather than a memorandum
decision, (2) the finality of that order was clearly
discernable, and (3) the July judgment was unnecessary
because it was "merely a compact summary of the two
prior orders and did nothing more than restate what had
already been resolved in the prior orders." We address
each argument in turn.
[*P32] First, our broad holding in Code is inclusive
of all final district court decisions, regardless of how they
are styled. We held that "whenever" a court intends
[***15] any "document" to constitute its final action, the
court must explicitly direct that no additional order is
necessary. 20 Otherwise, rule 7(f)(2) "requires" the
preparation and entry of a separate order in conformity
with the court's decision. 21 Thus the requirements of rule
7(f)(2) apply to every final decision issued by a district

court, not just memorandum decisions or minute entries,
as SWC claims.
20 Id.
21 Id.
[*P33] Second, our holding in Code removes the
burden from litigants of discerning when the appeal
period has been triggered. SWC argues that litigants
retain this burden, and because the finality of the June
order was "discernible," in that it "unequivocally ended
the controversy between the parties[,]" the June order
triggered the appeal period.
[*P34] SWC is correct that a decision is final when
it ends the controversy between the parties. 22 SWC is
also correct that, pursuant to rule 3 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, an appeal of right may be [**974]
taken only from "final orders and judgments." 23 But rule
3 does not trump rule 7(f)(2). That is, while rule 3
provides the substantive requirement for a decision's
finality--that it end the controversy between the
parties--rule 3 does [***16] not eviscerate the procedural
requirements of rule 7 for triggering the appeal period
once a final decision is rendered.
22 We have defined a final judgment as one that
"ends the controversy between the parties." Salt
Lake City Corp. v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538, 539
(Utah 1979).
23 Utah R. App. P. 3(a).
[*P35] The rules work in concert: pursuant to rule
3, parties may take an appeal of right only from a final
decision. And pursuant to rule 7(f)(2), that decision
triggers the appeal period only upon the occurrence of
one of the following events: (1) the court approves an
order submitted with an initial memorandum, (2) the
court directs that no additional order need be entered, or
(3) a party prepares an order for entry that is consistent
with the court's final decision. It is the entry of the final
order according to rule 7(f)(2) that triggers the appeal
period. If the court fails to satisfy rule 7(f)(2)'s exceptions
and if the prevailing party fails to prepare an order for
entry, "the appeal rights of the nonprevailing party will
extend indefinitely." 24
24 Code, 2007 UT 43, P 6 n.1, 162 P.3d 1097.
[*P36] The strict application of rule 7(f)(2) supports
the judicial policy favoring finality, and it prevents the
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confusion [***17] that often leads--as it has here--to
additional litigation when parties are left to divine when a
court's decision has triggered the appeal period. In Code,
we explained that "[w]e see no benefit to a system in
which parties must guess, on a case-by-case basis,
whether a judge's language in a memorandum decision
'implie[s],' 'invite[s],' or 'contemplate[s]' further action by
the parties." 25 While we spoke in terms of a
memorandum decision because that was the issue before
us in Code, we take this opportunity to clarify that the
rule's requirements and the policy supporting the rule
apply to all final decisions, regardless of how they are
styled.
25
Id. P 6 (alterations in original) (citation
omitted).

argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing
law." [***19] While SWC's interpretation of the
law is incorrect, we cannot say that its claim was
groundless or made in bad faith. Accordingly,
there is no basis on which to award attorney fees
to Giusti.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO SWC ON
EACH OF GIUSTI'S CLAIMS
[*P39] We now review Giusti's claim that the
district court erred in granting summary judgment to
SWC on Giusti's (1) contract [**975] claims, (2)
fraudulent inducement claim, and (3) tortious interference
claim.

[*P37] We reject SWC's argument that the July
judgment was unnecessary and therefore the appeal
period was triggered by the June order. In this regard,
SWC argues that the July judgment was unnecessary
because it was "merely a compact summary of the
[November and June] orders and did nothing more than
restate what had already been resolved in the prior
orders." Even if, as SWC claims, the July judgment was a
duplication of the November and/or June orders, that
does not change our analysis that [***18] the July
judgment was nevertheless necessary to trigger the appeal
period. That is, because the requirements of rule 7(f)(2)
were not satisfied with the November or June order, the
July judgment was the only order that satisfied rule
7(f)(2). Therefore, it triggered the appeal period.

A. The District Court Did Not Err in Granting Summary
Judgment to SWC on Giusti's Contract Claims

[*P38] Rule 7(f)(2) applies to every final decision
issued by a district court. It therefore applies to the June
order issued by the district court in Giusti's case. Because
the district court did not direct that no additional order
was necessary, SWC, as the prevailing party, had the
obligation to prepare an order in conformity with the
court's decision. When SWC failed to do so, Giusti acted
appropriately in preparing the order, and the appeal
period was triggered when that order, in the form of the
July judgment, was entered on July 10. Thus, Giusti's
appeal was timely. 26

27 While Giusti does not [***20] clearly state
the particular basis of each of his contract claims,
it appears that his argument is that SWC (1)
breached his employment contract by terminating
his employment after only five months, (2)
breached the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing that was implied in the agreement by
terminating his employment early, and (3) should
be estopped from denying its promise of
employment given Giusti's reliance on that
promise.

26 Giusti seeks attorney fees on the ground that
SWC's motion to dismiss his appeal as untimely
was frivolous under Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 33(b). A frivolous claim under rule 33
"is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted
by existing law, or not based on a good faith

[*P41] Giusti signed three contracts in November
and December 1999. First, he signed the November offer
letter accepting employment with SWC. Second, he
signed the December 5 SWC employment agreement
containing an explicit provision that Giusti's employment
could be terminated "without cause at any time." Third,

[*P40] Giusti first argues that the district court
erred in granting SWC's motion for summary judgment
on Giusti's three contract claims: breach of contract,
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
promissory estoppel. Each of these claims is based on
Giusti's assertion that the November offer letter,
operating as an employment contract, guaranteed him a
minimum of twelve months of employment. 27 Because
we hold that the November offer letter provided no
guaranty of employment, the district court correctly
granted summary judgment to SWC on each of Giusti's
contract claims.
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Giusti initialed the December 13 contract, which was a
duplication of the November offer letter with only one
change to his compensation scheme.
[*P42] Giusti argues that the November offer
letter--and,
by
extension,
the
December
contract--contained a provision guarantying him twelve
months of employment with SWC. SWC contends that
the November offer letter merely "covered the terms of
Plaintiff's compensation, including base salary, override,
commissions, the amount [***21] of a draw, stock
options, vacation, and benefits." It did not "provide[] him
with 'a minimum term' of twelve months employment at
SWC." Additionally, SWC argues that because Giusti
signed the SWC employment agreement containing the
at-will provision, he agreed to the at-will nature of his
employment.
[*P43] Because the November offer letter provided
no guaranty of employment, and because Giusti was an
at-will employee, SWC argues that Giusti's contract
claims--all based on his assertion that he was guaranteed
twelve months employment--must fail. The district court
agreed, and we affirm.
[*P44] Under basic rules of contract interpretation,
courts first look to the writing alone to determine its
meaning and the intent of the contracting parties. 28 "If
the language within the four corners of the contract is
unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from
the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the
contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." 29 Only
where there is ambiguity in the terms of the contract may
the parties' intent "be ascertained from extrinsic
evidence." 30 "A contractual term or provision is
ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable
interpretation [***22] because of uncertain meanings of
terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies." 31 The
question here is whether the November offer letter is
ambiguous such that we may consider extrinsic evidence,
including conversations between Giusti and Hyde. We
conclude that it is not ambiguous. It reads as follows:
SWC will also provide you with a
monthly
subsidy
payment
or
non-recoverable draw for a 12 month
period to allow you to build the staff in the
product area and grow your personal book
of business and start receiving overrides
and commission. For [**976] the first 12

months of employment SWC will provide
you with a payment of $ 7,500 per month.
Your commission and overrides during
that ramp up period will be applied to the
subsidy payment. At anytime during the
12 month period you can make a one time
election to move from the subsidy plan to
the commission and override plan if you
desire. (Emphases added.)

28 See Deep Creek Ranch, LLC v. Utah State
Armory Bd., 2008 UT 3, P 15, 178 P.3d 886.
29 Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT
50, P 17, 84 P.3d 1134 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
30 Deep Creek Ranch, 2008 UT 3, P 16, 178
P.3d 886.
31 Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, P 25, 190
P.3d 1269 [***23] (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
[*P45] This language plainly does not guarantee
Giusti's employment. There is no statement implying that
his employment cannot be terminated or that it is
guaranteed for any period. The language indicates only
the level of compensation and benefits Giusti is to receive
during the first twelve months of his employment, should
it last that long. The contract does not guarantee that his
employment will last that long. Because there is no
ambiguity in the language of the contract, we need not,
and must not, consider extrinsic evidence to determine its
meaning.
[*P46] Additionally, in Utah, we presume that
employment contracts are at-will. 32 When an employer
intends to alter the at-will arrangement and guarantee
employment for a specified period, we require the
employer to make that promise clear and definite: "There
must be a manifestation of the employer's intent [to
guarantee employment] that is communicated to the
employee and sufficiently definite to operate as a contract
provision." 33 Otherwise, as the court of appeals has held,
"an employer could never tell a potential employee in a
job interview what was expected of him or her over the
next [***24] few months or years without creating [a
guaranty of employment] contract." 34 Here, the language
in the November offer letter does not guarantee Giusti
employment for twelve months. And we will not infer
such a promise where it clearly does not exist.
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32 Uintah Basin Med Ctr. v. Hardy, 2002 UT 92,
P 21, 54 P.3d 1165; see also Evans v. GTE Health
Sys. Inc., 857 P.2d 974, 975 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
33 Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d
997, 1002 (Utah 1991).
34 Evans, 857 P.2d at 978.
[*P47] Additionally, a month after signing the
November offer letter, Giusti signed the SWC
employment agreement that contained an at-will
employment provision. Section 6.2 of the agreement
provides as follows:

other claims, this claim is based on Giusti's assertion that
the November offer letter contained a guaranty of
employment. Because the November offer [***26] letter
contained no such guaranty, this argument fails.
[*P50] Finally, Giusti argues that the district court
erred in dismissing his contract claims [**977] that are
unrelated to the termination of his employment. He fails,
however, to adequately brief those claims. 36 His entire
argument consists of two sentences and a footnote
containing a six-item laundry list of Giusti's allegations
against SWC and Hyde. We therefore decline to address
this argument.

6.2 Termination With or Without Cause
Employer may terminate Employee's
employment with Employer without cause
at any time upon two (2) weeks advance
written notice to Employee.

[*P48] According to Giusti, he reviewed this
provision with Pat Black, the Human Resources Director,
and told her that the provision did not apply to him.
When Black responded that she had no knowledge of any
other arrangement Giusti may have had with Hyde, Giusti
signed the document. He did not strike out any provision
of the agreement [***25] or ask to sign it later so that he
could speak with Hyde prior to signing it. Given that
Giusti is a sophisticated executive who was savvy enough
to recognize and question the at-will provision, he clearly
could have noted his concerns on the document or
refused to sign it until he could clarify his concerns. He
did neither. And because the terms of the SWC
employment agreement are clear, the conversation he
claims he had with Black is inadmissable parol evidence.
35 The SWC employment agreement clearly provides, as
does the November offer letter, that Giusti's employment
was at-will.
35 Giusti also argues that Black fraudulently
induced him to sign the SWC employment
agreement by telling him that his signature was a
prerequisite to her processing his benefit
enrollment. Giusti presented no evidence that her
statement was fraudulent. We therefore decline to
address his argument on this point.
[*P49] Giusti next argues that the November offer
letter supersedes the SWC employment agreement and,
therefore, his employment was not at will. As with his

36
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure
24(a)(8)-(9) requires adequate briefing of the
arguments, including, "the contentions and
reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented, . . . with citations to the authorities,
statutes, and parts of the record relied on."
[*P51] For all the foregoing reasons, the district
court did not err in granting summary judgment to SWC
on Giusti's contract claims.
B. The District Court Did Not Err in Granting Summary
Judgment to SWC on Giusti's Fraudulent Inducement
Claim
[*P52] Giusti next argues that the district court
erred in granting summary judgment to SWC on his
claim that SWC "fraudulently induc[ed] him to leave his
secure executive employment at Cambric and accept
employment and employment contracts at SWC." The
[***27] district court granted summary judgment to SWC
on this claim because it found that Giusti made "no
showing of damages, a crucial element of [the] claim."
The court was correct.
[*P53] As the party moving for summary judgment,
SWC had the burden of demonstrating that there was no
genuine issue of material fact. 37 SWC asserted that
Giusti had not demonstrated that he suffered damages--an
essential element of his fraudulent inducement
claim--and, therefore, there was no issue of material fact
on the question of damages. 38 When, as here, the moving
party "challenges an element of the nonmoving party's
case on the basis that no genuine issue of material fact
exists, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to
present evidence that is sufficient to establish a genuine
issue of material fact." 39 The district court found that
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Giusti failed to satisfy this burden. Specifically, the court
found that Giusti failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact regarding his damages, and the court
granted summary judgment to SWC. We affirm.

Cambric, he suffered damages. Because Giusti failed to
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he
incurred such damages, the court correctly granted
SWC's motion for summary judgment.

37 Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
38 The elements of a fraud claim include the
following:

40
Giusti accepted employment at Callware
shortly after his employment was terminated at
SWC.

(1) a representation; (2)
concerning a presently existing
material fact; (3) which [***28]
was false; (4) which the
representor either (a) knew to be
false, or (b) made recklessly,
knowing that he had insufficient
knowledge upon which to base
such representation; (5) for the
purpose of inducing the other party
to act upon it; (6) that the other
party, acting reasonably and in
ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in
fact rely upon it; (8) and was
thereby induced to act; (9) to his
injury and damage.
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980)
(emphasis added).
39 Eagar v. Burrows, 2008 UT 42, P15, 191
P.3d 9 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
[*P54] Giusti asserts that the district court erred in
measuring his damages by comparing his Cambric
compensation with his post-Cambric compensation.
Giusti claims that in measuring his damages, the court
should have considered the value of the SWC
employment agreement and awarded him its full value.
As we have held, however, the SWC employment
agreement was not breached. Therefore, Giusti is not
entitled to the benefit of that bargained-for agreement.
[*P55] Rather, Giusti is limited to those damages
necessary to compensate him for having been, as he
claims, fraudulently induced to leave Cambric.
Accordingly, the court measured Giusti's [***29]
damages by comparing what he earned at Cambric, in
base salary and commissions, with what he earned at
SWC, and later, at Callware. 40 Under this measure, if
Giusti suffered a loss in compensation after leaving

[*P56] The approach employed by the district court
has been adopted by other jurisdictions. 41 [**978] In
Pennsylvania, for example, the Superior Court concluded
that the plaintiff-employee was entitled to distinct
damages for his fraudulent inducement claim. The court
noted that "[d]amages for fraud are limited to what losses
were immediately and proximately caused by the fraud"
and held that it was the "loss of [the employee's] salary
and benefits from [his prior employer that] was the injury
caused by appellant's fraudulent misrepresentation." 42
41 See, e.g., Helmer v. Bingham Toyota Isuzu,
129 Cal. App. 4th 1121, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136,
143-44 (Ct. App. 2005); Prokopeas v. Rapp
Collins World Wide, Inc., No 3:03-CV-1994-D,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20507, at *2 (N.D. Tex.
Oct. 13, 2004).
42 Lokay v. Lehigh Valley Coop. Farmers, Inc.,
342 Pa. Super. 89, 492 A.2d 405, 410, 411 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1985).
[*P57] [***30] We agree with this approach and
clarify that in the employment context, damages for
fraudulent inducement consist of the losses that are
"immediately and proximately caused" by the fraud. That
is, the employee is entitled to recover the difference
between the compensation provided by the employer
whom the employee was induced to leave and the
compensation that follows. The district court was correct
in applying this measure to Giusti's claim.
[*P58] Giusti also argues that, even if the court
applied the correct measure of damages, it erred in
calculating those damages. The district court found that
Giusti's employment at Cambric provided him the
following: $ 125,000 annual salary, an $ 800 per month
car allowance, and a future periodic bonus based on the
company's economic performance and Giusti's
performance. The court then compared that compensation
with Giusti's compensation at SWC, which provided
Giusti the following: $ 180,000 annual salary plus
bonuses and other benefits. Finally, the court reviewed
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Giusti's compensation from Callware and found that it
constitutes the following: $ 125,000 annual salary plus
commissions and bonuses.
[*P59] In comparing these figures, the court
reviewed the [***31] annual salaries and commission
and bonus structures at Cambric, SWC, and Callware.
The court concluded that Giusti earned the same annual
salary at Callware as he did at Cambric ($ 125,000), and
that he earned more at SWC ($ 180,000) than at Cambric.
Thus, he suffered no damages in his annual salary as a
result of leaving Cambric. Giusti disputes this finding,
claiming that his base salary at Cambric was due to
increase to $ 135,000 in January 2000. Thus, according to
Giusti, the court made a $ 10,000 error in its calculations.
[*P60] But even if the district court had determined
that Giusti's annual salary was $ 135,000 at Cambric, that
determination would not have changed the court's
conclusion that Giusti suffered no damages. That is,
Giusti's annual salary at SWC was also a factor, and it far
exceeded $ 135,000--it was $ 180,000. Based on these
figures, Giusti earned $ 45,000 more at SWC than at
Cambric. Therefore, even if Giusti earned $ 10,000 less at
Callware than at Cambric ($ 125,000 versus $ 135,000
respectively), his total annual salary following his
employment at Cambric still exceeded that of what he
earned at Cambric, and any claimed error in the court's
calculation of his annual [***32] salary was harmless. 43
43 State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, P 20, 20 P.3d
888. ("[H]armless error is an error that is
sufficiently inconsequential that there is no
reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome
of the proceedings.").
[*P61] Based on its comparison of Giusti's bonus
and commission structure at Cambric and Callware, the
court rejected his claim that his bonuses at Cambric far
exceeded those at Callware. Giusti claimed that he would
have received $ 75,000 in bonuses at Cambric. The court
found that such a claim was "speculative at best and
cannot be proven with requisite 'reasonable certainty'
because [Giusti's future bonuses] are tied to [Cambric's]
future economic performance as well as [Giusti's] future
performance." As to his commissions at Callware, Giusti
testified only that he received commissions, but that he
could not remember how much.
[*P62] Because Giusti claimed future bonuses at
Cambric but failed to provide current commission figures

from Callware, [**979] the court could not accurately
compare the numbers to determine whether Giusti
suffered any damages by leaving Cambric. And it
correctly held that "[s]ummary judgment is warranted if a
plaintiff fails 'to supply evidence, which, [***33] if
accepted as true, would clearly and convincingly support
each element of a fraud claim.'" 44
44 The district court quoted Republic Group v.
Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 292 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994).
[*P63] The district court was correct in (1)
distinguishing between breach of contract and fraudulent
inducement damages, (2) measuring damages by
comparing Giusti's Cambric compensation with his
post-Cambric compensation, and (3) granting summary
judgment because Giusti failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact regarding his damages. Therefore, the
district court did not err in granting summary judgment to
SWC on Giusti's fraudulent inducement claim.
C. The District Court Did Not Err in Granting Summary
Judgment to SWC on Giusti's Tortious Interference Claim
[*P64] Giusti next argues that the district court
erred in granting summary judgment to SWC on Giusti's
tortious interference claim. Giusti claims that "Hyde and
Erickson maliciously and intentionally interfered with
[Giusti's] existing and prospective economic relations
with SWC [by terminating his employment] for the
wholly personal reason of saving their own jobs and not
for any legitimate business purpose of their employer."
The district [***34] court correctly rejected this claim.
[*P65] To recover damages for tortious
interference, "a plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant
intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's existing or
potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose
or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff."
45 When the defendants are also employees, however, the
plaintiff must establish that the defendants were acting
outside the scope of their employment for purely
personal reasons. 46 Employees act for purely personal
motives when their actions are in no way connected with
the employer's interests. 47
45 Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657
P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982) (citation omitted).
46 See Lichtie v. U.S. Home Corp., 655 F. Supp.
1026, 1028 (D. Utah 1987).
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47 See Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d
1053, 1057 (Utah 1989).
[*P66] The two sides submitted conflicting
evidence as to the reason for Giusti's termination. SWC
cited numerous performance-based reasons, 48 while
Giusti cited non-performance based reasons. Specifically,
Giusti claims that because SWC failed to meet its
revenue targets for the year, Hyde engaged in a
"malicious plan to divert attention from his own failures
to meet [***35] SWC's revenue targets by blaming
Giusti." Based on these claims, Giusti argues that there
was a genuine issue of fact regarding the motive of Hyde,
and therefore, summary judgment was inappropriate.
48 At his deposition, Hyde claimed that Giusti's
employment was terminated because Giusti (1)
failed to actively drive revenue and close deals for
SWC, (2) was not sufficiently familiar with
SWC's products, (3) created disharmony among
the salesforce who worked for him, and (4) was
not effective in promoting SWC products, training
the sales organization, dealing with customers,
helping close deals, or interacting with team
members.
[*P67] The district court correctly noted, however,
that "when an employee's activity is so clearly within the
scope of employment that reasonable minds cannot differ,
the court may decide the issue as a matter of law." 49
49 See Christensen v. Swenson, 874 P.2d 125,
127 (Utah 1994).
[*P68] Here, the court correctly found that, as high
level executives with the responsibility for the operation
of SWC, "the right to terminate is an activity clearly
within the scope of employment of Erickson and Hyde."
50 The court also noted that even if [**980] Hyde had
mixed motives for terminating [***36] Giusti's
employment, that does not prevent a grant of summary
judgment. 51
50 The court of appeals has explained that duties
within the scope of employment include those that
are
"generally
directed
toward
the
accomplishment of objectives within the scope of
the employee's duties and authority, or reasonably
incidental thereto." Nunez v. Albo, M.D., 2002 UT
App 247, P 12, 53 P.3d 2.
51 See Lichtie, 655 F. Supp. at 1027 ("[I]f an

agent acts with mixed motives his or her conduct
will be within the scope of employment[,]" and
summary judgment is appropriate.).
[*P69] The district court was correct on all points.
Giusti presented no evidence that Hyde and/or Erickson
acted beyond the scope of employment and terminated
Giusti's employment for purely personal reasons that
were in no way connected with their employer's interests.
Thus, Giusti failed to raise a genuine issue of material
fact regarding Hyde's and Erickson's motives, and the
court correctly granted summary judgment to SWC on
Giusti's tortious interference claim.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN
DENYING SWC'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES
OR IN LIMITING ITS RECOVERY OF COSTS
[*P70] We now address SWC's cross-appeal, in
which it claims that the [***37] district court erred in
denying it attorney fees and in limiting its award of costs
to $ 55. We hold that the district court did not err in either
regard. We address each argument below.
A. The District Court Did Not Err in Denying SWC
Attorney Fees
[*P71] SWC first argues that the district court erred
in denying it attorney fees. In its order, the court noted
that "attorney fees in Utah are awarded only as a matter
of right under a contract or statute." 52 The court then
reviewed section 7.3 of the SWC employment agreement
and found that it did not provide for an award of fees to
SWC under the facts of this case. The court was correct.
52 The district court quoted Foote v. Clark, 962
P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1998).
[*P72] Section 7.3 provides in relevant part the
following:
In the event either party defaults in any
of the terms or provisions of this
Agreement the non-defaulting party shall
be entitled to recover its, his or her
reasonable attorney's fees and costs
incurred, whether or not suit is
commenced or final judgment obtained.
(Emphasis added.)

Page 12
2009 UT 2, *P72; 201 P.3d 966, **980;
621 Utah Adv. Rep. 11; 2009 Utah LEXIS 8, ***37
[*P73] "Fees provided for by contract . . . are
allowed only in strict accordance with the terms of the
contract." 53 The terms of section 7.3 require that there
[***38] be a defaulting party in order for an award of
fees to be triggered. The district court correctly
noted--and SWC has never claimed otherwise--that
"[Giusti] is not a defaulting party." The court then ruled
that section 7.3 was never triggered, and therefore, could
not serve as the basis for an award of fees to SWC.
53 Foote, 962 P.2d at 54.
[*P74] On appeal, SWC contends that while the
precise terms of section 7.3 were unmet, SWC is
nevertheless entitled to an award of fees. SWC cites Utah
Code section 78B-5-826 and our holding in Bilanzich v.
Lonetti, 54 wherein we interpreted and applied section
78B-5-826.
54 2007 UT 26, 160 P.3d 1041.
[*P75] Section 78B-5-826 provides the following:
A court may award costs and attorney
fees to either party that prevails in a civil
action based upon any promissory note,
written contract, or other writing executed
after April 28, 1986, when the provisions
of the promissory note, written contract, or
other writing allow at least one party to
recover attorney fees. 55

55 Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 (2008).
[*P76] SWC argues that in Bilanzich, we
interpreted this section broadly to mean that whenever
litigation is based on a writing that contains a provision
allowing at least one [***39] party to recover attorney
fees, the precise terms of the provision are irrelevant, and
district courts should liberally award fees to prevailing
parties. Bilanzich, however, is inapplicable.
[*P77] In Bilanzich, we held that when a contract
creates "an unequal exposure to the risk of contractual
liability for attorney [**981] fees," 56 district courts may
apply section 78B-5-826 to ensure that both parties are
subject to the attorney fee provision. 57 Here, section 7.3
of the SWC employment agreement provided attorney
fees to the "non-defaulting party." Thus, as to attorney

fees, neither party had a contractual advantage or
assumed more contractual liability than the other; SWC
and Giusti were subject to the provision equally.
Accordingly, Bilanzich does not apply. SWC is entitled
to fees only under the terms of section 7.3. That section
requires a defaulting party. In this case, there was none,
and the district court correctly denied SWC's claim for
fees.
56 2007 UT 26, P 19, 160 P.3d 1041.
57
"[T]he language of the statute is not
mandatory but allows courts to exercise discretion
in awarding attorney fees and costs." Id. P 17.
B. The District Court Did Not Err in Limiting SWC's
Recovery of Costs
[*P78] SWC next argues that [***40] the district
court erred in limiting its recovery of costs. The district
court ruled that rule 54(d) did not provide for costs
except for $ 55 in witness costs. 58 We review the district
court's denial of costs for abuse of discretion, granting a
high degree of deference to the court's decision. We hold
that the court did not abuse its discretion in limiting
SWC's award of costs. 59
58 SWC also argues that it is entitled to costs
under section 7.3 of the SWC employment
agreement. Because we conclude that there was
no defaulting party, section 7.3 was never
triggered, and we do not address this argument.
59 See, e.g., Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973
P.2d 932 (Utah 1998).
[*P79] Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure provides in pertinent part that
costs shall be allowed [**982] as of
course to the prevailing party unless the
court
otherwise
directs;
provided,
however, where an appeal or other
proceeding for review is taken, costs of the
action, other than costs in connection with
such appeal or other proceeding for
review, shall abide the final determination
of the cause.

[*P80] "Costs" as used in rule 54 refers to fees that
are paid to the court, fees that are paid to witnesses, costs
that are [***41] authorized by statute, costs incurred in
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taking depositions, subject to the limitation that they were
taken in good faith and appear to be essential for the
development and presentation of the case. 60
60 Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah
1980).
[*P81] SWC's Verified Memorandum of Costs,
which it timely submitted pursuant to rule 54(d), 61
requested total costs of $ 13,329.56. Of that amount, $
2,039.60 was for photocopy costs, Westlaw charges, and
witness fees. The remaining amount--$ 11,289.96--was
for deposition costs for ten individuals, including Giusti,
whose deposition was taken over the course of seven
sessions.
61 See Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2).
[*P82] The court limited SWC's award to $ 55 in
witness costs and found that SWC's request for "copying
costs and overnight delivery charges is not within the
definition of costs." Turning to the deposition costs, the
court found that, while SWC's depositions were taken in
good faith, the case was decided on legal rather than
factual grounds, and therefore, SWC failed to establish
that the extensive deposition of Giusti was "essential for
the development of the case[,] and since there is no
method to parse out what portion may have been essential
[***42] from the overall claim, the claim is denied."
[*P83] SWC argues that due to the factually
intensive nature of Giusti's claims, all the depositions
SWC conducted were essential to defending against each
claim, and the depositions allowed SWC to "successfully
move for dismissal of every one of [Giusti's] claims
except one that [he] voluntarily dismissed." Additionally,
SWC points out that the court did not explain why it
denied costs regarding the other nine depositions. Thus, it
claims, the district court erred.
[*P84] In reviewing a district court's denial or
award of costs, we apply a highly deferential standard.
We also recognize that rule 54(d) is discretionary: "costs
shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party
unless the court otherwise directs." 62 And there are two
requirements for awarding deposition costs: the trial court
must be persuaded that (1) the depositions were taken in
good faith, and (2) they must appear to be essential to the
development of the case. 63

62 Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) (emphasis added).
63 Frampton, 605 P.2d at 774.
[*P85] Given these considerations, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in limiting SCW's award of
costs. The district court specifically addressed [***43]
the two requirements for awarding deposition costs and
found that, while the depositions were taken in good
faith, the court was unpersuaded that the "extensive
length of [Giusti's] deposition" was necessary.
[*P86] SWC argues that Giusti's extensive
deposition was necessary because of the factually
intensive nature of his claims and because he was prone
to giving long, speech-like answers. But such an
argument is insufficient to demonstrate that the court
abused its discretion. The court applied the correct
standard, gave a legitimate reason for its decision, and
therefore, did not abuse its discretion. We therefore
affirm the court's decision to limit SWC's award of costs
to $ 55.
CONCLUSION
[*P87] First, rule 7(f)(2) and our decision in Code
demonstrate that the July judgment was necessary, and
therefore, Giusti's appeal was timely. Second, the district
court did not err in granting summary judgment to SWC
on each of Giusti's claims: (1) his contract claims fail
because the November offer letter did not guarantee
Giusti's employment; (2) his fraudulent inducement claim
fails because Giusti failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact regarding his damages; and (3) his tortious
interference [***44] claim fails because Giusti failed to
raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding Hyde's
and Erickson's motives in terminating his employment.
[*P88] Finally, the district court did not err in
denying SWC attorney fees because the SWC
employment agreement does not provide for them on the
facts of this case. The district court also did not abuse its
discretion in limiting SWC's award of costs. We therefore
affirm each of the district court's decisions.
[*P89] Chief Justice Durham, Justice Wilkins,
Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in Associate
Chief Justice Durrant's opinion.
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OPINION BY: ZIMMERMAN
OPINION
[*308] ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice:
Lowell R. Simpson, Sandra S. Simpson, Jay
Simpson, and Glenna R. Simpson ("the Simpsons")
appeal a decision of the district court finding that a road

adjacent to their property and historically used to access
the airport servicing Heber City (the "Airport Road") was
not a "public highway" as defined by section 27-12-89 of
the Utah Code and was therefore [**2] properly closed
by Heber City. We have jurisdiction to hear this case
under section 78-2-2(3)(j) of the Utah Code. We reverse
and remand.
This controversy arose out of Heber City's decision
in 1992 to extend the length of its municipal airport's
runway and expand the airport's protection zone. 1 To
effect this expansion, Heber City sought to acquire by
condemnation a portion of the Simpsons' property. 2
During the condemnation proceeding, the public nature of
the Airport Road became an issue because the Simpsons
contested the adequacy of the compensation offered by
Heber City. Specifically, they asserted that the valuation
of the condemned property interests should take into
account the fact that the property had direct access to
Highway 189 via the Airport Road. 3 The Simpsons
argued that a purchaser of the condemned portion of their
property would have paid a premium for its access to
Highway 189 via a public highway. The Airport Road
connected the airport to Highway 189 and ran exclusively
over property owned by Heber City. Heber City,
however, had previously acted unilaterally to close the
Airport Road. 4 The road had to be closed to satisfy the
requirements of the protection [**3] zone. The Airport
Road had also connected the Simpsons' condemned
property to Highway 189. The Simpsons were not,
however, landlocked by the closure because their
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remaining property accessed Highway 189 via Daniels
Canyon Road, which is a public highway.
1
The history of the creation of the airport is
also relevant to this case. In 1947, Heber City and
Wasatch County jointly acquired property for
construction of the Heber Airport. The Simpsons
and several other property owners in the area sold
their property to be used for the airport. All but
one of the deeds from these property owners
expressly conveyed away the right to access their
remaining property from the airport to be built on
the property conveyed by them. The one property
owner who did not convey away his rights-of-way
across the airport facility was Mr. Howe. His
property was landlocked by the airport, and
therefore, he was expressly granted a right-of-way
across the airport from his property to Highway
189.
2 Heber City acquired fee title to a portion of
the Simpsons' property and an aviation easement
over an additional portion of the Simpsons'
property.
[**4]
3
For ease of reference, we have appended a
map of the Airport Road.
4 Heber City asserts that it closed the Airport
Road at the insistence of the Federal Aeronautics
Administration, which had determined that there
was a risk that planes taking off or landing would
collide with vehicles or pedestrians on the road.
Heber City first closed the Airport Road in
December 1988. However, Wasatch County
objected to the road closure. Heber City and the
County eventually worked out a compromise in
which Heber City agreed to build a new road to
provide access for properties landlocked by the
closure of the Airport Road. The road was closed
again in 1989 and has remained closed since that
time.
[*309] Heber City disputed whether the Airport
Road was a public highway within the definition of
section 27-12-89 of the Code, which requires continuous
use as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years. In
effect, the City argued that it could close the road without
compensating for the loss of direct access it provided
because it was a private road owned by the City and
running over City property.

The parties [**5] agreed that this critical point of
contention needed to be resolved before the issue of just
compensation could be determined. Therefore, they
stipulated that the trial could be bifurcated, separating the
issue of whether the Airport Road was a public highway
from the compensation portion of the condemnation
proceedings. The district court entered an order
bifurcating these issues.
During the trial concerning the "public" status of the
Airport Road, the Simpsons presented numerous
witnesses who testified that they had used the Airport
Road for a variety of reasons other than for accessing the
airport. These included attending shooting events at a gun
club on property adjacent to the road, using it as a kind of
"lover's lane," accessing businesses located along the
road, riding horses, picnicking, and watching airplanes
take off and land. The witnesses testified that the public
used the road for these purposes from the opening of the
road in 1947 until its closure in 1989.
In addition, the Simpsons presented the testimony of
Robert Mathis, who had been the Wasatch County
Planner from 1976 through the time of the trial. Mr.
Mathis testified that when he became the Wasatch
County Planner, [**6] the Airport Road was designated
on the county maps as a class B road. This designation
means that the road is a public road entitled to state funds
for maintenance and construction. See Utah Code Ann. §
27-12-22 (defining class B roads); id. § 27-12-127
(creating fund for class B and C roads); Utah Admin.
Code R926-3-4(1) (establishing permissible uses of class
B and C funds). According to Mr. Mathis, Wasatch
County received money from the state for maintaining
this road from sometime prior to 1976 through the time
the Airport Road was closed in 1989. Mr. Mathis also
testified that the County and Heber City disagreed as to
whether formal proceedings to vacate the road were
necessary before the road could be closed, with Heber
City taking the position that no such proceedings were
required. See Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-90 (providing
procedure for vacating public road).
Following the conclusion of the trial on the public
highway issue, the district court issued a memorandum
decision finding that the Airport Road was not a public
highway as defined by section 27-12-89 of the Code. In
its memorandum decision, the district court stated:
The Court acknowledges that this [**7] is a close
decision. There is evidence of public use of the airport
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roadway over an extended period of time. However, in
the interest of fairness and justice, it would appear this
was simply the type of roadway that should be exempted
from the technical provisions of U.C.A. § 27-12-89.
Thereafter, the court entered an order denying the
Simpsons the right to claim compensation for the Airport
Road access to Highway 189. 5 The Simpsons moved for
a new trial, but the district court denied this motion. The
parties stipulated that the court's order constituted a final
judgment under rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, and the district court entered an order to that
effect. The Simpsons appealed to this court.
5
Although both parties submitted proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial
court did not adopt either. We therefore treat the
trial court's memorandum decision as its findings
and conclusions supporting its order.
We first state the appropriate standard of review.
Here, [**8] the district court examined section
27-12-89, made the requisite findings of fact, and
determined that the facts found by it did not meet the
statutory definition of a public highway. We review this
ultimate determination, which is a mixed question of fact
and law, for correctness. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,
936 (Utah 1994). Historically, we have given trial courts
a fair degree of latitude in determining [*310] the legal
consequences under section 27-12-89 of facts found by
the court. See, e.g., Bonner v. Sudbury, 18 Utah 2d 140,
417 P.2d 646, 648-49 (Utah 1966) (upholding conclusion
that street had been dedicated to public use); Thompson v.
Nelson, 2 Utah 2d 340, 273 P.2d 720, 723 (Utah 1954)
(upholding conclusion that road was not public highway).
Under section 27-12-89, a road is deemed "dedicated and
abandoned" to the public if it "has been continuously
used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years."
Granting discretion to the trial court is appropriate under
that section, as its legal requirements, other than the
ten-year requirement, are highly fact dependent and
somewhat amorphous. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 938, 940.
The issues presented under section 27-12-89, therefore,
do not [**9] lend themselves well to close review by this
court, as we would be hard-pressed to establish a
coherent and consistent statement of the law on a
fact-intensive, case-by-case review of trial court rulings.
See id. Therefore, when reviewing a trial court's decision
regarding whether a public highway has been established
under section 27-12-89, we review the decision for

correctness but grant the court significant discretion in its
application of the facts to the statute. Finally, we
"require[] proof of dedication by clear and convincing
evidence." Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d
1097, 1099 (Utah 1995) (citing Thomson v. Condas, 27
Utah 2d 129, 493 P.2d 639, 639 (Utah 1972)).
The Simpsons argue that the Airport Road was a
public highway by virtue of section 27-12-89 of the Utah
Code. That section provides, "A highway shall be
deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the use
of the public when it has been continuously used as a
public thoroughfare for a period of ten years." Utah Code
Ann. § 27-12-89. Thus, for a road to become a public
highway by dedication under section 27-12-89, there
must be (i) continuous use, (ii) as a public thoroughfare,
(iii) for a period of [**10] ten years. To prevail on this
appeal, the Simpsons must show that the district court
could not correctly conclude that they failed to establish
one or more of these three elements. 6
6
Though each of the three elements under
section 27-12-89 for the establishment of a public
highway
embodies
a
logically
distinct
requirement that must be satisfied, the elements
are so intertwined that they are not readily
susceptible to separate discussion. For example, it
is difficult to analyze whether the "use" has been
continuous without determining at the same time
whether that "use" has been as a public
thoroughfare. Recognizing this difficulty, we
acknowledge that our attempt to give separate
treatment for each of the three elements will
necessarily involve some overlap between our
discussions of the individual elements under
section 27-12-89.
We begin our analysis under section 27-12-89 with
the continuous use requirement. The witnesses presented
at trial testified to using or observing others using the
Airport Road [**11] frequently and without interruption
from just after the road's construction in 1947 until its
closure in 1989. For example, Ray Lloyd, a local resident
who had lived in the vicinity of the Airport Road for over
fifty years, testified that he drove on the Airport Road to
attend shooting events at a gun club from 1948 to 1955.
During that time, no one ever challenged his right to
drive on the road. 7 He further testified to observing other
people use the road over an extended period of time for
various purposes including riding horses, hauling hay,
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and necking.
7
Mr. Lloyd testified that when the airport
became operational in 1955, the gun club was
required to relocate.
Other witnesses testified to significant commercial
traffic on the Airport Road to various businesses located
along the road. The testimony of Jay Simpson reveals
substantial traffic on the Airport Road to a junkyard. He
testified as follows:

evidence demonstrates that the public "made a continuous
and uninterrupted use of" the Airport Road "as often as
they found it convenient or necessary." 9 See Boyer v.
Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395, 326 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah 1958).
We conclude that this evidence establishes as a matter of
law that the Airport Road was used continuously for
purposes other than reaching the airport. See Draper City,
888 P.2d at 1101 (emphasizing importance of preventing
general public use of road to avoid statutory dedication).
8
Though the County classified the Airport
Road as a class B road, this fact alone does not
compel the conclusion that the road was a public
highway under section 27-12-89. See Bonner, 417
P.2d at 648 ("The fact that [the road in question]
was shown on the public records to be a public
street" "will not necessarily establish it as a public
way[.]"). In this case, Mr. Mathis admitted that he
merely accepted the Airport Road's designation as
a class B road from his predecessor. Therefore,
we do not know why it was initially classified as a
class B road.

Q Did you ever see or observe a junk yard or a used
car type business or area?
A Oh yes.
Q [**12] Where was that located in reference to the
road that we are talking about?
A That was off from the oil, south of the oil south of
Lloyd Brothers Garage or their yard. Approximately, 300
feet and they probably had 3 or 4 acres of ground that
they had junk cars on. Everybody went down there for a
part, it seemed like.
[*311] Q And over what period of, or how many
years would you say you have observed this type of use
of the road that you have described?
A Early years there wasn't that many, back in the
40's and 50's there wasn't quite that many. But the late
50's, 60's it just kept getting more and more and more
use.
Q Did that use continue in the fashion you have
indicated up to the time it was closed?
A Yes, it did.
George Webb also testified that customers drove on
the Airport Road to his shop for his livestock
transportation business.
None of the witnesses testified to any interruption of
the public's use of the road, other than its temporary
closure in 1988 and final closure in 1989. Indeed, Mr.
Mathis, the Wasatch County Planner, testified that the
County considered the Airport Road, which was in the
unincorporated portion of the county, to be a public road.
[**13] 8 Thus, the County certainly was not likely to
restrict the public's use of the road. The uncontradicted

[**14]
9 The only evidence suggesting any limitation
of the public's use was that the gun club moved to
a new location after the airport became
operational. This fact alone, however, is
insufficient to justify the conclusion that the road
was not continuously used. No other evidence
suggested that any other public use of the road
was limited. Furthermore, the fact that the gun
club was required to move indicates that it was
the shooting activities of the gun club in the
immediate vicinity of the airport, not the public's
use of the road, that prompted airport officials to
relocate the club.
We now consider whether this "continuous use" was
"use as a public thoroughfare." Perhaps our most detailed
definition of "public thoroughfare" was announced in
Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127, 1131 (Utah
1916), where we stated:
A "thoroughfare" is a place or way through which there is
passing or travel. It becomes a "public thoroughfare"
when the public have a general right of passage. Under
[the identically worded predecessor statute to section
27-12-89,] the highway, even though it be over privately
owned [**15] ground, will be deemed dedicated or
abandoned to the public use when the public has
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continuously used it as a thoroughfare for a period of 10
years, but such use must be by the public. Use under
private right is not sufficient. If the thoroughfare is laid
out or used as a private way, its use, however long, as a
private way, does not make it a public way; and the mere
fact that the public also make use of it, without objection
from the owner of the land, will not make it a public way.
Before it becomes public in character the owner of the
land must consent to the change.
See also Thompson, 273 P.2d at 723 (quoting same
passage with approval). This definition establishes four
general requirements: (i) There must be "passing or
travel," (ii) the "use must be by the public," (iii) use by
permission does not constitute use as a public
thoroughfare, and (iv) "before [the road] becomes public
in character the owner of the land must consent to the
change." We have subsequently abandoned interpreting
into the language of the statute the requirement that the
owner must consent to the dedication. Draper City, 888
P.2d at 1099 (citing Leo M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine
Meadow Ranches, [**16] 639 P.2d 211, 213 (Utah
1981); Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447, 449 (Utah
1981)). We have, however, maintained the permissive
[*312] use element. See, e.g., Thurman, 626 P.2d at 449.
Regarding the class of individuals who constitute "the
public," we stated in Draper City that our case law has
distinguished between use of a road by owners of
adjoining property and by the general public. "Such
property owners cannot be considered members of the
public generally, as that term generally is used in
dedication by user statutes." Petersen, 20 Utah 2d 376,
438 P.2d 545 at 546. This is because adjoining owners
may have documentary or prescriptive rights to use the
road or their use may be by permission of the owners of
the fee of the road.
888 P.2d at 1099; see also Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah
2d 376, 438 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah 1968).
Having established the general legal principles of
what it means to use a road as a public thoroughfare, we
proceed to examine the evidence to determine whether
this legal standard was satisfied. Several witnesses
testified to use that could qualify as use as a public
thoroughfare. 10 For example, Mr. Lloyd, while testifying
about the shooting events at the gun club, stated: [**17]
"We always had a lot of spectators [sic] would always
drive out on the weekends and watch the shoots or family
people and stuff that [sic] was interested in it. It was a lot

of the community that came out there." As we noted
above, other witnesses testified that numerous customers
used the Airport Road to reach the various businesses
located along that road. Moreover, there was testimony
indicating additional public uses of the Airport Road as a
"lover's lane" and also as a place to ride horses.
10
Under the facts of the instant case, the
public's use of the Airport Road simply to go to
and from the airport is of the permissive nature
that will not lead to a dedication and abandonment
to the public, as this is precisely how Heber City
wanted the road used. See Gillmor v. Carter, 15
Utah 2d 280, 391 P.2d 426, 428 (Utah 1964)
(finding owners' "agreement with duck clubs
granting permission to use" road across their land
to be inconsistent with statutory requirements for
dedication of public highway). Therefore,
evidence regarding this use of the road is
irrelevant to our consideration of whether the
Airport Road was used as a public thoroughfare.
[**18] There is no indication in the district court's
memorandum decision that it found any of the above
evidence incredible. To the contrary, the district court
specifically referred in its findings of fact to some of
these public uses. Furthermore, when the court concluded
its memorandum decision by "acknowledging that this is
a close decision," the court stated, "There is evidence of
public use of the airport roadway over an extended period
of time." Indeed, no evidence to the contrary was
presented. Moreover, Heber City never argued at trial or
on this appeal that these uses were not by the "public."
Because Heber City does not challenge the accuracy of
the trial court's finding that "there is evidence of public
use of the airport roadway," we do not review whether all
of these uses were indeed by individuals who qualify as
members of the public. When a party fails to challenge a
factual finding and marshal the evidence in support of
that finding, we "assume[] that the record supports the
findings of the trial court and proceed[] to a review of the
accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the
application of that law in the case." Saunders v. Sharp,
806 P.2d 198, 199 [**19] (Utah 1991) (per curiam)
(citing Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782
P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985)).
The evidence establishes that the public used the
Airport Road for whatever purposes they deemed
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"convenient or necessary." 11 See Boyer, 326 P.2d at 109.
On the basis of this evidence, we find as a matter of law
that the public used the Airport Road as a public
thoroughfare.
11 The sole evidence to the contrary was that
the gun club relocated after the airport became
operational. For the same reasons we discussed
above, see supra note 9, this fact alone is
insufficient to justify the conclusion that the
Airport Road was not used as a public
thoroughfare.
Having concluded that the first two elements under
section 27-12-89 were satisfied, we turn to the final
requirement in section 27-12-89: Continuous use as a
public thoroughfare must occur for at least ten years. As
we discussed above, the uncontroverted facts establish
that the [**20] public continuously used the Airport
Road as a public thoroughfare [*313] from essentially
its moment of creation in 1947 until Heber City placed a
barricade across it in 1989. This amounts to over forty
years of continuous use as a public thoroughfare, easily
satisfying the ten-year requirement. We conclude
therefore that the facts compel the conclusion that the
ten-year requirement was satisfied as a matter of law.
Our conclusion that all three elements under section
27-12-89 for the establishment of a public highway were
satisfied is supported by the district court's memorandum
decision. After acknowledging in its memorandum
decision that "there is evidence of public use of the
airport roadway over an extended period of time," the
court added, "However, in the interest of fairness and
justice, [the Airport Road] should be exempted from the
technical provisions of U.C.A. § 27-12-89" (emphasis
added). The plain language of section 27-12-89, however,
does not support granting such an exception for the
Airport Road. Once the technical provisions of that
section have been satisfied, the road is a "public
highway." The court has no discretion to ignore that fact.
We hold that the court [**21] erred in concluding that
the Airport Road was not a public highway when closed
by Heber City in 1989. 12
12 The fact that the road has not been used since
1989 does not change its status as a public
highway. In Western Kane County Special Service

District No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d
1376, 1377-78 (Utah 1987), we held that a
highway which had been dedicated and
abandoned to the public by the public's use of it
"from 1919 until 1931, when the highway was
relocated and public use of the . . . road stopped,"
still maintained its status as a public highway
though half a century had passed since the road
was used by the public. See also Clark v. Erekson,
9 Utah 2d 212, 341 P.2d 424, 425-26 (Utah 1959)
(requiring
property
owner
to
remove
encroachments, which included buildings, fences,
and trees, from public road though some
encroachments had been in place for thirty years).
Furthermore, the City's placement of a barricade
across the road does not change the public status
of the road. Memmott v. Anderson, 642 P.2d 750,
753 (Utah 1982).
Section 27-12-90 of the Code provides the
only method for eliminating the "public" status of
a public highway. That section states, "All public
highways once established shall continue to be
highways until abandoned or vacated by order of
the highway authorities having jurisdiction over
any such highway, or by other competent
authority." Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-90. The court
found that Heber City had not formally
abandoned or vacated the Airport Road under that
section, and the City does not dispute this finding.
Consequently, the Airport Road is still a public
highway.
[**22] We reverse the district court's decision that
the Airport Road was not a public highway under section
27-12-89, and we remand for further proceedings to
determine the just compensation to be paid by Heber City
as a result of its condemnation of the Simpsons' property.
Justice Howe, Justice Durham, Justice Russon, and
Judge Taylor concur in Chief Justice Zimmerman's
opinion.
Having disqualified himself, Associate Chief Justice
Stewart does not participate herein; District Judge
Stanton M. Taylor sat. [*314] Appendix: Map of Airport
Road
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PRIOR HISTORY:
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Appellant.
A. Dean Jeffs, Provo, for Appellees.
JUDGES: Before Judges Orme, Davis, and Jackson.
Norman H. Jackson, Judge concurs. Gregory K. Orme,
Presiding Judge concurs in the result only.
OPINION BY: DAVIS
OPINION
[*910] OPINION
DAVIS, Associate Presiding Judge:
Stephen C. Martin appeals the trial court's rulings
regarding access rights to a ten-foot-wide driveway
occupying a portion of his property. We affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand in part.
FACTS
The property in question is a narrow strip of land
approximately 56 feet wide and 277 feet long. A
driveway approximately ten feet wide runs through the
property and provides access to both the Martin and the
Kohler residences. The testimony at trial [*911] was
that historically this entire strip of land was regarded and

treated as a public roadway (roadway). The roadway once
led to a slaughterhouse, a public store, a creamery, a
public swimming pool, and was also used for at least
twenty-two years by the public as access to a business
known as the "Buehler [**2] Hot Pots." In addition,
witnesses testified that the general public used the
roadway for access to property to the north of the Buehler
Hot Pots for recreational and agricultural purposes.
Despite its widespread public use and general
reputation as a public thoroughfare, the roadway was
included in the legal description of a larger parcel of
private property to the north of the roadway. This
property was purchased by Ferrin and Martha Whitaker
in 1956. In 1966, appellee Marden R. Kohler's parents,
Reed and Elda Kohler, approached the Whitakers, who
were close friends, and advised them that they had an
interest in buying the lot just south of theirs. Because the
lot was landlocked, Reed and Elda Kohler asked for
permission to use the driveway improved by the
Whitakers to access the home they intended to construct.
This permission was granted orally, and Reed and Elda
Kohler purchased the lot and built the home.
After the Kohlers finished the home and moved in,
the Whitakers requested payment from the Kohlers for an
"ownership" interest in the driveway and for driveway
maintenance. This money was never paid. Nevertheless,
the Kohlers continued to use the driveway and to
participate [**3] in the maintenance of the property
surrounding the driveway.
In 1981, the Whitakers sold their property to Karen
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and Dick Bassett. The Bassetts were told by the
Whitakers that Elda Kohler (Reed Kohler had since died)
had permission to use the driveway while she was alive
and then permission would terminate.

easement for the permanent and unrestricted use" of the
roadway. Martin appeals.

Martin purchased the property from the Bassetts in
1987. Prior to purchasing the property, Martin was told
by the Bassetts that Elda Kohler had the right to use the
driveway during her life only. After the purchase, Martin
approached Elda regarding his understanding of use of
the driveway, and Elda's response was noncommittal. In a
subsequent conversation, Elda again refused to address
the issue, and referred Martin to her son, Marden. Martin
contacted Marden, and Marden expressed his
understanding that the driveway was a public road, and
that Martin had no right to gate the entrance to the
driveway. After Elda Kohler died in 1992, Martin
installed a locked gate at the entrance to the driveway.
Marden and Joy Kohler subsequently brought this action,
claiming that they owned an easement to the driveway
and that the driveway was a public thoroughfare.

Martin raises numerous issues for review. 1
However, we need reach only two: whether the trial court
erred in ruling that the roadway was a dedicated, public
thoroughfare pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89
(1995); and, if a public thoroughfare was created,
whether the trial court erred in ruling that the entire strip
of property was dedicated to the public. Martin does not
challenge the factual underpinnings for the trial court's
rulings. Instead, he argues the trial court misapplied the
law, and urges this court to review the trial court's legal
conclusions for correctness. See Carrier v. Pro-Tech
Restoration, 909 P.2d 271, 272 (Utah App. 1995).

After a bench trial, the trial [**4] court found by
clear and convincing evidence that:
the roadway adjacent to Plaintiffs' real property and
extending northward from the intersection of Second
North Street and Second West Street of Midway City to a
line extended westerly from the north side of Plaintiffs'
asphalt driveway where it enters the Plaintiffs' property
was historically and continuously used by the general
public as a public thoroughfare for far in excess of a 10
year period of time. The width of the thoroughfare area
extended from fences along its west side and east side
which are still in their historic locations. The entire
thoroughfare area was used by the general public both for
passage of people and animals and for the travel and
parking of vehicles. The use of the thoroughfare by the
public was not only in connection with the use of the land
now owned by the Plaintiffs, but also for access by the
public to the lands north of the properties of these parties.
The thoroughfare area was always open for the free and
unobstructed passage of people and vehicles from its
south end northward past the Plaintiffs' land from before
1922 to at least 1948.
Based upon these findings, the court ruled: (1) the
roadway [**5] on which the driveway was built was a
public thoroughfare; (2) the Kohlers "are the owners of
an easement and right of way over and upon the
roadway"; and (3) the Kohlers "also own a prescriptive

[*912] ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1.
We do not address Martin's arguments
regarding joinder and the alleged violation of
Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution.
Martin has not demonstrated that the trial court
abused its discretion in failing to grant the motion
for joinder of Midway City. Further, the argument
regarding the unconstitutional taking is entirely
without merit and need not be addressed. See
State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 303 (Utah 1992).
[**6] Generally speaking, Martin is correct that
"the effect of a given set of facts is a question of law and,
therefore, one on which an appellate court owes no
deference to a trial court's determination." State v. Pena,
869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). However,
the critical question, and one of some subtlety, arises only
after we have said that an issue is a question of law and
no deference is owed the trial court. At this point, we
must attempt to determine when the articulated legal rule
to be applied to a set of facts--a rule that we establish
without deference to the trial courts--embodies a de facto
grant of discretion which permits the trial court to reach
one of several possible conclusions about the legal effect
of a particular set of facts without risking reversal.
Id. at 937.
The court in Pena concluded that a "spectrum of
discretion exists and that the closeness of appellate
review of the application of law to fact actually runs the
entire length of this spectrum." Id. at 938. When the
decisions are more fact- dependent, or when the
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credibility of the witnesses has a strong bearing on the
decision, broader discretion is generally granted to the
trial [**7] court. Id. At the other end of the spectrum,
resolution of such issues as "whether a 'municipal
function' has been delegated to a state commission in
violation of article VI, section 28 of the Utah
Constitution," is subject to de novo review as more of a
policy determination than a factual issue. Id.

with the multitude of fact patterns that may constitute a . .
. [public thoroughfare] determination." [**9] Id. at 940.
However, we require that the dedication of property to
the public be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099
(Utah 1995). "The law does not lightly allow the transfer
of property from private to public use." Id.
ANALYSIS

We must determine in this case whether the ruling
that a public thoroughfare exists should be reviewed with
some discretion granted to the trial court. The Utah
Supreme Court has provided three criteria for assessing
when some degree of deference should be given to the
trial court's application of the law to the facts. These are:
(i) when the facts to which the legal rule is to be
applied are so complex and varying that no rule
adequately addressing the relevance of all these facts can
be spelled out; (ii) when the situation to which the legal
principle is to be applied is sufficiently new to the courts
that appellate judges are unable to anticipate and
articulate definitively what factors should be outcome
determinative; and (iii) when the trial judge has observed
"facts," such as a witness's appearance and demeanor,
relevant to the application of the law that cannot be
adequately [**8] reflected in the record available to
appellate courts.
Id. at 939.
Consideration of these criteria persuades us that
some degree of discretion is appropriately accorded to the
trial court in cases determining whether a public
thoroughfare exists. While "ten years of public use"
seems a clear rule of law, these cases, by their very
nature, involve reconstruction of historical facts
concerning timing, nature, and the extent of public usage.
Usually, as here, witnesses are required to dredge the
recesses of their minds for aged memories. Accordingly,
this kind of testimony requires the trial court to do some
weighing and assessing of the credibility of witnesses. In
short, the trial court is in the best position to determine
whether the particular set of circumstances in question
merits a conclusion [*913] that the property has been
dedicated or abandoned to public use.
We therefore conclude that it is appropriate to review
the trial court's ruling that a public thoroughfare was
created with some degree of deference to the trial court.
"Trial courts should be permitted some rein to grapple

The trial court ruled that based upon continuous use
by the general public for a period greater than ten years,
the roadway leading to the Kohler residence was
impliedly dedicated to the public as a public highway.
Section 27-12-89 of the Utah Code states, "A highway
shall be deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to
the use of the public when it has been continuously used
as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years." Utah
Code Ann. § 27-12-89 (1995). Moreover, once a public
highway has been established pursuant to section
27-12-89, it remains a public highway unless expressly
abandoned by the proper authorities. Id. § 27-12-90.
"Highway" is defined as "any public road, street, alley,
lane, court, place, viaduct, tunnel, culvert, bridge, or
structure laid out or erected for public use, or dedicated
or abandoned to the public, . . . including the entire area
within the [**10] right-of-way." Id. § 27-12-2(6).
Martin does not dispute the evidence of public use of
the roadway, but contends that this evidence does not
satisfy the requirements of section 27-12-89. Specifically,
Martin argues that use of the roadway to access the
Buehler Hot Pots does not qualify as "public use"
because the Buehler Hot Pots was an adjoining property
owner. Further, the public used the roadway as business
invitees of Buehler Hot Pots, and it is well established
that mere use of the roadway by adjoining property
owners (and public invitees thereof) does not create a
public thoroughfare. See Bernardo, 888 P.2d at 1099;
Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 438 P.2d 545, 546
(1968); Thompson v. Nelson, 2 Utah 2d 340, 273 P.2d
720, 723 (Utah 1954) ("'The mere use by the public of a
private alley in common with the owners of the alley does
not show a dedication thereof to public use, or vest any
right in the public to the way.'" (citations omitted)
(emphasis added)). Martin also contends that other use of
the roadway was sporadic and would not independently
support a ruling of public dedication.
Martin correctly states the law regarding use of
property by adjoining [**11] land owners. As our
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supreme court recently stated,
It is important here to note that our case law has
distinguished between use of a road by owners of
adjoining property and by the general public. "Such
property owners cannot be considered members of the
public generally, as that term generally is used in
dedication by user statutes." Petersen, 438 P.2d at 546.
This is because adjoining owners may have documentary
or prescriptive rights to use the road or their use may be
by permission of the owners of the fee of the road.
Bernardo, 888 P.2d at 1099. The Buehler Hot Pots was
an adjoining landowner; hence the rule excluding
evidence of such use has application here. Nevertheless,
there was abundant, unrebutted evidence in support of the
trial court's conclusion that the roadway was used by the
general public for purposes other than access to the
Buehler Hot Pots for a period far in excess of the
requisite ten years. The evidence was that the roadway
was used continuously for recreational purposes, for
agricultural purposes, and for access to other business
activities. In addition, the Probst family, owners of the
roadway from approximately 1939 to 1956, always
considered [**12] the roadway to be public, did not
fence off the roadway, did not post any signs, and in
general made no attempts to limit the passage of the
public. Other individuals also testified that it was their
opinion, and the general public opinion, that the roadway
was public. In fact, when the Whitakers installed a gate
blocking the roadway in 1970, adjoining [*914]
landowners hired an attorney to request that the roadway
be reopened because it had been recognized as a public
thoroughfare for over fifty years. The Whitakers
subsequently removed the gate. Thus, clear and
convincing evidence supports the trial court's ruling that
the roadway was dedicated or abandoned to the public.
See Bonner v. Sudbury, 18 Utah 2d 140, 417 P.2d 646,
648 (Utah 1966) (noting "all of the facts should be
considered together; and where there is dispute about
whether a public use is established, determination of the
facts and resolution of the issue is primarily the
responsibility of the trial court").
Because we affirm the trial court's ruling that a
public thoroughfare had been created, Martin's argument
that creation of a private right in a public thoroughfare
cannot occur is well taken. "A prescriptive right [**13]
is in conflict with the dedication of land to the use of the
general public." Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447, 449

(Utah 1981); see also Thornley Land & Livestock Co. v.
Morgan Bros. Land & Livestock Co., 81 Utah 317, 17
P.2d 826, 827 (1932) ("The use by individual persons in
common with the public generally is regarded as
permissive, and by such common use no individual
person can acquire a right by prescription as against the
owner of the fee."). We therefore reverse the trial court's
rulings that the Kohlers own "an easement and a right of
way over and upon the roadway," that the doctrines of
promissory estoppel and equity prevent Martin from
denying the existence of such an easement, and that the
Kohlers had a prescriptive easement for use of the
roadway.
Finally, Martin argues that even if a public
thoroughfare was created, the trial court erred in failing to
assess the reasonable and necessary width of the
roadway. We agree. The trial court found that the public
thoroughfare extended the full width of the land between
the east and west fences. "Generally, the width of a
public road is determined according to what is reasonable
and necessary under all the facts and circumstances."
[**14] Memmott v. Anderson, 642 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah
1982). Because the trial court failed to make this
determination, we remand for this limited purpose. 2
2. Because we affirm the trial court's finding of
a public thoroughfare, we also affirm the trial
court's order requiring Martin to remove the gate
obstructing this thoroughfare.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's ruling that the roadway
was, by clear and convincing evidence, dedicated to the
public. We also affirm the ruling that Martin is required
to remove the gate preventing access to this public road.
We reverse the court's rulings concerning the existence of
easements to the roadway because they are inconsistent
with the ruling that the roadway is public. Finally, we
remand for a determination of the necessary and
reasonable width of this public road.
James Z. Davis,
Associate Presiding Judge
CONCUR BY: Jackson; Orme
CONCUR
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I CONCUR:
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT ONLY:

Gregory [**15] K. Orme,
Presiding Judge
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OPINION BY: MAUGHAN
OPINION

The trial proceeded; both parties called [**2]
witnesses, and presented other evidence. On the day the
court signed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
judgment, defendant filed a motion to reopen for the
purpose of introducing new evidence. This motion was
grounded on the assertion the exact nature of plaintiff's
claim was unknown, and that he didn't discover until trial
certain books, documents, and records needed to be
discovered. The motion was denied on the ground
defendant had 20 months to discover what books,
records, and documents the plaintiff was relying on to
support his claim.

[*497] Plaintiff sued to recover a sum he claimed
under an agreement with defendant. Plaintiff asserted
defendant owed him $11,122.30 for services rendered,
and costs advanced. Upon trial to the court, plaintiff was
awarded $9,078.27. Defendant appeals. We affirm, and
award costs to plaintiff.

On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in
denying the motion to reopen. A motion to reopen to take
additional testimony when a case has been submitted to
the court, but prior to the entry of judgment, is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court. 1

The complaint was filed on March 20, 1974, the
answer April 16, 1974. Counsel for both parties signed a
notice of readiness for trial which was filed October 22,
1975. Due notice, dated November 19, 1875, set the
matter for trial December 3 and 4, 1975.

1 Davis v. Riley, 20 Utah 2d 325, 437 P.2d 453
(1968); Tangaro v. Marrero, 13 Utah 2d 290, 373
P.2d 390 (1962); Kirkham v. Spencer, 3 Utah 2d
399, 285 P.2d 127 (1955); Mitchell v. Spanish
Fork West Field Irrigation Co., 1 Utah 2d 313,
265 P.2d 1016 (1954); Tuft v. Brotherson, 106
Utah 499, 150 P.2d 384 (1944).

On the date of trial defense counsel appeared, but
defendant was absent. Defense counsel moved for a
continuance, representing he had advised his client of the
date of trial; but the client had gone on a vacation to
Hawaii. He admitted he didn't know why his client

[**3] Defendant contends the court abused its
discretion in failing to hear additional evidence
concerning matters of defense to the claims of plaintiff,
which were not available at the time of the trial.
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Specifically, his reasons are: (1) Not all of the
documentary evidence had been discovered by the
parties, viz, plaintiff did not have all the evidence
available for his use in establishing his claim; (2)
defendant's presence at the trial would have materially
aided the court in reaching a decision.
Defendant had ample opportunity to produce his
books and records to indicate his version of the
transactions with plaintiff, and to be present at the trial.
We discover no basis to ascribe abuse of discretion to the
denial of the motion to reopen.
A court should consider a motion to reopen to take
additional testimony in light of all the circumstances and
grant or deny it in the interest of fairness and substantial
justice. 2 Judged by this standard, the denial of
defendant's motion subserves the interest of fairness and
substantial justice.

2 6 A. Moore's Federal Practice (2d Ed.), Sec.
59.04[13] p. 59-36.
[**4] Defendant further contends the court erred in
awarding judgment against defendant as an individual.
The claim is plaintiff dealt with Lynn S. Porter
Housemovers, Inc., a corporation; and, therefore,
defendant is neither the proper party to the action, nor the
one who is liable to plaintiff.
Such a claim was not in the pleadings or advanced at
trial. It is raised for the first time on appeal. Any
objection to a defect of parties is waived, if not asserted
by a party as provided in Rule 12(h), U.R.C.P.
HENRIOD, C.J., and ELLETT, CROCKETT and
WILKINS, JJ., concur.

Page 1

LEXSEE 86 P3D 402
Petitioners: KIM MCINTYRE and STEVE MCINTYRE, v. Respondents: BOARD
OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, GUNNISON COUNTY, COLORADO; SIERRA
MINERALS CORP. and OMYA INC.
No. 02SC803
SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO
86 P.3d 402; 2004 Colo. LEXIS 158

March 15, 2004, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY:
[**1] Certiorari to the Colorado
Court of Appeals Court of Appeals Case No. 01CA2408.
Bd. of County Comm'rs v. McIntyre, 2002 Colo. App.
LEXIS 1634 (Colo. Ct. App., Sept. 19, 2002)
DISPOSITION:
directions.

statutory period of twenty years; and (3) the landowner
must have had actual or implied knowledge of the
public's use of the road and made no objection to such
use. Part one of this test requires a showing of both
adversity and a public claim of right.

Reversed and remanded with

HEADNOTES
Requirements for acquisition of a public road by
prescription, § 43-2-201(1)(c), 11 C.R.S. (2002)- Claim
of Right - Adverse Use -Twenty Year Prescriptive Period
- Overt Act of Public Entity - Notice to Landowner.
SYLLABUS
In this case, the owners of private land in Gunnison
County challenge a quiet title decree the trial court
entered in favor of Gunnison County for a road across
their property. The Supreme Court holds that the footpath
across this property did not become a "public road" by
prescription, because the county took no action to claim a
public right to it, for example, by doing maintenance or
placing the footpath on its trail and road system.
In order to acquire a public prescriptive right to a
road, a claimant must show that: (1) members of the
public have used the road under a claim of right and in a
manner adverse to the landowner's property interest; (2)
the public has used the road without interruption for the

[**2] To satisfy the claim of right requirement, the
claimant must provide evidence that a reasonably diligent
landowner would have had notice of the public's intent to
create a public right of way. The evidence must include
some overt act on the part of the public entity responsible
for public roads in the jurisdiction sufficient to give
notice of the public's claim of right. This notification to
the landowners starts the prescriptive period; without
such notice, the prescriptive period does not begin.
COUNSEL: Kim McIntyre, Steve McIntyre, Tempe,
Arizona, Petitioners Appearing Pro se.
David Baumgarten, Gunnison, Colorado, Attorney for
Respondent.
Beth A. Dickhaus, Thomas J. Lyons, Denver, Colorado,
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae, Colorado Counties, Inc.
JUDGES: JUSTICE HOBBS delivered the opinion of
the court. JUSTICE MARTINEZ dissents, and CHIEF
JUSTICE MULLARKEY joins in the dissent.
OPINION BY: HOBBS
OPINION
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[*404] EN BANC
JUSTICE HOBBS delivered the opinion of the court.
We granted certiorari in this case to review the court
of appeals decision in Board of County Comm'rs v.
McIntyre, 2002 Colo. App. LEXIS 1634, No. 01CA2408,
2002 WL 31112520 (Colo. App. Sept. 19, 2002). 1 The
trial court ruled [**3] on summary judgment that
Gunnison County had obtained a road by prescription
across certain private lands pursuant to section
43-2-201(1)(c), 11 C.R.S. (2002). The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court. We reverse. We hold that the
county failed to meet the claim of right requirement of
section 43-2-201(1)(c) for the establishment of a public
road by prescription across the McIntyre lands.
1 We granted certiorari on the following issues:
1. Whether section
43-2-201(1)(c), 11 C.R.S. (2002)
requires the government to give
notice of public use or of a public
claim of right to the landowner
before acquiring property by
prescription.
2. Whether respondent denied
petitioners' constitutional right to
due process prior to property
deprivation by taking a trail by
prescription across petitioners'
private property as a public road
where respondent never notified
petitioners of any claim of right for
public use of that trail.

I.
The petitioners, Kim [**4] and Steve McIntyre
(McIntyres) own six mining claims near the Town of
Marble in Gunnison County. They purchased their
property from L.E. Schooley and Associates (Schooley)
in 1994. Schooley had acquired the property by virtue of
a tax deed in 1960; there is no evidence in the record of a
deed in the chain of title that contains a dedication,
reservation, or exception for a public road across the
McIntyre property.

The McIntyre property includes a portion of an old
electric tramway route that the Colorado Yule Marble
Company operated to [*405] haul marble to the Town of
Marble from its quarry. The quarry adjoins the McIntyre
land.
In 1941 the Marble Company ceased operations.
Marble from the quarry was used in building the Lincoln
Memorial and the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, among
other notable public buildings in the United States; so the
quarry site has significant historical and tourist value to
the Town of Marble and Gunnison County. The public
has traversed the approximately three-plus mile route
from the Town of Marble to the quarry site since the
1940s by four wheel drive vehicle and footpath. Only a
footpath exists across the McIntyre property because of a
steep gradient that veers [**5] away from Yule Creek,
severe erosion on sections of the footpath, and marble
spoil piles which block vehicle access across the
McIntyre lands.
William Bush, a Schooley partner, testified that
approximately six to eight people per week walked the
former tramway route across the McIntyre property from
the 1960s to the 1990s to access the quarry site and
public lands for recreation. Bush built and maintained a
fence across the former tramway route on the McIntyre
property for a short time in the early to mid 1960s. Some
of these people who walked across the property during
the 1960s to the 1990s requested permission; some did
not. When requested, Bush always granted permission.
Bush testified that he never saw any member of the
public use a vehicle to cross the property.
In 1986, Schooley gave written permission to the
Colorado Department of Mined Land Reclamation to
enter the property and build a boardwalk over a washed
out section of the route as part of a state mined land
reclamation safety project on the Colorado Yule Marble
Company quarry site. This agreement expressly provided
that the landowner waived no rights by granting access
permission to the State.
In the 1990s, the Colorado [**6] Yule Marble
Company reopened the quarry. Avoiding that portion of
the impassable old tramway route across the McIntyre
property, the Marble Company cut a new road to access
the quarry from the vehicle-passable portion of the old
tramway route. Concerned about liability arising from the
deteriorating footpath and wastes that walkers left on
their property, the McIntyres closed the footpath across
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their property in the mid-90s.
At present a graveled road from Marble ends in a
parking lot, located off of the McIntyre property, from
which persons can take a private tour to the quarry site on
a trail or the road that the quarry operators installed off of
the McIntyre property in the 1990s. Foot access to the
quarry's vicinity is also available from the parking lot via
Forest Service trails.
At no time during the prescriptive period from the
1960s to the 1990s the trial court found to exist in this
case did Gunnison County include the footpath across the
McIntyre property on its road and trail system, or perform
any maintenance activity on the path. The uncontested
evidence in the record, including testimony of Gunnison
County officials, was that the County had never assumed
"jurisdiction" [**7] over the trail on the McIntyre
property during the prescriptive period.
However, when the McIntyres commenced
excluding members of the public from their property,
Gunnison County brought this action against them,
seeking a declaratory judgment that the route across the
McIntyre property is a public road pursuant to section
43-2-201(1)(c). Following evidentiary hearings, the trial
court granted a preliminary injunction against the
McIntyres in favor of the County, preventing them from
barring members of the public from using the footpath.
The County amended its pleadings under C.R.C.P.
105 to quiet title against all property owners along the old
tramway route from Marble. After further proceedings,
the trial court entered a quiet title decree "for a public
highway pursuant to C.R.S. 43-2-201(1)(c) dedicated to
public uses under the jurisdiction of the Board of County
Commissioners of the County of Gunnison, Colorado"
for the entire length and width of the old tramway route,
up to sixty feet in width. The court of appeals affirmed.
No party to the quiet title action, other than the
McIntyres, [*406] appears before us to challenge the
quiet title decree.
Limiting [**8] our decision to the McIntyre
property, we conclude that the trial court and court of
appeals failed to properly apply the criteria of Board of
County Comm'rs v. Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975 (Colo.
1984), in considering whether a public road existed by
prescription across the McIntyre property. Among other
requirements, Flickinger requires the public entity to
prove a claim of right to the public road. The facts of

record on summary judgment do not support that
Gunnison County took any overt action meeting the
claim of right requirement to commence running of the
prescriptive period for establishment of a public road on
the McIntyre property under section 43-2-201(1)(c).
Accordingly, the trial court and court of appeals erred in
ruling that the footpath along the former tramway route
across the McIntyre property became a public road by
prescription.
II.
We hold that the county failed to meet the claim of
right requirement of section 43-2-201(1)(c) for the
establishment of a public road by prescription across the
McIntyre property.
In conducting our review in this case, we recognize
that a court may enter summary judgment when there is
no disputed issue of material [**9] fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We
review de novo an order granting summary judgment.
Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colorado Water
Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d 1251, 1256 (Colo. 1995).
Our decision in this case reiterates that the claimant
for a public road by prescription must demonstrate the
following: (1) members of the public have used the road
in a manner adverse to the landowner's interest and under
a claim of right; (2) the public has used the road,
continuously, for twenty years; and (3) the landowner had
actual or implied knowledge of the public's use and made
no objection to that use of the road.
We are concerned here with the claim of right
requirement. To satisfy the claim of right requirement,
the claimant must provide evidence that a reasonably
diligent landowner would have had notice of the public's
intent to create a public right of way. The evidence must
include some overt act on the part of the public entity
responsible for public roads in the jurisdiction sufficient
to give notice of the public's claim of right. This
notification to the landowners starts the prescriptive
period; without such notice, [**10] the prescriptive
period does not begin.
A. Private Prescription and Public Road Prescription
Differentiated
The case before us commenced as an action against
the McIntyres, then became a quiet title action between
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Gunnison County and all claimants pursuant to C.R.C.P.
105. This rule provides for complete adjudication of the
rights of all parties who, when served, have the
opportunity to adjudicate their claim of right to an
interest in the real property. Board of County Comm'rs v.
Timroth, 87 P.3d 102, 2004 Colo. LEXIS 120, No.
02SC704, slip op. at 6-7 (Colo. March 8, 2004).
In the case before us, the trial court and the court of
appeals ruled that twenty years of public use adverse to
the property owner was itself sufficient to establish a
public road by prescription under section 43-2-201(1)(c).
These rulings make the requirements for private
prescriptive rights and public prescriptive road rights the
equivalent of each other. They are not.
In regard to private prescriptive rights, section
38-41-101(1), 10 C.R.S. (2003), provides that eighteen
years of "adverse possession of any land shall be
conclusive evidence of absolute ownership" in a case for
recovery of title or possession [**11] by the prior owner
of the real property. Section 38-41-103 provides, in
addition, that a continuous claim of ownership under the
color of a record conveyance or other instrument is
"prima facie evidence of adverse possession" during the
prescriptive period. Section 38-41-106 reduces the
eighteen year period to seven years when the residence,
occupancy, or possession of the adverse possessor is
under color of title, in law or equity deducible of [*407]
record, from the State of Colorado or the United States.
Section 38-41-108 recognizes the title of persons in actual
possession of the lands under claim and color of title who
have possessed the lands and paid taxes on the property
for seven years. To the same effect is section 38-41-109,
applicable to vacant and unoccupied land.
Missing from the private prescription statutes is the
requirement of section 43-2-201(1) that the claimant of a
public road prescriptive right must demonstrate a claim of
right and use adverse to the landowner for the twenty
year prescriptive period. As set forth in our case law, the
requirements of section 43-2-201(1)(c) are: (1) members
of the public must have used the road under a claim of
right and in a manner [**12] adverse to the landowner's
property interest; (2) the public must have used the road
without interruption for the statutory period of twenty
years; and (3) the landowner must have had actual
knowledge of the public's use of the road and made no
objection to such use. Board of County Comm'rs v.
Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975, 980 (Colo. 1984).

In contrast, a private prescriptive easement is
established when the use is: "(1) open or notorious; (2)
continued without effective interruption for [eighteen
years]; and (3) the use was either (a) adverse or (b)
pursuant to an attempted, but ineffective grant." Lobato v.
Taylor, 71 P.3d 938, 950 (Colo. 2002).
The Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes §
2.18 cmt. f (2002) recognizes that although, in general,
the requirements for a public prescriptive easement are
the same as those for a private easement, some states do
require a governmental body to assert some claim of
ownership through acts of maintenance or otherwise. As
shown by our case law construing section 43-2-201(1)(c),
Colorado is one of these states.
In conducting our analysis, we turn first to what
[**13] constitutes a public road; then we examine the
claim of right requirement that must accompany the
public's adverse use in order for a public road to exist by
prescription.
B. What Is A Road Under Section 43-2-201(1)(c)
We first address what constitutes a "road" for
purposes of public prescription under section
43-2-201(1)(c). 2 In Simon v. Pettit, 687 P.2d 1299 (Colo.
1984), the claimed public "roads" were two "narrow but
well-defined footpaths" across private property that
members of the public had used for recreational access
for the twenty year statutory period. Id. at 1300. Our
previous decision in Hale v. Sullivan, 146 Colo. 512, 362
P.2d 402 (1961), provided for a broad definition of
"road." In Simon we adopted a more restrictive definition.
2 Section 43-2-201(1)(c) provides that "all roads
over private lands that have been used adversely
without interruption or objection on the part of the
owners of such lands for twenty consecutive
years" are public highways. Read in context with
the other provisions of section 43-2-201(1),
subsection (1)(c) requires some form of "action or
knowing
inaction
by
the
appropriate
governmental body" for a public right. Simon v.
Pettit, 687 P.2d 1299, 1303 (Colo. 1984). Title 43
addresses transportation; Article 2 addresses state,
county, and municipal highways; and Part 2
addresses county and other public highways. It is
within this part that the public prescription statute
is codified; therefore, it follows that any "road,"
as contemplated in the statute, must meet the
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definition of a county or other public highway.
Since Part 2 does not contain a definitional
section, we turn to our case law for the definition
of "road" for the purposes of the public
prescriptive right statute.
[**14] We held that the legislature did not intend
the synonymous terms "road" or "public highway" in
section 43-2-201(1)(c) to include all footpaths in
Colorado used adversely to the landowner by members of
the public for twenty years or more. However, the
legislature did intend that the courts consider the
characteristics, conditions, and locations of the ways in
applying the statute. Simon, 687 P.2d at 1302-03.
We concluded that the public entity responsible for
maintaining public roads in the jurisdiction must take
some action, formal or informal, indicating its intention
to treat the right of way as a public road. Id. at 1303
(citing Kratina v. Board of County Comm'rs, 219 Kan.
499, 548 P.2d 1232 (1976)).
[*408] Our reliance in Simon on the Kansas
Supreme Court decision in Kratina is highly significant
to the case before us. The Kansas Supreme Court
emphasized that "mere use by the traveling public is
ambiguous" as to whether the use was with landowner
permission or not. On the other hand, "where public
officials take some positive action, either formally or
informally, such as improving or maintaining the road,
the intention of the [**15] public at least is
unmistakable." Kratina, 219 Kan. at 504-505, 548 P.2d
at 1237. "When a road is worked by public authorities the
owner is chargeable with the knowledge that they do so
under a claim of right." Id. at 505, 548 P.2d at 1237.
Due to the lack of any positive action by the
claiming county or township that demonstrated a claim of
right, the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that there could be
no public road by prescription:
In any event, the court is satisfied that
the rule adopted here is the more equitable
one, and will resolve the difficulties
inherent in attempting to determine the
intent of a landowner and of the public on
the basis of ambiguous acts alone. The
cases just cited and others, to the extent
that they support the establishment of a
public road based on public travel alone,
and dispense with any action by public

authorities, are disapproved.
In this case there was never any
recognition, formal or informal, of the
disputed road by any public body. Under
the rule just announced there could be no
public road by prescription.
Id. at 506-507, 548 P.2d at 1238.
When explicating section 43-2-201(1)(c), [**16]
we adopted and applied the Kratina claim of right rule in
Flickinger and Simon. In Simon, we recognized that a
footpath might qualify as a public road in the jurisdiction
if it were included on the government's map of its road
system. We assumed that an action of the public entity,
such as placing the footpath on a city map for the
requisite twenty year prescription period, coupled with
use by the public for that period, would meet both the
claim of right and the adversity requirements for a
prescriptive public road within the meaning of section
43-2-201(1)(c). Simon, 687 P.2d at 1303. Nevertheless,
because there was no evidence that the City of Boulder
even knew the paths existed, much less maintained them
or in any way accepted them as public streets, we held
that the claimants had not met their burden of proving a
claim of right pursuant to section 43-2-201(1)(c).
Our reasoning and holding in Simon recognizes that
section 43-2-201(1)(c) appears in the statutory provisions
pertaining to the acquisition, funding, and maintenance of
state, county, and city roads and road systems. Under
these provisions, a county, for example, may obtain a
public [**17] road by (1) express or implied dedication
of the road to the public by the property owner, section
43-2-201(1)(a),(b); (2) purchase of a right-of-way,
section 43-2-204; (3) condemnation and payment of just
compensation for the property interest necessary for the
road, sections 43-2-112 and 43-2-204; or (4) prescription,
section 43-2-201(1)(c). As we discuss in more detail
below, to proceed by the fourth means, the public entity
must establish its claim of right by some overt action that
puts the landowner on notice that it intends to include the
public way within its road system; only then can the
public way be considered a "road" or "public highway,"
thus beginning the prescriptive period under section
43-2-201(1)(c).
C. Requirements for Obtaining a Public Road by
Prescription
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The claimant of a prescriptive right for a public road
across private property has the burden of proving
compliance with the requirements for such a right by a
preponderance of the evidence. 3 In Board of County
Comm'rs v. Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975 (Colo. [*409]
1984), we construed section 43-2-201(1)(c) to require the
claimant to meet a three-part test for the establishment of
a public road by prescription: [**18]
(1) members of the public must have
used the road under a claim of right and in
a manner adverse to the landowner's
property interest;
(2) the public must have used the road
without interruption for the statutory
period of twenty years; and
(3) the landowner must have had actual or
implied knowledge of the public's use of
the road and made no objection to such
use.
Id. at 980 (emphasis added). The first part includes both
adversity and claim of right.
3
In 1984, when we decided Flickinger, the
standard of proof in adverse possession cases was
by clear and convincing evidence. See Flickinger,
687 P.2d at 981, n.7; Bd. of County Comm'rs v.
Masden, 153 Colo. 247, 385 P.2d 601 (1963)
(holding that public entity had to prove existence
of public road by prescription by clear and
convincing evidence). However, in Gerner v.
Sullivan, 768 P.2d 701 (Colo. 1989) we overruled
the clear and convincing language in Masden, and
held that a standard of preponderance of the
evidence applies to adverse possession cases.
[**19] Flickinger presented a factual situation very
different from the case before us now. In 1953, the
county included the road as part of the county road
system. 4 After proper notifications and hearings, the
Board adopted the map as the official map of the
Saguache County road system. Because the road was now
included in the county road system, it became eligible for
state maintenance funds and Saguache County began
receiving funds in order to maintain the road. Id. at
978-79.

4 Prior to 1924, the road existed as a "wagon"
road, consisting of just two dirt tracks. In 1924,
the road was converted to a dirt road in order to
allow vehicular access. Flickinger, 687 P.2d at
978 n.2.
During the 1960s and 1970s, county employees
graded the road using county equipment several times.
Additionally, the county installed two culverts under the
road in 1953, and cleared snow from the road at the
request of local ranchers. The Flickingers were always
aware that the public used the road for recreational
[**20] purposes and that governmental employees used
it to access adjacent federal land. The Flickingers knew
that public employees were keeping the road in good
repair. Some users sought the Flickingers' permission to
use the road; most did not. Id. at 979-80.
Occasionally the Flickingers had to tell users to leave
their property if they camped on it or left trash, but they
never interfered with the use of the road until 1977. In
1977, because of concerns about the increasing number
of people crossing their property via the road, the
Flickingers locked an existing gate. In 1978 the
Department of Highways struck the road from the public
highway inventory and ceased contributing payment of
funds to Saguache County to maintain the road. Id. at
979.
Saguache County then sought an injunction barring
the Flickingers from locking the gate to prohibit public
access to the road. Ruling that the road was indeed a
public road by prescription, the trial court issued the
requested injunction. Id. at 980. We affirmed under
section 43-2-201(1)(c), holding that this section codifies
the common law method by which the public can obtain a
property interest [**21] for a public road by prescription.
We identified the requirements necessary for such an
acquisition: the public must have used the road: (1) under
a claim of right and in a manner adverse to the
landowner's property interest; (2) without interruption for
the statutory period of twenty years; and (3) the
landowner had actual or implied knowledge of the
public's use and did not object to such use. We added that
when a claimant shows that the use has continued for the
prescriptive period of time, the claimant is afforded a
presumption that the use was adverse. 5 Id.
5 To the extent that our holding in Shively v. Bd.
of County Comm'rs, 159 Colo. 353, 411 P.2d 782
(1966) merges the statutory prescriptive period
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and the claim of right requirements into a test that
requires only a showing of public use for a twenty
year period, we overrule that case as contrary to
our decision in Flickinger.
The Flickingers argued that the gate at the foot of the
road prevented the public from establishing [**22] the
requirement of adversity, despite the fact that they had
never locked the gate until 1977. We concluded that "the
placement of the gate does not conclusively establish the
character of the public use as permissive and nonadverse.
A gate, in other words, may be erected for purposes other
than obstruction of public travel." Id. at 981. The
evidence in Flickinger showed that the primary purpose
of the gate was to benefit a rancher who used the
Flickinger's property as pasture for his [*410] livestock.
Additionally, since the Flickingers had never made any
attempt to lock the public from their property prior to
1977, we concluded that the purpose of the gate was to
keep livestock away from a nearby highway, not to keep
the public off of the Flickingers' land. Id.
We held that sufficient evidence existed to find that
the public had used the Flickingers' road "under a claim
of right and in a manner adverse to [their] property
interests" since at least 1953. Id. at 980. The evidence
showed that the county asserted the public character of
the road when it incorporated it into the county road
system. In addition: (1) the county received state funds to
maintain the road; (2) [**23] the public continuously
entered the property and used the road for recreational
purposes as well as to access adjacent lands; and (3) the
Flickingers had "actual knowledge of the public use of
the road and generally acquiesced in it." Id. at 981.
Hence, both the requirement of adversity and the
requirement of a claim of right were met in regard to a
prescriptive right for a public road on Flickingers'
property.
D. No Road Prescriptive Right In This Case
Although the route across the McIntyre property
once supported vehicular travel on a tramway route from
five to eight feet in width, in some places, to twelve to
fifteen feet in width, in other places, the use the public
made of this route during the statutory twenty year period
was for a footpath. A scrap marble heap from previous
marble quarrying operations along the route requires
walkers to "scramble" over the pile; other obstacles to
vehicular travel exist, such as fences and posts.

Because the public's use during the statutory twenty
year period was for a footpath, our decision in Simon is
particularly pertinent. Gunnison County must have taken
some overt claim of right action, formal or informal,
giving notice [**24] to the landowner of the public's
claim of right and demonstrating that it considered the
footpath across the McIntyre land to be a public road, for
example, by performing maintenance or including the
footpath on its county road system during the prescriptive
period. Simon v. Pettit, 687 P.2d 1299, 1303 (Colo.
1984).
The only evidence of maintenance by a public entity
in the record before the trial court was that the Colorado
Division of Mined Land Reclamation had entered the
McIntyre property to build a boardwalk over a washed
out section of the route to the old marble quarry site for
safety purposes. This entry occurred by written
permission of the McIntyres' predecessor in interest, with
the agreement expressly providing that the landowner
waived no rights by granting access permission to the
State.
In the absence of any overt action by Gunnison
County indicating its intention to treat the footpath along
the old tramway route as a public road, the trial court and
the court of appeals erred by conflating the adversity and
claim of right requirements for establishment of a public
road by prescription pursuant to section 43-2-201(1)(c)
into a single criteria of public [**25] use for the twenty
year statutory period. Neither court applied all of the
Flickinger requirements; in particular, the claim of right
requirement. They examined only the adversity
requirement.
But, our contemporary case law contains a restrictive
reading of section 43-2-201(1)(c), requiring twenty year
use by the public of a road in a manner adverse to the
landowner and under a public claim of right. In Colorado,
two parallel lines of cases have developed from our
courts. One line of cases addresses the requirement of
adversity. The other line addresses claim of right. This
claim of right must be supported by evidence of an overt
act or acts that put the landowner on notice of the public's
claim of right to a road across the property. We now
discuss both requirements but preface our analysis with a
discussion about the dedication cases.
1. Dedication and Adverse Possession Distinguished
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We first addressed public prescriptive rights in Starr v.
People, 17 Colo. 458, 30 P. 64 (1892). In Starr, the
question was whether the road at issue was a public
highway at the time the action was instituted. Id. at 459,
30 P. at 65. We addressed [**26] two alternative [*411]
theories: dedication and adverse possession. Id.
Depending on the facts of the particular case, several
factors could raise an implication of dedication on the
landowner's part, including the fact that the public had
used the road for a considerable length of time without
objection by the landowner.
Use of the road by the public for a
considerable length of time without
objection by the owner of the land may
increase the weight of the evidence, if any
there be, arising from acts or declarations
of the owner indicating his intent to
dedicate. But mere use, without such acts
or declarations, unless for a period of time
corresponding to the statutory limitation of
real actions, cannot be held sufficient to
vest the easement in the public, as by
prescription.
Id. at 460, 30 P. at 65. At that time we indicated that use
by the public for the statutory time was itself sufficient to
create a public prescriptive right.
We revisited the issue of dedication and implied
dedication in Mitchell v. City of Denver, 33 Colo. 37, 78
P. 686 (1904). There, we reiterated that, in order for a
private road to become a public highway [**27] by
dedication, the landowner must manifest some intent for
that outcome. We left room for a future case involving
adverse possession. We concluded that the evidence in
Mitchell fell short of establishing a dedication or a
prescriptive easement because the facts did not show
either acquiescence by the landowner or adverse
possession.
That the city of Denver, or some of its
constituent municipal corporations, six or
seven years before the trial graded this
street, put up signposts at the intersection
of the adjoining streets, and placed thereon
the names thereof, is not, under the facts,
sufficient evidence of acquiescence by the
owners in this alleged assertion of public
ownership, or sufficient to make out an

ownership
possession.

arising

from

adverse

Id. at 40, 78 P. at 687.
We next addressed the issue in Lieber v. People, 33
Colo. 493, 81 P. 270 (1905). Here, we repeated the rules
of dedication set forth in Starr and Mitchell, but--because
of a factual dispute as to whether the road the claimants
sought actually crossed the land in question--we did not
reach a conclusion regarding the requirements for
creating a public road [**28] on private property. Id. We
simply observed that the evidence must show, with
reasonable certainty, that public travel occurred on the
land in controversy. Id. at 498, 81 P. at 271.
2. Adversity and Claim of Right
In 1931, we formally recognized that the public must
make some public claim of right in order to establish a
prescriptive easement. 6 Mayer v. San Luis Valley Land
& Cattle Co., 90 Colo. 23, 26 5 P.2d 873, 874 (1931).
However, we did not fully address this requirement until
1984 when we discussed public prescriptive rights
generally in Simon v. Pettit, 687 P.2d 1299 (Colo. 1984).
In order to satisfy the requirements of section
43-2-201(1)(c), the public must use a road "adversely,
under a claim of right, and without interruption for the
statutory period of twenty years, and the landowner
knows of but does not object to the use." Id. at 1302. This
quote appears before we began discussing the definition
of a "road" in Simon. At that point in the opinion, we
were first explaining the necessary elements for a public
prescriptive right. Simon was published a week after
Flickinger. As demonstrated [**29] by the commas in
between the phrases, we clearly intended that adversity
and claim of right constitute separate requirements for a
public prescriptive right. We held that public
maintenance of the road, or the inclusion of the road on a
public road system map, would serve as strong evidence
in favor of a public prescriptive right. Id. at 1303.
6 We attach, as Appendix A, a survey of cases
decided in other jurisdictions regarding the
requirements for a public prescriptive right.
Prior to the case now before us, the court of appeals
has addressed the claim of right requirement as well as
the adversity requirement. See Littlefield v. Bamberger,
32 P.3d 615 (Colo. App. 2001). In Littlefield, the court
[*412] of appeals recognized that a county's use and
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maintenance of a mail delivery route might qualify for a
prescriptive easement, but upheld the trial court's
determination that the evidence in the case did not
support this conclusion. Id. at 620. In Alexander v.
McClellan, 56 P.3d 102 (Colo. App. 2002), [**30] the
court of appeals affirmed the trial court order finding a
public prescriptive right in the road at issue. Id. at 105. In
support of its holding, the court of appeals cited to
evidence showing continuous public use and maintenance
of the road for at least the statutory twenty year
prescriptive period.
Several witnesses testified to the public's
continuous use of [the road] and the
[public] maintenance of it for over twenty
years. [The landowner] even testified that
he was aware of traffic on [the road]; he
admitted that, prior to acquiring the
disputed property, he saw approximately
ten cars per week, in addition to regular
school bus traffic, using [the road].
Id. at 104.
In Board of County Comm'rs v. Kobobel, 74 P.3d
401 (Colo. App. 2002), the claimants presented very little
evidence of public use of the road, and no evidence of a
public claim of right, therefore, no public road by
prescription existed. Id. at 404-405. In State v. Cyphers,
74 P.3d 447 (Colo. App. 2003), the court of appeals
addressed both the issue of adversity and claim of right.
Affirming the trial court's [**31] holding in favor of a
public prescriptive right, the court of appeals deferred to
the trial court's findings of fact of continuous public use
and public use of the road without the landowner's
permission. Id.
In Board of County Comm'rs v. W.H.I., Inc., 992
F.2d 1061 (10th Cir. 1993), the Tenth Circuit focused on
whether the public had acquired a prescriptive right to a
road pursuant to section 43-2-201(1)(c). Although the
record was sparse on the issue, evidence did exist that the
public used the road for the requisite period of time. Id. at
1065. The evidence also showed that the Board of County
Commissioners had enacted a resolution declaring an
intention to claim the road as a public road. The
prescriptive period began, so the court ruled, when the
Board passed its resolution. Id. at 1066. Although the
resolution was improperly recorded, the court held the
landowner to this notice of a public claim. Id. ("Section

43-2-201(1)(c) does not require that public use be based
on color of title or properly recorded resolutions. The
[resolution served] to illustrate notice of adverse, open,
and notorious use by the public.").
[**32] While a public claim of right is a separate
and necessary requirement for establishing a public
prescriptive right to a road, the claim of right requirement
is integrally intertwined with the adversity requirement.
Sporadic use of the road is not enough to establish
adversity or put the property owner on notice of a public
claim of right. Turner v. Anderson, 130 Colo. 275, 274
P.2d 972 (1954). In Turner, we held that occasional use
of the road by members of the public did not rise to the
level of a prescriptive right. Id. at 278-79, 274 P.2d at
974 ("a prescriptive right to the use of [a] road . . . was
not established by the evidence, because the use of said
road was irregular, infrequent, sporadic, and far more
permissive than adverse.").
While evidence of a fence or gate on the road gives
rise to a strong indication that any public use of the road
is permissive, their existence does not provide the
landowner with a conclusive presumption that the use is
permissive. In Mayer v. San Luis Valley Land & Cattle
Co., 90 Colo. 23, 5 P.2d 873 (1931), the landowners kept
unlocked gates on the road at issue. When the landowners
eventually [**33] locked the gates, the claimant brought
an action seeking to have the road declared a public
highway pursuant to section 43-2-201(1)(c). Id. at 24-26,
5 P.2d at 874-75. We observed that mere proof of public
use of the land for the statutory period does not rise to the
level of a prescriptive right. Id. at 26, 5 P.2d at 875.
Addressing the requirement of adversity, we held that
obstructing free travel with gates or fences will ordinarily
prevent the public from acquiring a highway by
prescription. Id. By constructing a gate across a road, a
landowner conveys the clear message that any public use
of that road is with the landowner's permission only; and
the public's use is not adverse.
[*413] In Martino v. Fleenor, 148 Colo. 136, 365
P.2d 247 (1961), we addressed the requirement of
adversity and plainly held that public use for the
prescriptive period is not alone sufficient to establish a
public prescriptive right. Claimants, their relatives,
friends, employees, and southern neighbors had used the
road for more than forty-two years without the objection
of the landowners. Because the landowners placed three
wire gates across the road, [**34] thus obstructing
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travel, rendering the use permissive only, no public
prescriptive right was established. Id. at 141-42, 365 P.2d
at 250.
Similarly, in Lang v. Jones, 191 Colo. 313, 552 P.2d
497 (1976), the road was consistently blocked by a gate,
although the gate was not locked. Id. at 315, 552 P.2d at
499. The public's access was permissive because where
gates obstruct free travel along the road, even if the gates
are unlocked, the use of the road is not adverse. Id.
Nevertheless, in Flickinger, we said that the existence of
a gate did not give rise to a conclusive presumption of
permissive use. There, the landowners used the gate to
keep livestock in, rather than to keep the public out.
Board of County Comm'rs v. Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975,
981 (Colo. 1984).
In Walter v. Hall, 940 P.2d 991 (Colo. App. 1996),
the court of appeals followed our reasoning in Flickinger
that evidence of a gate is not conclusive evidence that use
was only permissive. Id. at 995. Similarly, in Littlefield v.
Bamberger, 32 P.3d 615 (Colo. App. 2001), the court of
appeals again [**35] held that evidence of a fence, in
and of itself, does not necessarily prove permissive use.
Id. at 620.
3. Statutory Public Policy
In reviewing the case before us, we also look to the
statutory public policy. The legislative intent of section
43-2-201(1)(c) is that the establishment of a public road
by prescription is a narrow alternative to the other
available means a public entity has for establishing a
road, which include: (1) express or implied dedication of
the road to the public by the property owner; (2) purchase
of a right-of-way by the public entity; or (3)
condemnation and payment of just compensation for the
property interest necessary for the road.
The General Assembly has encouraged landowners
to allow public use of their land; in turn, it has guarded
against landowners losing their property rights when
allowing such use. See § 33-41-103, 9 C.R.S. (2003)
(limiting landowner liability for public use of private
land). The vacant land exception also demonstrates this
legislative policy, as we discussed in Simon. Travel over
vacant land is deemed permissive and cannot serve as the
predicate for a prescriptive right: [**36]
Where the land is vacant and unoccupied
and remains free to public use and travel

until circumstances induce the owner to
enclose it, the mere travel across it,
without objection from the owners, does
not enable the public to acquire a public
road or highway over the same. Such use
by the public of vacant and unoccupied
land by travel over it, even after the period
of twenty years, is regarded merely as a
permissive use.
Simon v. Pettit, 687 P.2d 1299, 1301 (Colo. 1984). See
also 18-4-201(3), 6 C.R.S. (2003); People v. Schafer, 946
P.2d 938, 942 (Colo. 1997).
The trial court and court of appeals rulings in the
case now before us, if upheld, would have the
effect--contrary to Colorado public policy--of
discouraging private landowners from allowing (1) the
public to cross their land for recreational purposes to
reach other private or public lands,(2) without this use
causing adverse consequences to the property interests
and title of the landowner.
Consistent with this statutory policy, the public
entity claim of right requirement under section
43-2-201(1)(c), recognized in Simon and Flickinger,
establishes a restrictive [**37] statutory policy towards
public prescriptive road claims. The public entity
claimant must establish the public's adverse use for the
twenty year prescriptive period and take some overt
action or actions that give the property owner notice of
the public's claim of right in order for the prescriptive
period to commence running under section
43-2-201(1)(c). The strongest indicator of a [*414]
county's claim of right is the inclusion of the road on the
county road system and the expenditure of public funds
for maintaining the road. 7
7 Many of the states surrounding Colorado have
definitively addressed this issue. Specifically,
Idaho has required that the board of
commissioners lay out and record a road in order
to establish a public highway. Cox v. Cox, 84
Idaho 513, 373 P.2d 929 (1962). Kansas requires
some official action, either formal or informal,
and cites maintenance or improvement of a road
as a strong indicator that the public has gained a
prescriptive right. Kratina v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 219 Kan. 499, 548 P.2d 1232 (1976).
Very recently, the Montana Supreme Court held
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that the public had acquired a prescriptive right
where public funds had been expended for the
maintenance of the road. Smith v. Russell, 2003
MT 326, 318 Mont. 336, 80 P.3d 431 (Mont.
2003). New Mexico recognizes public
maintenance of a road as evidence that the public
has established a prescriptive right. Board of
County Comm'rs v. Friendly Haven Ranch Co., 32
N.M. 342, 257 P. 998 (1927). Last year, the
Wyoming Supreme Court held that a claimant
must "bring home" notice of an adverse claim to a
landowner, simply providing evidence that the
landowners were aware of the public's use and
could see the road from their home did not suffice
to establish a prescriptive right. Yeager v. Forbes,
2003 WY 134, 78 P.3d 241, 256 (Wyo. 2003).
Moreover, both Illinois and Missouri, from whom
we have adopted constitutional provisions, are in
accord with the requirement of a public claim of
right. See Swinford v. Roper, 389 Ill. 340, 59
N.E.2d 863 (1945); O'Connell v. Chicago
Terminal Transfer R.R. Co., 184 Ill. 308, 56 N.E.
355 (1900); Terry v. City of Independence, 388
S.W.2d 769 (Mo. 1965).
[**38] Accordingly, on the claim of right issue, the
claimant must provide evidence that a reasonably diligent
landowner would have had notice of the public's claim of
right to the road. The evidence must include some overt
act on the part of the public entity responsible for roads in
the jurisdiction that it considers the road a public road.
This notification commences the prescriptive period;
without it, the prescriptive period never begins.
An overt act sufficient to provide notice of the public
claim of right could include any number of actions. In a
state such as Colorado, where snowfall is a frequent
occurrence, plowing roads might constitute an overt act.
Including a road on a public road system map, using the
road for mail delivery or school buses, expending public
funds for the maintenance or improvement of the road,
posting signage indicating a public road, or installing
drainage systems for the road could each be an act putting
the landowner on notice of the public's claim of right to
the road. As with the other requirements for establishing
a public road by prescription, the public entity has the
burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence to
demonstrate that it considered [**39] the way across the
private property a public road.

In the case before us, the only evidence of any public
claim of right to access across the McIntyre property is
that the Colorado Department of Mined Land
Reclamation entered the property to construct a
boardwalk over a washed out section of the trail for
safety purposes. But this work occurred with the property
owner's permission under an agreement between the State
of Colorado and the property owner.
The uncontested facts of record on summary
judgment do not demonstrate Gunnison County's claim of
right for a public road on the McIntyre property that
commenced the running of the twenty year prescriptive
period; thus, the trial court erred in ruling that the
prescriptive period had run against these property owners.
The trial court's summary judgment order and quiet title
decree in favor of Gunnison County must be vacated in
regard to the McIntyre property. Because no other
property owner appears to contest the trial court's quiet
title decree in favor of the County, we presume that these
claims were settled in favor of the County, or that the
other private property owners impliedly dedicated the old
tramway right-of-way across [**40] their property to the
County.
III.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of
appeals and remand this case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
JUSTICE MARTINEZ dissents, and
JUSTICE MULLARKEY joins in the dissent.

CHIEF

APPENDIX A
We have surveyed the case law from the highest
courts of many states and found that [*415] cases differ
regarding the requirements for a public prescriptive right.
In the following cases the courts required only a
showing of adversity.
Carter v. Walker, 186 Ala. 140, 65 So. 170 (1914)
(recognizing that continuous adverse use by the public is
sufficient to establish a prescriptive right).
Spindler v. Toomey, 232 Ind. 328, 331, 111 N.E.2d 715,
716 (1953) ("if the roadway here in question is free and
common to all who have occasion to use it, and it has
been so used for a period of twenty years or more, it is a
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public highway by statute.").
Mahoney v. Town of Canterbury, 150 N.H. 148, 834 A.2d
227 (N.H. 2003) (requiring only adversity requirement to
establish a public prescriptive right).
Earle v. Poat, 63 S.C. 439, 41 S.E. 525 (1902) [**41]
(reasoning that because all landowners hold their land
subject to the right of the state to take some of that land
for a road, public use may create a presumption of a
public claim of right).
Gore v. Blanchard, 96 Vt. 234, 118 A. 888 (1922)
(recognizing general rule that if use is open and
notorious, it will be presumed adverse and under a claim
of right).
The cases we find applicable here, based on our
discussion in Simon and Flickinger, include both adverse
use by the public and a public entity claim of right.
Nelms v. Steelhammer, 225 Ark. 429, 283 S.W.2d 118
(1955) (requiring public claim of right but allowing for
slight deviation in path of travel in certain
circumstances).
Cox v. Cox, 84 Idaho 513, 373 P.2d 929 (1962)
(requiring board of commissioners to lay out and record
road in order to establish a public prescriptive right).
Swinford v. Roper, 389 Ill. 340, 59 N.E.2d 863 (1945)
(requiring both adversity and claim of right and noting
that public maintenance is a strong indicator of a claim of
right).
O'Connell v. Chicago Terminal Transfer R.R. Co., 184
Ill. 308, 56 N.E. 355 (1900) [**42] (evidence of public
maintenance on land tended to show establishment of
public prescriptive right although was not conclusive).
Kratina v. Board of County Comm'rs, 219 Kan. 499, 548
P.2d 1232 (1976) (public must take some official action,
either formal or informal, such as maintaining or
improving road in order to establish a public prescriptive
right).
Cummings v. Fleming County Sportsmen's Club, Inc.,
477 S.W.2d 163, 167 (Ky. 1972) (public use must be "so
manifest as to afford notice to an ordinarily prudent
owner.").

Downing v. Benedict, 147 Ky. 8, 143 S.W. 756 (1912)
(requiring exercise of public authority in order to
establish public prescriptive right).
Comber v. Plantation of Dennistown, 398 A.2d 376 (Me.
1979) (claim of right is necessary to establish a public
prescriptive right but sporadic instances of public
maintenance will not serve to create such right).
Mackenna v. Town of Searsmont, 349 A.2d 760 (Me.
1976) (although public claim of right is required to
establish public prescriptive right, road need not be
formally dedicated or laid out).
Sprow v. Boston & A.R. Co., 163 Mass. 330, 39 N.E.
1024 (1895) [**43] (public must show that landowner
had knowledge or reason to belive that public used the
road under a claim of right).
Bain v. Fry, 352 Mich. 299, 89 N.W.2d 485 (1958) (use
must be so open, hostile and notorious as to provide
notice to the landowner that title to the land is denied).
Trowbridge v. Van Wagoner, 296 Mich. 587, 296 N.W.
689 (1941) (public use must be accompanied by some act
by public authorities sufficient to give landowner notice
that title to the land is denied).
South Branch Ranch Co. v. Emery, 191 Mich. 188, 157
N.W. 419 (1916) (mere use by public will not establish a
public prescriptive right, some act of public control is
necessary).
Ladner v. Board of Supervisors, 793 So. 2d 637, 639
(Miss. 2001) (public must show "exertion of dominion
over the roadway in question.").
[*416] Armstrong v. Itawamba County, 195 Miss. 802,
16 So. 2d 752 (1944) (public authorities must exercise
jurisdiction over the road, such as overseeing its upkeep
at public expense).
Wills v. Reid, 86 Miss. 446, 38 So. 793 (1905) (some
expenditure of public moneys or exercise [**44] of
public power over a road is necessary in order to establish
a public prescriptive right).
Terry v. City of Independence, 388 S.W.2d 769 (Mo.
1965) (where city took possession of public area, graded
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it, oiled it, expended public funds in maintaining it and
exercised dominion over it, public acquired prescriptive
right).
Smith v. Russell, 2003 MT 326, 318 Mont. 336, 80 P.3d
431 (Mont. 2003) (public acquired prescriptive right
where public funds had been expended for maintenance
of the road).
Swandal Ranch Co. v. Hunt, 276 Mont. 229, 915 P.2d
840 (Mont. 1996) (evidence that county commissioner
had declared a road on landowner's ranch supported a
finding that the landowner had knowledge of the county's
adverse claim to the road).

[**46] Witter v. Damitz, 81 Wis. 385, 51 N.W. 575
(1892) (public construction and maintenance of a
highway for statutory period of time constituted a public
highway by prescription).
Yeager v. Forbes, 2003 WY 134, 78 P.3d 241, 256 (Wyo.
2003) (claimants must "bring home" notice of adverse
claim to landowners).
Board of Comm'rs v. Patrick, 18 Wyo. 130, 104 P. 531,
107 P. 748 (1910) (public authority must assume some
sort of control or jurisdiction over a road in order for it to
become a public road by prescription).
DISSENT BY: MARTINEZ

Board of County Comm'rs v. Friendly Haven Ranch Co.,
32 N.M. 342, 257 P. 998 (1927) (recognizing public
maintenance of road as evidence that public has gained a
prescriptive right).
Speir v. Town of New Utrecht, 121 N.Y. 420, 24 N.E. 692
(1890) (requiring proof that public authorities in some
way recognized, kept in repair, or adopted road in order
for it to become [**45] a public road by prescription).
Doyle Milling Co. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 256 Or. 271,
473 P.2d 135 (1970) (public use must adequately apprise
landowner of nature of public claim of right so landowner
knows a public servitude will burden the land unless the
landowner takes proper action to prevent it).
Donohugh v. Lister, 205 Pa. 464, 55 A. 23 (1903) (where
public authority had paved and repaved road several
times, public acquired prescriptive right even though
landowner had paid for curbing of road).
Scheller v. Pierce County, 55 Wash. 298, 104 P. 277
(1909) (where county, at times, refused to expend money
on road and landowners at all times paid taxes on
property, public prescriptive right did not arise).
Cramer v. Dep't of Highways, 180 W. Va. 97, 375 S.E.2d
568 (1988) (requiring adverse use as well as official
recognition that road is public, which could include
public maintenance or an order of recognition).
Boyd v. Woolwine, 40 W. Va. 282, 21 S.E. 1020 (1895)
(in order to constitute public road, county court must
have accepted or in some way recognized such road).

DISSENT
JUSTICE MARTINEZ dissenting:
I.
I find two grave errors in the majority analysis which
cause me to dissent. First, and most troublesome, is the
majority's insertion of an additional requirement into the
test for prescription of a public highway. Second, the
majority conflates the test for whether a road is
established by adverse possession with the determination
of whether the route is a road in the first instance. I
cannot agree with the majority's decision to add an
additional requirement of government action to the test
for prescription given the fact that the legislature has not
changed the statute in [**47] over one hundred years.
Furthermore, I find that the majority's analysis of the
threshold question of whether a particular route is a road
under the prescription statute incorrectly includes
elements of prescription. I respectfully dissent.
II.
The General Assembly enacted the section under
which this case arises in 1893. Ch. [*417] 147, sec. I,
1893 Colo. Sess. Laws 435. The legislature has not
changed the law since that time. "The following are
declared to be public highways . . . (c) All roads over
private lands that have been used adversely without
interruption or objection on the part of the owners of such
lands for twenty consecutive years." § 43-2-201(1)(c), 11
C.R.S. (2003). This section codified the common law and
definitively established that all roads on private lands that
have been used adversely for more than twenty years,
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without interruption or objection by the owner, become
public highways. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Flickinger,
687 P.2d 975, 980 (Colo. 1984).
We have interpreted this section in our previous
cases and have held that a party seeking to establish a
road across private property as a public highway must
demonstrate: [**48]
(1) members of the public must have
used the road under a claim of right and in
a manner adverse to the landowner's
property interest;
(2) the public must have used the road
without interruption for the statutory
period of twenty years; and
(3) the landowner must have had
actual or implied knowledge of the
public's use of the road and made no
objection to such use.
Id. Thus, our case law merely outlines what the statute
dictates: there must be adverse, uninterrupted use for
twenty years, with the owner's knowledge.
I disagree with the majority's analysis and
application of this test because the majority attempts to
separate our requirement that the use must be "under a
claim of right and in a manner adverse" into two distinct
requirements. As I do not find that we have ever stated
that use under a claim of right is any different than
adverse use, I cannot agree with the majority's analysis.
Moreover, the majority's further assertion that this
additional requirement applies only to public entities is
untenable. I find the majority's departure from our
previous case law, despite the fact that legislature has not
changed the statute in over one hundred [**49] years, an
exercise of authority more properly left to the General
Assembly.
First, the terms "use under a claim of right" and
"adverse use" are synonymous. The majority contends
that we have developed "two parallel lines of cases," one
which addresses "claim of right" and the other which
addresses "adversity". Maj. Op. at 20. However, the more
obvious reading of our previous cases is that we have
used the term "claim of right" only as explanation of, and
thus synonymously with, the term "adverse use." For
example, in Lieber v. People, 33 Colo. 493, 499, 81 P.

270, 271 (1905), we stated that to give a road a public
character the use under section 43-2-201(1)(c) must have
been "adverse (that is, under a claim of right)." See also
Mayer v. San Luis Valley Land & Cattle Co., 90 Colo.
23, 26, 5 P.2d 873, 875 (1931). Thus, both of these terms
characterize the type of use that is required before a claim
of prescription can be established: the use must be hostile
to the owner's rights.
The case law in Colorado illustrates that we have
used these terms synonymously to describe the single
requirement of adverse use by the public. In State v.
Cyphers, 74 P.3d 447 (Colo. App. 2003), [**50] for
example, the court of appeals found that ranchers',
hunters', sightseers', and oil explorers' use of the road
supported a finding of adverse use. The court did not
require a claim of right by any public entity, pointing out
that "it is not necessary that a governmental subdivision
maintain the road to retain its status as a public highway."
Id. at 450. Thus, the court of appeals clearly did not
require anything more than adverse use by the public to
establish a public highway by prescription. Similarly, in
Littlefield v. Bamberger, 32 P.3d 615, 620 (Colo. App.
2001), the court of appeals held that a prescriptive right
had not been established because there was not adverse
use by the public. The court concluded that the use was
"sporadic in nature, rather than part of a pattern of
general public use." Id. The court made no mention of a
requirement that the county had to make some overt act
evidencing that the use was under a claim of right,
holding only that there was not a sufficient showing of
adverse use. Id. The court of appeals has used the term
"claim of right" in place of adverse use. Bd. of County
[*418] Comm'rs v. Kobobel, 74 P.3d 401, 405 (Colo.
App. 2002). [**51] However, in that case the court found
only that the public's use was not over the length of the
entire road and therefore a public highway was not
established. Id. The court never considered the lack of
any action by a public entity thus illustrating that the
court was merely using the terms adverse use and use
under a claim of right interchangeably. These cases
confirm that although the facts in some cases involve
action by a public entity, we have never held that such
public action is a separate or additional requirement.
Such action serves merely as evidence illustrating
adverse use. In sum, we have required only that the use,
whether by the general public or a public entity, be
adverse to the landowner's interest.
We have further defined adverse use as "actual,
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visible, exclusive, hostile." Mayer, 90 Colo. at 26; 5 P.2d
at 875. This definition is consistent with both the
definitions of "adverse use" and "claim of right" stated in
Black's Law Dictionary. "Adverse use" is defined as "use
without license or permission." Black's Law Dictionary
53 (6th ed. 1990). "Adverse" is defined further with
specific regard to use of land: use of land is "adverse,
[**52] as against owner, if it is not made in
subordination to him, is open and notorious." Id. The
"claim of right doctrine," in regard to adverse possession,
is defined as a claimant "in possession as owner, with
intent to claim the land as his or her own, and not in
recognition of or subordination to record title owner." Id.
at 248. Both terms explain that the use must be hostile
and not in subordination to the record property owner.
In short, these terms all serve to explain, and
differentiate, adverse use from permissive use. This
distinction is important because if the evidence shows
that the use was permissive, there can be no prescriptive
right. Mayer, 90 Colo. at 26; 5 P.2d at 874. As explained
in the Restatement of Property, "claim of right" does not
mean that the user must claim entitlement or title, as
sometimes mistakenly asserted, but merely that the user
must not behave as if no adverse use were being asserted.
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 2.16 cmt. f
(2000). "Claim of right" therefore "adds little to the
requirements expressed by the 'open or notorious' and
continuity requirements. [**53] " Id. Thus, the real
question posed by the requirement that the use be adverse
or under a claim of right is whether the public used the
land without permission and in a manner that was hostile
to the true owner. This evidence then serves to illustrate
that the public was asserting its ownership over the
property--the backbone of a claim of prescription. See Bd.
of County Comm'rs v. W.H.I., Inc., 992 F.2d 1061, 1066
(10th Cir. 1993). Action by the county could certainly be
part of the evidence used to show an adverse use.
However, county action is not a requisite for a showing
of adverse use. See id. (County's actions "serve only to
illustrate notice of adverse, open, and notorious use by
the public.").
Although recognizing that "the claim of right
requirement is integrally intertwined with the adversity
requirement," Maj. Op. at 26, the majority still argues
that we have actually established two separate
requirements for a showing of adverse use. The majority
states that in Mayer, "we formally recognized that the
public must make some public claim of right in order to

establish a prescriptive easement." Maj. Op. at 23.
However, in that case we stated only [**54] that the
public must have used the land, "adversely under claim or
color of right." Mayer, 90 Colo. at 26; 5 P.2d at 874.
Furthermore, we went on in that case to equate the terms:
the use must be adverse "that is, under a claim of right."
Id. at 26, 5 P.2d at 875. Although Mayer supports the
proposition that the use must be adverse to the owner,
thus evidencing a claim of ownership, that case says
nothing to indicate that the evidence showing adverse use
would be any different from that showing a claim of
right.
Bolstering the point that "claim of right" is merely
another way of saying "adverse use" is our outline of the
requirements to establish a public highway across private
property in Flickinger. There we outlined three
requirements. Under the first, we stated "members of the
public must have used the road under a claim of right and
in a manner adverse to the landowner's property interest."
Flickinger, 687 P.2d at 980. Although [*419] the
majority points to the "and" combining claim of right and
in a manner adverse in Flickinger, and a comma
separating claim of right and adverse in Simon v. Pettit,
687 P.2d 1299 (Colo. 1984), [**55] 8 I find more
persuasive the manner in which we initially laid out those
requirements in Flickinger. We outlined only three
requirements and numbered them accordingly. Had we
intended to require four elements, I believe that we would
have done so, or at least noted that the three requirements
included subparts. More importantly, we did not analyze
the terms use under a claim of right and adverse use
differently or separate them in any way. Instead, we
disposed of the first prong of the test in three sentences,
and we moved on to discuss the plaintiff's constitutional
claims. Thus, I have trouble reaching the majority's
conclusion that we have previously established more than
the three elements listed in Flickinger.
8 In Flickinger, we stated that the use must be
"under a claim of right and in a manner adverse to
the landowner's interest." Flickinger, 687 P.2d at
980. In Simon, which was not decided on the basis
of prescriptive rights, we noted the requirements
of prescription and stated that the public must use
a road "adversely, under a claim of right." Simon,
687 P.2d at 1302. Thus, we have used both the
word "and" and a comma to separate these two
descriptions of adverse use.
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[**56] Law in other states supports this analysis.
Contrary to the majority's assertion that many cases
require both adversity and a public claim of right," Maj.
Op. at Appendix A, the Restatement clearly states that a
majority of states do not require governmental action to
establish a public highway by prescription. 9 Restatement
(Third) of Property: Servitudes § 2.18 cmt. f (2000).
States that do not adopt this approach base their
conclusion on statutory language requiring governmental
action. For example, the Supreme Court of Idaho has
recognized that adverse use and use under a claim of right
are synonymous. The Idaho Supreme Court outlined its
requirements which included one that the use must be
"adverse and under a claim of right." Hodgins v. Sales, 76
P.3d 969, 973 (Idaho 2003). The court went on to explain
that these two terms are synonymous: "adverse use, also
referred to as hostile use or use under a claim of right."
Id. at 975; see also Williams v. Harrsch, 297 Ore. 1, 681
P.2d 119, 123 (Or. 1984) ("To establish a public roadway
by prescription the use must be adverse or under a claim
[**57] of right and not merely by permission of the
landowner."). Although some other states have laws
which require official action, these cases support nothing
more than a public policy argument that such a change
should be made. See, e.g., Bd. of Comm'rs v. Friendly
Haven Ranch Co., 32 N.M. 342, 257 P. 998, 998 (N.M.
1927) (Statute defined public highways as all roads
dedicated to public use or "recognized and maintained by
the corporate authorities of any county."). Colorado's law
does not presently include such a requirement and any
change to our law is exclusively within the province of
the legislature.
9
States that adopt the lost-grant theory of
adverse possession have trouble extending
prescription to the public. See Mihalczo v.
Woodmont, 175 Conn. 535, 400 A.2d 270, 272-73
(Conn. 1978); Kratina v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 219
Kan. 499, 548 P.2d 1232 (Kan. 1976);
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes §
2.18 cmt. f (2000). The lost grant theory reasons
that a landowner would not acquiesce in the use
of land without expressly granting such a right.
Kratina, 548 P.2d at 1235. However, as there can
be no grant without a definite grantee, courts that
adopt the lost-grant theory face the problem that
the public is an indefinite grantee. Restatement
(Third) of Property: Servitudes § 2.18 cmt. f
(2000). Most courts have sidestepped this legal
fiction and allowed a servitude for the public by

finding an implied dedication to the general
public. Id. Thus, "the majority of American courts
have permitted the acquisition of servitudes by
long-continued public use ." Id.
[**58] Second, the majority states that only public
entities are subject to this additional requirement.
Although the majority points to different language
discussing the requirements for public and private
prescriptive rights, we have never held public entities to a
different standard than private individuals. For example,
in Shively v. Board of County Commissioners, 159 Colo.
353, 357, 411 P.2d 782, 784 (1966), we analyzed the
sufficiency of evidence to support the finding of use
under a claim of right; we stated that there is a
presumption that the use is adverse when it has been
made for the prescribed [*420] amount of time. 10 We
went on to say that the "rule is no different with respect
to presumptive rights gained by the public under [section
43-2-201]." Id. at 357-58, 411 P.2d at 784. Thus, not
only did we equate a claim of right with adverse
possession, we specifically stated that the test of
adversity is the same for public and private entities.
10
The majority's assertion that Flickinger
overruled Shively is problematic for two reasons.
First, Flickinger quotes Shively approvingly.
Specifically, Flickinger says: "A party relying on
section 43-2-201(1)(c) is aided by a presumption
that 'the character of the use is adverse where
such use is shown to have been made for a
prescribed period of time.'" Flickinger, 687 P.2d
at 980 (emphasis added) (quoting Shively, 159
Colo at 357, 411 P.2d at 784). More importantly,
but more subtly, our traditional presumption that
public use is adverse when it continues for the
prescribed period (twenty years) is further
evidence that we have never before required a
separate showing of a "claim of right" by a public
entity. Such a "claim of right" does not fall under
the presumption; the presumption only refers to
adversity. Flickinger, 687 P.2d at 980; Shively,
159 Colo. at 357, 411 P.2d at 784. Yet, no case
employing the presumption has gone on to
examine whether there was a public claim of
right. Consequently, any reference to "claim of
right" as a requirement distinct from adversity
necessarily arises for the first time in the
majority's opinion in this case. Because this is the
first instance in which we require a showing of
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"claim of right," it is this opinion rather than
Flickinger that overrules Shively.
[**59] Furthermore, although our language varies
in our explanation of the requirements for a prescriptive
right, the substance of the requirements is the same. In
the context of a private prescriptive easement, we have
stated that the easement is established if the use is: "1)
open or notorious, 2) continued without effective
interruption for the prescriptive period, and 3) the use
was either a) adverse or b) pursuant to an attempted, but
ineffective grant." Lobato v. Taylor, 71 P.3d 938, 950
(Colo. 2002) (citing, e.g., Restatement (Third) Property
§§ 2.17, 2.16). These requirements mirror those that we
have outlined for the establishment of a public highway
by prescription. First, the use must be open or notorious.
This element is identical to our requirement for a public
prescriptive right that the landowner have actual or
implied knowledge of the public's use. Flickinger, 687
P.2d at 980. The landowner could not have such
knowledge if the use were not open or notorious. Second,
the use must continue for the prescriptive period. This
requirement mirrors what we have required of the
public--the use must continue for the statutory period of
twenty years. [**60] Id. Third, in the context of a
private prescriptive easement, we stated that the use must
be adverse or pursuant to an attempted but ineffective
grant. Again, we required adverse use just as we have for
public prescriptive rights. Id. We have never found
adverse use, in either a public or private prescriptive
rights case, and then denied the right for lack of a
showing that the use was under a claim of right. In short,
we have never required more of the public than a private
individual to gain a prescriptive right.
The majority's desire to require an overt act on the
part of public entities before a road can be established
also confuses the test of adverse use with the
determination of whether a route constitutes a road in the
first place. As I feel that the distinction between these
two issues may clarify my disagreement with the
majority, I will discuss that issue next.
III.
We have stated that an initial question in a
prescriptive rights case is whether the route in question
comes within the definition of a "road" so that it may be
declared a public highway. Simon, 687 P.2d at 1302. The
majority appears to combine the initial determination of
whether [**61] the route in question could even be

declared a "road," so as to have section 43-2-201(1)(c)
apply, with the inquiry of whether a public highway was
established by prescription. The majority concludes that
the roadway was merely a footpath. However, the
majority then argues that in order to turn a footpath into a
public highway, all of the elements of prescription must
be established. As I find that the statute and all of the
elements of prescription do not apply unless the route in
question is first determined to be a road, I disagree with
the majority's analysis.
The word "road" "is a generic term and includes
overland ways of every character; the scope to be given
it, depending on the [*421] context in which it appears."
Id. (quoting Hale v. Sullivan, 146 Colo. 512, 518, 362
P.2d 402, 405 (1961)). Thus, the context determines
whether the term should have a broad or a narrow
interpretation. Id.
In Simon, we considered three things in deciding
whether urban footpaths that cut through a vacant lot
could constitute roads and thus come under the provisions
of section 43-2-201(1)(c) for a prescriptive highway.
First, we looked at the intention of the legislature [**62]
and decided that when the legislature adopted the statute
it did not intend for eighteen-inch urban footpaths to be
considered public highways. Id. at 1302. Second, we
addressed whether there was any evidence that the city
had adopted the footpaths as roads. Id. at 1303. Third, we
discussed the public policy behind rigidly applying the
statute to include such shortcuts. Id. at 1303-04.
Applying all of these factors, we held that the footpaths
in question did not come under the definition of a road so
as to come under section 43-2-201(1)(c). Id. at 1304.
Thus, we stated, we did not need to address the additional
issue discussed by the court of appeals: whether the
public acquired prescriptive rights. Id.
Simon therefore illustrates that the initial
determination of whether a route is a road, thus
implicating section 43-2-201(1)(c), is different from the
question of whether or not a public highway is
established under section 43-2-201(1)(c). Although we
considered evidence in that case of whether the city had
accepted the paths as public streets, we did so in the
context of whether the road at issue fell under the
definition of road so as to enable the prescription [**63]
statute to apply. Furthermore, we specifically recognized
that "section 43-2-201(1)(c) does not require the city to
expend funds or otherwise demonstrate its willingness to
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accept highways established by prescription." Id. at 1303.
We stated that such evidence would strongly indicate that
a path had acquired the status of a public highway. Id.
However, those considerations were made in the context
of whether the footpaths were roads so as to cause section
43-2-201(1)(c) to apply.
In short, the preliminary question of whether a route
comes under the term "road" as used in the statute
governing public highway prescription resolves only
whether the statute applies. That determination is separate
and distinct from the question of whether the public has
established a public highway by prescription. If the
majority truly believes the route at issue here is not a
road, it would be more appropriate for the majority to
resolve the case on that issue alone as we did in Simon,
and leave the law of public prescription unaltered.
IV.

In sum, I disagree with the majority's requirement
that in order for a public highway to be established by
prescription, an official governmental entity [**64] must
make some formal action which the majority calls a
"claim of right." I believe that we have required only a
showing of adverse use, which is synonymous with use
under a claim of right. Thus, I find that the majority's
requirement is wholly new to our test for prescription as
it has stood for over one hundred years. Furthermore,
because I also disagree with the majority's analysis of
whether the route in question is a road, I believe the trial
court and the court of appeals decided this case correctly.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to say that CHIEF JUSTICE
MULLARKEY joins in this dissent.
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1.
DEDICATION--REQUISITES
AND
SUFFICIENCY. Since a dedication rests primarily in the
owner's intent, there must be a concession intentionally
made by him, provable by declarations or acts, or inferred
from circumstances, though no form or ceremony is
necessary, but it must appear that he knew of the public
use and intended to grant to the public the right to such
use. (Page 249.)
2. DEDICATION--EVIDENCE--SUFFICIENCY.
Evidence held insufficient to show dedication of highway
to public use. (Page 250.)
3. DEDICATION--REVOCATION. If a highway is
established by dedication and acceptance by the public, it
continues to be a highway as long as public use
continues, regardless of attempted revocation by the

dedicator. (Page 250.)
4. DEDICATION--USE--PUBLIC NATURE. Where
the users of an alleged dedicated highway were of three
classes, one using by a grant in a deed, another by the
right of entry collateral to a canal easement, and the third
by a right or claim not disclosed by the evidence, but
using merely for egress from their own private land, there
was no public use of the highway. (Page 250.)
5. HIGHWAYS--"PUBLIC THOROUGHFARE." A
"thoroughfare" is a place or way through which there is
passing or travel, and becomes "public" when the public
have a general right of passage. (Page 250.)
6. DEDICATION--USE OF WAY UNDER
PRIVATE GRANT--EFFECT. Under Comp. Laws 1907,
section 1115, providing that a highway shall be deemed
to have been dedicated to the use of the public when
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for ten years,
use under private right is insufficient to show dedication,
and such use, however long, does not make the way
public, and the mere fact that the public also use it
without objection from the owner will not make the way
public. (Page 250.)
7.
EASEMENTS--PRESCRIPTIVE
RIGHT--HIGHWAYS. A prescriptive easement does not
arise in seven years by analogy to the statute barring
action to recover realty when a plaintiff was not seized of
the property within seven years, such statutes not
applying to rights of way or easements, but prescriptive
right can arise only by adverse use and enjoyment under
claim of right uninterrupted and continuous for twenty
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10.
EASEMENTS--GRANT
BY
DEED--REQUISITES AND SUFFICIENCY. Generally,
when the owner of a tract of land has arranged and
adapted various parts, so that one derives a benefit from
the other of a continuous and obvious character, and he
sells one part without mentioning the incidental
advantage or burdens of one in respect to the other, there
is implied an understanding that such advantages and
burdens continue. (Page 254.)
11. EASEMENTS--SEVERANCE--REQUISITES
AND SUFFICIENCY. Elements essential to constitute
easement by severance are unity of title followed by
severance, an apparent, obvious and visible servitude at
the time of severance, reasonable necessity to the
enjoyment of the dominant estate, and it must usually be
continuous and self-acting. (Page 254.)
12.
EASEMENTS--WAYS
OF
NECESSITY--REASONABLE NECESSITY OF USE.
An easement by severance in a right of way apparent at
the time of severance does not exist except so far as is
reasonably necessary to the use of the dominant estate,
and the fact that a house on the severed tract faced toward
an extended way not necessary to access did not give an
easement thereon. (Page 255.)
13.
EASEMENTS--GRANT
BY
DEED--LOCATION. Generally on severance of title, if
the deed conveys a right of way across land still held by
the grantor, but does not fix its course or extent, and at
the time of conveyance there was in use on the land
reserved such a way plainly visible, and known to the
parties, it will be deemed to have been intended by the
grantor to be conveyed. (Page 256.)

OPINION BY: LOOFBOUROW
OPINION
[*245] [**1128] LOOFBOUROW, District Judge.
This action was brought in equity to quiet title to
certain lands and to restrain the defendants from
interfering with the plaintiff's peaceable possession of the
same. The plaintiff alleges title to the land and that the
defendants wrongfully removed fence posts placed
thereon by plaintiff, and threaten to remove them as often
as plaintiff replaces them, and that defendants at divers
times have crossed over said land with vehicles and on
foot, and will continue to so interfere with the peaceable
possession of plaintiff unless restrained, and plaintiff
prays for a decree quieting title and enjoining the
defendants from trespassing on said land.
The defendants admit that plaintiff [***2] owns the
land in question, but they claim a right of way across a
part of said land for themselves, and that the roadway so
used by them is a public highway. They admit that one of
the defendants removed from said roadway certain posts
placed thereon by plaintiff, and that they travel said road,
but deny that they are trespassers thereon. They allege
that on October 8, 1887, the plaintiff conveyed by
warranty deed to Jane Kersey, now deceased, and through
whom the defendants claim, the land that the defendants
now occupy and which lies directly to the north of
plaintiff's land, the boundary line being the north side of a
canal running east and west between the two tracts, with
all appurtenances thereto, and a right of way for ingress
and egress over and across the lands of plaintiff with
[*246] vehicles and domestic animals, that for fifteen
years prior to the making of said deed, and at the time of
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said conveyance, the road in question existed and was
and had been used by the public, and that it was a
well-defined, clearly marked road, and allege that the
plaintiff has, by various acts, attempted to interfere with
the use of said highway; and the defendants ask that their
right [***3] in said road be decreed to them, and that the
plaintiff be enjoined from further interfering with the
peaceable possession of said right by the defendants. The
following sketch will explain the situation of the lands of
the respective parties, [**1129] the location of the canal,
and the right of way in dispute:
[SEE SKETCH IN ORIGINAL]
The district court made findings of fact to the
following effect, to wit: That the deed in question was
executed and delivered by the plaintiff, Joseph N. Morris,
to Jane Kersey on October 8, 1887, and that, after
describing the land by metes and bounds, it contained the
following clause:
"Together with a right of way for ingress and egress
to said land from east line of said section over a strip of
land one rod wide along the south side of and following
the course of said Utah & Salt Lake Canal, said right of
way to include the right of ingress and egress to and from
said land first above conveyed with vehicles and
domestic animals of all kinds at any and all times."
That subsequent to said conveyance said Jane Kersey
died, leaving the defendants, except Joseph Blunt, her
heirs, and that Joseph Blunt is the administrator of the
estate of the [***4] [*247] said Jane Kersey, deceased.
That the road in question is not, and never was, a public
highway. That the canal through the lands in question has
a shoulder or bank about eighteen inches above the
general level of the land and extending from 1 to 1 1/2
rods south from the water's edge and along the south side
of said canal. That the meaning of the phrase "a strip of
land one rod wide along the south side of and following
the course of said Utah & Salt Lake Canal" is that the
south side of said canal is the outer edge of said shoulder
or bank, and that the right of way specifically mentioned
in the deed extends along the south or outer edge of said
shoulder and extends from the east section line westerly
along the course above indicated parallel to and 1 1/2
rods south of the high-water mark, following the
meanderings thereof, more or less, to a point directly
south of the southeast corner of defendants' land; thence
westerly 2 1/2 rods; thence north across the canal to the
land of the plaintiff, thereby leaving a square 2 1/2 rods

each way for the purpose of turning and crossing the
canal. That the defendants have no right or interest in the
lands of the plaintiff other than [***5] as above
indicated. The court issued an injunction restraining the
defendants from in any manner interfering with the use
by plaintiff of the lands owned by him, except as above
indicated, thus closing to the defendants the road from
about the southeast corner of defendants' land to the point
where said road formerly crossed the canal a distance of
about twenty rods.
The defendants at once perfected this appeal,
assigning numerous errors which are specifically as
follows: (1) That the court was wrong in its findings that
the whole road was not a public highway; (2) wrong in its
finding and conclusion that the strip of road about twenty
rods in length from the east line of the defendants' land
westerly to the point where formerly said road crossed
the canal, did not pass to the defendants under the deed
mentioned as an appurtenance to the land.
Upon examining the record and the evidence, we
find that this suit was filed June 20, 1914. The evidence
shows that on October 8, 1887, when Jane Kersey
became the owner of the land now held by the defendants
by a conveyance from [*248] the plaintiff, the road
extended west of the east line of her property about
twenty rods, and then turned [***6] north across the
canal; that the road before that time had continued on
west on the south side of the canal from that point
through the section, and some of the people who lived to
the west and those working on the canal traveled said
road frequently; that it was unimproved, marked only by
wheel tracks which were plainly visible; that it was open,
without gates; that there were no signs to the effect that it
was a private highway, and that there never have been
such signs along the road; that the house bought by Jane
Kersey, with the land, faced toward this road that
extended west of the point where the district court found
it turned north across the canal; that the Kersey place has
been continuously occupied, and the occupants and the
visitors traveled the road to and from the house; that there
has been no change in the location of the road; that it is in
substantially the same position on the ground now that it
was twenty-seven years ago; that in making and cleaning
the canal the excavated material and debris were thrown
out on the south side of the canal, making the surface of
the ground rough and uneven for a distance of 1 to 1 1/2
rods along the south side of the canal and through [***7]
its entire length upon the land in question; that numerous
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boulders were thrown out of the canal; that no bridge
existed at the point where defendants contend the road
should cross the canal; that in about 1912 the plaintiff
plowed the road to the canal bank, and that frequently, in
plowing the lands adjoining the road, plaintiff deposited
boulders from his land upon the road; that the defendants,
with shovels, leveled the road and threw the rocks to the
north toward the canal, and continued to travel the road
as before; that in 1914 plaintiff set posts in the roadway
where defendants crossed the canal, turning north, and
that the defendants, or some of them, removed said posts
and threw them [**1130] aside and continued to cross at
that point; that plaintiff closed the road on the south side
of the canal running west from the defendants' present
crossing in about 1910; that the road was plowed by
plaintiff in about 1904; that in about 1907 plaintiff placed
a wire gate at the public highway along the east line of
the section; that [*249] defendants objected and cut it
down; that the water in the canal is about sixteen feet
wide; that the company does not have title to the [***8]
land covered by the canal, and claims only by usage; that
there is no bridge across the canal to the Jane Kersey
place.
It will be seen that the defendants' complaint in this
court is as to that part of the decree that turns the road
across the canal at about the southeast corner of the
defendants' land, instead of permitting an extension of
twenty rods to the west, and then turn north across the
canal as it did formerly.
They rely upon three grounds to hold the road in
question, to wit: (1) That by long continual use it has
become a public highway; (2) that by their and Mrs.
Kersey's use they have an easement by prescription; (3)
that said road was granted by said deed, both by the
description of a road one rod wide, specially described,
and also by reason of said road being appurtenant to the
land conveyed in the deed. We will examine these
questions in order:

knew of the use by the public, and intended to grant the
right of way to the public. No formal acceptance by any
public officer or agent is necessary, but there must be
actual use by the public. City of Cincinnati v. White, 6
Pet. 440, 8 L. Ed. 452; Morgan v. Railroad Co., 96 U.S.
716, 24 L. Ed. 743; Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah
227, 26 P. 291; Whittaker v. Ferguson, 16 Utah 240, 51
P. 980; Schettler v. Lynch, 23 Utah 305, 64 P. 955;
Culmer v. Salt Lake City, 27 Utah 252, 75 P. 620; Wilson
v. Hull, 7 Utah 90, 24 P. 799.
From the evidence, it appears that the plaintiff, two
years before the commencement of this action, plowed
the road to the canal bank; that frequently in plowing
lands adjoining [*250] the road plaintiff rolled boulders
from the land into the road, which the defendants
removed before they could travel the road; that plaintiff
closed the road extending west from the Kersey crossing
five years before the commencement of this action; that a
wire gate was placed [***10] by the plaintiff across the
entrance to the road on the east section line seven years
before the commencement of this action; and that the
road was plowed by the plaintiff as much as ten years
before the commencement of this action.
All these facts negative an intention on the part of
the plaintiff to dedicate to public use. On the contrary, the
fair inference to be drawn from them is that he intended
not to dedicate the roadway to the public. It is true that, a
dedication by the owner and an acceptance by the public
once made, the highway thus established continues to be
a highway as long as the public use continues; and if in
this case the public use were sufficient to constitute an
acceptance and the owner had in fact intended to
dedicate, then the dedication would be complete; but we
think there is no evidence tending to show that there ever
was an intent to dedicate to public use.

First, that by long continual use the twenty rods of
road in question has become a public highway; that is,
that there has been a dedication by the owner to the
public use and an acceptance by the public.

Next we must consider the people who used this
road. Did their traveling upon it constitute a use by the
public? The evidence discloses three classes of persons
only who used this road, to wit, the occupants of the
Kersey place and their visitors, the workmen upon the
canal, and some persons who lived [***11] in the middle
of the section.

A dedication rests primarily in the intent of the
owner. There must be a concession intentionally made by
him, which [***9] may be proved by declarations or by
acts, or may be inferred from circumstances. No form or
ceremony is necessary. It must, however, appear that he

As to the occupants of the Kersey place, they had an
express grant of a right of way for ingress and egress
contained in their title deed (not considering now the
extent or limitation of the right conveyed in the deed), so
they were not traveling the road by reason of its public
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character, but under the express provision of their deed.
As to the workmen upon the canal, they were there
under the right by "user" claimed by their company. The
right of way for their canal, whatever it is, if it authorizes
the occupancy of the land for canal purposes, carries with
it the right, under reasonable limitations to enter the
premises to construct, repair, and operate the canal, its
headgates, its laterals, etc., which are a part of or
connected therewith. So [*251] these persons were not
on this road by reason of its public character, but under
whatever right by "user" the canal company had over this
land for canal purposes.
As to the persons who lived in the center of the
section, the evidence does not disclose how many there
are or ever were, how frequently they used the road, by
what right they traveled the road, nor the circumstances
of their use, nor [***12] that they have in any way
improved their property depending upon the public use of
the road, nor that they are in any respect so situated that
closing the road will be an injury to them. Compare the
case made as to them with the situation disclosed by the
evidence in the case of Schettler v. Lynch, 23 Utah 305,
64 P. 955.
However, the people in the middle of this section are
not in court, and their rights are not being determined.
Their use of the road [**1131] is material here only so
far as it may have a bearing upon its public character, and
the evidence as to their use of the road in question is very
meager.
Complied Laws of Utah 1907, section 1115,
provides:
"A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated
and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of
ten years."
A "thoroughfare" is a place or way through which
there is passing or travel. It becomes a "public
thoroughfare" when the public have a general right of
passage. Under this statute the highway, even though it
be over privately owned ground, will be deemed
dedicated or abandoned to the public use when the public
has continuously used it [***13] as a thoroughfare for a
period of 10 years, but such use must be by the public.
Use under private right is not sufficient. If the
thoroughfare is laid out or used as a private way, its use,

however long, as a private way, does not make it a public
way; and the mere fact that the public also make use of it,
without objection from the owner of the land, will not
make it a public way. Before it becomes public in
character the owner of the land must consent to the
change. Elliott, Roads and Streets, section 5.
From a consideration of the facts in evidence, viewed
in the light of the well-established principles of law, we
must conclude, [*252] as did the trial court, that there is
disclosed no such intention on the part of the owner of
the land to dedicate to public use, nor such use by the
public constituting an acceptance as is necessary to show
a dedication or abandonment to public use.
The second contention of the appellants is that by
their and Mrs. Kersey's use they have an easement by
prescription.
"The right to a public road or private way by
prescription arises from the uninterrupted adverse
enjoyment of it under a claim of right know to the owner
for the requisite length [***14] of time. Anciently the
right to the easement arose by prescription from the use
of the land for so long a time that there was no existing
evidence as to when such use commenced. Its origin must
have been at a time 'whereof the memory of man runneth
not to the contrary.' Later the rule was changed by
limiting the time of uninterrupted possession to 20 years."
Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227, 26 P. 291.
"Prescription refers the right to the highway to the
presumption that it was originally established pursuant to
law, by proper authority; while dedication refers it to a
contract either expressed or implied. Dedication implies a
conveyance and an acceptance, while prescription
requires an unbroken possession or use under claim of
right." Elliott, Roads and Streets, § 191.
A prescriptive right to an easement does not arise in
seven years, by analogy to the provision of the statute
barring an action to recover real property when the
person asserting title was not seized or possessed of the
property in question within seven years. These statutes do
not apply to rights of way or any other class of easements
by prescription. The right by prescription can only arise
by adverse [***15] use and enjoyment under claim of
right uninterrupted and continuous for a period of twenty
years. Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227, 26 P. 291;
Funk v. Anderson, 22 Utah 238, 61 P. 1006; North Point
Co. v. U. & S. L. C. Co., 16 Utah 246, 52 P. 168, 40 L. R.
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A. 851, 67 Am. St. Rep. 607; Lund v. Wilcox, 34 Utah
205, 97 P. 33.
A prescriptive right in the public is disposed of by
our conclusion, heretofore reached, that the evidence
does not show use by the public, and that this was not a
public highway; but there is still the question of a private
[*253] right of way by prescription. Under the
well-established rule, the use, in order that it may ripen
into a prescriptive title, must, in any case, not only be
adverse and continuous, and under claim of right for a
period of twenty years, but it must be uninterrupted
throughout that period. In the case at bar the use of the
defendants and their predecessors commenced in 1887, at
which time there was a severance of the title to the
parcels of land, and could not ripen into title by
prescription until 1907. But the defendants' own
testimony shows that the plaintiff plowed the road in
question as early [***16] as 1904, and from that time to
the commencement of this action the plaintiff, from time
to time, placed rocks in the road, from the plowed land
adjoining, and that the defendants, with shovels, leveled
the ground and removed the rocks to the north to make
the road passable; and following these acts, and clearly
indicating the attitude of each of the parties to this suit to
the claim of the defendants to the ownership of this right
of way at about the time the twenty-year period would
have expired, plaintiff placed a wire gate across the road
at the point where it left the public highway, and the
defendants cut it down. From these circumstances we
conclude that the use was not uninterrupted, and that no
right by prescription could arise under these
circumstances. Wasatch Irrig. Co. v. Fulton, 23 Utah
466, 65 P. 205; Crosier v. Brown, 66 W. Va. 273, 66 S.E.
326, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 174; Reid v. Garnett, 101 Va. 47,
43 S.E. 182; Wooldridge v. Coughlin, 46 W. Va. 345, 33
S.E. 233.
The third contention made by appellants is that the
road was granted by deed both by the description of a
road one rod wide, specially described, and also by
reason of said road [***17] being appurtenant to the land
conveyed in the deed. The deed contained the very usual
clause, following the specific description of the real
estate, to wit, "together with all and singular the
tenements, hereditaments, and appurtenances thereunto
belonging or in any wise appertaining." Whatever passed
under this clause as an appurtenance must have been an
existing easement at the time of the making of the deed; i.
e., such rights were conveyed by [**1132] this [*254]

clause as were then belonging or in any wise then
appertaining to said land. But during the unity of title no
easement could exist as between parts of the land. An
owner cannot have an easement in his own land because
during the unity of title all the benefits and uses for
easement are comprehended within his general
ownership. Such a clause in a deed will not create a new
right, nor, in case of severance of title, will it convey a
right to a use for the benefit of one part of the land over
another part. Such a right, if it is conveyed, must be by
definite language which first creates or defines the
easement and then conveys it. Duvall v. Ridout, 124 Md.
193, 92 A. 209, L. R. A. 1915C, 345.
An appurtenance [***18] implied upon a severance
of title is referred to the intent of the grantor, and such
intent is gathered from conditions existing at the time of
the severance of title and implied from such
circumstances; and in general terms, the rule may be
stated that when the owner of a tract of land has arranged
and adapted the various parts so that one derives a benefit
and advantage from the other of a continuous and
obvious character, and he sells one of the parts without
making mention of the incidental advantage or burdens of
one in respect to the other, there is implied an
understanding and agreement that such advantages and
burdens continue as before the separation of title. Ingals
v. Plamondon, 75 Ill. 118; Carbrey v. Willis, 7 Allen
(Mass.) 364, 83 Am. Dec. 688; Scott v. Moore, 98 Va.
668, 37 S.E. 342, 81 Am. St. Rep. 749; Grace M. E.
Church v. Dobbins, 153 Pa. 294, 25 A. 1120, 34 Am. St.
Rep. 706; Quinlan v. Noble, 75 Cal. 250, 17 P. 69.
The elements essential to constitute an easement by
severance are: (1) Unity of title followed by severance;
(2) that at the time of the severance the servitude was
apparent, obvious, and visible; (3) that the [***19]
easement is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the
dominant estate; and (4) it must usually be continuous
and self-acting, as distinguished from one used only from
time to time when occasion arises.
We pass the fourth requirement, as to which there is
a [*255] clear conflict in the decided cases. There are
decisions by courts of final jurisdiction in the various
states holding that the servitude, in order to pass as
implied upon severance, must be of a continuous nature,
i. e., one which may be enjoyed without the act of man,
as a right to conduct water through a spout which
discharges water automatically whenever rain falls.
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Bonelli Bros. v. Blakemore, 66 Miss. 136, 5 So. 228, 14
Am. St. Rep. 550; Fisk v. Haber, 7 La. Ann. 652.
On the other hand, courts hold that the kind of
easement is not to be considered, but merely whether it is
apparent, designed to be permanent, reasonably necessary
to the enjoyment of the property, and arises from a
severance of a unified title. Baker v. Rice, 56 Ohio St.
463, 47 N.E. 653.
As to the first essential, i. e., unity of title followed
by severance, that, in this case, is admitted. As to the
second, that [***20] the servitude was apparent,
obvious, and visible at the time of severance, the
undisputed evidence is to the effect that at the time of
severance the way in question was a well-defined, though
unimproved, driveway. However, as to the third essential,
i. e., that the servitude is reasonably necessary to the
enjoyment of the dominant estate, there is serious doubt.
It must be borne in mind that the issue presented in this
case is not whether the defendants shall have a roadway
from their land to the public highway on the east--that far
the way was decreed to the defendants by the district
court--but whether or not this roadway shall end at the
southeast corner of defendants' land, or extend twenty
rods west, still over the plaintiff's land, and then across
the canal, and enter the land of defendants. So the
question here is whether or not the evidence discloses a
reasonable necessity for perpetuating the twenty rods of
roadway west from the southeast corner of defendants'
land. The only evidence upon this subject is that the
dwelling house upon the defendants' land, which was
there at the time of severance, faced south some distance
from and toward the canal and the extended roadway.
[***21] Does this disclose that the extension of the
roadway, which the defendants seek, is reasonably
necessary to the proper enjoyment of the property
conveyed, or that this extension of the roadway
materially adds to the value of [*256] the land? We
think not. From a careful consideration of the conditions
and circumstances of the property at the time of
severance, as disclosed by the evidence, we cannot find
that there is any advantage whatever to the defendants'
property in continuing the roadway past the southeast
corner of defendants' land as decreed by the district court.
That there must exist a reasonable necessity is
apparent from an examination of the decided cases. Some
of these cases go to the extent that, in order to create a
servitude upon severance, there must be shown an

absolute necessity. However, the requirement of
reasonable necessity seems to be supported by the weight
of authority and by reason. Weidekin v. Snelson, 17 Ill.
App. 461; Dolliff v. Boston and M. R. R., 68 Me. 173;
Wentworth v. Philpot, 60 N.H. 193; Brakely v. Sharp, 9
N.J. Eq. 9; Evans v. Dana, 7 R.I. 306; Jarvis v. Seele Mill
Co., 173 Ill. 192, 50 N.E. [***22] 1044, 64 Am. St. Rep.
107; Root v. Wadhams, 107 N.Y. 384, 14 N.E. 281; Wells
v. Garbutt, 132 N.Y. 430, 30 N.E. 978; McElroy v.
McLeay, 71 Vt. 396, 45 A. 898; Paine v. Chandler, 134
N.Y. 385, 32 N.E. 18, 19 L. R. A. 99; Kelly v. Dunning, 43
N.J. Eq. 62, 10 A. 276; Miller v. Hoeschler, [**1133]
126 Wis. 263, 105 N.W. 790, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 327;
Ogden v. Jennings, 62 N.Y. 526; Sellers v. Texas C. R.
Co., 81 Tex. 458, 17 S.W. 32, 13 L. R. A. 657.
Within this third proposition is included the
contention that the roadway is extent, as is existed at the
time of the conveyance, passed under the express terms
of the deed by the description of "a right of way for
ingress and egress to said land from the east line of
section over a strip of land one rod wide along the south
side of and following the course of said Utah & Salt Lake
Canal," by reason of the fact that at the time of the
conveyance there was upon the land such a right of way
in use and known to the parties to the deed. The rule may
be stated generally that upon the severance of title, if the
deed contains a clause conveying a right of way across
the land still [***23] held by the grantor, but not fixing
its course and extent, and it is made to appear that at the
time of conveyance there was in use upon the land
reserved such a way plainly visible, and known to the
parties, [*257] it will be deemed that the way intended
by the grantor is the one actually in existence. Gerrish v.
Shattuck, 128 Mass. 571; O'Brien v. Schayer, 124 Mass.
211; Peabody v. Chandler, 17 Misc. 655, 40 N.Y.S. 1028;
Bannon v. Angier, 2 Allen (Mass.) 128.
This rule of law is well established, and is highly
beneficial, but the cases to which we must look for
illustrations of its application are from communities
where conditions as to marked boundaries and inclosures
are, and for a long time have been, fixed and settled, and
in which its application is much more easily made than in
a community such as that involved in this case. This
community, as disclosed by the evidence, during the
years involved, was in process of settlement, and the
whole country was but recently largely open, and the
traveler free to follow almost any course that promised to
bring him most easily to his journey's end. Here we find
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wheel tracks in almost any direction [***24] without
system, and without regard to section lines or property
rights. When, in a community so situated, the time arrives
for the fencing of fields and the establishing of permanent
roads and rights of way, the strict application of this rule
would, in many cases, produce fantastic results quite
inconsistent with justice. In this case we feel that its
applicability is doubtful. Here we have a grant of a right
of way for ingress and egress to this land from the east
line of the section along the south side of the canal. The
evidence shows that at the time the deed was made the
wheel tracks along the south side of the canal extended
the whole length of the canal through the property of the
plaintiff, with a turn-off at the point where the defendants
now contend it should still remain. There is no reason
suggested in the evidence why a turn-off at this point is
more advantageous to defendants' land than at the
southeast corner of the defendants' land. In construing
any grant of right of way the use, in character and extent,
is limited to such as is reasonably necessary and
convenient to the dominant estate and as little
burdensome to the servient estate as possible for the use

contemplated. [***25] In the case before us the terms of
the grant cannot be said to be wholly general. The way is
to be along the south side of the canal, [*258] and is to
extend from the east line of the section, and is for the
purpose of ingress and egress. In the absence of proof of
disadvantage to the dominant estate occasioned by
turning the road across the canal at the southeast corner
of the land, the right of the servient estate to have the
easement as little burdensome as possible consistent with
the use contemplated should be recognized.
Under all the circumstances in this case, we are
satisfied that the rule that, where the grant of a right of
way is general, the fact that there is such a right of way
visible and in use upon the land makes the grant certain,
is not applicable.
For the reasons given, the decree of the district court
is affirmed, with costs.
STRAUP, C. J., and FRICK, J., concur.
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OPINION BY: PER CURIAM
OPINION
[*570] The plaintiff filed a suit in equity against
defendant, one of its directors, for an order requiring him
to transfer a mineral lease issued by the State of Utah in
his own name. The complaint sounded in breach of a
fiduciary relationship.
After a hearing, the court ordered the transfer as
requested. The court also ordered plaintiff to pay
defendant $485 for the first year of the lease. The order
was in the form of an unsigned minute entry dated June 5,
1980. Before it was formalized, the defendant filed a
motion to proffer additional testimony to show
entitlement to similar payments for years subsequent to
the first year of the lease, which would aggregate about
$1,800. The motion was granted. The finding and
judgment (including allowance for the additional lease
payments) were signed and formalized on July 19, 1982,
without the court having acted on the plaintiff's
objections thereto.
In September, 1982, the plaintiff moved to vacate
that part of the judgment adding the amounts mentioned.
As reasons, plaintiff [**2] assigned the court's failure to

rule on plaintiff's objections before entry of judgment,
and failure to notify of its entry before the time for appeal
had expired. Recognizing the error, the court granted the
plaintiff's motion to vacate the judgment at a hearing on
October 12, 1982. At that time, the court denied the
plaintiff's objections to the findings and decree and
ordered the July judgment to be entered as of the date of
the hearing--October 12, 1982. The plaintiff timely
appealed therefrom and urged invalidity of the modified
judgment on the grounds that under Rule 59(a), Utah R.
Civ. P., evidence known by the defendant to exist at time
of judgment could not be admitted as "newly discovered"
evidence.
The trial court is vested with considerable discretion
in a case like this. 1 The following language appears
applicable and controlling:
Like the motion for a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence, a
motion to reopen the case to take
additional testimony is normally addressed
to the discretion of the trial court, and its
discretionary denial or grant of the motion
will be interfered with by an appellant
court only for abuse . . . . [footnotes
omitted]. [**3] 2

1 Lewis v. Porter, Utah, 556 P.2d 496 (1976).
2 6A Moore's Federal Practice 59.04[13].
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There was no abuse of discretion in the instant case. The
trial court had erred in signing the findings and judgment
while the objection thereto was still pending and
undecided. It was this error that prompted the trial court
to grant the plaintiff's motion to vacate the judgment.
The trial court subsequently denied plaintiff's objections.

By making the judgment previously entered effective as
of October 12, the plaintiff was assured its right of
appeal, which timely was exercised.
The judgment is affirmed, with no award of costs on
appeal.
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JUDGES: DURRANT, Justice.
OPINION BY: DURRANT
OPINION
On Certification from the Utah Court of Appeals
DURRANT, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
[**624] [*P1] By statute, an unwed father must, in
order to preserve his paternal rights, file a paternity
petition in court and register a notice of that petition with
the Department of Health. 1 These documents may be

filed before the child's birth, but must be filed before the
mother consents to adoption or relinquishes the child to
an adoption agency. 2 The mother is required to wait
twenty-four hours after the child's birth before consenting
to adoption or relinquishing the child. 3 Thus, the typical
unwed father is allowed a period that extends until
twenty-four hours following the child's birth to file the
requisite petition and to register a notice--or risk losing
all rights to the child.
1
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-30-4.13(3)(a),
-4.14(6) (Supp. 2006); accord id. §
78-30-4.13(3)(a) (Supp. 2004), amended by ch.
137, § 6 & ch. 150, § 5, 2005 Utah Laws 894-96,
1017-18; Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b)
[***2] (Supp. 2004), repealed and reenacted by
ch. 186, § 3, 2006 Utah Laws 835-37.
2 Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-30-4.13(3)(d), -4.14(6)
(Supp. 2006); accord id. §§ 78-30-4.13(3)(a),
-4.14(b) (Supp. 2004).
3 Id. § 78-30-4.19(1) (Supp. 2006).
[*P2] The question posed in this case is whether the
period provided by statute in which unwed fathers may
preserve their rights by filing a paternity action and
registering notice should be enlarged when it expires on a
weekend or holiday. More specifically, the question is
whether rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
applies to [**625] enlarge these statutory deadlines. In
this case, Nikolas Thurnwald did not file his paternity
petition and register notice prior to his child's premature
birth on Saturday morning of Labor Day weekend, and he
was thereafter unable to file until the next Tuesday
because the courts and state offices were closed.
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Meanwhile, the mother, A.E., relinquished their child to
L.D.S. Family Services for adoption on Sunday morning,
at the expiration of the twenty-four-hour waiting period.
Thurnwald's paternity petition was dismissed by the
district court because he had not filed his petition and
registered with the state prior to A.E.'s relinquishment.
[***3] Thurnwald argues on appeal that we should apply
rule 6 and deem his petition timely.
[*P3] This case presents us with two alternatives
for interpreting the statutes: (1) we could conclude, as did
the district court, that the twenty-four-hour postbirth
period is designed solely for the benefit of the mother and
that the unwed father's obligation is tied in all instances
to the mother's relinquishment--not to any time period to
which rule 6 applies; or (2) we could conclude that the
effect of the statutes is to create a minimum filing period
extending to twenty-four hours after the child's birth in
which the unwed father has a right to file and register,
and that this period is subject to extension under rule 6.
[*P4] We hold that the first of these two
alternatives, the one selected by the district court, is
unconstitutional because it denies unwed fathers a
postbirth time period in which to file and register if the
birth falls on a weekend or holiday. When faced with two
plausible interpretations of a statute, one constitutional
and the other not, we are obligated to select the
constitutional interpretation. Accordingly, we hold that
rule 6 applies to enlarge the filing period until the end of
[***4] the next business day in cases where the unwed
father would not otherwise receive a full business day to
file postbirth because part or all of the twenty-four-hour
period falls on a holiday or weekend.

were living together in Davis County in early 2004 when
A.E. became pregnant with their child. Thurnwald and
A.E. initially discussed marriage and continued to live
together. But in April 2004, A.E. moved out and went to
live with her grandparents. During most of the pregnancy,
A.E. was covered by her grandmother's health insurance.
[*P7] After A.E. moved out, she and Thurnwald
continued to date. They also had discussions about how
to best prepare for the birth of their child. About [***5] a
month after A.E. went to live with her grandmother,
Thurnwald and A.E. agreed that Thurnwald should move
to Fruitland to work with his grandfather's company so he
would have better working hours and be better able to
afford to buy a house and support the child. In
accordance with this plan, Thurnwald moved to Fruitland
to start working and find a place to live. While there, he
talked with A.E. on the phone daily and visited on the
weekends. Approximately three weeks later, A.E. decided
that she did not want to move to Fruitland; so Thurnwald
moved back to Davis County.
[*P8] The parties also discussed raising the child
together and moving in with Thurnwald's parents. About
a month before the child's birth, they discussed
Thurnwald joining the military to provide a steady job
and insurance for the family. And they discussed
purchasing family insurance.
[*P9] During A.E.'s pregnancy, Thurnwald went to
all but one of her doctor appointments. He went shopping
with A.E., and together they purchased several outfits for
the baby. Thurnwald also purchased a car [**626] seat,
bassinet, crib, diaper bag, diapers, and some blankets.

4 Johnson v. Hermes Assocs., Ltd., 2005 UT 82,
P 2, 128 P.3d 1151 ("When reviewing a rule
56(c) motion for summary judgment, we recite the
facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party.").

[*P10] On approximately August 17, 2004, A.E.
told Thurnwald that, with her grandmother's [***6]
encouragement, she had gone to an appointment at L.D.S.
Family Services to talk about adoption. The next day,
Thurnwald and A.E. went to the L.D.S. Family Services
office along with Thurnwald's mother. Thurnwald was
told at that meeting that nothing was finalized but that
A.E. had signed papers stating that L.D.S. Family
Services would take care of the baby's birth if A.E.
decided to give the baby up for adoption. The
representative told Thurnwald and his mother to stop
pressuring A.E. and let her make her own decision.

[*P6] Thurnwald and A.E. were involved in a
romantic relationship for more than three years, and they
lived together from August 2003 to April 2004. They

[*P11] After the meeting at L.D.S. Family Services,
A.E. told Thurnwald that she did not want to give the
baby up for adoption and that he did not have anything to

BACKGROUND
[*P5] The district court dismissed Thurnwald's
petition after granting summary judgment against him; so
we recite the facts in the light most favorable to
Thurnwald. 4
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worry about. Nonetheless, between August 18 and the
child's birth, Thurnwald's mother made several calls on
Thurnwald's behalf to determine his rights regarding the
child, including calls to a lawyer and to the Department
of Health. The Department of Health told them to get a
lawyer if they thought the baby might be placed for
adoption. The lawyer told them he would look into it and
get back to them.
[*P12] On August 21, approximately two weeks
before the child's birth, Thurnwald and A.E. together
attended a baby shower [***7] for the child and received
gifts to help care for a newborn. Approximately two days
before the child's birth, Thurnwald and A.E. talked about
selling his car and getting a car more suitable for the
child.
[*P13] On Saturday, September 4, 2004, A.E. went
into premature labor. The child was born that day at 9:24
a.m. in Layton, Utah. Neither A.E. nor her family notified
Thurnwald.
[*P14] Thurnwald found out about the birth from
one of A.E.'s co-workers at approximately 10:30 a.m. that
same day when he called A.E.'s workplace to see if she
wanted to go with him to a movie that night. Upon
hearing that A.E. had given birth, Thurnwald called A.E.
at the hospital. She told him that she was giving their
child up for adoption. Thurnwald left work immediately
and drove to the hospital. When he got there, A.E.
refused to see him. Hospital personnel told Thurnwald
that A.E. had registered as a "silent" patient and that he
could not visit or speak with her or the child.
[*P15] That same day, Thurnwald contacted his
lawyer. But Thurnwald was unable to file the required
paternity petition with the court and register with the
Department of Health on Sunday or Monday because it
was Labor Day weekend and state offices [***8] and
courts were closed. Instead, he filed a paternity petition
with the court on Tuesday, September 7, at 12:05 p.m.,
and filed a notice with the registrar of vital statistics on
the same day. In conjunction with the petition for
paternity, he also filed an Order to Show Cause to stop
any adoption proceedings.
[*P16] In the meantime, A.E. waited twenty-four
hours as required by statute and then, on Sunday
morning, relinquished custody of the child to L.D.S.
Family Services for adoptive placement.

[*P17] At a hearing on the paternity petition, the
parties agreed to continue the matter based on an
agreement with L.D.S. Family Services that it would not
finalize the adoption until this matter was concluded.
Thereafter, on July 22, 2005, the district court granted
summary judgment against Thurnwald because he did not
file his paternity petition and notice before A.E.'s
relinquishment. The district court concluded that, because
it was not "impossible for him to comply with the filing
requirements of the statute," Thurnwald's right to due
process was not violated. The district court then
dismissed the paternity petition in an order dated August
17, 2005. Thurnwald originally appealed this case to us,
[***9] but we transferred it to the court of appeals
because we lacked original appellate jurisdiction over the
case. After the parties filed their appellate briefs, the
court of appeals certified this case back to us. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(b).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[*P18] Because Thurnwald appeals from the district
court's grant of summary judgment, [**627] this case
presents only questions of law that we review for
correctness, "giv[ing] no deference to the district court's
legal decisions." 5
5 Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85,
P 10, 100 P.3d 1200.
ANALYSIS
[*P19] Utah's adoption statutes 6 require unwed
fathers who desire to preserve their paternal rights to both
file a paternity petition in court and register a notice of
that petition with the state registrar of vital statistics in
the Department of Health. 7 Both of these documents
must be filed prior to either the birth mother's consent to
adoption or her relinquishment of the child to an adoption
agency, 8 but the mother may not consent "until at least
24 hours after the birth of her child." 9 The unwed father's
strict compliance with the statute is mandated. 10 The
consequence of failing to timely file a paternity [***10]
petition and register is the loss of "any right in relation to
the child," including the right to notice of adoption
proceedings and the right to consent or withhold consent
to the child's adoption. 11
6 Some of the relevant adoption statutes have
been amended since 2004 when Thurnwald filed
his petition for paternity. We cite the current
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statutes, but also reference the statutes then in
effect. Unless otherwise noted, the amended
statutes contain only organizational and stylistic
changes, and have the same practical effect as
those in effect in 2004.
7 Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-30-4.13(3)(a), -4.14(6)
(Supp. 2006); accord id. § 78-30-4.13(3)(a)
(Supp. 2004), amended by ch. 137, § 6 & ch. 150,
§ 5, 2005 Utah Laws 894-96, 1017-18; Utah Code
Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b) (Supp. 2004), repealed
and reenacted by ch. 186, § 3, 2006 Utah Laws
835-37.
The current version of section 78-30-4.13(3)
reads as follows:
(a) In order to preserve any right
to notice and consent, an
unmarried biological father may,
consistent with Subsection 3(d):
(i) initiate
proceedings
to
establish paternity .
. .; and
(ii) file a notice
of the initiation of
the
proceedings
described
in
Subsection (3)(a)(i)
with
the
state
registrar [***11] of
vital
statistics
within
the
Department
of
Health.

....
(d) The action and notice
described in Subsection (3)(a):
(i) may be filed
before or after the
child's birth; and
(ii) shall be
filed prior to the
mother's:

(A) execution
of
consent
to
adoption of the
child; or
(B)
relinquishment
the
child
adoption.

of
for

The predecessor of this section in effect in 2004
when Thurnwald filed his paternity petition reads
as follows:
(3)(a) In order to preserve any
right to notice and consent, an
unmarried biological father may
initiate proceedings to establish
paternity . . . and file a notice of
the initiation of those proceedings
with the state registrar of vital
statistics within the Department of
Health prior to the mother's
execution of consent or her
relinquishment to an agency. That
action and notice may also be filed
prior to the child's birth.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.13(3)(a) (Supp. 2004).
Thurnwald cites the 2004 version of this
statute in his brief; A.E. cites the 2006 version in
hers. Neither party addresses whether the changes
in this statute are relevant to our analysis. We
therefore assume that the parties agree that the
statute in effect in 2004 and the current statute
require the [***12] same actions of unwed
fathers who wish to establish paternity to a child.
8 Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-30-4.13(3)(d), -4.14(6)
(Supp. 2006); accord id. §§ 78-30-4.13(3)(a),
-4.14(b) (Supp. 2004).
9 Id. § 78-30-4.19(1) (Supp. 2006).
10
Id. § 78-30-4.14(11); accord id. §
78-30-4.14(5) (Supp. 2004).
11
Id. § 78-30-4.14(ii); accord id. §
78-30-4.14(5) (Supp. 2004).
[*P20] In effect, the adoption statutes give an
unwed father until twenty-four hours after the birth of his
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child to file a paternity petition and register--or risk
losing all rights to his child. After the twenty-four-hour
postbirth waiting period, the birth mother may consent to
adoption or may relinquish the child to the custody of an
adoption agency at any time and in so doing immediately
deprive the father of any rights to the child.

relinquishment, so that rule 6 is inapplicable; or (2) that
the statutes create a minimum filing period that extends
to twenty-four hours after the child's birth and may be
enlarged in accordance with rule 6 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure if the last day of the period occurs on a
weekend or holiday.

[*P21] Thurnwald argues that because the
twenty-four-hour postbirth period expired on a holiday
weekend, rendering him unable to preserve his paternal
rights after the birth of the child, the district court should
have applied rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
to enlarge the time for filing to the end [**628] of the
next business day after the child's birth. Rule 6 provides:

[*P24] The district court adopted the first
interpretation in granting summary judgment against
Thurnwald. We hold, however, that application of the
statutes in accordance with the district court's
interpretation is unconstitutional because it would
prematurely terminate an unwed father's opportunity to
assert paternity when the child's birth occurs on a
weekend or holiday. We first discuss the due process
rights of unwed fathers and the constitutionality of Utah's
adoption statutes, holding that unwed fathers cannot be
denied a postbirth filing opportunity. We then address
rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and determine
that it can be used to enlarge [***15] the deadline for
filing when the twenty-four-hour postbirth period falls on
a weekend or holiday.

In computing any period of time
prescribed [***13] or allowed by . . . any
applicable statute, . . . [t]he last day of the
period so computed shall be included,
unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal
holiday, in which event the period runs
until the end of the next day which is not a
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. 12

12 Utah R. Civ. P. 6.
If rule 6 applies, Thurnwald argues, his petition was
timely because it was filed before the end of the first full
business day after his child's birth. Further, Thurnwald
asserts that if rule 6 does not apply, the statutes
unconstitutionally deprive him of his right to due process.
[*P22] On the other hand, A.E. argues that the
twenty-four-hour waiting period is intended to benefit the
birth mother, not the unwed father, and that rule 6 cannot
be used to enlarge the time for filing because the relevant
statutory deadline is ultimately the time of the mother's
consent or relinquishment. According to A.E., the statute
governing the time period for filing a paternity petition
"reveals an unambiguous legislative intent to require that
unmarried biological fathers demonstrate a commitment
to parenthood prior to a mother's relinquishment."
[*P23] In sum, we are presented with two
alternative interpretations [***14] of the statutes
controlling fathers' parental rights: (1) that the
twenty-four-hour postbirth period is designed solely for
the benefit of the mother and that the unwed father's
filing period is tied in all instances to the mother's

I. UTAH'S STATUTES VIOLATE DUE PROCESS IF
THEY ARE INTERPRETED TO DEPRIVE UNWED
FATHERS OF CHILDREN BORN ON WEEKENDS
AND HOLIDAYS OF A POSTBIRTH OPPORTUNITY
TO PRESERVE PATERNAL RIGHTS
[*P25] Under both federal and state law, an unwed
biological father has an inchoate interest in a parental
relationship with his child that acquires full constitutional
protection only when he "demonstrates a full
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by
[coming] forward to participate in the rearing of his
child." 13 As explained by the United States Supreme
Court in Lehr v. Robertson, 14
The significance of the biological
connection is that it offers the natural
father an opportunity that no other male
possesses to develop a relationship with
his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity
and
accepts
some
measure
of
responsibility for the child's future, he may
enjoy the blessings of the parent-child
relationship and make uniquely valuable
contributions to the child's development. If
he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution
will not automatically compel a State to
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listen to his opinion [**629] of where the
[***16] child's best interests lie. 15

may not deny unwed fathers the opportunity to
establish such relations--what the Court described
as 'the inchoate interest in establishing a
relationship with [the child] . . . .' Lehr establishes
no measure of time constituting an adequate
opportunity. However, because of a child's urgent
need for permanence and stability, the unwed
father must act quickly . . . ." (quoting Lehr, 463
U.S. at 262-65)); In re X., 559 N.E.2d 418, 424,
76 N.Y.2d 387, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855 (N.Y. Ct. App.
1990) (considering whether unwed fathers must
ever be accorded "the full measure [***18] of
constitutional protection--the right to a continued
parental relationship absent a finding of
unfitness-- . . . where a child is placed for
adoption before any real relationship can exist,"
and concluding as a matter of federal law "that
such an interest must be recognized in appropriate
circumstances").

13 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261, 103 S.
Ct. 2985, 77 L. Ed. 2d 614 & n.17 (1983)
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted); accord In re adoption of B.B.D., 1999
UT 70, P 11, 984 P.2d 967.
14 463 U.S. 248, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 77 L. Ed. 2d
614.
15 Id. at 262.
[*P26] In Lehr, the United States Supreme Court
recognized that individual states may define when an
unwed father has grasped that opportunity. It upheld the
constitutionality of New York's paternity statute against a
challenge by an unwed father of a two-year-old who had
failed in the two years since his child's birth to legally
claim his paternity by mailing a postcard to the state's
registry. 16
16 Id. at 263-65.
[*P27] The United States Supreme Court has not,
however, determined the rights of an unwed father of a
newborn child or considered whether the United States
Constitution places additional restrictions on the laws a
state may enact to terminate unwed fathers' opportunities
to assert their rights to newborns. Some courts have
interpreted Lehr to herald greater protection of the
father's opportunity interest in cases involving newborns,
reasoning that in those cases the unwed father has not yet
had the opportunity to fully demonstrate the level of his
commitment [***17] to the child. 17
17 See, e.g., Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 670
F. Supp. 1537, 1541 (D. Utah 1987) (noting that
"[s]ome courts and commentators have
determined that the potential interest recognized
in Lehr may require greater constitutional
protection if it is asserted, as in this case, at or
near the time of birth rather than after a
significant lapse of time as in Lehr," but holding
that "[t]hat question need not be resolved [here]");
In re Steve B.D., 112 Idaho 22, 730 P.2d 942, 945
(Idaho 1986) ("Lehr indicated both that the state
may not deny due process and equal protection to
unwed fathers who enjoyed established
relationships with their children, and that the state

[*P28] In Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah,
we applied a due process analysis under the Utah
Constitution to give greater protection to the rights of
unwed fathers of newborns. We described an unwed
father's opportunity interest in developing a relationship
with his newborn as a "provisional right" that is itself
protected by the due process clause of the Utah
Constitution. 19 And we said that "[w]e measure the
statutory specifications for the termination of that
provisional right against the tests of compelling state
interest and narrowly tailored means." 20 But because of
the state's compelling interest in assuring speedy
identification of the newborn's legal parents and the
narrow tailoring of the statute, we held that section
78-30-4(3), the predecessor of the adoption statutes at
issue in this case, was facially constitutional. 21
18

18
19
20
21

681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984).
Id. at 206.
Id.
Id. at 206-07.

[*P29] [***19] Under the old Utah Code section
78-30-4(3), 22 an unwed father was required to preserve
his rights by registering a notice of claim to paternity
with the Department of Health. 23 That section provided
that the notice "may be registered prior to the birth of the
child but must be registered prior to the date the
illegitimate child is relinquished or placed with an agency
licensed to provide adoption services." 24 The intent of
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the statute was "to facilitate permanent and secure
placement of illegitimate children whose unwed mothers
wish to give them up for adoption and whose unwed
fathers take no steps to officially identify themselves and
acknowl [**630] edge paternity." 25 Specifically, "[t]he
registration requirement was viewed as a procedure that
would protect the putative father's parental rights if he
timely claimed his paternity." 26 Thus, the registration
statute was intended to strike a balance between two
competing interests: "the significant state interest in
speedily placing infants for adoption and the
constitutionally protected rights of putative fathers." 27
22 Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4(3) (Supp. 1983),
repealed by Adoption Act Amendments, ch. 245,
§ 24, 1990 [***20] Utah Laws 1173, 1178.
23 Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4(3)(b).
24 Id.
25 Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 795 P.2d 637,
641 (Utah 1990).
26 In re Adoption of W., 904 P.2d 1113, 1117
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citing Recording of Utah
Floor Debates, 41st Leg., February 6, 1975).
27 In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d
686, 691 (Utah 1986).
[*P30] In Wells, the unwed father challenged the
constitutionality of this statute. 28 We held the statute
"facially valid," stating as follows:
[T]he state has a compelling interest in
speedily identifying those persons who
will assume a parental role over newborn
illegitimate children. Speedy identification
is important to immediate and continued
physical care and it is essential to early
and uninterrupted bonding between child
and parents. If infants are to be spared the
injury and pain of being torn from parents
with whom they have begun the process of
bonding and if prospective parents are to
rely on the process in making themselves
available
for
adoptions,
such
determinations must also be final and
irrevocable.
Section 78-30-4(3) is narrowly
tailored to achieve the purposes identified
above. No infringement of the unwed
father's rights not essential to the statute's

[***21] purposes has been identified. Due
process does not require that the father of
an illegitimate child be identified and
personally notified before his parental
right can be terminated. In the common
cases of unwed fathers without desires to
assume the responsibilities and to claim
the rights of parenthood, such a
requirement
would
frustrate
the
compelling state interest in the speedy
determination described above. 29
In subsequent cases, we continued to uphold the
constitutionality of the old section 78-30-4 without
engaging in additional analysis. 30
28 See Wells, 681 P.2d at 207.
29 Id. at 206-07.
30 In re B.B.D., 1999 UT 70, P 18, 984 P.2d
967; Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 795 P.2d
637, 641-43 (Utah 1990); In re Adoption of Baby
Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686, 689 (Utah 1986);
Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 680 P.2d 753,
755 (Utah 1984).
[*P31] In Wells, we additionally held that the
unwed father's as-applied due process challenge could not
succeed because it had been possible for him to register
before the birth mother consented to their child's
adoption. 31 Wells's biological child was born in Salt
Lake City on September 23, 1981. 32 Wells, who lived in
Moab, Utah, mailed his registration form to [***22] the
Department of Health in Salt Lake City on that same day,
but the form did not reach the Department of Health until
September 30. 33 In the meantime, on September 24, the
birth mother consented to the child's adoption. 34 Thus,
Wells's registration was seven days late. In rejecting his
as-applied challenge, we noted that Wells could not show
that it had been impossible for him to file because he had
"ample advance notice of the expected time of birth and
the fact that the mother intended to relinquish the child
for adoption, advice of counsel on filing the required
form, and a copy of the form provided by a social worker
for the department." 35 Wells had signed the form on
September 18, but he said that he did not mail it until
September 23 because he was waiting to ensure that the
baby was his; if it was born any later he would have
believed that someone else was the father. 36
31 Wells, 681 P.2d at 207.
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32
33
34
35
36

Id. at 201.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 207-08.
Id. at 202.

[**631] [*P32] Our decision in Wells is in many
respects relevant to our analysis of the constitutionality of
the adoption statutes and their effect in this case.
Although the adoption code has been overhauled several
times since we decided Wells, [***23] 37 the statutory
language at issue in that case was very similar to the
language in the present statutes that requires unwed
fathers to file prior to the mother's consent or
relinquishment. But in Wells we did not consider the
issue raised here--whether the statute can be
constitutional if it completely cuts off postbirth rights of
unwed fathers when the child is born on a weekend or
holiday. In upholding the old section 78-30-4, we said
only that "[n]o infringement of the unwed father's rights
not essential to the statute's purposes has been identified."
38

37 See, e.g., Adoption Amendments, ch. 187,
2006 Utah Laws 834; Adoption Amendments, ch.
137, 2005 Utah Laws 891; Adoption
Amendments, ch. 122, 2004 Utah Laws 546;
Adoption Act Revision, ch. 168, 1995 Utah Laws
531; Adoption Act Amendments, ch. 245, 1990
Utah Laws 1173; see also In re adoption of W.,
904 P.2d 1113, 1118-19 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)
(explaining 1990 overhaul of adoption statutes).
38 Wells, 681 P.2d at 207.
[*P33] In this case, we therefore consider whether
the infringement upon the unwed father's provisional
right caused by interpreting the statutes to make it
impossible for unwed fathers of children born on
weekends or holidays [***24] to preserve their rights
postbirth is necessary to achieve the state's compelling
interests. While in the past the adoption statutes required
only that unwed fathers register with the state before the
mother consented to adoption or relinquished the child,
the adoption statutes now require an unwed father to both
register notice and file a paternity petition before the
child is relinquished. In addition, if the unwed father of a
newborn desires to establish a right to withhold consent
to his child's adoption (rather than simply to receive
notice of the adoption and an opportunity to present
evidence regarding the child's best interests), 39 he must

file in the paternity action a sworn affidavit "stating that
he is fully able and willing to have full custody of the
child[,] . . . setting forth his plans for care of the child[,]
and . . . agreeing to a court order of child support and the
payment of expenses incurred in connection with the
mother's pregnancy and the child's birth." 40 He must also
have "offered to pay and paid a fair and reasonable
amount of the expenses incurred in connection with the
mother's pregnancy and the child's birth, in accordance
with his financial ability." [***25] 41 These actions must
all be taken before the mother consents to adoption or
relinquishes the child. 42
39 See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.13(11) (Supp.
2006); accord id. § 78-30-4.13(11) (Supp. 2004),
amended by ch. 137, § 6 & ch. 150, § 5, 2005
Utah Laws 894-96, 1017-18.
40 Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(6)(b) (Supp.
2006); accord id. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b)(i) (Supp.
2004), repealed and reenacted by ch. 186, § 3,
2006 Utah Laws 835-37.
41 Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(6)(d) (Supp.
2006); accord id. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b)(iii) (Supp.
2004).
42 Id. § 78-30-4.14(6) (Supp. 2006); accord id. §
78-30-4.14(2) (Supp. 2004).
[*P34] As we previously held in Wells, it is beyond
dispute that "the state must . . . have legal means to
ascertain within a very short time of birth whether the
biological parents (or either of them) are going to assert
their constitutional rights and fulfill their corresponding
responsibilities, or whether adoptive parents must be
substituted." 43 The state also has compelling interests in
promoting "early and uninterrupted bonding between
child and parents" and in facilitating final and irrevocable
adoptions. 44
43 Wells, 681 P.2d at 203.
44 Id. at 206. Since we held in Wells that the
paternity statutes [***26] then in effect were
necessitated by compelling state interests, the
Legislature enacted section 78-30-4.12, codifying
the compelling interests that we previously
discussed and adding findings that "[t]he state has
a compelling interest in requiring unmarried
biological fathers to demonstrate [a full
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood]
by providing appropriate medical care and
financial support and by establishing legal
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paternity, in accordance with the requirements of
this chapter" as well as a compelling interest "in
holding parents accountable for meeting the needs
of children." Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(2)(a),
(e) (Supp. 2006). We are not bound in our
constitutional analysis by the Legislature's
statements in support of the constitutionality of
the laws that the Legislature has enacted.
[**632] [*P35] Yet we are persuaded that as
interpreted by the district court in this case, the statute's
effect of cutting off postbirth weekend and holiday filing
opportunities for unwed fathers is not necessary to
achieve the state's compelling interests, nor is such an
interpretation a narrowly tailored means of achieving
those interests. Under the adoption statutes as interpreted
by the district [***27] court, the unwed father whose
child is born on a weekend or holiday would have no
opportunity to assert his paternity after the birth of the
child. Accordingly, no unwed father could be certain of
when he must file a paternity action and register with the
Department of Health in order to preserve his rights. He
could not be certain that he will have time after the birth
of his child to file because his child may be born on a
weekend or holiday.
[*P36] The lack of certainty presents particular
problems for unwed fathers because they must not only
register by filing a simple form with the state, but also
file a paternity action in which they profess a willingness
to take custody of the child, "set[] forth . . . plans for care
of the child," and pay for birth expenses, all before the
mother signs her consent and relinquishment. 45 On one
hand, because an unwed father could not be assured of
even a minimal amount of time to file after the child's
birth under the district court's interpretation of the statute,
there would be an incentive for the unwed father to
commence an action and file early to preserve his rights.
But on the other hand, the Legislature may have intended
under the adoption [***28] statutes for the unwed father
to reach a certain maturity in the decision-making process
regarding the care of the child after birth before filing a
paternity action. Therefore, the unwed father also has an
incentive to wait until he is ready to finally decide what is
best for the child before taking the actions required by the
adoption statutes.
45
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(6) (Supp.
2006); accord id. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b) (Supp.
2004).

[*P37] This is not a problem that we previously
contemplated in Wells because in that case we were not
presented with a situation where the father's rights were
effectively cut off as of the time of the child's birth,
leaving the father no postbirth opportunity to assert his
rights. Wells was aware of his baby's birth that same day
and presumably could have filed before the mother
relinquished the baby the next day. In this case, although
Thurnwald had the right--and opportunity--to assert his
paternal rights prior to the birth of the child, the district
court's interpretation of the statute has the effect of
eliminating Thurnwald's postbirth opportunity altogether,
essentially requiring him to have asserted his rights
prebirth.
[*P38] Neither this state nor any other [***29]
state that we know of has held it constitutionally
permissible to cut off a father's right to assert his
paternity interest at a time before the child's birth. 46
When the court of appeals was presented with a similar
problem under the old section 78-30-4 in In re K.B.E., 47
it held the statute unconstitutional as applied, stating that
the statute was "'not created to encourage a "race" for
placement to cut off the rights of fathers who are
identified and present.'" 48 In that case, the unwed father
registered on the afternoon of the same day of his child's
birth, but his registration was preempted by the actions of
the mother who filed an adoption petition that morning.
49 The court explained that "[t]o deprive both [the unwed
father] and [the child] of the possible benefits of their
relationship simply because [the unwed father] [**633]
filed his notice just a few hours after [the mother] filed
[her] petition for adoption . . . [flies] in the face of
fundamental fairness and due process." 50
46 The parties do not cite any such case from
other jurisdictions and our own research has not
uncovered any such case. In a recent case from
Arkansas where a statute would have cut off a
father's right [***30] to notice when he failed to
file prior to his child's birth, the court found that
the father's due process rights were not violated,
but it rested its conclusion on the fact that the
father had actual notice, which allowed him to
participate in the proceeding, and thus was not
prevented from asserting a paternity claim. See
Escobedo v. Nickita, 2006 Ark. LEXIS 178 *1.
47 740 P.2d 292 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
48 Id. at 296 (quoting Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social
Servs., 680 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah 1984) (Durham,
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J., dissenting)).
49 Id. at 293.
50 Id. at 296.
[*P39] In short, the lack of a guaranteed filing
period after the child's birth under the district court's
interpretation of the adoption statutes would create great
uncertainty for unwed fathers and a risk of a sudden and
unintentional loss of the opportunity to file that is
unnecessary to the state's compelling interests. The
statute already explicitly provides that the Legislature's
concern for the mother's relationship with the child is
important enough to require her to wait twenty-four hours
before the relinquishment. In most instances when the
mother relinquishes the child after the twenty-four-hour
waiting period expires, the parties to the adoption
[***31] will not know for certain if the father has filed an
adequate legal claim until they consult the state registry.
In the meantime, the child usually goes home with a
prospective adoptive family. Further, in cases involving a
relinquishment on a holiday or weekend, the parties to an
adoption already have to wait until the next business day
to be certain that the father did not file an appropriate
paternity petition and register his claim. In this case,
L.D.S. Family Services contacted the registry the
Tuesday after Labor Day weekend. Given these practical
realities, the addition of a single business day in which
the father may file does not unduly burden the state's
compelling interest in prompt resolution of parental
rights.
[*P40] Additionally, the uncertain filing period that
the statute would provide to unwed fathers under the
district court's interpretation actually works against,
rather than promotes, the state's compelling interest in
permanent adoptions. If the rights of unwed fathers are
well defined, it will be more difficult for fathers to mount
as-applied constitutional challenges to the deprivation of
their rights. As we said in Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social
Services, 51 "a firm cutoff [***32] date is reasonable, if
not essential." 52 That firm cutoff date benefits all parties
if it is tied to a certain time period after the child's birth
rather than being left to the uncertainty of nature. In at
least one case involving an as-applied challenge to the
statute, we have expressed significant concern over an
unwed father's unexpected loss of the opportunity to
assert paternity where the child was born prematurely. 53
Such cases would be less troubling under an
interpretation of Utah law that allows unwed fathers a
guaranteed window after the child's birth to assert

paternity without risk that the mother's actions will
deprive him of that right.
51 680 P.2d 753 (Utah 1984).
52 Id. at 755.
53 See In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717
P.2d 686, 690-91 (Utah 1986).
II. RULE 6 APPLIES TO ENLARGE THE TIME THAT
AN UNWED FATHER OF A CHILD BORN ON A
WEEKEND OR HOLIDAY HAS TO FILE AND
REGISTER
[*P41] Having determined that the district court's
interpretation of the statutes unconstitutionally deprives
unwed fathers of due process, we now consider whether
that unconstitutionality may be avoided by applying rule
6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to enlarge the time
in which an unwed father may file [***33] when the
twenty-four-hour postbirth period falls on a weekend or
holiday. As the Utah Court of Appeals has recognized,
because the statutes controlling adoption do not "purport
to contain[] a complete set of procedural guidelines to
govern adoptions," 54 the rules of civil procedure are
generally applicable to adoption proceedings. 55
Therefore, we will apply rule 6 to the relevant adoption
statutes unless we conclude that its application would be
inconsistent with those statutes. 56
54 Thiele v. Anderson, 1999 UT App 56, P 15,
975 P.2d 481.
55 See id. PP 15-16 & n.6.
56 See id. PP 16-17 & n.6.
[*P42] In determining whether application of rule 6
would be inconsistent with the adoption statutes defining
the filing deadlines [**634] imposed on unwed fathers,
we apply standard canons of statutory construction.
"[O]ur primary goal is to give effect to the legislature's
intent in light of the purpose the statut[es were] meant to
achieve." 57 Additionally, because "no act should be
declared unconstitutional unless it is clearly and palpably
so," we read the statutes in a manner "consistent with
basic constitutional rights." 58 Therefore, we follow the
fundamental rule of statutory construction that "if a
legislative [***34] act is susceptible of two
constructions, one conformable to the constitutional
provision on the subject and the other not, [we] will adopt
the one that is conformable, and reject the one that is
not." 59
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57 Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah
1998).
58 Ellis v. Soc. Servs. Dep't of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250,
1255-56 (Utah 1980).
59 Pleasant Grove City v. Holman, 59 Utah 242,
202 P. 1096, 1098 (Utah 1921).
[*P43] We initially agree with A.E. that the
adoption statutes requiring unwed fathers to file a
paternity petition, register, and take other actions "prior
to the mother's . . . execution of consent to adoption of
the child[,] or . . . relinquishment of the child for
adoption" 60 are generally intended to cut off the unwed
father's right to intervene at the same time that the
mother's rights to the child are cut off. But as we noted
above, the adoption statutes work in concert to give most
unwed fathers twenty-four hours, covering a total of one
business day after the birth of a child, to file a paternity
petition and register--or risk losing all rights to his child.
If we determine that the Legislature intended through this
statutory scheme to create a minimum filing [***35]
period for unwed fathers that is connected to a calculable
time period after the child's birth, rule 6 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure would apply to enlarge the filing
period when the last day falls on a holiday or weekend.
And unwed fathers would essentially be given a
minimum period of one business day to file a petition for
paternity and to register with the state after the child's
birth--but beyond that point the unwed father could file
only prior to the mother's consent or relinquishment. 61
60 Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.13(3)(d)(ii) (Supp.
2006); accord id. § 78-30-4.13(3)(a) (Supp.
2004), amended by ch. 137, § 6 & ch. 150, § 5,
2005 Utah Laws 894-96, 1017-18.
61
In Indiana, a statutory scheme that
differentiates between minimum and maximum
time periods controls an unwed father's filing
rights, where the unwed father must register by
the later of thirty days after the child's birth or the
filing of a petition for the child's adoption. Ind.
Code Ann. § 31-19-5-12 (LexisNexis 2006).
[*P44] The question before us is, therefore, whether
as a matter of statutory construction we should interpret
the minimum filing period ending a total of one day after
birth to be a time period allowed by [***36] statute
subject to enlargement by rule 6, or whether the filing
period must in all cases be attached to the mother's

relinquishment. A.E. argues that the Legislature intended
that unwed fathers demonstrate the appropriate
commitment prior to the mother's relinquishment,
whenever it occurs, and that the twenty-four-hour waiting
period was enacted solely for the benefit of the mother.
She cites for support to a treatise on family law, which
suggests that such waiting periods derive
from the view that a woman cannot fully
comprehend
the
significance
of
relinquishing all rights to her child until
she has had the actual experience of giving
birth. She needs time to reflect upon the
wisdom of an earlier expressed intention
to relinquish the child, or to reconsider an
earlier reluctance to relinquish.
62

62 Joan H. Hollinger, Adoption Law & Practice
§ 2.11[1][a] (2006).
[*P45] That the Legislature likely intended section
78-30-4.19 to give the mother sufficient time to consider
her decision in light of the events of childbirth does not,
however, rule out the probability that the Legislature was
also concerned with defining the unwed father's rights.
And as we described in the previous section, under
[***37] the Utah Constitution, an unwed father must also
be given a reasonable opportunity to decide whether he
will take the legal actions necessary to assert his paternal
rights. Section 78-30-4.19 is part of a section of the Code
that establishes procedures that strike a balance between
[**635] "the rights and interests of all parties affected by
an adoption proceeding." 63 In fact, the Legislature states
in section 78-30-4.12(3)(a) that "[i]n enacting Sections
78-30-4.12 through 78-30-4.21, the Legislature prescribes
the conditions for determining whether an unmarried
biological father's action is sufficiently prompt and
substantial to require constitutional protection." 64 Thus,
the statutes are subject to two possible interpretations:
one where the statutes are intended to set a minimum
filing period for unwed fathers and where that period is
subject to enlargement by rule 6; and one where the filing
period is linked only to the mother's relinquishment,
whenever it occurs.
63
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(1) (Supp.
2006).
64 Id. § 78-30-4.12(3)(a).
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[*P46] Where two interpretations of a statute are
possible, we adopt the interpretation that is constitutional.
Therefore, in this case, we interpret the adoption [***38]
statutes to provide unwed fathers with a minimum filing
period that in most cases extends until a total of
twenty-four hours after the child's birth. In the ordinary
case, this gives the unwed father a total of one full
business day after his child's birth to complete the
requirements (although the business day may be split, for
example, between Monday afternoon and Tuesday
morning). This is a period of time that can be calculated
before the end of the period and thus is one to which rule
6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure applies. To assure
that the unwed father always gets one business day after
the child's birth, we apply rule 6 any time the occurrence
of a weekend or holiday means that the father is not
afforded a full business day. In those cases, the filing
period is extended to the end of the next business day. 65
In this case, because A.E. gave birth on Saturday
morning, Thurnwald had until the end of the day on
Tuesday to file.
65 We recognize that the application of rule 6 to
the postbirth filing period may give some unwed
fathers more than twenty-four hours after a child's
birth to file a paternity petition. If the
twenty-four-hour
postbirth
period
falls
exclusively on [***39] weekdays, the unwed
father has one full business day in which to file
his petition. But if any portion of the postbirth
period falls on a weekend or holiday, the unwed
father has until the end of the next business day to
file his petition, which may result in a postbirth
filing period of more than twenty-four hours even
exclusive of the weekend or holiday hours. For
example, if the child is born at noon on Friday,
the unwed father will have until the end of the
business day on Monday to file his petition. This
result is a consequence of rule 6 allowing for a
time period to run "until the end of the next day
that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal
holiday." Utah R. Civ. P. 6. When rule 6 has no
application because no portion of the relevant
time period falls on a weekend or holiday, there is
no basis for enlarging the time for filing.
CONCLUSION
[*P47] We hold that unwed fathers have a
constitutional right to a postbirth opportunity to assert

paternity that is unduly infringed upon if Utah's adoption
statutes are interpreted to eliminate that opportunity when
a child is born on a weekend or holiday. Accordingly, we
interpret Utah's adoption statutes to provide unwed
fathers with a minimum [***40] period of twenty-four
hours after the child's birth to file a paternity claim. And
in instances where unwed fathers do not receive a full
business day after the birth to file their claims because
part or all of the period falls on a holiday or weekend, we
apply rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to
enlarge the filing period to the end of the next business
day. Because Thurnwald's child was born on Saturday of
Labor Day weekend and he filed his paternity petition
and notice on Tuesday, the next business day, we hold
that Thurnwald's petition was timely. We therefore
reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment
against him and remand for further proceedings
consistent herewith.
--[*P48] Justice Parrish, Justice Nehring, and Judge
Barrett concur in Justice Durrant's opinion.
[*P49] Having disqualified herself, Chief Justice
Durham does not participate herein; District Judge
William A. Barrett sat.
--DISSENT BY: WILKINS
DISSENT
[**636]
dissenting:

WILKINS, Associate Chief Justice,

[*P50] I respectfully differ with my colleagues. It
appears clear that the Legislature intended to give an
unmarried biological father a strictly limited but adequate
period of time within which to take the legal steps
necessary to assert [***41] any claim he intends to make
as a legal father. The period begins at the moment of
conception and ends at the time the biological mother
executes her consent to adoption. If he fails to act
promptly, his claim to the child ends with the mother's.
The usual biological processes result in a window of at
least eight or nine months within which the unmarried
biological father is at liberty to file the necessary legal
action and notice. The only obstacle to successful
preservation of this right is totally within the control of
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the father: delay.
[*P51] The limitation placed by statute on the
legally effective consent to adoption by the biological
mother is not linked to, nor does it appear to be intended
to limit, action by the unmarried biological father. The
father has until the mother consents to the adoption of the
child. The mother is prohibited from consenting to the
adoption for a period of 24 hours after the birth of her
child. Although these two limitations are interrelated
factually, they are independent legally. No direct
reference to the "additional 24 hours, or one business
day" relied upon by my colleagues appears in the statute
relating to the father's limitations.
[*P52] No predictable [***42] cut-off date for the
father's filing is discernable in advance. It is subject to
calculation only in retrospect, and only when and if the
mother gives her consent to adoption of the child. As a
result, Rule 6 of the Rules of Civil Procedure (extending
to the next business day an act required by a designated
date) has no application. An unmarried biological father
cannot possibly rely on Rule 6 in waiting until Monday.

Only after it is too late can he even know that the
deadline has arrived.
[*P53] This result, harsh as it may at times appear,
is in keeping with the policy set by the Legislature. Those
who elect to father a child without benefit of marriage
must take steps to assert their legal relationship with the
child, or they risk losing it altogether. The policy of the
law is to give the greatest benefit to the child, the
innocent party in the overall situation, by encouraging
either responsible parenting or prompt and early
adoption. A father who waits the full gestation period
before taking the necessary action to ensure his continued
legal relationship with his child, does so at his own risk.
The law acts to cut him off, in favor of his child, when
prompt and legal adoption is the [***43] alternative.
[*P54] I find no constitutional impediment to the
statutory process established by the Legislature in this
regard. I would affirm the decision of the trial court.
---
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OPINION BY: DURRANT
OPINION
[**758] DURRANT, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
[*P1] This case, along with two companion cases
that we also decide today, 1 concerns Utah Code section
72-5-104(1) (the "Dedication Statute"), which provides
that "[a] highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use
of the public when it has been continuously used as a
public thoroughfare for a period of ten years." 2 In this

BACKGROUND
[*P2] The road known as West Center Street in the
Town of Leeds originates at an intersection with Main
Street, extends north to the crest of a small incline,
[***2] and then proceeds downhill across real property
owned by Terry Prisbrey through a narrow "box"
underpass beneath Interstate 15 to an area known as
Angel Springs. In 2000, Mr. Prisbrey purchased the
property from Joanne George, whose family had owned
the property since 1878. Sometime thereafter, Mr.
Prisbrey, in an attempt to restrict travel on the road,
erected a chain link fence across the road at the entrance
to the "box" tunnel and affixed "No Trespassing" signs to
the fence. In response, the Town of Leeds filed this action
seeking a declaratory judgment [**759] deeming West
Center Street dedicated to the public pursuant to Utah
Code section 72-5-104(1) 3 and a temporary restraining
order and injunction enjoining Mr. Prisbrey from
restricting travel on the road.
3 An earlier version of this statute was in effect
at the time the Town of Leeds claims West Center
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Street was dedicated and abandoned to the use of
the public. See Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89
(1995). A 1998 amendment to the earlier version
renumbered this section but made no substantive
changes to it. 1998 Utah Laws 861. We therefore
refer to the current version of the statute
throughout this opinion.
[*P3] The trial court conducted evidentiary [***3]
hearings regarding the temporary restraining order. By
stipulation of the parties, the hearings were consolidated
with and considered as a trial on the merits. The trial
court heard testimony from a number of witnesses who
claimed that they used West Center Street whenever they
wished, without restriction, and without obtaining Mrs.
George's permission. The trial court also heard from Mrs.
George, who testified that in October 1964, and again in
October 1971, 1978, 1985, 1992, and 1999, she, alone or
with the assistance of her sons, set up a twenty-four-hour
roadblock on West Center Street for the purpose of
retaining private ownership of the road. These roadblocks
consisted of her or her sons' physical presence, sawhorses
placed across the road, and "No Trespassing" signs
placed on the sawhorses. Mrs. George testified that she
never encountered anyone attempting to travel on West
Center Street during her roadblocks and knows of no one
who was actually prevented from using the road because
of her blockades.
[*P4] At the conclusion of the hearings, the trial
court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law. It concluded that "[m]embers of the public traveled
West Center Street from [***4] 1966 to 1996 as often as
they found it convenient or necessary, at times chosen by
them and, therefore, the public's use of West Center
Street was continuous during that period of time." It also
concluded that, during the same period of time, West
Center Street was used as a public thoroughfare because
"there was not sufficient action taken to adequately put
the public on notice either that permission was needed to
use West Center Street nor was there sufficient action
taken by Mrs. George to obstruct the public's free and
unrestricted passing and travel on West Center Street."
And the court found that "continuous use of West Center
Street as a public thoroughfare was made for a period of
ten years (1966 to 1996)." Thus, the court concluded that
the Town of Leeds had demonstrated by clear and
convincing evidence that "West Center Street is a
dedicated public road pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
72-5-104(1)." The court ordered Mr. Prisbrey to remove

any obstructions of or signage on West Center Street and
enjoined him from taking future action to prevent travel
on the road. Mr. Prisbrey appealed; we have jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(j).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[*P5] We review [***5] the "trial court's legal
interpretation of the Dedication Statute for correctness
and its factual findings for clear error." 4 But whether the
facts of a case satisfy the requirements of the Dedication
Statute is a mixed question of fact and law that involves
various and complex facts, evidentiary resolutions, and
credibility determinations. 5 Thus, we review the "trial
court's decision regarding whether a public highway has
been established under [the Dedication Statute] . . . for
correctness but grant the court significant discretion in its
application of the facts to the statute." 6
4 Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, P
8, 179 P.3d 768.
5 Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307,
309-10 (Utah 1997).
6 Id. at 310.
ANALYSIS
[*P6] The Dedication Statute provides as follows:
"A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the
public when it has been continuously used as a public
thoroughfare for a period of ten years." 7 We have
explained that a road is "continuously used" [**760]
when the public makes "a continuous and uninterrupted
use" of it "as often as they [find] it convenient or
necessary." 8 In Wasatch County v. Okelberry, a
companion case that we decide today, we set forth a
bright-line [***6] rule for determining what qualifies as
an interruption in continuous use sufficient to restart the
running of the Dedication Statute's ten-year period: "[a]n
overt act that is intended by a property owner to interrupt
the use of a road as a public thoroughfare, and is
reasonably calculated to do so." 9 Credible evidence of
such an interruption precludes a finding of continuous
use. 10
7 1 Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) (2001).
8 Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395, 326 P.2d 107,
109 (Utah 1958).
9 2008 UT 10, P 15.
10 Id.
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[*P7] In this case, the trial court found that West Center
Street was continuously used as a public thoroughfare
from 1966 to 1996. But the court also found that Mrs.
George, in 1964, 1971, 1978, 1985, 1992, and 1999,
established twenty-four-hour physical roadblocks of West
Center Street. This, Mrs. George testified, she did with
the intent of retaining private ownership of the road. We
conclude that Mrs. George's testimony is credible
evidence of overt acts intended and reasonably calculated
to interrupt the use of West Center Street as a public
thoroughfare. Although she did not block the public's
actual use of the road because her roadblocks occurred
during intermissions in the road's use, Mrs. George's
[***7] intent and conduct were nevertheless sufficient to
interrupt West Center Street's continuous use as a public
thoroughfare for purposes of the Dedication Statute. 11
Because each of Mrs. George's roadblocks was an
interruption sufficient to restart the running of the
Dedication Statute, West Center Street has not been
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of
ten years. We therefore reverse the trial court's decision
and remand with an instruction to enter judgment in favor
of Mr. Prisbrey.

11 See id. P 16 (explaining that periods of time
between usages of an infrequently traveled road
are mere intermissions, not interruptions, and that
the distinction between an intermission and an
interruption "lies in the intent and conduct of the
property owner").
CONCLUSION
[*P8] Mrs. George's twenty-four-hour roadblocks
constituted overt acts intended to interrupt the use of
West Center Street as a public thoroughfare and were
reasonably calculated to do so. These interruptions
preclude a finding of continuous use. We reverse the trial
court's decision deeming West Center Street a dedicated
public road and remand with an instruction to enter
judgment in favor of Mr. Prisbrey.
[*P9] Chief Justice [***8] Durham, Associate
Chief Justice Wilkins, Justice Parrish, and Justice
Nehring concur in Justice Durrant's opinion.
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OPINION BY: DURHAM
OPINION
[**1085] On Certification from the Utah Court of
Appeals
DURHAM, Chief Justice:
INTRODUCTION
[*P1] This case comes before this court as the result
of a visitation dispute between a child's maternal
grandparents and her father. Following the unexpected

death of the child's mother, the grandmother petitioned
the district court for custody of the child. However, the
district court awarded custody to the father. Although the
court's custody order urged the father to allow future
visitation between the child and her grandparents, the
parties were unable to agree upon an acceptable visitation
schedule. As a result, the grandmother filed a petition for
visitation pursuant to Utah Code section 30-5-2 (Supp.
2005) (the Grandparent Visitation Statute). The district
court granted the petition.
[*P2] On appeal, the father asks this court to
declare [***2] that the district court's application of the
statute violated his fundamental rights under the United
States Constitution to manage the care, control, and
custody of his child. While the father limits his
arguments to an as-applied challenge, his claims appear
to also directly challenge the constitutionality of any
court's authority to order grandparent visitation. Because
the Grandparent Visitation Statute grants courts authority
to order grandparent visitation, we must undertake a
facial constitutional analysis of the statute. Accordingly,
we analyze first whether the plain language of the statute
is unconstitutional, and second whether the trial court
applied the statute in a manner that unconstitutionally
infringed upon the father's liberty interest in the care,
custody, and control of his child. We hold that the statute
is constitutional, both on its face and as applied in this
case.
BACKGROUND
[*P3] Darryl and Shauna Thurgood were divorced
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in February 1994. In December 1995, following a brief
period of reconciliation, Ms. Thurgood gave birth to their
daughter (the child). The following March, Ms. Thurgood
and her child moved in with Ms. Thurgood's parents,
Darlene [***3] and Robert Uzelac, where they lived for
the next three years. During that period, the child spent a
substantial amount of time with her grandparents and
interacted with them on a daily basis. When the child
became old enough to attend preschool, one of her
grandparents regularly picked her up from school and
spent afternoons with her. The Uzelacs cared for the child
during the week, took her camping on weekends, and
vacationed with her.
[*P4] The extent of the Uzelacs' involvement
changed somewhat in February 1999, when Ms.
Thurgood moved into her own home, taking the child
with her. Thereafter, the grandmother continued to play a
significant role in the child's life by babysitting the child
several times each week and speaking to her on the phone
almost daily. This ended just over a year later when Ms.
Thurgood died unexpectedly after a short illness. As a
result, Ms. Uzelac moved into the child's home to provide
full-time care for the child.
[*P5] Following Ms. Thurgood's death, Ms. Uzelac
petitioned to be appointed as guardian and conservator of
the child. 1 However, in June 2000, the district court
awarded custody to the child's father, Mr. Thurgood, as
the sole surviving [***4] natural parent. In its order, the
district court stated that there "ought" to be future
visitation between the child and her maternal
grandparents with Mr. Thurgood's approval and under
"reasonable and liberal circumstances," and the court
admonished the parties "to cooperate to see that the child
visits appropriately with her grandmother."
1 Ms. Uzelac was the only plaintiff before the
district court. Mr. Uzelac never joined her as a
party. However, to the extent that the time the
child spends with Ms. Uzelac will also be spent
with Mr. Uzelac, the district court's findings
determined that it would be in the child's best
interests to spend time with her maternal
grandparents. Like the district court, we will refer
to the grandparents where relevant, even though
Ms. Uzelac is the only appellee.
[**1086] [*P6] Shortly thereafter, it became
apparent that the parties could not work out a mutually
acceptable visitation schedule. Mr. Thurgood first

received custody in June 2000, but he did not allow any
visitation between [***5] the child and the Uzelacs for
five months. Thereafter, Mr. Thurgood granted Ms.
Uzelac two visits in December 2000, one for the child's
birthday and the other for a family Christmas party. The
next visitation occurred in March 2001, when Mr.
Thurgood allowed Ms. Uzelac to spend one hour with the
child. Ms. Uzelac did not see the child again until July
2002, at which time she petitioned the court for visitation
pursuant to the Grandparent Visitation Statute. In July
2002, the court granted Ms. Uzelac temporary visitation,
pending a final resolution of this matter. Despite the
court-ordered schedule for visitation on the first weekend
of every month, Mr. Thurgood only allowed Ms. Uzelac
to visit the child twice between July 2002 and January
2003. As a result, the district court ordered the father to
allow Ms. Uzelac to make up for the lost visits by
spending every other weekend with the child for an
indefinite period of time. Subsequently, visitation took
place every other weekend until December 2003, when
the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
order, holding that the district court had abused its
discretion by ordering make-up visitation in excess of the
visitation [***6] necessary to remedy the number of
visits the father had prevented. Thurgood v. Uzelac, 2003
UT App 439, PP 14-15, 83 P.3d 398. In January 2004,
Mr. Thurgood moved to Florida with the child and the
district court ordered temporary telephonic visitation
between the child and Ms. Uzelac. The last telephonic
visitation on record occurred in February 2004.
[*P7] During this protracted litigation, Mr.
Thurgood challenged the constitutionality of the
Grandparent Visitation Statute, complaining that it
infringed upon his liberty interest in the care, custody,
and control of his child. The district court held the statute
was constitutional, therefore giving Ms. Uzelac standing
and the court jurisdiction to proceed to the question of
whether visitation was in the child's best interests. The
court then ordered the parties to conduct discovery
regarding whether visitation was in the best interests of
the child.
[*P8] As part of its discovery order, the court
ordered the performance of a "visitation evaluation by a
duly qualified evaluator." The parties stipulated to the
appointment of Valerie Hale, Ph.D. Although Mr.
Thurgood was invited to participate in the evaluation
[***7] process, he declined to do so. Because Mr.
Thurgood refused to participate, Dr. Hale was only able
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to conduct an informal evaluation that was "limited to an
assessment of the nature of the relationship between [the
child] and her maternal grandparent without further input
from Mr. Thurgood." Dr. Hale conducted her evaluation
by meeting with the child and the Uzelacs at the Uzelacs'
home during one of the scheduled grandparent visitation
periods.
[*P9] Based on her evaluation, Dr. Hale made the
following findings: (1) "[t]here is a great deal of physical
affection between the grandparents and [the child]"; (2)
"[b]oth grandparents were patient [and] able to set and
maintain limits" with the child; (3) "[t]he child responded
to her grandparents as loved and trusted care givers"; (4)
the child "expressed her desire to spend more time with
her grandparents"; and (5) the child talked about the time
when she lived in her grandparents' home with her
mother. Dr. Hale concluded that, as a result of the
grandparents' role as primary caregivers, the child
"demonstrated a strong emotional attachment to her
grandparents" that was as strong as parent-child
emotional attachments [***8] and that the loss of this
attachment would devastate the child. In addition, Dr.
Hale concluded that the child still had an emotional
wound from her mother's death. Because Dr. Hale
believed the child kept the memory of her mother alive
through access to her grandparents, she concluded that a
loss of the relationship with the Uzelacs would impede
the child's ability to cope with her mother's death.
Therefore, Dr. Hale recommended that it would be "in the
best interests of the child to maintain a meaningful
relationship with her maternal grandparents which is
characterized by frequent and on-going visitation with
them."
[**1087] [*P10] A trial regarding whether Ms.
Uzelac should be granted permanent visitation was held
on July 28, 2004. At the trial, Dr. Hale testified regarding
her findings and her evaluation report was admitted into
evidence. Mr. Thurgood countered Dr. Hale's testimony
with the testimony of Brad Drown, a licensed clinical
social worker. Mr. Drown testified that visitation would
not be appropriate at that time due to the animosity
between Mr. Thurgood and the Uzelacs, as was
evidenced by the ongoing dispute.
[*P11] The district court rejected Mr. Drown's
recommendation, [***9] determining instead that there
is a "bond of love and affection between [the child] and
both of her maternal grandparents." The court then

concluded that the parental presumption had been
rebutted and visitation would be in the child's best
interests. Therefore, the court ordered visitation between
Ms. Uzelac and her grandchild.
[*P12] Mr. Thurgood appealed the district court's
decision to the Utah Court of Appeals, claiming that the
district court's application of the Grandparent Visitation
Statute violated his constitutional rights. The court of
appeals certified the case to this court. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(b)
(2002).
ANALYSIS
[*P13] Parents have a constitutional right to
manage "the care, custody and control of their children."
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147
L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000). The U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized that this right is "perhaps the oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests." Id. at 65. This liberty
interest encompasses parents' personal choices in family
life beginning with their right to marry and conceive and
extending to their right [***10] to control the education
of their children and raise them according to the dictates
of their religion. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982)
(recognizing that freedom of personal choice in matters
of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected
by the 14th Amendment); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 232-233, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1972)
(holding that compulsory high school attendance
interfered with Amish parents' fundamental rights to raise
their children according to the dictates of their religion);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31
L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972) (recognizing the "rights to conceive
and raise one's children"); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070 (1925)
(holding that a parent's liberty interest extends to the
choice of education and upbringing of children); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L.
Ed. 1042 (1923) (holding that the right to "marry,
establish a home and bring up children" is protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and includes the parents' right to control the education of
[***11] their children). In accordance with this right,
parents are entitled to a presumption that they act in the
best interests of their children, see, e.g., Parham v. J.R.,
442 U.S. 584, 602, 99 S. Ct. 2493, 61 L. Ed. 2d 101
(1979) ("The law's concept of the family rests on a
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presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in
maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required
for making life's difficult decisions."), and their
child-rearing decisions are therefore generally entitled to
deference, see Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69.
[*P14] Notwithstanding the parental presumption,
however, "the family itself is not beyond regulation."
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S. Ct.
438, 88 L. Ed. 645 (1944). The state as parens patriae has
a "wide range" of authority that may ultimately limit
parental autonomy in raising children. Id. at 167. The
U.S. Supreme Court has long upheld the state's use of its
parens patriae authority to protect children in many
arenas; for example it has recognized a state's authority to
mandate school attendance, see Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400
(acknowledging importance of education enforced in
[***12] most states by compulsory education laws),
regulate child labor, see Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v.
Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320, 325, 34 S. Ct. 60, 58 L. Ed.
245 (1913) (allowing states to prohibit youths from
working in dangerous occupations), and protect children
from abuse and neglect, see Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766-67
[**1088] (upholding state interest in "promoting the
welfare of the child" through a parental termination
proceeding as long as the state provides sufficient
protection to parents to satisfy due process).
[*P15] The state's power to protect the best
interests of minor children also extends to divorce
proceedings and custody determinations. See Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433, 104 S. Ct. 1879, 80 L. Ed. 2d
421 (1984) (reversing a state court's decision to give a
father custody based on the mother's interracial marriage
and stating that "[t]he goal of granting custody based on
the best interests of the child is indisputably a substantial
governmental interest for purposes of the Equal
Protection Clause"); cf. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(5)(a)
(Supp. 2005) ("In determining parent-time rights of
parents . . . the court shall consider [***13] the best
interest of the child."). In some cases, states have
extended this authority to include the protection of
relationships that children have formed with third parties.
See Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 643 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995) (recognizing the state has a legitimate interest
"in fostering relationships between grandparents and their
grandchildren"); cf. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(5)(a)
(requiring courts to consider the best interests of the child
in determining the visitation rights of immediate family
members). For example, many states, like Utah, have

passed laws protecting the relationship between children
and grandparents. 2
2 See Ala. Code § 30-3-4.1 (Supp. 2005); Alaska
Stat. § 25.20.065 (2004); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
25-409 (Supp. 2005); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-103
(2006); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-1-117 (2005); Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 46b-59 (2005); Del. Code Ann. tit.
10, § 1031 (2006); Ga. Code Ann. § 19-7-3
(2006); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571-46.3 (Supp. 2005);
Idaho Code Ann. § 32-719 (2006); 750 Ill. Stat.
5/607 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); Ind. Code Ann. §
31-17-5-1 (2006); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 405.021
(2006); Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. § 722.27b
(2006); Minn. Stat. § 257C.08 (2004); Miss. Code
Ann. § 93-16-3 (2004); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.402
(Supp. 2005); Mont. Code Ann. § 40-9-102
(2005); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1802 (2004); Nev.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 125C.050 (LexisNexis 2004);
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-9-2 (LexisNexis 1999); N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 5-13.2A (2005); N.D. Cent. Code §
14-09-05.1 (2004); 23 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§
5311-5313 (West 2001); R.I. Gen. Laws §§
15-5-24.1 to -24.3 (2003); S.D. Codified Laws §
25-4-52 (2006); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-6-306 to
-307 (2006); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.433
(Vernon Supp. 2005); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§
1011-1016 (2002); Wis. Stat. §§ 767.245, 880.155
(2003-04); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-7-101 (2005).
[***14] [*P16] Utah first statutorily recognized
the importance of grandparent relationships in 1975 when
the legislature amended Utah Code section 30-3-5, which
dealt with orders concerning children in a divorce
proceeding, to address grandparent visitation. Gribble v.
Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah 1978) (citing Utah Code
Ann. § 30-3-5 (1953)). The amended version of the
statute instructed courts to consider "the welfare of the
child" when granting grandparent visitation. Utah Code
Ann. 30-3-5 (1953). The amendment reflected the
"legislative intent to protect the relationships which affect
the child whose parents are being divorced, and to be
sensitive to the fact that relationships beyond those of
parent-child may be important enough to protect vis-a-vis
visitation." Gribble, 583 P.2d at 66. Two years later, in
1977, the Utah Legislature extended its recognition of
grandparent visitation by adopting Utah Code sections
30-5-1 and -2, the first Utah statutes dealing exclusively
with the visitation rights of grandparents. 1977 Utah
Laws page no. 566. [***15] Specifically, section 30-5-2
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provided, "The district court may grant grandparents
reasonable rights of visitation to grandchildren, if it is in
the best interest of the grandchildren." Id.
[*P17] Since 1977, section 30-5-2 has been
amended a number of times. Its current iteration grants
grandparents standing and provides that Utah courts may
grant visitation if the grandparents rebut the presumption
that "a parent's decision with regard to grandparent
visitation is in the grandchild's best interests." Utah Code
Ann. § 30-5-2 (2) (Supp. 2005). The statute then lists a
number of factors that are relevant to the court's
determination of whether the presumption has been
rebutted. Id. In particular, the statute favors grandparents
whose children have been separated from their
grandchildren by death, divorce, separation, or loss of
custody by the child of the grandparents. See id. § 30-5-2
(2)(c), (e), (f).
[**1089] [*P18] The district court granted Ms.
Uzelac visitation pursuant to this statute. While Mr.
Thurgood argues that the district court's order was an
unconstitutional application of the statute, his arguments
are framed as a facial challenge [***16] in that he does
not address any arguments unique to either the facts of
his case or the district court's application of the statute.
Rather, his argument suggests that courts can never
constitutionally grant grandparent visitation over the
objections of a fit custodial parent and thus the statute
cannot be constitutionally applied under any
circumstance. Moreover, the district court's authority to
grant grandparent visitation is contingent upon the
constitutional validity of the statute as a whole.
Therefore, we begin our analysis of this case by
addressing whether the statute unconstitutionally
infringes upon a parent's right to the care, custody, and
control of his or her children. Because we conclude that it
does not, we then consider whether the statute was
applied unconstitutionally in this case.
I. UTAH'S GRANDPARENT VISITATION STATUTE
IS CONSTITUTIONAL
A. Troxel v. Granville
[*P19] The only U.S. Supreme Court case
addressing the federal constitutionality of grandparent
visitation is Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct.
2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000). In Troxel, the children's
paternal grandparents petitioned for bimonthly visitation
following the death [***17] of the children's father. Id.

at 61. The grandparents brought their petition pursuant to
a Washington statute that allowed "any person" to
petition the court for visitation rights "at any time" and
authorized the court to order visitation if it would "serve
the best interest of the child." Id. (quoting Wash. Rev.
Code. § 26.10.160 (3) (1994)). The children's mother did
not oppose all visitation, but she sought to limit it to one
short visit per month. Id. The trial court disagreed with
the mother's judgment and, over her objections, ordered
visitation twice per month based on the "best interests of
the children." Id. at 61-62. The Washington Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court's order, and the
grandparents sought review from the Washington
Supreme Court. Id. at 62. The Washington Supreme
Court granted the grandparents' petition and held that the
statute was facially unconstitutional because it failed to
require a "threshold showing of harm" before interfering
with parental judgments and swept too broadly by
allowing "any person" to petition the court at "any time,"
leaving the "best interest" standard as the only limiting
[***18] factor. Id. at 63. On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment of the Washington Supreme
Court. Id.
[*P20] A plurality of the Court held that, as applied,
the Washington statute unconstitutionally infringed upon
the mother's fundamental right to control the upbringing
of her children, id. at 73, because it failed to accord
proper deference to the parental presumption, 3 id. at
68-69. The grandparents did not allege or present
evidence that their grandchildren's mother was unfit;
therefore, the presumption that fit parents act in their
children's best interests applied and the mother's
decisions were entitled to deference. Id. Despite her right
to the parental presumption, the trial court did not give
any "special weight" to her decision regarding
grandparent visitation. Id. at 69. In fact, the trial court
essentially applied the opposite presumption, assuming
that grandparent visitation was in the children's best
interests. Id. The trial judge specifically stated, "I think
[visitation with the] [grandparents] would be in the best
interest of the children and I haven't been shown [***19]
it is not." Id. (first alteration in original). The trial judge
then reminisced about the enjoyable summers he had
spent with his own grandparents and expressed his hope
that grandparent visitation [**1090] would be as
enjoyable an experience for the children in the case
before him. Id. at 72. This approach effectively required
the mother to prove that her proposed visitation schedule
would be in the best interests of her children rather than

Page 6
2006 UT 46, *P20; 144 P.3d 1083, **1090;
559 Utah Adv. Rep. 4; 2006 Utah LEXIS 138, ***19
requiring the grandparents to prove that the children's
best interests would be better served by their own, more
generous visitation schedule. Id. at 69.
3 The plurality consisted of four justices. Troxel
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147
L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000). Two other justices concurred
in the judgment, voting to uphold the Washington
Supreme Court's facial invalidation of its own
statute. Id. at 75-80 (Souter & Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment). The remaining three
justices dissented. See id. at 80-91 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); id. at 91-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id.
at 93-102 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
[***20] [*P21] The plurality's conclusion that the
trial court did not give the proper weight to the mother's
decisions was supported by the fact that the mother did
not seek to deny all visitation and that the district court
did not make adequate findings to support its decision. Id.
71-73. The plurality deemed it important that the mother
did not attempt to deny the grandparents all visitation, but
merely wished to limit it beyond the visitation requests of
the grandparents. Id. at 71. Despite her willingness to
offer visitation opportunities to the grandparents, the trial
court did not defer to her proposed schedule or make any
findings that the mother's proposed visitation schedule
was unreasonable. Id. at 72. Moreover, the trial court
articulated only two formal findings to support its order
to supercede the mother's decision: (1) that the
grandparents were "part of a large, central, loving family
. . . and [could] provide opportunities for the children in
the areas of cousins and music," and (2) that "the children
would be benefitted by spending quality time with [their
grandparents]." Id. at 72. The plurality [***21] believed
that such meager findings indicated that the trial court's
decision hinged on "a simple disagreement" between the
trial judge and the mother regarding the children's best
interests. Id. This was impermissible because the "Due
Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the
fundamental right of parents to make child rearing
decisions simply because a state judge believes a 'better'
decision could be made." Id. at 72-73. Therefore, based
on the trial court's presumption that grandparent visitation
was in the children's best interests and the trial court's
meager findings, the plurality held that the trial court did
not afford due weight to the mother's decision and thus
applied the statute unconstitutionally. Id. at 73.
[*P22] Although the plurality limited its holding to

the statute's unconstitutional application, it did criticize
the statute as a whole. Specifically, the plurality stated
the statute was "breathtakingly broad," essentially
allowing "any person" to petition for visitation at "any
time" and giving the court power to grant such a petition
as long as it served the child's best interest. Id. at 67.
[***22] According to the plurality, this language
"effectively permit[ted] any third party seeking visitation
to subject any decision by a parent concerning visitation
of the parent's children to state-court review." Id. The
plurality's censure did not end there. It also disapproved
of the statute's failure to require that a court afford a
parent's decision "any presumption of validity or any
weight whatsoever," instead leaving the decision "solely
in the hands of the judge." Id. The plurality recognized
that this essentially meant that a Washington court could
"disregard and overturn any decision by a fit custodial
parent concerning visitation," id. (emphasis in original),
which is exactly what it believed the trial court had done,
id. at 72.
[*P23] The plurality recognized that most state
court visitation adjudication occurs on a case-by-case
basis and therefore declined to hold that all nonparental
visitation statutes violate the Due Process Clause as a per
se matter. Id. at 73. However, the plurality's criticisms of
the Washington statute's language and application
provide guidelines concerning what a statute should
include in order [***23] to comport with due process.
Following Troxel, statutes allowing a court to award
visitation over the wishes of a parent must presume that
fit parents act in their children's best interests. Id. at
69-70. Likewise, the plurality implied that statutes
requiring a finding that the parent has unreasonably
denied or limited visitation would be more likely to be
upheld. See id. at 71-72 (favorably citing to state statutes
containing a requirement that visitation be unreasonably
denied). Finally, given the plurality's criticisms of the
district court's failure to make adequate factual [**1091]
findings, id. at 72, statutes ought to provide guideposts to
aid courts in making specific determinations regarding
the rebuttal of the parental presumption. Statutes that
follow these guidelines provide greater assurance that
courts will allow the parent to make the decision in the
first instance and accord "special weight" to the parent's
decision when it is reviewed. Id. at 70.
[*P24] The plurality's decision also provides
guidance regarding what Troxel and the Due Process
Clause do not require. Although the plurality recognized
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[***24] that as a fit parent the mother was entitled to the
parental presumption, the plurality did not say that a fit
parent's decision regarding visitation was absolute; rather,
the plurality clearly contemplated that the presumption
might be rebutted. See id. at 69. The plurality stated that
the decision about whether to cultivate an
intergenerational relationship "is for the parent to make in
the first instance. And, if a fit parent's decision . . .
becomes subject to judicial review, the court must accord
at least some special weight to the parent's own
determination." Id. at 70. Thus, the problem in Troxel
was not the trial court's intervention, but its failure to give
any deference to the mother's decision. Id. at 69.
Similarly, the plurality decision does not impose the
requirement that the parental presumption be rebutted by
a showing of harm to the child. Indeed, the plurality
specifically refused to determine whether the Due
Process Clause requires a showing of harm or potential
harm to the child as a condition precedent to granting
visitation. Id. at 73 (noting the plurality did not consider
whether nonparental [***25] visitation statutes must
include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child
as a condition precedent to granting visitation in order to
satisfy due process).
[*P25] In light of these federal constitutional
standards, we now address whether Utah Code section
30-5-2 provides sufficient structural safeguards to protect
the constitutional rights of parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their
children.
B. Utah's Grandparent Visitation Statute
[*P26] "[L]egislative enactments are endowed with
a strong presumption of validity; and . . . they should not
be declared unconstitutional if there is any reasonable
basis upon which they can be found to come within the
constitutional frame work [sic]." Greaves v. State, 528
P.2d 805, 806-07 (Utah 1974). Therefore, when
analyzing the constitutionality of a statute, the court
"presumes that the statute is valid" and "resolve[s] any
reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality." State v.
Lopes, 1999 UT 24, P 6, 980 P.2d 191. Moreover, we
will "construe the statute to avoid interpretations that
conflict with relevant constitutional [***26] mandates,
so long as the resulting construction does not conflict
with the reasonable or actual legislative purposes of the
statute." State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 1009 (Utah 1995).
With these principles in mind, we hold that Utah Code

section 30-5-2 (Supp. 2005) can be interpreted
consistently with the principles announced in Troxel. 4
4
This case presents this court with its first
post-Troxel opportunity to address the
constitutionality of Utah's Grandparent Visitation
Statute. Utah courts have, however, considered
whether prior versions of the statute were
constitutional under pre-Troxel jurisprudence. For
example, in Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635
(Utah Ct. App. 1995), the Utah Court of Appeals
considered the constitutionality of a prior version
of the Grandparent Visitation Statute, which
provided, "The district court may grant
grandparents and other immediate family
members reasonable rights of visitation if it is in
the best interests of the children." Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-5-2 (Supp. 1994). The court of appeals
concluded the statute was constitutional because it
was "narrowly tailored to require 'reasonable'
periods of temporary visitation only if the court
[found] visitation to be 'in the best interest of the
children,'" and it placed the burden of proving
best interests on the grandparents rather than
presuming that visitation was in the children's best
interests. Campbell, 896 P.2d at 642-43 (quoting
Utah Code Ann. § 30-5-2 (Supp. 1994)). Thus, the
visitation statute was "rationally related to
promoting the State's legitimate interest in
fostering relationships between grandparents and
their grandchildren." Id. at 643. The Grandparent
Visitation Statute has since been narrowed
significantly. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-5-2 (Supp.
2005).
[***27] [**1092] [*P27] First, the Grandparent
Visitation Statute protects parental liberty interests by
explicitly incorporating a presumption that parents act in
the best interests of their children. Utah Code Ann. §
30-5-2(2) ("There is a rebuttable presumption that a
parent's decision [concerning grandparent visitation] is in
the grandchild's best interests."). Accordingly, courts
must generally give deference to a parent's grandparent
visitation decisions and may only override them where
the petitioning grandparent rebuts the presumption. A
grandparent meets this burden when the grandparent
shows that there are special circumstances that permit the
court to set aside the parent's decision even after the court
has given it special weight. See id. We read the statute to
require that a court must, as a threshold matter,
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specifically determine that the grandparent has met this
burden in the process of considering whether the court
should order visitation. The court's inquiry must
acknowledge that, at all times, the burden of proof rests
on the petitioner and not on the parent.
[*P28] The Grandparent Visitation Statute does not
specify a standard of proof [***28] by which the
parental presumption must be rebutted. The degree of
proof required in a particular type of proceeding has
"traditionally been left to the judiciary to resolve."
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755, 102 S. Ct. 1388,
71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Because the parental presumption deals with
parental liberty interests, and accordingly should be
afforded great deference by the courts, we conclude that a
clear and convincing standard of proof should apply to
satisfy due process requirements. See Santosky, 455 U.S.
at 769 (mandating the application of at least a clear and
convincing standard in parental rights termination cases).
Therefore, a grandparent petitioning the court for
visitation under the Grandparent Visitation Statute must
clearly and convincingly rebut the parental presumption.
5

5 Our requirement that the grandparents must
rebut the presumption by clear and convincing
evidence is consistent with prior versions of
section 30-5-2. The 1998 version of section
30-5-2 provided that in order for a court to
override a parent's visitation decision, the court
had to find "the petitioner has, by clear and
convincing evidence, rebutted the presumption
that the parent's decision to refuse or limit
visitation with the grandchild was reasonable."
Utah Code Ann. § 30-5-2(2)(e) (1998). The clear
and convincing requirement was removed from
the statute in 2000. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-5-2
(2000).
[***29] [*P29] In addition to incorporating the
parental presumption, Utah's Grandparent Visitation
Statute contains a second structural component to prevent
judgments based on mere disagreement between the
judge and the parent by listing several relevant factors
that may justify setting a parent's decision aside. These
factors are: (1) whether the petitioner is a "fit and proper
person"; (2) whether visitation with the grandchild has
been "denied or unreasonably limited"; (3) whether the
parent is "unfit or incompetent"; (4) whether the

petitioner has "acted as the grandchild's custodian or
caregiver" or has a "substantial relationship with the
grandchild" the loss of which is "likely to cause harm to
the grandchild"; (5) whether the petitioner's child (the
parent of the grandchild) "has died or become a
non-custodial parent"; (6) whether the petitioner's child
has been "missing for an extended period of time"; and
(7) whether "visitation is in the best interest of the
grandchild." Utah Code Ann. § 30-5-2(2)(a)-(g). These
factors can be grouped into three categories, which we
will discuss below.
[*P30] The first category generally addresses
situations [***30] where a family has been divided by
some turn of fate--death, divorce, loss of custody, a
missing person, or a declaration that a parent is unfit or
incompetent. The statute recognizes that when a family
unit has been touched by these events a situation may
arise where the child's interests differ from those of the
parent. This is particularly true where the direct family
line between grandparents and grandchildren has been
severed, leaving the "in-law" relationship as the only
remaining adult connection. Id. § 30-5-2(2)(c), (e), (f).
Recognizing the potential for conflict in the relationship
between the parent and the "in-law" and the resulting
potential for interference with the grandparent-grandchild
relationship, the statute provides [**1093] an avenue for
grandparents and grandchildren to maintain their
relationship. 6
6 Prior to 1992, the only grandparents eligible
for court-ordered visitation under the Grandparent
Visitation Statute were those grandparents "whose
child, who is the parent of the grandchildren, is
dead, or . . . is divorced or legally separated from
the other parent of the grandchildren." Campbell,
896 P.2d at 640 n.9 (citing Utah Code Ann. §
30-5-1(2) (1989)). The current version of the
Grandparent Visitation Statute does not
incorporate this as a requirement, but rather
includes it as one of several factors a court may
consider when addressing a grandparent's petition
for visitation. However, we note that it will be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a
grandparent to rebut the parental presumption
where a family unit is intact because few, if any,
of the statutory factors will apply. See Campbell,
896 P.2d at 640 n.9 ("[W]e note that the state has
a stronger argument for court intervention to
protect the extended family when the nuclear
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family has been dissolved." (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, intact
family units do not generally present the same
emotional tensions as those that arise where the
familial connections have been severed by an
unfortunate twist of fate that has left only a
strained in-law relationship in its wake. While it is
true that parents in an intact family unit might
unreasonably deny visitation to their own parents,
the statute does not appear to be directed to such
situations, but rather to those, such as the case
before us, where an in-law has unreasonably
denied visitation to the parents of his or her
former spouse.
[***31] [*P31] The second group of statutory
factors encompasses situations where the state has an
interest in protecting the child from harm. Thus, a court
may grant grandparents visitation if the grandparents can
clearly and convincingly show they share a "substantial
relationship" with the grandchild and the "loss or
cessation of that relationship is likely to cause harm to the
grandchild." Id. § 30-5-2 (2)(d). The state's interest may
also extend to situations where the child's parent has
"denied or unreasonably limited" visitation, id. §
30-5-2(2)(b), because of the increased probability that the
parent is not acting in the child's best interests.
[*P32] The third category of statutory factors may
be more accurately categorized as necessary threshold
findings. These are findings that a court must make in
order to grant visitation. For example, a court cannot
order visitation if the petitioning grandparent is not a "fit
and proper person to have visitation with the grandchild."
Id. § 30-5-2(2)(a). Likewise, a court cannot order
visitation unless it is in the best interests of the child. See
id. § 30-5-2(2)(g). This holds true even if the petitioner
has satisfied [***32] other statutory factors.
[*P33] We recognize that the statute describes "best
interests" and grandparent fitness as relevant factors to
the determination of whether the parental presumption
has been rebutted. Id. § 30-5-2(2)(g). However, a judge
could not rely solely on these factors in determining
whether the parental presumption has been rebutted and
still comport with due process. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at
72-73 ("[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit a
State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to
make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge
believes a 'better' decision could be made."). Allowing

these factors alone to rebut the parental presumption
would come too close to allowing a judge to supercede a
parent's decisions based solely on a disagreement
between the parent and the judge. Thus, while a
grandparent must be fit to receive court-ordered
visitation, we do not believe a grandparent's fitness,
standing alone, would ever properly serve as a reason to
override the parent's decision. Rather, it is only one of
many factors that a court can consider in determining
whether the circumstances allow it to intervene in the
parent's [***33] decision-making process. Moreover, in
order for the statute to adhere to constitutional
requirements, we read the statute to require that the
parental presumption be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence before a court orders visitation based on the
child's best interests. This distinction is not readily
apparent from the plain language of the statute, but it is
necessary to sufficiently protect parental rights. We
recognize, of course, that the factual findings that support
other statutory factors, such as whether the loss of a
substantial grandparent relationship will affirmatively
harm the child, will often overlap with facts relevant to
the ultimate determination of whether grandparent
visitation is in the child's best interests.
[*P34] While the statute lists several means by
which a grandparent can rebut the parental [**1094]
presumption, the presumption is most clearly rebutted
when the court finds the existence of several relevant
factors, such as in this case. Here, the court found that (1)
Ms. Thurgood, the grandparent's child, had died; (2) the
grandparents had a substantial relationship with the child,
due in large part to a prior caretaking relationship, and
the loss [***34] of the grandparent-grandchild
relationship would harm the child; (3) the grandmother
was fit; and (4) Mr. Thurgood had unreasonably limited
or denied visitation.
[*P35] We therefore hold that the Grandparent
Visitation Statute is not unconstitutional under Troxel.
The statute expressly incorporates the parental
presumption, thereby ensuring that courts give "special
weight" to the decisions of fit parents. Moreover, it
provides guidance to courts in determining whether the
petitioning grandparents have established circumstances
under which the courts can, nevertheless, supercede the
parent's decision.
[*P36] Our holding that the statute is constitutional
does not suggest the statute is flawless. We acknowledge
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that the statute is confusing and, consequently, provides
very little guidance to a district judge trying to resolve a
grandparent visitation dispute. 7 However, it is not our
role to repair drafting defects that do not render a statute
unconstitutional. This task falls to the legislature.
Accordingly, we suggest, and indeed encourage, that our
state legislature clarify the statute to provide more
guidance to courts confronted with grandparent visitation
issues. [***35] We hope that our decision in this case
will assist the legislature in that undertaking.
7 This opinion has already addressed some of the
flaws with this statute by clarifying the way in
which some of the factors must be treated to
satisfy constitutional requirements. See supra PP
29-34. For example, we specified that a
grandparent's fitness is a threshold finding and
that a court cannot rely on best interests alone and
still comport with due process. Supra PP 32-33.
However, our construction of the statute does not
fully clarify the manner in which it should be
applied. For example, the statute lists several
"relevant" factors a court may consider in
determining whether the parental presumption has
been rebutted, including (1) whether the
grandparent is fit, (2) whether visitation has been
"denied or unreasonably limited", (3) whether
"the parent is unfit", (4) whether the grandparent
has acted as the child's caregiver or "otherwise
has had a substantial relationship with the
grandchild", (5) whether grandparent visitation is
in the grandchild's best interests, and (6) whether
the grandparent's child who is the parent of the
grandchild has died, lost custody, or disappeared.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-5-2(2). Although we have
attempted to categorize these factors and have
provided some instructions regarding how they
should be applied, the statute still does not
provide a district court with much guidance
regarding how the factors ought to be weighed or
applied.
[***36] [*P37] Having determined that the
Grandparent Visitation Statute is constitutional, we now
turn to whether the trial court's application of the statute
violated the liberty interests of Mr. Thurgood.
II. AS APPLIED, THE GRANDPARENT VISITATION
STATUTE DOES NOT INFRINGE UPON MR.
THURGOOD'S LIBERTY INTERESTS

[*P38] To determine whether the statute survives an
as-applied challenge, we review the decision of the lower
court to determine whether it meets the standards
established by Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.
Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000). "Constitutional
challenges to statutes present questions of law, which we
review for correctness." Provo City Corp. v. Thompson,
2004 UT 14, P 5, 86 P.3d 735. For the district court's
application to be constitutional, the grandparents must
have clearly and convincingly rebutted the presumption
favoring Mr. Thurgood's decision regarding grandparent
visitation, and the district court must have found that
grandparent visitation was in the child's best interests.
Moreover, this determination must be accompanied by
sufficient findings of fact to justify state interference. We
hold that the district court constitutionally [***37]
applied the statute.
[*P39] As required by Troxel, 530 U.S. at 70, the
district court gave special weight to Mr. Thurgood's
decisions. Before ordering visitation, the district court
placed the burden of proof on the grandparents to rebut
the presumption that Mr. Thurgood's visitation decision
was in the best interests of the child. In determining
whether the grandparents rebutted this presumption, the
district court closely followed the structure [**1095]
established by the relevant factors listed in the statute.
[*P40] The district court first looked to the
structure of the family. Specifically, the court noted that
this was the second time that the courts had been asked to
intervene in the affairs of this family, stating "[t]he two
parents of [the child] 'invited' the intervention of this
court into the issue of custody and visitation, in the first
instance, by divorcing in the courts of the State of Utah,
thus necessitating a custody and visitation order." (Supp.
2005). 8 Moreover, consistent with Utah Code section
30-5-2(2)(e), the district court noted that Ms. Uzelac's
daughter, Ms. Thurgood, had died.
8 We note that visitation and custody rights were
not ordered in the divorce decree as the parties
were divorced before the child was born.
However, the divorce necessitated the court's
intervention after the child's birth by setting forth
custody, visitation, and child support orders.
[***38] [*P41] The district court also found that
visitation between the child and the grandparents had
been unreasonably limited or denied. When Mr.
Thurgood first received custody in June 2000, he did not
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allow visitation for five months. After this five month
period, he granted Ms. Uzelac two visits, one for the
child's birthday and the other for a family Christmas
party. The next visitation did not occur until March 2001,
and it only lasted for one hour. Thereafter, Mr. Thurgood
did not allow visitation or telephone calls until July 2002,
despite repeated attempts by the Uzelacs to contact the
child. After the judge ordered visitation in July 2002, Mr.
Thurgood only allowed Ms. Uzelac to see the child twice
between July 2002 and January 2003, when the district
court issued a second visitation order. Following that
order, Ms. Uzelac saw the child every other weekend
throughout 2003 until Mr. Thurgood and the child moved
to Florida in January 2004. Mr. Thurgood terminated all
phone contact between the Uzelacs and the child one
month later. Based on these findings, there was sufficient
evidence for the district court to determine that visitation
had been "denied or unreasonably limited, [***39] " in
satisfaction of one of the named statutory factors. Utah
Code Ann. § 30-5-2(2)(b).
[*P42] Finally, the court considered the "substantial
relationship" between the child and her grandparents,
concluding that the loss of this relationship would be
harmful to the child. Cf. id. § 30-5-2(2)(d). The mother
and the child lived with the Uzelacs, and the Uzelacs took
care of the child on a daily basis throughout most of the
child's first four years of life. Mr. and Ms. Uzelac picked
the child up from school, took her camping on the
weekends, and traveled with her. After the child's mother
died, Ms. Uzelac lived with the child until Mr. Thurgood
received custody. Moreover, the district court's
conclusion that the child and the Uzelacs shared a
substantial relationship was largely based on an expert's
evaluation of the relationship between the child and the
Uzelacs. The evaluation found that the child responded to
her grandparents as "loved and trusted care givers," and
that there was a "great deal of physical affection"
between the child and the Uzelacs. The evaluation noted
that during the evaluator's visit, the child reminisced
about living in the [***40] grandparent's home with her
mother and "expressed [a] desire to spend more time with
her grandparents." The evaluator concluded that (1) the
child demonstrated an "emotional attachment to her
grandparents [that] was as strong as [that] seen between
parents and children"; (2) the attachment could be
explained by the grandparents' role as primary caregivers;
(3) the loss of her mother remained a deep emotional
wound for the child that had not been resolved; (4) the
child kept the memory of her mother alive through her

relationship with her grandparents; (5) the child would be
unable to work through the loss of her mother without
frequent access to her grandparents; and (6) the loss of
contact with the Uzelacs would be devastating and cause
the child to suffer. The evaluator therefore recommended
that it would be in the best interests of the child to
maintain a meaningful, ongoing relationship with the
Uzelacs. The trial court agreed with these findings and
found the presumption had been rebutted.
[*P43] We agree that the evidence presented to the
district judge clearly and convincingly rebutted the
parental presumption, thereby permitting the court to
override Mr. Thurgood's [***41] [**1096] decision
even after giving it special weight. We also agree with
the district court's finding that grandparent visitation was
in the child's best interests 9 due to the child's attachment
to her grandparents and the potential harmful
ramifications of severing this relationship. Therefore, the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered
grandparent visitation in this case.
9 Although the Grandparent Visitation Statute
does not define "best interests," the district courts
of this state have extensive experience in applying
this standard, particularly in the family dissolution
context. In addition, there are statutes addressing
best interests in other contexts that provide
guidance. For example, Utah Code section
30-3-34 (Supp. 2005) establishes fifteen factors a
district court may consider to determine best
interests of the child in the context of parental
visitation after divorce. The factors that the court
may consider in determining whether more or less
parent time should be awarded under Utah Code
section 30-3-34(2) are:
(a) parent-time would endanger
the child's physical health or
significantly impair the child's
emotional development; (b) the
distance between the residency of
the child and the noncustodial
parent; (c) a substantiated or
unfounded allegation of child
abuse has been made; (d) the lack
of demonstrated parenting skills
without safeguards to ensure the
child's
well-being
during
parent-time; (e) the financial
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inability of the noncustodial parent
to provide adequate food and
shelter for the child during periods
of parent-time; (f) the preference
of the child if the court determines
the child to be of sufficient
maturity; (g) the incarceration of
the noncustodial parent in a county
jail, secure youth corrections
facility, or an adult corrections
facility; (h) shared interests
between the child and the
noncustodial parent; (i) the
involvement of the noncustodial
parent in the school, community,
religious, or other related activities
of the child; (j) the availability of
the noncustodial parent to care for
the child when the custodial parent
is unavailable to do so because of
work or other circumstances; (k) a
substantial and chronic pattern of
missing, canceling, or denying
regularly scheduled parent-time;
(I) the minimal duration of and
lack of significant bonding in the
parents' relationship prior to the

conception of the child; (m) the
parent-time schedule of siblings;
(n) the lack of reasonable
alternatives to the needs of a
nursing child; and (o) any other
criteria the court determines
relevant to the best interests of the
child.

[***42] CONCLUSION
[*P44] The Grandparent Visitation Statute is
consistent with the constitutional framework established
in Troxel v. Granville and is therefore valid. Moreover,
we find that the evidence presented below clearly and
convincingly rebutted the parental presumption
incorporated in the statute. As a result, the district court
acted within its discretion when it superceded Mr.
Thurgood's decision by ordering grandparent visitation
based on the child's best interests. We therefore affirm.
[*P45] Associate Chief Justice Wilkins, Justice
Durrant, Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in
Chief Justice Durham's opinion.
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the road. From a judgment declaring the road to be
public, enjoining defendants from interfering with use of
the road, and overruling the exception of
unconstitutionality, [**2] defendants appeal. We
affirm.
Specification of Errors

COUNSEL: Pugh & Nelson, by Robert G. Pugh,
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant.
Gahagan & Gahagan, by Russell E. Gahagan, Attorneys
for Plaintiff-Appellee.
JUDGES: Bolin, Hall and Marvin, JJ.
OPINION BY: HALL
OPINION
[*1196] Statement of the Case
Plaintiff, Griffin E. Vaughn, sued to enjoin
defendant, Carrie DeMoss Williams, and her husband
from blocking an alleged public gravel road by placing a
gate across the road. The road connects property which
plaintiff leases and on which he resides with a
blacktopped parish road. Defendants answered alleging
the road is a private road. Defendants also filed an
exception pleading the unconstitutionality of LSA-R.S.
48:491. After trial, the district court held the road to be
public based on a 1934 dedication, work done on the road
by the Police Jury from 1969 to 1975, and public use of

Defendants specify the district court erred:
(1) In finding that an authentic act of
dedication in 1934 by the then owners of
the property was intended to dedicate that
portion of the road traversing the land
owned by defendant.
(2) In holding that sufficient work had
been done by the Police Jury for the road
to become public under R.S. 48:491.
(3) In dismissing appellants' exception
challenging the constitutionality of 48:491
on the grounds that defendant's property is
being taken without due process of law
and
without
just
and
adequate
compensation.
Findings of Fact
(1) The following is a schematic drawing of the
property and road in question:
[*1197] [SEE ILLUSTRATION IN ORIGINAL]
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(2) Plaintiff leased property in Section 33 from
Walter DeMoss in 1969, for agricultural purposes and has
resided on Paps Hill since 1973.
(3) The road in dispute runs from Paps Hill across
property owned by DeMoss, Joan Yarbrough Gresham,
Reimer Calhoun and defendant, Mrs. Carrie D. Williams,
to Parish Road 608. The gate erected by defendant is at
the intersection of the gravel road with Parish [**3]
Road 608.
(4) There has been a road running easterly from Paps
Hill across the S/2 of Sections 33 and 34 since at least
1917.
(5) This road was formally dedicated as a public road
by instrument dated in 1934, executed by John C.
Yarbrough and Mrs. Jimmie DeMoss King, mother and
ancestor in title of Walter DeMoss and Carrie DeMoss
Williams.
(6) The dedication described the eastern end of the
road as running easterly across the DeMoss property to
the Grand Bayou Road, which ran north-south along the
east section lines of Sections 33 and 34, and which no
longer exists.
(7) The extension of the road which runs southerly
through the Carrie DeMoss Williams property in Section
3 to Parish Road No. 608 was built in 1937 along the
course of an old wagon road, and has been in use since
that time.

Road 608 was put up by defendant in late 1975.
[*1198] (12) Defendant protested use of the road by
the public at a Police Jury meeting in 1967. However,
she thereafter made no further protests until erection of
the gate. She saw the Police Jury grader working on the
road on several occasions, knew the Jury placed gravel on
the road, and expressly consented to some work done in
1969 and the ditching in 1975. She was aware of the
road's use by the public.
Specification of Error No. 1 - Formal Dedication
The 1934 act of dedication described the road as
beginning at the west extreme of the DeMoss property in
Section 33, running west and east through that property,
continuing easterly through the Yarbrough property, and
further continuing easterly through the DeMoss property
to intersect [**5] the Grand Bayou Public Road. The part
of road in dispute runs virtually due south through
defendant's property and connects with Parish Road 608
rather than the Grand Bayou Road, which no longer
exists.
It must be concluded that the act of dedication did
not cover or include the southerly extension of the public
road, which was built a few years later and apparently
took the place of the easterly extension which led to the
later abandoned Grand Bayou Road. The southerly
extension in dispute is not a public road by virtue of the
1934 act of dedication.
Specification of Error No. 2 - Informal Dedication

(8) The road from Paps Hill to Parish Road No. 608
has been maintained and kept up by the Red River Parish
Police Jury to some extent, at least since 1969.
(9) The Police Jury has worked the road from one to
three times a year since 1969. It has occasionally graded
the road and occasionally placed gravel on the road. It
ditched the road in 1975. At the time of trial, the road
was well [**4] ditched and there was substantial gravel
in the roadbed.
(10) Plaintiff and defendant have both done
maintenance work on the road. Plaintiff has worked it
about three times a year. Defendant has worked and put
gravel on the part of the road between her home and
Road 608.
(11) The road was open to and used by the public
until the gate at the intersection of the road with Parish

The jurisprudence divides informal dedication into
two categories: implied dedication and tacit dedication. 1
Implied dedication, nonstatutory in nature, requires both
the landowner's intent to create a public road and the
public's acceptance of the landowner's offer. Such
intention to dedicate may be manifested by the actions of
the landowner, while the acceptance by the public may be
evidenced by public use. Tacit dedication is founded
upon statute and its existence is determined by
application of LSA-R.S. 48:491, which provides in
pertinent part:
"All roads [**6] . . . which have been or
are hereafter kept up, maintained or
worked for a period of three years by
authority of any parish governing
authority in its parish . . . shall be public
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roads . . ."

An occasional "brushing up" or token maintenance of a
private road does not establish a tacit dedication. Jackson
v. Town of Logansport, 322 So.2d 281 (La.App.2d Cir.
1975), and authorities cited therein.
1
The distinction between implied and tacit
dedication is not clearly made in all of the
reported cases. The terms are sometimes used
interchangeably and some cases seem to consider
tacit dedication as a form of implied dedication.
See, for example, Wyatt v. Hagler, 238 La. 234,
114 So.2d 876 (1959).
In Boynton v. Bertrand, 309 So.2d 769 (La.App.3d
Cir. 1975), it was held that regular grading approximately
three times a year and occasional cleaning of ditches by
the Police Jury was more than token maintenance and
was sufficient to constitute a tacit dedication under the
statute, even though [**7] the property owners also
participated in maintenance. In Latour v. Dupuis, 164
So.2d 620 (La.App.3d Cir. 1964), a tacit dedication was
found where the Police Jury graded the road two or three
times a year, put gravel on the road on one occasion, and
trimmed trees in the ditches alongside the road. See also
Foshee v. Longino, 236 So.2d 870 (La.App.3d Cir. 1970);
Mouton v. Bourque, 253 So.2d 689 (La.App.3d Cir.
1971); and Police Jury, Parish of Catahoula v. Briggs,
291 So.2d 472 (La.App.3d Cir. 1974).
Tacit dedication does not result where active
opposition is directly communicated by the landowner to
the governing body. Town of Eunice v. Childs, 205 So.2d
897 (La.App.3d Cir. 1967), writ refused 251 La. 937, 207
So.2d 540 (1968). However, protests not made directly to
the governing body or made after the road has been
maintained by the governing body for three years do not
prevent a tacit dedication under the statute. Wyatt v.
Hagler, 238 La. 234, 114 So.2d 876 (1959); Winn Parish
Police [*1199] Jury v. Austin, 216 So.2d 166
(La.App.2d Cir. 1968).
The work done by the Police Jury in the instant case
amounted to more than token maintenance. At [**8]
least since 1969, and particularly since 1973, the Police
Jury has worked on the road several times each year,
grading, ditching and adding gravel. It is significant that
the southerly part of the road crossing defendant's

property in Section 3 is a continuation of or extension of
a dedicated public road, and that the road has been used
by the public for many years. Although defendant
asserted the private nature of the road at a Police Jury
meeting in 1967, she thereafter consented to work done
by the Jury in 1969 and 1975, and allowed other
maintenance to be done without protest.
Our conclusion is that the trial court was correct in
finding the road to be a public road by reason of
maintenance by the Police Jury for more than three years.
There was a tacit dedication under LSA-R.S. 48:491.
Specification of Error No. 3 - Constitutionality
Appellants
contend
LSA-R.S.
48:491
is
unconstitutional in that it violates Article 1, Sections 2
and 4 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, which
provides in part:
"Section 2. No person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, except by due
process of law."
"Section 4. Every person has the right
to acquire, own, control, [**9] use,
enjoy, protect, and dispose of private
property. This right is subject to
reasonable statutory restrictions and the
reasonable exercise of the police power.
"Property shall not be taken or
damaged by the state or its political
subdivisions except for public purposes
and with just compensation paid to the
owner or into court for his benefit. * * *"

The statute, interpreted as applying only where the
landowner has knowledge of and acquiesces in
maintenance of a road by the public authority, and as not
applying where the landowner opposes and protests such
maintenance, does not offend the constitutional
provisions. Knowledge, acquiescence, and usually
acceptance of the benefits of public maintenance for a
period of time under the statute amounts to a tacit
dedication by the landowner - a giving by the landowner
rather than a taking by the public authority. The
landowner impliedly or tacitly gives his consent to the
establishment of a public road. The statute establishing
the public character of a road after maintenance by the
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governing authority for a period of three years, as
interpreted, does not amount to a taking of private
property without due process of law [**10] or without
payment of just and adequate compensation.
The constitutionality of the statute is also supported
by Article VI, Section 24 of the Louisiana Constitution of
1974 which provides:
"Section 24. The public, represented by
local governmental subdivisions, may
acquire servitudes of way by prescription
in the manner prescribed by law."

The acquisition of a servitude by the public under
LSA-R.S. 48:491 is closely akin to prescription. Compare
Frierson v. Police Jury of Caddo Parish, 160 La. 957,
107 So. 709 (1926); Goree v. Midstates Oil Corporation,
205 La. 988, 18 So.2d 591 (1944).
The district court correctly overruled defendants'
exception of unconstitutionality.
Decree
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the district
court is affirmed at appellant's costs.
Affirmed.
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OPINION
[**748]
McHUGH, Judge:
[*P1] Wasatch County (Wasatch) appeals the trial
court's ruling that principles of estoppel prevent it from
exercising control over roads, located on land owned by

West Daniels Land Association (the Association) and E.
Ray Okelberry, Brian Okelberry, and Eric Okelberry
(collectively, the Okelberrys), 1 that were [**749]
adjudicated abandoned and dedicated to the public. The
Okelberrys cross-appeal the trial court's determination
that the roads were dedicated to the public under Utah
Code section 72-5-104(1). See Utah Code Ann. §
72-5-104(1) (2001). We affirm in part and reverse and
remand in part.
1 The Association owns property immediately
adjacent to property owned by the Okelberrys. As
members and shareholders in the Association, the
Okelberrys used the Association's land in
conjunction with their own for grazing livestock.
The Association was initially included in the suit
as a defendant. However, for reasons not clear
from the record, it withdrew from the litigation.
After the Association failed to appoint successor
counsel, Wasatch sought default judgment against
the Association. The Okelberrys opposed the
motion and argued that as members of the
Association they had the right to represent its
interests at trial. The trial court did not directly
enter a ruling on Wasatch's default judgment
motion. Later, the court noted that default
judgment had been entered against the
Association in its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. However, the trial court had
allowed the Okelberrys to submit evidence with
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respect to the roads located on both the
Okelberrys' and the Association's properties at
trial. Additionally, the trial court adjudicated the
status of the roads located on the Association's
property, implicitly rejecting Wasatch's argument
that the Okelberrys lacked standing to represent
the Association's interests. See Zions First Nat.
Bank v. C'Est Bon Venture, 613 P.2d 515, 517
(Utah 1980) (recognizing that trial courts
implicitly deny motions where later judgment is
in conflict with and fails to give effect to the
motions). Because Wasatch has not appealed the
issue of the Okelberrys' standing to represent the
interests of the Association, this court addresses
the merits without distinguishing between the
Okelberrys' and the Association's properties. See
Whitmer v. City of Lindon, 943 P.2d 226, 228 n.1
(Utah 1997) (declining to address issue not
appealed).

Canyon Road, which the trial court determined
had not been abandoned to the public. Because
neither party appeals the trial court's decision with
respect to Maple Canyon Road, it is not addressed
here.
[*P3] Sometime in 1989, the Okelberrys started
barring public use of the Four Roads by constantly
locking the gates and posting no trespassing signs. In the
mid-1990s, the Okelberrys placed their property into a
Cooperative Wildlife Management Unit (CWMU) that
allowed them to realize a profit from exclusive hunting
activities on the property. In 2001, twelve years after the
Okelberrys began permanently locking the gates,
Wasatch initiated suit to have the Four Roads declared
public highways under Utah Code section 72-5-104. See
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104. 4 Under that provision, "[a]
highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the
public when it has been continuously used as a public
thoroughfare for a period of ten years." Id. § 72-5-104(1).

[***2] BACKGROUND
[*P2] In 1957, the Okelberrys 2 purchased a tract of
rural, undeveloped property in Wasatch County. The
property is criss-crossed by a series of unimproved dirt
roads including the four roads at issue in this appeal: the
Thorton Hollow Road, Ridge Line Road, Parker Canyon
Road, and Circle Springs Road (the Four Roads). 3 The
Four Roads begin and end at points outside the
Okelberrys' property or are connected to roads that begin
and end outside the property. At the time the property
was purchased, it was bordered on the east and south by
fences, separating the Okelberrys' property from United
States Forest Service property. There were also multiple
wire gates along the Four Roads such that persons
traveling on the Four Roads generally had to open the
gates before proceeding within the boundaries of the
Okelberrys' property.
2 The tract was initially purchased by E. Ray
Okelberry, his brother, Lee Okelberry, and their
father, Roy Okelberry. Sometime after 1957, Ray
and Lee Okelberry bought their father's interest in
the property. And later, when Lee decided to
retire, Ray's sons, Eric and Brian Okelberry,
bought Lee's interest. At the present time, Ray,
Eric, and Brian Okelberry own the property and
continue to use it for their livestock operation.
[***3]
3

The initial suit included a fifth road, Maple

4 An earlier version of this provision, see Utah
Code Ann. § 27-12-89 (1995), was in effect at the
time Wasatch claims dedication or abandonment
of the Four Roads occurred. However, the current
version, see id. § 72-5-104(1) (2001), is
"substantively identical" to the earlier version.
State v. Six Mile Ranch Co., 2006 UT App 104,P4
n.3, 132 P.3d 687. Therefore, in the interests of
convenience, all references and citations will be to
the current version. See id.
[***4] [*P4] After a three-day bench trial, the
court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law.
First, the court "specifically found that there was not
public use of the [Four Roads] in the 1940s or before and
also . . . no evidence of vehicular use prior to the 1950s."
The court also specifically found that Wasatch had never
performed any maintenance on the Four Roads.
[*P5] Turning to the evidence and testimony
presented at trial, the court noted that Wasatch had
presented witnesses, members of the general public, who
testified that for different periods of time between 1957
and 1989 they freely used the Four Roads. The court
noted that the Okelberrys' witnesses alternatively testified
that beginning in the 1960s, the gates on the Four Roads
were generally kept closed and "periodically locked for
several days at a time and that signs were also posted on
the gates and property which stated 'No Trespassing -Private Property.'" Additionally, employees of [**750]
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the Okelberrys testified that they had, at times, asked
people trespassing on the property or the roads to leave.
After weighing the evidence, the court assumed the truth
of the Okelberrys' factual assertions and nonetheless
[***5] determined that it was "clear that individuals
using the roads beginning in the late 1950s until the late
1980s or early 1990s used the roads without interruption,
they used the roads freely, and though not constantly,
they used the roads continuously as they needed."
[*P6] The court also found that the majority of
users were members of the general public, traveling
without permission, and therefore used the Four Roads as
a public thoroughfare. Finally, without defining exactly
which ten years the Four Roads were used continuously
as public thoroughfares, the court determined that
between 1960 and 1990, public use "continued for at least
ten years, if not much longer, or for multiple periods of
ten years." Thus, the court concluded that the Four Roads
had been dedicated to public use "well over ten years
prior to 1989 when the Okelberrys began [permanently]
locking the gates."
[*P7] Although determining that the roads had been
abandoned and dedicated to the public, the court found
that Wasatch was equitably estopped from enforcing the
dedication on behalf of the public. The court supported
the estoppel determination with two findings. First, that
"for a period of twelve [***6] years [the Okelberrys]
exerted control and used the roads in an openly hostile
manner to the public use of the streets." And second,
although "little improvements have been made to the
roads themselves," the Okelberrys had expended "large
amounts of time and money" on their sheep and cattle
operations as well as cultivated their business relationship
with the CWMU. Wasatch appeals the trial court's
judgment that it is equitably estopped from opening the
Four Roads to public use, and the Okelberrys
cross-appeal the trial court's ruling that the Four Roads
are public roads by dedication.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[*P8] The Okelberrys challenge the trial court's
determination that the Four Roads were abandoned and
dedicated to the public under Utah Code section
72-5-104(1). See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1). "The
trial court's ultimate conclusion that the facts of this case
either satisfy or do not satisfy the requirements of section
72-5-104(1) is a mixed question of fact and law, which
we review for correctness." State v. Six Mile Ranch Co.,

2006 UT App 104, P9, 132 P.3d 687 (citing Heber City
Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1997)).
[***7] However, because the legal requirements of a
public highway determination under section 72-5-104(1)
are "highly fact dependent and somewhat amorphous,"
we "give[] trial courts a fair degree of latitude in
determining the legal consequences . . . of facts found by
the court." Id. (quotations and citation omitted); accord
Heber City Corp., 942 P.2d at 309-10. "'Therefore, when
reviewing a trial court's decision regarding whether a
public highway has been established under section
[72-5-104(1)], we review the decision for correctness but
grant the court significant discretion in its application of
the facts to the statute.'" Six Mile Ranch Co., 2006 UT
App 104 at P9 (alteration in original) (quoting Heber City
Corp., 942 P.2d at 310).
[*P9] The Okelberrys also challenge the sufficiency
of the evidence, arguing that Wasatch has not provided
clear and convincing evidence of continuous use as a
public thoroughfare. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1).
"To establish the dedication of a public road, we require
clear and convincing evidence." AWINC Corp. v.
Simonsen, 2005 UT App 168, P7, 112 P.3d 1228 [***8]
(citing Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 493 P.2d
639, 639 (1972)). Where a party challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence, "[a]n appellate court must
launch any review of factual findings from rule 52(a) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and its clearly
erroneous test . . . ." In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54,PP28-29,
147 P.3d 401, 561 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (quotations
omitted); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact
. . . shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.").
Although it is appropriate for a "reviewing court to
consider [**751] the standard of proof the prevailing
party below was required to meet," the trial court's
findings of fact will only be reversed under the clearly
erroneous standard embodied in rule 52(a) where a
review of the record as a whole demonstrates the result is
"against the clear weight of the evidence or leave[s] the
appellate court with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made." In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54 at P40;
see also Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v.
Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987).
[***9]
[*P10] Alternatively, Wasatch argues that the trial
court erred when it applied equitable estoppel to bar its
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future attempts to open the Four Roads to public use.
"[W]hether the trial court committed reversible error in
applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel" to a public
road determination is a question of law, which is
"reviewed for correctness without any special deference."
Western Kane County, 744 P.2d at 1377-78.
ANALYSIS
I. Dedication to the Public
[*P11] Under Utah Code section 72-5-104(1), "[a]
highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the
public when it has been continuously used as a public
thoroughfare for a period of ten years." Utah Code Ann. §
72-5-104(1). Thus, for a road to become a public
highway under the statute, three elements must be met,
"there must be (i) continuous use, (ii) as a public
thoroughfare, (iii) for a period of ten years." Heber City
Corp., 942 P.2d at 310, quoted in Six Mile Ranch Co.,
2006 UT App 104 at P11.
[*P12] The Okelberrys argue that the trial court's
findings of fact were not supported by clear and [***10]
convincing evidence; therefore, its conclusions that the
Four Roads had been used continuously as public
thoroughfares were in error. We will address each of
these elements in turn, noting, however, that although
each element "embodies a logically distinct requirement
that must be satisfied, the elements are so intertwined that
they are not readily susceptible to separate discussion."
Id. at 310 n.6.
A. Continuous Use
[*P13] Under Utah law, continuous use of a road
exists when "'the public, even though not consisting of a
great many persons, made a continuous and uninterrupted
use' not necessarily every day, but 'as often as they found
it convenient or necessary.'" AWINC Corp., 2005 UT App
168 at P11 (quoting Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395, 326
P.2d 107, 109 (1958)). It is not required that public use
be constant, rather it need only to have "'occurred as
often as the claimant had occasion or chose to pass. . . .
Mere intermission is not interruption.'" Id. (omission in
original) (quoting Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559
P.2d 948, 949 (Utah 1977)).
[*P14] The Okelberrys argue that the evidence of
continuous use [***11] of the Four Roads was not clear
and convincing because, at trial, they presented

unrebutted evidence showing that the Okelberrys had
expelled persons who lacked permission to use the roads
and controlled access to the roads through closed gates
that were periodically locked. At the heart of the
Okelberrys' argument is the proposition that uncontested
evidence of a closed or locked gate across a road, or a
single instance where a party is ejected from the road, is
an interruptive event sufficient to defeat any claim of
continuous use by the public as a matter of law. While
acknowledging the ease of application of such a
bright-line test, we disagree.
[*P15] In making public road determinations, the
Utah Supreme Court has stated that "all of the facts
should be considered together, and where there is dispute
about whether a public use is established, determination
of the facts and resolution of the issue is primarily the
responsibility of the trial court." Bonner v. Sudbury, 18
Utah 2d 140, 417 P.2d 646, 648 (1966) (emphasis
added). Prior cases have recognized that the presence of
gates, including the frequencies with which they are
closed or locked, is a factor [***12] to be weighed
heavily in making the continuous use determination. See,
e.g., Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 809
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) (taking into account that road had
been [**752] "generally barred by a locked gate," as
well as testimony that the public "had been unable to use
the road because of the gate"). Nonetheless, the presence
of obstructions or gates, open or closed, unlocked or
locked, has been treated as only one of the many factors a
trial court may consider when determining if the public
use was continuous. See Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d
447, 449 (Utah 1981) (affirming trial court's
determination of public road despite finding that road was
"periodically block[ed]" during the relevant time).
Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has declined
opportunities to rely solely on the presence of a gate,
locked or unlocked, to affirm trial courts' determinations
that roads have not been dedicated to the public. See
Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 493 P.2d 639,
640-41 (1972) (weighing presence of gates, locked and
unlocked, along with signage, lack of governmental
maintenance, nature of use, and character of users in
finding [***13] road was not abandoned); Gillmor v.
Carter, 15 Utah 2d 280, 391 P.2d 426, 427 (1964)
(relying on evidence of gates, as well as signs, grants of
permission, past litigation initiated by the property
owners alleging private road, and contracts for exclusive
use); cf. Wilhelm v. Pine Meadows Estates, Inc., 2001 UT
App 285, No. 20000559-CA, 2001 Utah App. LEXIS 131,
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at *3 - *4 (Oct. 4, 2001) (per curiam) (noting that the
owners had blocked access to the road several times but
also weighing character of users and nature of use);
Campbell, 962 P.2d at 809 (examining evidence of
locked gate and testimony by members of the public who
had been unable to use the road because of the gate).
While we leave open the possibility that evidence that a
road was blocked by a locked gate may weigh heavily
enough, given the other facts and circumstances, to be
dispositive of the question of continuous use, we do not
accept the Okelberrys' argument that any evidence of a
locked gate, no matter how brief, is conclusive evidence
of interrupted use.
[*P16] Strong policy considerations underlie public
highway determinations governed by [***14] Utah
Code section 72-5-104. Utah appellate courts have noted
that because "the ownership of property should be
granted a high degree of sanctity and respect," Draper
City v. Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995),
"dedication of property to public use should not be lightly
presumed," Thurman, 626 P.2d at 448. In consideration
of this policy, the Utah Supreme Court has placed the
burden of proving the existence of a public road by clear
and convincing evidence on the party seeking the
dedication. See Draper City, 888 P.2d at 1099 ("This
higher standard of proof is demanded since the ownership
of property should be granted a high degree of sanctity
and respect.").
[*P17] However, adopting the test urged by the
Okelberrys would disrupt the delicate balance embodied
in the clear and convincing standard. If a property owner
was able to defeat a dedication claim by simply providing
self-serving testimony that at some point she interrupted
use of a road by locking a gate for a single short period of
time within a ten-year period or ejecting a single person
from the road, the dedication statute would be
eviscerated. [***15] Cf. Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d
376, 438 P.2d 545, 546-47 (1968) (reversing trial court's
determination of dedication where evidence was almost
exclusively provided by self-serving witnesses "having
their own special and private interests in the road");
Bonner, 417 P.2d at 648 ("Resolution of [a dedication]
issue cannot rest entirely upon what the owner says was
his intent. In case controversy arises he can always avow
that his intent was in accord with his interest." (footnote
omitted)). At the same time, we note the difficulty
property owners face in locating disinterested witnesses
to testify that they were prevented from using the roads at

their convenience or the time of their choosing because
they met with a locked gate or were turned away. 5 It is
precisely for these reasons that a trial court is given great
latitude in weighing the facts in light of the credibility
and motivation of witnesses when determining if use of a
road by the public was continuous. See Petersen, 438
P.2d at 549 (Crockett, C.J., dissenting) [**753] (noting
that "it is the prerogative of the trial judge to determine
whether the tests [for dedication] have [***16] been
met" including a weighing of interested witness's
testimony).
5 These failed attempts to use the road may be
unknown to the property owners. Even in cases
where the property owner ejected a member of the
public, he is unlikely to retain identification or
contact information that could be used to
subpoena the member of the public for trial.
[*P18] Thus, the question of continuous use should
be approached as a multi-faceted inquiry that requires a
trial court to weigh all the evidence presented in light of
the credibility of witnesses. We recognize that evidence
of gates, and in particular locked gates, during the
relevant period is strong evidence of interrupted use. See,
e.g., Campbell, 962 P.2d at 809 (noting that trial court's
determination that there was not continuous use was
permissibly premised on finding that road was "generally
barred by a locked gate"); Cox v. Cox, 84 Idaho 513, 373
P.2d 929, 933 (Idaho 1962) ("Where gates are in
existence across a road [***17] barring the passage and
making it necessary to open them in order to use the road,
the existence of such gates is considered as strong
evidence that the road was not a public road."); cf.
Thomson, 493 P.2d at 640-41 (discussing gates, chains,
and padlocks across road in affirming trial court's
determination that dedication had not occurred).
Nonetheless, in some instances, evidence of a gate, even
a locked gate, may not weigh heavily enough to establish
that there was an interruption of continuous use. See, e.g.,
Utah County v. Butler, 147 P.3d 963, 2006 UT App 444,
PP12-15 (affirming trial court's determination of
dedication even where property owners presented
evidence that gate across road had at one time been
locked). In deciding whether a locked gate acted as an
interruptive force sufficient to restart the running of the
statutory ten-year period, the trial court should weigh the
evidence regarding the duration and frequency that the
gate was locked against the frequency and volume of
public use to determine if there is clear and convincing
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evidence that public use of the road was continuous.
[*P19] In this case, the trial court balanced the
frequency [***18] and duration that the gates were
locked against the frequency and volume of public use.
The trial court found that even were it to accept as true
"that beginning in the 1960s the gates were periodically
locked for several days at a time," it was nonetheless
"clear that individuals using the roads beginning in the
late 1950s until the late 1980s or early 1990s used the
roads without interruption, . . . and though not constantly,
they used the roads continuously as they needed."
[*P20] The trial court's conclusion is supported in
the record. Several witnesses testified that they used the
Four Roads during the relevant period and were never
asked to leave and never encountered a locked gate.
"[W]e do not set aside the trial court's factual findings
unless they are against the clear weight of the evidence or
we otherwise reach a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made." Western Kane County Special
Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376,
1377 (Utah 1987). No such conviction is held here. Clear
and convincing evidence may be premised on "[t]he
testimony of one credible witness[] if believed by the
court or jury." Bonner v. Sudbury, 18 Utah 2d 140, 417
P.2d 646, 648 (1966). [***19] Here, the trial court may
have relied on any one of many witnesses. We do not,
therefore, disturb the trial court's conclusion that there
was continuous use.
B. Public Thoroughfare
[*P21] Three general requirements must be met to
demonstrate that the road at issue was used as a public
thoroughfare: "(i) [t]here must be passing or travel, (ii)
the use must be by the public, [and] (iii) use by
permission does not constitute use as a public
thoroughfare." Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d
307, 311 (Utah 1997) (quotations omitted). The
Okelberrys do not challenge the trial court's findings that
there was passing or travel nor do they challenge that the
travel was engaged in by members of the public. Rather,
the Okelberrys assert that it was error for the trial court to
find that there was clear and convincing evidence of use
as a public thoroughfare because they presented
uncontested evidence that gates were maintained on the
Four Roads throughout the relevant period. More simply,
the Okelberrys argue that the mere presence of a gate,
locked or unlocked, is conclusive proof of permissive use
and therefore may, as a single inquiry, defeat a finding of

public [***20] thoroughfare. [**754] This court has
rejected such a construction of Utah law.
[*P22] "It is firmly established under Utah law that
permissive use cannot result in either adverse possession
or dedication of private property to the public." Campbell
v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah Ct. App.
1998) (citing Heber City Corp., 942 P.2d at 311-12;
Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447, 449-50 (Utah 1981)).
In Campbell v. Box Elder County, we recognized that a
property owner's use of a gate was strong evidence, but
not conclusive proof, of permissive use. See 962 P.2d at
809. There, we affirmed the trial court's determination
that use was permissive where it was supported by
evidence showing "the Campbells had unlocked the gate
every year except 1994 for deer hunting season and had
relocked it at the end of each hunting season." Id.
However, we have since clarified the treatment of gates
in Campbell by explaining that it is not the presence of
the gate, alone, that indicates permissive use. See State v.
Six Mile Ranch Co., 2006 UT App 104, P23, 132 P.3d
687. Instead, Campbell stood "for [***21] the
proposition that an overt act, such as locking and
unlocking a gate, provides evidence of permissive use."
Id. While the overt act of locking and unlocking the gate
under the facts and circumstances in Campbell was an
indication of permissive use, the erection of a gate by a
property owner does not conclusively establish the
character of the public use as permissive because a gate
"may be erected for purposes other than obstruction of
public travel." McIntyre v. Board of County Comm'rs, 86
P.3d 402, 409-10 (Colo. 2004) (quotations and citation
omitted). For example, because a gate may be erected
across a public road for the purpose of controlling
livestock, see Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-106 (2001), gates
across roads do not always carry an inference of
permissive use. See, e.g., Lemont Land Corp. v. Rogers,
269 Mont. 180, 887 P.2d 724, 728 (Mont. 1994) (noting
that where "the gate was used to control livestock, not
travel," it was insufficient evidence to support a
conclusion of permissive use).
[*P23] Therefore, "[w]hile evidence of a fence or
gate on the road gives rise to a strong indication that
[***22] any public use of the road is permissive, their
existence does not provide the landowner with a
conclusive presumption that the use is permissive."
McIntyre, 86 P.3d at 412; see also Tomlin Enters., Inc. v.
Althoff, 2004 MT 383, P19, 325 Mont. 99, 103 P.3d 1069
("[T]he fact that the passage of a road has been for years
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barred by gates or other obstructions to be opened and
closed by the parties passing over the land, has always
been considered as strong evidence in support of a mere
license to the public . . . ." (quotations and citation
omitted)). Instead, trial courts are given wide latitude to
determine if use is permissive because the "legal
requirements [of section 72-5-104], other than the
ten-year requirement, are highly fact dependent and
somewhat amorphous." Heber City Corp., 942 P.2d at
310.
[*P24] The Utah Supreme Court has warned that in
public road dedication cases, appellate courts should not
attempt to "establish a coherent and consistent statement
of the law on a fact-intensive, case-by-case review of trial
court rulings." Id. Thus, under Utah law, trial courts are
"permitted some reign to grapple with the multitude
[***23] of fact patterns that may constitute a . . . [public
thoroughfare] determination." Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d
910, 913 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (alteration and omission in
original) (quotations and citation omitted). Because the
trial court has significant discretion to weigh the myriad
facts that provide evidence of non-permissive use, the
trial court's determination that travel on the Four Roads
was without permission is adequately supported by the
record as is its determination that the Four Roads were
used as public thoroughfares. Several witnesses testified
to using the Four Roads for decades without seeking or
obtaining permission and without encountering locked
gates. Additionally, testimony from both parties tended to
support the trial court's conclusion that the gates were
primarily in place as a method of controlling the
Okelberrys' livestock operations, not for the purpose of
controlling public use. Both of these findings are
sufficient to sustain the trial court's conclusion that the
Four Roads were used without permission as public
thoroughfares. See [**755] Thurman, 626 P.2d at 449
(affirming finding of public thoroughfare and noting that
"[a]lthough [***24] testimony in the instant case
indicated some of the use . . . was with permission, there
was clear and convincing evidence of frequent and
general use of the road without defendants' permission").
[*P25] Because we do not have a firm conviction
that the trial court was mistaken, we do not disturb the
trial court's findings that the Four Roads were used
continuously as public thoroughfares for a period of at
least ten years. We affirm the trial court's determination
that the Four Roads were dedicated to the public by
action of Utah Code section 72-5-104. See Utah Code

Ann. § 72-5-104(1). Upon affirming the trial court's
judgment that the Four Roads were public roads, it is
necessary to address the issue of equitable estoppel raised
by Wasatch on appeal.
II. Equitable Estoppel
[*P26] Wasatch challenges the trial court's
determination that Wasatch is equitably estopped from
asserting the public's rights in the Four Roads because it
had failed to do so for a period of twelve years. As a
general rule, once a road is dedicated and abandoned to
the public under section 72-5-104(1), subsequent acts by
the property owner [***25] to limit the public's use
cannot change its status as a public highway. See Utah
Code Ann. § 72-5-105 (Supp. 2006); Heber City Corp. v.
Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 313 n.12 (Utah 1997) (noting
that the fact that the road had not been used by the public
for several years "d[id] not change its status as a public
highway"); Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No.
1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377-78 (Utah
1987) (holding road was still a public highway although
fifty years had passed since the road was used by the
public); Clark v. Erekson, 9 Utah 2d 212, 341 P.2d 424,
425-26 (1959) (requiring landowner to remove
encroachments on public highway even though some of
the structures had been in place more than thirty years).
Instead, under Utah Code section 72-5-105, "all public
highways . . . once established shall continue to be
highways . . . until abandoned or vacated by order." Utah
Code Ann. § 72-5-105(1). The Utah Supreme Court has
interpreted the language of this section to require strict
compliance with statutory procedures to effect an
abandonment or vacation [***26] of a public road by the
government. See Ercanbrack v. Judd, 524 P.2d 595, 597
(Utah 1974).
[*P27] There is no dispute that the Four Roads have
not been abandoned or vacated by order under section
72-5-105(1). Despite the requirements of that section,
"there may be circumstances so extreme that" the
doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied against the
government "to prevent the assertion of rights in a public
highway." Western Kane County, 744 P.2d at 1378.
However, to remain "in harmony with the expressed will
of the legislature, which requires that a strict statutory
procedure be followed for the vacation of a public road,"
courts should be "extremely reluctant to apply the
doctrine of estoppel against the assertion of rights in a
public highway by a government entity." Id.
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[*P28] To prevail on their claim of equitable
estoppel, the Okelberrys were required to show three
elements:
(1) an admission, statement, or act
inconsistent with the claim afterward
asserted, (2) action by the other party on
the faith of such admission, statement, or
act, and (3) injury to such other party
resulting from allowing the first party to
[***27] contradict or repudiate such
admission, statement, or act.
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 602 P.2d
689, 694 (Utah 1979). Additionally, when estoppel is
asserted against the government, the admission,
statement, or act relied upon must amount to a "very
clear, well-substantiated representation[] by [the]
government entit[y]." Anderson v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
839 P.2d 822, 828 (Utah 1992). More specifically, in
public roads cases, the Utah Supreme Court has indicated
that the admission, statement, or act by the government
must be an affirmative representation. See Wall v. Salt
Lake City, 50 Utah 593, 168 P. 766, 769 (1917) (noting
that case was uncommon and suitable for the application
of estoppel because "the municipality by its own
affirmative acts, declarations, and conduct, [**756]
misled the [property owner]" (emphasis added)).
[*P29] The Okelberrys argue that Premium Oil Co.
v. Cedar City, 112 Utah 324, 187 P.2d 199 (1947), set
out a special test for estoppel against the government in
public roads cases whereby estoppel may be premised on
the government's acquiescence in the private [***28]
party asserting exclusive control over the roads. We
disagree. The Okelberrys rely on the language in
Premium Oil that states:
[W]here the public have long withheld
the assertion of control over streets, and
private parties have been . . . induced to
believe the streets abandoned by the
public, . . . with the acquiescence of those
representing the public . . . the doctrine of
equitable estoppel may be applied.
Id. at 204 (emphasis added) (quotations omitted).
However, any exception created by Premium Oil
allowing the assertion of estoppel against the government
in public roads cases, where reliance is premised on

government inaction or acquiescence, was abrogated by
subsequent legislation and case law. Cf. Western Kane
County, 744 P.2d at 1378 ("We are extremely reluctant to
apply the doctrine of estoppel against the assertion of
rights in a public highway by a government entity. This
reluctance is in harmony with the expressed will of the
legislature, which requires that a strict statutory
procedure be followed for the vacation of a public road."
(citation omitted)).
[*P30] At the time Premium Oil was decided in
1947, the [***29] law governing abandonment of a
public road was found in Utah Code section 36-1-3 and
stated: "All highways once established must continue to
be highways until abandoned by order of . . . competent
authority." Utah Code Ann. § 36-1-3 (1943) (emphasis
added). Thus, the statute only required that the highway
be "abandoned," and it may have been possible for a
private property owner to reasonably rely on the
government's "abandonment" or acquiescence in private
control as an element of an estoppel claim. See Premium
Oil, 187 P.2d at 204. However, in 1963, the Utah
Legislature amended the language of section 36-1-3 6 by
enactment of Utah Code section 27-12-90, which stated:
"All public highways once established shall continue to
be highways until abandoned or vacated by order of . . .
competent authority." Act of 1963, ch. 39, § 90, 1963
Utah Laws 114, 141; Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-90 (1969)
(emphasis added). In addition to the "abandoned or
vacated" language of the 1963 amendment, the highway
code was also amended in 1965, creating a strict statutory
procedure for "abandon[ing] or vacat[ing]" a public
highway. See Act of 1965, ch. 52, §§ 1-5, 1965 Utah
[***30] Laws 154, 154-56; Utah Code Ann. §§
27-12-102.1 to -102.5 (Supp. 1969). Decisions of the
Utah Supreme Court following enactment of these
statutory procedures make it clear that a public highway
may only be abandoned or vacated when there has been
strict statutory compliance. See Western Kane County,
744 P.2d at 1378; Henderson v. Osguthorpe, 657 P.2d
1268, 1270 (Utah 1982); Ercanbrack, 524 P.2d at 597.
6 Utah Code section 36-1-3 was renumbered in
1953 to section 27-1-3 without changing the
language. See Utah Code Ann. § 27-1-3 (1953)
(amended 1963).
[*P31] Thus, under the modern statutes 7 and case
law, a private property owner would no longer be able to
reasonably rely on the government's acquiescence in
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private control to establish a claim of estoppel. See
Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v.
Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1378 (Utah 1987)
("[E]stoppel should not be available to circumvent the
statutory process. [***31] "). Instead, a property owner
can only claim reasonable reliance where the
governmental entity has made some affirmative
representation that it intended to abandon or vacate the
road in compliance with the statutory procedure. To hold
otherwise would come dangerously close to recognizing a
form [**757] of adverse possession against the
government whereby a private party could obtain
equitable rights in a public road merely by exercising
adverse control for a period of time. Utah law expressly
prohibits any person from acquiring rights in a public
road by adverse possession. See Utah Code Ann. §
78-12-13 (2002).
7 Utah Code section 27-12-90 was renumbered
in 1998 to section 72-5-105(1) and remains
substantively unchanged. See Act of 1998, ch.
270, § 133, 1998 Utah Laws 806, 861; Utah Code
Ann. § 72-5-105 (Supp. 2005). The current
statutory procedure for abandoning or vacating a
public road can be found at Utah Code section
72-3-108. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-108 (2001).
[***32] [*P32] In this case, there was no evidence
that Wasatch made any representation with respect to the
Four Roads, let alone a representation that the statutory
procedures had been or would be followed to abandon or
vacate the Four Roads. 8 Instead, the trial court based its
estoppel determination on the fact that Wasatch
acquiesced in the private control by "failing to bring an
action for twelve years." Therefore, we reverse the trial
court's judgment preventing Wasatch from enforcing the
public's rights in the Four Roads. 9

8 Because we hold that the Okelberrys have not
met the first element of a claim for equitable
estoppel, we need not address the remaining
elements.
9
Although our holding allows Wasatch to
enforce the public's rights to access the Four
Roads, nothing in this opinion should be read to
suggest that the public has obtained any rights,
hunting or otherwise, with respect to the
Okelberrys' private property abutting the roads.
On the contrary, members of the public are only
free to travel over the Four Roads and have no
rights, absent permission from the Okelberrys, to
enter onto their land, which remains private.
[***33] CONCLUSION
[*P33] We do not have a firm conviction that the
trial court erred when it determined that the Four Roads
were dedicated and abandoned to the public pursuant to
Utah Code section 72-5-104(1) after having been
continuously used as public thoroughfares for a period of
at least ten years. We also conclude that it was reversible
error for the trial court to apply the doctrine of equitable
estoppel against Wasatch's attempts to enforce the
public's rights to use the Four Roads. We therefore affirm
in part and reverse and remand in part for entry of
judgment consistent with this decision.
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge
[*P34] WE CONCUR:
Russell W. Bench,
Presiding Judge
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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OPINION
[**770] On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
DURRANT, Justice:

INTRODUCTION
[*P1] In this case and two companion cases that we
also decide today, 1 we consider the operation of Utah
Code section 72-5-104(1) (the "Dedication Statute"),
which provides as follows: "A highway is dedicated and
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of
ten years." 2 We granted certiorari in this case to consider
whether the court of appeals erred in its application of the
standard for ascertaining continuous use as a public
thoroughfare under this statute. We conclude that it did so
err. We reverse and remand for the entry of specific
findings of fact relevant to the standard we announce
today and for an application of that standard.
1 Town of Leeds v. Prisbrey, 2008 UT 11, 179
P.3d 757; Utah County v. Butler, 2008 UT 12,
179 P.3d 775.
2 Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) [***2] (2001).
BACKGROUND
[*P2] In 1957, Roy Okelberry and his sons, E. Ray
and Lee, purchased a large tract of land (the "Property")
in Wasatch County near Wallsburg, Utah. E. Ray and Lee
later acquired their father's interest in the Property.
Sometime thereafter, Lee sold his interest in the Property
to E. Ray and E. Ray's sons, Brian and Eric. E. Ray,
Brian, and Eric Okelberry (the "Okelberrys") currently
own the Property and use it for their livestock operations.
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[*P3] Several unimproved mountain roads cross the
Property, all of which begin and [**771] end (or
connect with roads that begin and end) at points outside
of it. Four of these roads are at issue in this case: Circle
Springs Road, Thorton Hollow Road, Parker Canyon
Road, and Ridge Line Road (collectively, the "Four
Roads"). 3 When Roy, E. Ray, and Lee Okelberry
purchased the Property in 1957, fences on its east and
south sides separated it from United States Forest Service
property, and wire gates along these fences controlled
access to the Four Roads, requiring persons entering or
exiting the Property to open the gates before proceeding.
3 The underlying lawsuit also included Maple
Canyon Road. The trial court found that this road
had not been dedicated [***3] and abandoned to
the public. Neither party appealed this decision,
and we do not address it here.
[*P4] In 2001, Wasatch County filed a Complaint
for Declaratory Judgment and Quiet Title against the
Okelberrys, the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources, 4
and West Daniels Land Association, 5 seeking to have the
Four Roads declared dedicated and abandoned to the use
of the public pursuant to Utah Code section 72-5-104. 6
During a three-day bench trial, Wasatch County
presented several witnesses who testified that they had
used the Four Roads without the Okelberrys' permission
for recreational purposes during the 1960s, 1970s, and
1980s. These witnesses also testified that although there
were gates on the roads, their use of the roads was
unrestricted. The Okelberrys presented evidence and
testimony that members of the public had not had
unrestricted access to the roads, but that the gates on the
roads had been locked, at least occasionally, as early as
the late 1950s and that "No Trespassing," "Keep Out," or
"Private" signs were posted. The Okelberrys testified that
they had given permission to a large number of people in
the community to use their roads and Property and had
sold trespass and [***4] hunting permits. And witnesses
testified that the Okelberrys, in the mid-1990s, placed
their Property in a cooperative wildlife management unit
for use as a private hunting unit. The Okelberrys and their
employees testified that when they encountered persons
on the Property or roads without express permission to be
there, they asked them to leave.
4 Wasatch County settled its dispute with the
Utah Division of Wildlife Resources in 2003.
5
Portions of Ridge Line Road and Parker

Canyon Road traverse property owned by West
Daniels Land Association (the "Association")
immediately adjacent to the Property. The
Okelberrys are members and shareholders in the
Association and use the Association's land,
together with their own, for grazing livestock. The
Association initially made an appearance through
counsel, but counsel later withdrew and no
successor was appointed. Wasatch County
thereafter sought default summary judgment
against the Association. The Okelberrys opposed
this motion, arguing that as members of the
Association they had "a vested interest to see that
no judgment is entered in this matter on behalf of
the plaintiff" and that, at trial, they "will present
evidence that there are [***5] no established
roads across the property of [the] Association."
For reasons that are unclear from the record, the
trial court did not enter a ruling on Wasatch
County's default judgment motion prior to trial. In
its posttrial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, the court noted that the Association's
"default was entered," but that the Okelberrys had
been allowed to submit "[e]vidence regarding the
use of those portions of the roads at issue which
are located in [the] Association's property" at trial.
The trial court made its determinations regarding
the Four Roads without distinguishing between
the Okelberrys' property and the Association's
property. We likewise do not distinguish between
the properties and refer only to the interests of the
Okelberrys because the parties have not appealed
this issue.
6 An earlier version of this statute was in effect
at the time Wasatch County claims the Four
Roads were dedicated and abandoned to the use of
the public. See Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89
(1995). A 1998 amendment to the earlier version
renumbered this section but made no substantive
changes to it. 1998 Utah Laws 861. We therefore
refer to the current version of the statute
throughout [***6] this opinion.
[*P5] At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial
court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and,
later, supplemental findings of fact. The trial court found
"that there was no public use of the various roads in the
1940s or before and also that no evidence of vehicular
use prior to the 1950s existed." The court recognized that
there were gates on the roads that the Okelberrys or their

Page 3
2008 UT 10, *P5; 179 P.3d 768, **771;
597 Utah Adv. Rep. 9; 2008 Utah LEXIS 15, ***6
employees locked "[a]t various times in the past," but
found that they were locked "on a more permanent basis"
beginning in the early 1990s. In addition, the court found
[**772] that "[p]rior to the gates being locked, the
existence of the gates did not interrupt the public's use of
the roads."
[*P6] In its Conclusions of Law, the trial court
stated as follows:
Taking even the [Okelberrys'] factual
assertions as true, it is clear that
individuals using the roads beginning in
the late 1950s until the late 1980s or early
1990s used the roads without interruption,
they used the roads freely, and though not
constantly, they used the roads
continuously as they needed. Therefore,
[the] Court finds that prior to the
interrupting mechanisms being put in
place the roads in question were subject to
continuous [***7] use . . . .
The trial court also found that the majority of those using
the roads were nonpermissive users and members of the
general public. Thus, the court determined that "[p]rior to
the locking of the gates in the early 1990s the roads were
used as public thoroughfares." And the court found "that
the continuous use as a public thoroughfare continued for
at least ten years, if not much longer, or for multiple
periods of ten years." The court therefore concluded that
Wasatch County had established by clear and convincing
evidence that the Four Roads had been abandoned and
dedicated to the public. The court decided, however, that
Wasatch County was equitably estopped from opening
the roads to public use because the Okelberrys had, since
1989, asserted private control over the roads. The court
stated that "[t]o allow the County now to assert an
ownership interest in these roads would cause the
Okelberrys injury [and] would be unjust."
[*P7] Wasatch County appealed the trial court's
equitable estoppel determination, and the Okelberrys
cross-appealed the court's decision that the Four Roads
had been dedicated to the public. The court of appeals
reversed the trial court's equitable estoppel [***8]
decision and upheld its decisions regarding the public
dedication of the Four Roads. 7 We granted certiorari to
determine whether the court of appeals applied the
correct standard for determining whether a road has been

continuously used as a public thoroughfare pursuant to
Utah Code section 72-5-104. The parties do not
challenge, and we do not address, the equitable estoppel
issue.
7 See Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2006 UT
App 473, P 33, 153 P.3d 745.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[*P8] "On certiorari, we review for correctness the
decision of the court of appeals, not the decision of the
district court." 8 "The correctness of the court of appeals'
decision turns on whether that court correctly reviewed
the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of
review." 9 An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal
interpretation of the Dedication Statute for correctness
and its factual findings for clear error. 10 But whether the
facts of a case satisfy the requirements of the Dedication
Statute is a mixed question of fact and law that involves
various and complex facts, evidentiary resolutions, and
credibility determinations. 11 Thus, an appellate court
reviews "a trial court's decision regarding [***9]
whether a public highway has been established under [the
Dedication Statute] . . . for correctness but grant[s] the
court significant discretion in its application of the facts
to the statute." 12
8 D.J. Inv. Group, L.L.C. v. DAE/Westbrook,
L.L.C., 2006 UT 62, P 10, 147 P.3d 414.
9 State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, P 7, 95 P.3d 276.
10 See State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, P 20, 144
P.3d 1096.
11 Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307,
309-10 (Utah 1997).
12 Id. at 310.
ANALYSIS
[*P9] Both the United States and Utah
Constitutions prohibit uncompensated takings of private
property. 13 Yet, under certain circumstances, Utah
statutory law allows property to be transferred from
private to public use without compensation. The
Dedication Statute at issue in this case allows [**773]
for such a transfer. The statute provides that "[a] highway
is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when
it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for
a period of ten years." 14 In light of the constitutional
protection accorded private property, we have held that a
party seeking to establish dedication and abandonment

Page 4
2008 UT 10, *P9; 179 P.3d 768, **773;
597 Utah Adv. Rep. 9; 2008 Utah LEXIS 15, ***9
under this statute bears the burden of doing so by clear
and convincing evidence. 15
13 U.S. Const. amend. V [***10] ("[N]or shall
private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation."); Utah Const. art. I, § 22
("Private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation.").
14 Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) (2001).
15 See Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888
P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995); Bonner v. Sudbury,
18 Utah 2d 140, 417 P.2d 646, 648 (Utah 1966).
[*P10] In a number of our past cases, we have
sought to interpret the phrase "continuously used as a
public thoroughfare." We have explained that such use
occurs when "the public, even though not consisting of a
great many persons, [makes] a continuous and
uninterrupted use" of a road "as often as they [find] it
convenient or necessary." 16 The court of appeals,
borrowing language from one of our cases dealing with
the doctrine of right-of-way by prescription, has added to
this definition as follows: "'[U]se may be continuous
though not constant[] . . . provided it occurred as often as
the claimant had occasion or chose to pass. [. . .] Mere
intermission is not interruption.'" 17
16 Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395, 326 P.2d 107,
109 (Utah 1958).
17 Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806,
809 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Richards v.
Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d 948, 949 (Utah
1977)). [***11] The entire passage from which
this quote was extracted reads as follows:
"A way may be established by
prescription
without
direct
evidence of its actual use during
each year. A use may be
continuous though not constant. A
right of way means a right to pass
over another's land, more or less
frequently, according to the nature
of the use to be made by the
easement; and how frequently is
immaterial, provided it occurred as
often as the claimant had occasion
or chose to pass. It must appear not
to have been interrupted by the
owner of the land across which the

right is exercised, nor voluntarily
abandoned by the claimant. Mere
intermission is not interruption."
Richards, 559 P.2d at 949 (quoting 1 Thompson
on Real Property § 464 (1924)).
[*P11] Despite the best efforts of this court and the
court of appeals, a workable interpretation of "continuous
use" in the context of the Dedication Statute has remained
elusive. We have described ourselves as "hard-pressed to
establish a coherent and consistent statement of the law
on a fact-intensive, case-by-case review of trial court
rulings." 18 In reviewing the case now before us, the court
of appeals thoughtfully sought to bring some coherency
and consistency [***12] to this area of the law by
articulating a balancing test:
In deciding whether a locked gate acted
as an interruptive force sufficient to restart
the running of the statutory ten-year
period, the trial court should weigh the
evidence regarding the duration and
frequency that the gate was locked against
the frequency and volume of public use to
determine if there is clear and convincing
evidence that public use of the road was
continuous. 19

18 Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307,
310 (Utah 1997).
19 Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2006 UT App
473, P 18, 153 P.3d 745. The balancing test
articulated by the court of appeals applies only to
locked gates, but it could arguably apply to other
types of interruptions, and we consider its
potentially broad application here.
[*P12] We find the court of appeals' approach
problematic. The proposed test could be read to suggest
that the elements of the Dedication Statute are met where
the duration and frequency of continuous use as a public
thoroughfare simply outweigh the duration and frequency
of interruption during a ten-year period. Under this
standard, it could be argued that even where there is a
significant interruption in the use of a road, if the
[***13] period of use is greater than the length of the
interruption, the requirements of the Dedication Statute
would be satisfied. We think it unlikely that this is what
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the Legislature intended when it required that a road be
"continuously used." Indeed, to balance interruptions in
use against frequency of use in order to determine
whether a road was continuously used is inconsistent with
the very notion of continuous use--any sufficient
interruption in use necessarily makes use noncontinuous.
Moreover, we think that this balancing test fails to
remedy the lack of [**774] predictability from which
this area of the law suffers. Thus, while we reject the
court of appeals' interpretive approach, its careful review
of our case law and attempt to bring coherence to that
case law highlights for us the need for a clear, workable
standard. We take this opportunity to articulate such a
standard.
[*P13] In interpreting a statute, our goal is to
ascertain the Legislature's intent. 20 We do so by first
evaluating "the 'best evidence' of legislative intent,
namely, 'the plain language of the statute itself.'" 21 We
give the words of a statute their "plain, natural, ordinary,
and commonly understood meaning, in the [***14]
absence of any statutory or well-established technical
meaning, unless it is plain from the statute that a different
meaning is intended." 22
20 See Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, P 16, 158
P.3d 540.
21 Id. (quoting State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, P
8, 52 P.3d 1276).
22 State v. Navaro, 83 Utah 6, 26 P.2d 955, 956
(Utah 1933).
[*P14] The word "continuously" is neither defined
in the Dedication Statute nor imbued with technical
meaning. Thus, we understand "continuously" to have its
plain meaning of "without interruption." 23 A party
claiming dedication must therefore establish by clear and
convincing evidence that a road has been used without
interruption as a public thoroughfare for ten years in
order for the road to become dedicated to public use.
23
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary
defines "continuous" as "marked by uninterrupted
extension in space, time, or sequence."
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 270
(11th ed. 2003).
[*P15] The lack of clarity in this area of the law
stems largely from the fact that we have never set forth a
standard for determining what qualifies as a sufficient
interruption to restart the running of the required ten-year

period under the Dedication Statute. We do so now by
setting [***15] forth a bright-line rule by which we
intend to make application of the Dedication Statute more
predictable:
An overt act that is intended by a
property owner to interrupt the use of a
road as a public thoroughfare, and is
reasonably calculated to do so, constitutes
an interruption sufficient to restart the
running of the required ten-year period
under the Dedication Statute.
This rule does not change the burden of the party
claiming dedication. For a highway to be deemed
dedicated to the public, the party claiming dedication
must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
road at issue was continuously used as a public
thoroughfare for a period of ten years; credible evidence
of the type of interruption defined above--an overt act
intended to and reasonably calculated to interrupt use of a
road as a public thoroughfare--simply precludes a finding
of continuous use.
[*P16] In order to elucidate this standard, we think
it helpful to distinguish between an interruption in use
and an intermission in use. The distinction lies in the
intent and conduct of the property owner. As noted
above, a road may be used continuously even if it is not
used constantly or frequently. 24 For example, a [***16]
road may be used by only one person once a month, but if
this use is as frequent as the public finds it "convenient or
necessary," 25 and the landowner has taken no action
intended and reasonably calculated to interrupt use, the
use is continuous. The one-month period of time between
usages is a mere intermission, not an interruption.
Likewise, a road may be heavily traveled by the public
during certain times of the year but impassable because
of weather-related conditions at other times. Though the
use is not constant, if it occurs as often as the public finds
it convenient or necessary, and the landowner has taken
no action intended and reasonably calculated to interrupt
use, the use is continuous. The period of impassability
due to weather is a mere intermission, not an interruption.
24 See Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d
806, 809 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
25 Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395, 326 P.2d 107,
109 (Utah 1958).
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[**775] [*P17] Continuous use may be established as
to heavily or lightly used roads, as long as the use is as
frequent as the public finds it convenient or necessary.
We emphasize here, however, that the action necessary
by the landowner to establish an interruption in public
use does not vary [***17] depending on the level of
public use. An overt act intended and reasonably
calculated to interrupt public use restarts the statutory
period, and the effectiveness of such act is not tied to the
level of public use. In other words, an act by a landowner
sufficient to interrupt public use of a road used on a daily
basis by the public is also sufficient to interrupt public
use of a road used on a monthly basis by the public.

[*P19] The Okelberrys also claimed at trial that the
gates were periodically locked for several days at a time
beginning in the late 1950s. Here again, while the trial
court assumed this claim to be true for purposes of its
analysis, it did not make a factual finding on this issue.
The locking of gates for several days at a time constitutes
an overt act intended to interrupt public use and
reasonably calculated to do so. But factual questions
remain as to whether and when such an event or events
occurred. We therefore remand this case for the trial court
to make these factual determinations.

[*P18] We now apply our newly articulated test to
the facts of the case at hand. The Okelberrys asserted at
trial that there were signs on the roads indicating "No
Trespassing," "Keep Out," or "Private," and that
trespassers were at times asked to leave. Wasatch County
conceded that such signs were posted, but argued that
they referred only to property adjoining the roads and not
the roads themselves. While the trial court assumed the
Okelberrys' assertions to be true for purposes of its
analysis, it made no actual findings as to when the signs
were posted, what they appeared to reference, or whether
trespassers were asked to leave. Thus, while it is clear
that the posting of the signs constituted an overt act, it
remains a factual question whether the Okelberrys
intended [***18] the signs to interrupt public use of the
roads and whether the posting of the signs was
reasonably calculated to do so. Questions also remain as
to when the signs were posted and whether trespassers
were asked to leave, and if so, when and how many.

[*P20] Utah Code section 72-5-104(1) provides
that "[a] highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use
of the public when it has been continuously used as a
public thoroughfare for a period of ten years." We hold
today that an overt act that is intended by the property
owner to interrupt the use of a road as a public
thoroughfare, and is reasonably calculated [***19] to do
so, is an interruption in continuous use sufficient to
restart the running of the ten-year period under this
statute. If a party produces credible evidence of such an
interruption, this evidence will preclude a finding of
continuous use. Because the trial court did not make
specific findings of fact regarding the Okelberrys'
evidence of interruption in the use of the Four Roads as
public thoroughfares, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CONCLUSION

[*P21] Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief
Justice Wilkins, Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring
concur in Justice Durrant's opinion.
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Evidence that use of road across defendant's land by
public was largely confined to persons who wanted to use
creek land for fishing and hunting, and that gate had been
maintained across road from time to time, established that
use of road was permissive, and that no right to use of
road by public was obtained by prescription through long
and uninterrupted use thereof.
4. Injunction

Corrected and affirmed.
DISPOSITION: Corrected and affirmed.
HEADNOTES
1. Judgment
Where, in suit in equity to enjoin interference with
use of an alleged public road, full record of criminal
prosecution of complainant for trespass arising out of use
of such road was by agreement offered in evidence on
issue as to character of road, probative force of such
evidence could not be disregarded.

Where there is grave doubt as to complainant's right,
preliminary injunctive relief will generally be denied.
5. Highways
In suit in equity to enjoin interference with use of an
alleged public road, where it was reasonably apparent
that all material facts were presented on hearing to
dissolve preliminary injunction, and such facts
foreshadowed a final result contrary to complainant's
theory, chancellor properly dissolved preliminary
injunction.
6. Appeal and error

2. Highways
The placing of obstructions by owner across a road
on his land is a strong indication that use by others of
road is permissive only, and the erection of a gate across
a road tends to evidence an intention on the part of owner
to assume and assert ownership and possession of the
land over which the road runs.
3. Highways

In suit in equity to enjoin interference with use of an
alleged public road, where it appeared chancellor was of
impression that submission was for a final decree, and a
decree was rendered in accordance with such view, but
submission was only upon motion to dissolve preliminary
injunction, decree would be corrected to extent of giving
it a limitation to the motion only.
COUNSEL: Chauncey Sparks, of Eufaula, for appellant.
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As a general rule an open, defined roadway in continuous
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for a period of twenty years becomes a public highway by
prescription. Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Faulkner, 217
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permissive only, in recognition of his title and right to
claim possession. Ritter v. Hewitt, supra; Central of
Georgia R. Co. v. Faulkner, supra. It is the character
rather than the quantum of use that controls. Ritter v.
Hewitt, supra; Cabbell v. Williams, 127 Ala. 320, 28 So.
405. The hearing on a motion to dissolve a temporary
injunction granted without a hearing should be
considered [***2] on the same basis as the granting of an
injunction after hearing, under Code 1923, §§ 8304,
8305, 8307. Lynne v. Ralph, 201 Ala. 535, 78 So. 889.
Where, if the defendant's allegations are true, the
injunction will do him no harm and, if the plaintiff's
allegations are true, a dissolution will involve him in
irreparable injury, the injunction will not be dissolved.
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216 Ala. 486, 113 So. 516; Fleming v. Bryars, 227 Ala.
660, 151 So. 846; Cruce v. McCombs, 221 Ala. 507, 129
So. 279; Dean v. Coosa County Lbr. Co., 232 Ala. 177,
167 So. 566; Hancock v. Watt, 233 Ala. 29, 169 So. 704.
Ex parte affidavits may be offered and considered in
support of any of the facts in issue on granting or
dissolution of temporary injunction. Authorities, supra.
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see Stollenwerck v. Greil, 205 Ala. 217, 87 So. 338;
Harper v. State, 109 Ala. 66, 19 So. 901; McDade v.
State, 95 Ala. 28, 11 So. 375; Lewman & Co. v. Andrews,
129 Ala. 170, 29 So. 692. Appellant's case is rested upon
the theory that the road has been in use for a period of

twenty years; that is, the public has a prescriptive right to
it. Such right must be under a claim adverse and
continuous for a period of twenty years. It cannot be
permissive; for permissive use, however long, would
never ripen into prescription. Merchant v. Markham, 170
Ala. 278, 54 So. 236; Elliott, Roads & Streets, 137;
Gosdin v. Williams, 151 Ala. 592, 44 So. 611; Jones v.
Bright, 140 Ala. 268, 37 So. 79; Beverly v. State, 28 Ala.
App. 451, 185 So. 768.
JUDGES: LUCIEN D. GARDNER, C. J. WILLIAM H.
THOMAS, VIRGIL BOULDIN and ARTHUR B.
FOSTER, JJ., concurred.
OPINION BY: GARDNER
OPINION
[***4]
Justice.

[*526]

[**119]

GARDNER, Chief

Complainant filed this bill seeking injunctive relief
against respondents' obstruction of a certain road, which
he insists is a public road, leading from the Hitchitie
Settlement road and across the lands of respondents, into
and through his lands.
There is no pretense this road was established or
maintained by any public authorities, but complainant's
case rests solely upon the doctrine of prescription through
long and uninterrupted use thereof by the public as a
matter of right. Ritter v. Hewitt, 236 Ala. 205, 181 So.
289; Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Faulkner, 217 Ala. 82,
114 So. 686; Newell v. Dempsey, 219 Ala. 634, 122 So.
881.
Nor is it questioned that complainant has shown
damage peculiar to himself, that is, as to the matter of
practical access from his lands to the public markets, and
necessity for the road for the proper enjoyment of his
property. Ritter v. Hewitt, supra.
The case presents purely a question of fact--whether
the road is in fact a public road or only a private or
plantation road, as some of the witnesses denominate it.
Respondents insist that whatever [***5] use was
made of this road by the public was permissive only, and
that there has been no such continuous and uninterrupted
use by anyone for the prescriptive period of twenty years,
such as to create a presumption of dedication. Newell v.
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Dempsey, supra.
On the motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction
writ theretofore issued numerous affidavits were offered
by the respective parties. Those for complainant tended to
show continuous and uninterrupted use of the road by the
parties as a matter of right for a period of more than
twenty years, and pictures were introduced of some
portions of the road indicating long usage,--some of the
affidavits stating as much as fifty years or more. Most of
these affidavits are of the same verbiage with changes
only as to the length of time affiant had known the road,
and it appears some of them were fully prepared when
presented to the affiant for signature. A number of those
giving affidavits to complainant (among them Arrant,
Screws, Jackson and Kelly) subsequently repudiated the
statement therein that the road was a public road, and
made affidavits for respondents in support of the theory
of its private character, and that whatever [***6] use was
made of the road was permissive only.
In addition, respondents offer affidavits of a number
of citizens familiar with the road to the effect it was
always considered simply as a plantation road, and that
no member of the public made use thereof as a matter of
right.
Perhaps considered from the standpoint of affidavits
alone, the preponderance of the proof supports
respondents' theory of the case. But the submission was
not on affidavits alone. Several of the affiants testified in
the criminal prosecution case of complainant when
charged with trespass,--the presiding judge being the
same official who sat as chancellor in this equity
proceeding. [**120] Among other issues in that
prosecution was that of the character of this particular
road, and the chancellor on that trial saw and heard the
witnesses as they testified in regard thereto. The full
record of that trial was by agreement offered in evidence
on this submission, and its probative force as thus
indicated cannot be disregarded. Nelson v. Hammonds,
173 Ala. 14, 55 So. 301.
There are other material facts disclosed by all the
proof which we consider of much importance. Affiant
Newsome gives a history [***7] of this road, and his
affidavit discloses that in fact there have been in the
course of forty-five years three roads along this general
direction--all of a private character. He details the
disagreement arising over one of these roads, and the
change to the present road, and that this affiant himself

built a wire fence across this road in 1916, which
completely [*527] closed it for two years or more. Then
there was a gate across this road, sometimes kept closed;
and in 1924, 1925 and 1926, when one Bellamy lived at
the "Treadaway Home House" (as we understand the
record, complainant now owns the Treadaway place), the
gate across the road was "kept nailed up most of the
time." Bellamy states that this road "comes to a dead end
and stops in the upper part of the Treadaway place." On
one of the maps in evidence, the terminus of this road is
marked "cattle pen," which is on complainant's land, and
where the proof shows a gate across the road. The proof
is also to the effect there has been, and is now, a gate
across this road on respondents' land.
We find no denial of these salient facts in
complainant's affidavits. He states: "I have occupied or
used land in this community for the [***8] last twelve
years. During that time this road has been continuously
used by the public. Although it might have been closed
by a gate in the summer time, I never locked this gate, but
it was left unlocked for the purpose of admitting, back
and forth, the public in the use of said road. * * * It was a
public road, continuously used by the public, although
occasionally fastened to keep cattle in, but not by a
permanent gate or fence. There was always left a gap
open which the public could easily unlatch and continue
along said public road."
It must be conceded that obstructions placed across a
road, as indicated by this proof, is a strong indication that
the use by others is permissive only, and the erection of a
gate across a road tends to evidence an intention on the
part of the owner to assume and assert ownership and
possession of the land over which the road runs. Such
was the holding of this court in Whaley v. Wilson, 120
Ala. 502, 24 So. 855, the criticism of which in Locklin v.
Tucker, 208 Ala. 155, 93 So. 896, did not reach this
particular question. See, also, 19 Corpus Juris 897, 898.
We think it clear enough from the proof the use by
the public was [***9] largely confined to those persons
who wanted to use the creek lands for fishing and
hunting, and, indeed, the very "dead end" of the road at a
gate on complainant's lands also indicates its limited use
for those on his own as well as respondents' plantation.
Each case must of course rest upon its own peculiar facts,
but the discussion found in the opinion of Newell v.
Dempsey, 219 Ala. 634, 122 So. 881, is helpful.
Complainant himself occupied respondents' land as
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tenant for some years and raised objections at times to the
general use of the road by others. But in all events,
admittedly, the gates have all along been across the road
from time to time. From all the proof we think it clear
that a permissive use only is shown.
Complainant's
counsel
argues
that
upon
consideration of the motion to dissolve the injunction the
matter of relative injury to one with no resultant harm to
the other of the parties is to be weighed, and if the
retention of the injunction will do respondents no harm,
while its dissolution will work irreparable injury to
complainant, the injunction will be retained for a final
hearing of the cause. Profile Cotton Mills Co. v. Calhoun
Water Co., 189 Ala. 181, 66 So. 50. [***10]
But this same authority states and gives application
to another well-recognized rule (5 Pomeroy Equity Jur.
section 264) to the effect that where there is grave doubt
as to complainant's right, preliminary relief will generally
be denied. See, also, to like effect, 32 Corpus Juris, §
680, p. 402. We think this latter principle applicable here.
It is reasonably apparent that all the material facts
have on this hearing been presented, and all these facts
being considered in conjunction with the admitted proof
as herein outlined, foreshadows [**121] the final result
contrary to complainant's theory of the case. Such being

our conviction, the chancellor is not to be held in error in
the decree dissolving the injunction.
It appears from a study of this record that the
chancellor in fact was of the impression the submission
was for final decree, and a decree was rendered in
accordance with this view. But as we read the order of
submission, it was only upon motion to dissolve, and it
becomes necessary to correct the decree to the extent of
giving it a limitation to the motion only.
Though mentioned in the pleading, we find no
serious argument that the matter of the character of the
[***11] road, whether public or private, became res
adjudicata as to this proceeding by reason of
complainant's acquittal in his prosecution case for
trespass, [*528] and we consider it needs no discussion
here.
The decree appealed from is corrected, as
hereinabove indicated, and as thus corrected will be
affirmed, with the cost of this appeal to be taxed against
appellant.
Corrected and affirmed.
THOMAS, BOULDIN, and FOSTER, JJ., concur.
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[**778] On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
DURRANT, Justice:

INTRODUCTION
[*P1] In this and two companion cases that we also
decide today, 1 we consider the operation and application
of Utah Code section 72-5-104(1) (the "Dedication
Statute"). The Dedication Statute provides that "[a]
highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the
public when it has been continuously used as a public
thoroughfare for a period of ten years." 2 We granted
certiorari in this case to review three issues related to the
Dedication Statute: (1) whether the court of appeals erred
in evaluating the trial court's determination that the public
had continuously used the road at issue in this case
according to the requirements of the Dedication Statute;
(2) whether [***2] trespassing may constitute a public
use pursuant to the Dedication Statute; and (3) whether
the court of appeals erred in reviewing the trial court's
failure to designate a specific ten-year period of
continuous use and, if so, whether that failure constituted
reversible error. We affirm the decision of the court of
appeals, which, like the trial court, found the road at issue
to be dedicated and abandoned as a public highway. 3
1 Town of Leeds v. Prisbrey, 2008 UT 11, 179
P.3d 757; Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT
10, 179 P.3d 768.
2 Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) (2001).
3 Utah County v. Butler, 2006 UT App 444, P
24, 147 P.3d 963.
[*P2] We also granted certiorari to determine

Page 2
2008 UT 12, *P2; 179 P.3d 775, **778;
597 Utah Adv. Rep. 5; 2008 Utah LEXIS 17, ***2
whether the court of appeals erred in its application of
Utah Code section 72-7-104(4) to the facts of this case.
As to this issue, we reverse the decision of the court of
appeals.
BACKGROUND
[*P3] Bennie Creek Road (the "Road") begins in
Birdseye, Utah, at a junction with U.S. Highway 89 and
proceeds approximately two and one-half miles west until
it reaches the edge of the Uinta National Forest. The
Road continues into the forest, providing access to hiking
trails, camping areas, and the Nebo Loop Road. Before
entering the forest, [***3] the Road crosses real property
owned by Randy Butler, Donna Butler, Blaine Evans, and
Linda Evans (collectively, the "Butlers").
[*P4] In 1996, Mr. Butler erected a locked gate
across the Road. The following year, Utah County served
Mr. Butler with notices instructing him to remove the
gate. Mr. [**779] Butler did not remove the gate and
Utah County thereafter filed this action to have the Road
declared dedicated and abandoned to public use pursuant
to Utah Code section 72-5-104(1). 4 Utah County also
sought an order enjoining the Butlers from blocking
access to the Road and forcing them to remove the gate
and requested monetary relief from the Butlers of ten
dollars a day for each day the Road remained closed
following delivery of the notices pursuant to Utah Code
section 72-7-104(4).
4 An earlier version of this statute was in effect
at the time Utah County claims the Road was
dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public.
See Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89 (1995). A 1998
amendment to the earlier version renumbered this
section but made no substantive changes to it.
1998 Utah Laws 861. We therefore refer to the
current version of the statute throughout this
opinion.
[*P5] During an eight-day bench trial, [***4] the
trial court heard testimony from over sixty
witnesses--including previous and current owners of the
relevant property, various recreational users of the Road,
Utah Division of Wildlife Resources employees, Uinta
National Forest workers, and county employees assigned
to maintain the Road--regarding the use and condition of
the Road from 1925 to the present time. These witnesses
provided conflicting testimony as to the presence and
purpose of gates on the Road, the placement of "No

Trespassing" signs, and the necessity of obtaining
permission of a landowner to use the Road.
[*P6] In its Findings of Fact, the trial court cited the
conflicting testimony regarding locked gates. The gates,
the court found, were used for controlling livestock "and
not intended to restrict travel on the Road." The court
also found that the signs and painted posts along the
Road were positioned such that "they prohibited travel
off of the Road, not on the Road." And with respect to
other evidence that travel on the Road was restricted, the
court found that winter snow impeded all travel on the
Road, and that springs or bogs, which flooded the Road
in wet years, impeded travel by vehicle but not by foot,
horseback, [***5] or wagon. The court also found that,
although there was testimony that the Road was at times
impassable because it was used to deliver irrigation
water, "[a] clear and convincing majority of witnesses . . .
traveled the Road unrestricted by irrigation practices."
Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that the
Road "has been dedicated and abandoned to the use of
the public because it has been continuously used as a
public thoroughfare for a period of ten years" and ordered
the Butlers to remove "anything that blocks, locks, or
otherwise interferes with public access across the Road."
[*P7] Although the trial court otherwise found in
favor of Utah County, the court denied Utah County's
request for damages. The court explained in its
Memorandum Decision that "for some of the time since
construction of the metal Butler gate the [R]oad has been
obstructed and for some of the time it has not." Because
the county did not present evidence "to clarify how many
of the intervening 2,561 days were days when the [R]oad
was obstructed and how many were not," the court chose
not to impose a monetary penalty on the Butlers.
[*P8] The Butlers appealed the court's decision
regarding the public dedication [***6] of the Road, and
Utah County cross-appealed the court's failure to award
damages. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
conclusion that the Road has been dedicated and
abandoned to public use but reversed its damages
determination. 5 We granted certiorari on three issues
relating to the court of appeals' application of the
Dedication Statute and one issue regarding the award of
damages.
5 Utah County v. Butler, 2006 UT App 444, 147
P.3d 963.
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STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[*P9] "On certiorari, we review for correctness the
decision of the court of appeals, not the decision of the
district court." 6 "The correctness of the court of appeals'
decision turns on whether that court correctly [**780]
reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate
standard of review." 7 As to the Dedication Statute, "[a]n
appellate court reviews a trial court's legal interpretation
of the Dedication Statute for correctness and its factual
findings for clear error." 8 But whether the facts of a case
satisfy the requirements of the Dedication Statute is a
mixed question of fact and law that involves various and
complex facts, evidentiary resolutions, and credibility
determinations. 9 An appellate court therefore reviews
[***7] "a trial court's decision regarding whether a public
highway has been established under [the Dedication
Statute] . . . for correctness but grant[s] the court
significant discretion in its application of the facts to the
statute." 10 The question of whether the court of appeals
properly awarded damages under Utah Code section
72-7-104(4) is an issue of statutory interpretation, a
question of law that we review for correctness. 11
6 D.J. Inv. Group, L.L.C. v. DAE/Westbrook,
L.L.C., 2006 UT 62, P 10, 147 P.3d 414.
7 State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, P 7, 95 P.3d 276.
8 Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, P
8, 179 P.3d 768.
9 Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307,
309-10 (Utah 1997).
10 Id. at 310.
11 See Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, P 5, 162 P.3d
1099.
ANALYSIS
[*P10] We granted certiorari to review three issues
concerning the Dedication Statute, which reads as
follows: "A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the
use of the public when it has been continuously used as a
public thoroughfare for a period of ten years." 12 The
three issues relate to each of the three elements of this
statute--"continuous use," "a public thoroughfare," and "a
period of ten years"--which we review, in that order,
below. Following [***8] our review of the elements of
the Dedication Statute, we address the final issue on
which we granted certiorari, which concerns the damages
to which a party claiming dedication is entitled under
Utah Code section 72-7-104(4).

12 Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) (2001).
I. CONTINUOUS USE
[*P11] We first consider the court of appeals'
affirmation of the trial court's finding that the Road was
continuously used as a public thoroughfare. The Butlers
argue that the trial court failed to consider a variety of
circumstances that interrupted the public's continuous use
of the road. We require parties challenging factual
findings of a lower court to "first marshal all the evidence
in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the
evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding
even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the
court below." 13 To accomplish this, a party "may not
simply cite to the evidence which supports his or her
position and hope to prevail." 14 Rather, a party should
"construct the evidence supporting the adversary's
position, and then 'ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence.'"
15 "[P]arties that fail to marshal the evidence do so at the
risk that the reviewing court [***9] will decline . . . to
review the trial court's factual findings." 16 Nevertheless,
we "retain[] discretion to consider independently the
whole record and determine if the decision below has
adequate factual support." 17
13 Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp.,
2002 UT 94, P 21, 54 P.3d 1177.
14 Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, P 9, 144
P.3d 1147.
15 Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2007 UT 42, P
17, 164 P.3d 384 (quoting West Valley City v.
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah
1991)).
16 Id. P 19.
17 Id. P 20.
[*P12] In this case, the Butlers completely failed to
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's
conclusion that the Road was continuously used as a
public thoroughfare. In their brief, the Butlers simply
asserted that "[t]here is no evidence to marshal in support
of the district court's finding." This assertion is patently
false, as there is abundant evidence in the record [**781]
supporting the trial court's finding. Moreover, the trial
court repeatedly referenced such evidence in its written
decision. Because the Butlers' failure to marshal is
particularly egregious, we would ordinarily decline to
review the factual findings of the [***10] lower court
under these circumstances. But because we decide this
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case in tandem with two companion cases that also
involve the Dedication Statute, 18 one of which sets forth
the standard for ascertaining whether a road has been
"continuously used," 19 we choose to exercise our
discretion and review the merits of the Butlers' arguments
regarding continuous use in order to elucidate this
standard by applying it to specific facts.
18 Town of Leeds v. Prisbrey, 2008 UT 12, 179
P.3d 757; Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT
10, 179 P.3d 768.
19 See Wasatch County, 2008 UT 10, P 15.
[*P13] The Butlers argue that the Road was not
continuously used as a public thoroughfare because travel
on the Road was interrupted by naturally occurring
weather conditions, irrigation water, and locked gates.
Additionally, the Butlers argue that use of the Road was
not continuous because there were "No Trespassing"
signs along the Road and the landowners, on occasion,
called the county sheriff to have trespassers removed
from their property. As we explain below, none of these
occurrences amounted to an interruption in the public's
continuous use of the Road for purposes of the
Dedication Statute.
[*P14] A road is continuously [***11] used as a
public thoroughfare when "the public . . . [makes] a
continuous and uninterrupted use" of the road "as often as
they [find] it convenient or necessary." 20 This "'use may
be continuous though not constant[] . . . provided it
[occurs] as often as the claimant [has] occasion or
[chooses] to pass. [. . .] Mere intermission is not
interruption.'" 21 In a companion case that we decide
today, we hold that "[a]n overt act that is intended by a
property owner to interrupt the use of a road as a public
thoroughfare, and is reasonably calculated to do so,
constitutes an interruption sufficient to restart the running
of the required ten-year period under the Dedication
Statute." 22 Credible evidence of such an interruption
precludes a finding of continuous use. 23
20 Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395, 326 P.2d 107,
109 (Utah 1958).
21 Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806,
809 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d
948, 949 (Utah 1977)).
22 Wasatch County, 2008 UT 10, P 15.
23 Id.

[*P15] As to the Road, groundwater that flooded
the Road in the spring and snow that covered the Road in
the winter did not interrupt the Road's continuous use for
purposes of the Dedication [***12] Statute. These
conditions, natural in origin, were not overt acts
undertaken by the Road's owner.
[*P16] Irrigation water that flooded the Road and
gates along the Road, even though the result of overt acts,
also did not interrupt continuous use of the Road for
purposes of the Dedication Statute. The Road was
periodically used to deliver irrigation water to property
along the Road, but the record includes no evidence that
the Road was flooded by the Road owner with the intent
to interrupt the Road's continuous use as a public
thoroughfare rather than to simply deliver irrigation
water. Thus, because the overt acts undertaken to effect
irrigation were not undertaken with the requisite intent of
interrupting continuous use, they do not constitute an
interruption sufficient to restart the running of the
Dedication Statute's ten-year period. Similarly, the trial
court found that gates along the Road were erected, and
occasionally locked, for the purpose of controlling
livestock. It explicitly found that the gates were not
meant to restrict public travel on the Road. Although
gates can, under appropriate circumstances, constitute an
interruption for purposes of the Dedication Statute, 24 the
gates [***13] on the Road [**782] were not erected or
locked with the requisite intent and therefore did not
interrupt the public's continuous use of the Road.
24 See id. P 19 ("The locking of gates for several
days at a time constitutes an overt act intended to
interrupt public use and reasonably calculated to
do so.").
[*P17] The Butlers' arguments that removing
trespassers from and posting "No Trespassing" signs
alongside the Road interrupted the Road's continuous use
as a public thoroughfare are likewise without merit. The
only evidence regarding the removal of trespassers
relevant to the time period during which the trial court
found the Road to have been continuously used was the
testimony of one witness who was "hunting well off the
Road" at the time he was asked to leave. Because this
individual was not removed from the Road itself, the
action of the property owner does not constitute an overt
act intended and reasonably calculated to interrupt
continuous use of the Road as a public thoroughfare.
Likewise, the trial court found that "No Trespassing"
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signs prohibited travel off of the Road, but not on the
Road. Signs posted against travel on property adjacent to
the Road do not constitute an interruption [***14] of
travel on the Road itself. Thus, because none of the
actions cited by the Butlers amount to an overt act
intended and reasonably calculated to interrupt the use of
the Road as a public thoroughfare, we affirm the court of
appeals' conclusion that the trial court did not err in
determining that the Road was continuously used as a
public thoroughfare for purposes of the Dedication
Statute. 25
25 See Utah County v. Butler, 2006 UT App 444,
P 15, 147 P.3d 963.

with apparent authority to act for
the owner;
(ii) fencing or other enclosure
obviously designed to exclude
intruders; or
(iii)
posting
of
signs
reasonably likely to come to the
attention of intruders . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(2) (2003 & Supp.
2007).
27 Utah County v. Butler, 2006 UT App 444, P
11, 147 P.3d 963.

II. PUBLIC THOROUGHFARE
[*P18] We next consider whether trespassing may
constitute a "public" use pursuant to the Dedication
Statute. The Butlers argue that some trespassers should
not be considered members of the public for purposes of
determining whether a road was continuously used as a
public thoroughfare. Specifically, they contend that
trespassers who knowingly use a private road without
permission--in other words, criminal trespassers 26 --are
not members of the public for purposes of the Dedication
Statute. They contend that only persons who use a road
without knowledge of its private status--individuals they
call "good faith" trespassers--are members of the public
capable of continuously using a road as a public
thoroughfare. [***15] The court of appeals rejected the
Butlers' arguments and "agree[d] with the trial court that
trespassers are members of the 'public' for purposes of
determining whether the Dedication Statute has been
satisfied." 27
26 Utah Code section 76-6-206 defines criminal
trespass. The relevant subsection reads as follows:
(2) A person is guilty of criminal
trespass if . . .
...
(b) knowing his entry or
presence is unlawful, he enters or
remains on property as to which
notice against entering is given by:
(i) personal communication to
the actor by the owner or someone

[*P19] We have explained that certain persons are
not members of the public for purposes of the Dedication
Statute. Individuals with a private right to use a road,
such as adjoining property owners who "may have
documentary or prescriptive rights to use the road," are
not members of the public, nor are those who have been
given [***16] permission to use a road. 28 But other than
these two classes of individuals, we have not otherwise
defined who constitutes the public for purposes of the
Dedication Statute. To determine whether trespassers
constitute members of the public for purposes of the
statute, we must ascertain the intent of the legislature. 29
This we do by evaluating "the 'best evidence' of
legislative intent, namely, 'the plain language of the
statute itself.'" 30
28 Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d
1097, 1099 (Utah 1995).
29 See Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, P 16, 158
P.3d 540.
30 Id. (quoting State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, P
8, 52 P.3d 1276).
[**783] [*P20] Here, the Dedication Statute does
not reference or imply the character of the use required of
the user, only that users be members of the "public." The
"public" is commonly understood to be "the people as a
whole." 31 The plain language of the statute does not
exclude trespassers, including criminal trespassers, from
the class of persons who constitute the "public." All
trespassers are therefore "public" users capable of
continuously using a road for purposes of dedication. We
affirm the court of appeals' conclusion in this regard. 32
31

Merriam-Webster's Collegiate [***17]
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Dictionary 1005 (11th ed. 2003).
32 See Utah County, 147 P.3d 963, 2006 UT
App 444, P 11.
[*P21] Although we conclude that trespassers can
establish a public highway, we stress that a road owner
can preclude a finding of continuous use established by
trespassers by providing credible evidence of an overt act
intended and reasonably calculated to interrupt the use of
the road as a public thoroughfare. For example, if a road
owner erects and locks for several days at a time a gate
across a road for the purpose of blocking public use, this
act will restart the ten-year period and preclude a finding
of continuous use even if someone jumps the gate or
removes the lock and criminally trespasses on the road.
Proper action by a road owner can interrupt continuous
use by the public regardless of whether the persons using
the road are criminal or "good faith" trespassers.
III. PERIOD OF TEN YEARS
[*P22] With respect to the third element of the
Dedication Statue, the ten-year period, the Butlers argue
that the trial court failed to identify a ten-year period of
time in which the Road was continuously used as a public
thoroughfare. They suggest that the trial court's finding
that the Road was continuously used as a public
thoroughfare [***18] from approximately 1925 to
1980--a period of fifty-five years--is legally inadequate
because the court failed to "specifically pinpoint" one
ten-year period during those years.
[*P23] We have explained that, under the
Dedication Statute, "[c]ontinuous use as a public
thoroughfare must occur for at least ten years." 33 The
court of appeals concluded that this "permits a finding of
public dedication based on a time period greater than ten
years." 34 We agree. Here, the trial court's finding of
fifty-five years of continuous use is more than adequate
to support its determination that the Road was abandoned
and dedicated to the public under the Dedication Statute.
Thus, the court of appeals correctly affirmed the trial
court's finding that the Road was continuously used as a
public thoroughfare for a period of ten years.
33 Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307,
312 (Utah 1997) (emphasis added).
34 Utah County v. Butler, 2006 UT App 444, P
16, 147 P.3d 963.
IV. DAMAGES

[*P24] Finally, we consider whether the court of
appeals erred in its application of Utah Code section
72-7-104(4) to the facts of this case. Subsection (1) of
this code section provides that "the highway authority
having jurisdiction [***19] over the right-of-way may"
remove from the right-of-way of any highway any
structure installed by any person or "give written notice
to the person . . . to remove the installation from the
right-of-way." 35 And under subsection (3), if the
highway authority gives notice and "the installation is not
removed within ten days after the notice is complete, the
highway authority may remove the installation at the
expense of the person." 36 Subsection (4), which is the
focus of our review, provides that the "highway authority
may recover: (a) the costs and expenses incurred in
removing the installation, serving notice, and the costs of
a lawsuit, if any; and (b) $ 10 for each day the installation
remained within the right-of-way after notice was
complete." 37
35 Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(1) (2001).
36 Id. § 72-7-104(3).
37 Id. § 72-7-104(4).
[*P25] In this case, Utah County served the Butlers
with notice that the gate erected across [**784] the
Road by Mr. Butler should be removed, but the Butlers
did not remove the gate. As a result, Utah County asked
the trial court for statutory damages of ten dollars for
each day the gate remained across the Road. The court
denied Utah County's request, citing two considerations.
[***20] First, the court noted that Utah County created
and placed a sign on the gate indicating that travel was
allowed past the gate, but admonishing travelers to close
the gate and stay on the Road until they reach the national
forest. The court explained that "there have historically
been gates across the Road for purposes unrelated to
obstruction of traffic. An unlocked gate is consistent with
this pattern and would not be considered to violate the
right-of-way" Utah County has to the Road. Second, the
court stated that Utah County, "as the moving party in
seeking to obtain the penalty, had the burden of proving
specific evidence of the number of days the [Butlers]
have been in violation." This, the court said, Utah County
failed to do.
[*P26] The court of appeals reversed the trial court,
concluding that the trial court did not have discretion to
deny statutory damages to Utah County. 38 According to
the court of appeals, the highway authority is entitled to
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the remedies in section 72-7-104(4) if it is granted a
judgment in an action contesting the removal of an
installation on a right-of-way. 39 In addition, the court
explained that the gate across the Road "clearly falls
under the proscribed [***21] structures 'of any kind or
character' regardless of whether it was locked." 40 Thus,
the court of appeals suggested that the trial court's
decision not to award damages was inappropriately based
on the lack of evidence regarding whether the gate was
locked after the Butlers received notice from Utah
County. 41 The court of appeals concluded that
"[b]ecause Utah County made a proper showing that the
gate remained in place after notice was completed, the
trial court should have awarded section 72-7-104(4)
damages." 42
38 Utah County v. Butler, 2006 UT App 444, P
21, 147 P.3d 963.
39 Id. The court of appeals based this conclusion
on section 72-7-104(5), which reads as follows:
(5) (a) If the person . . . refuses to
remove [the installation] . . . , the
highway authority may bring an
action to abate the installation as a
public nuisance.
(b) If the highway authority is
granted a judgment, the highway
authority may recover the costs of
having the public nuisance abated
as provided in Subsection (4).

40 Utah County, 147 P.3d 963, 2006 UT App
444, P 22 (quoting Utah Code Ann. §
72-7-104(1)).
41 Id.
42 Id.
[*P27] The Butlers argue that the word "may," as
used throughout section 72-7-104, is a permissive term
and gives the [***22] trial court discretion to award
damages. In contrast, Utah County argues that the word
allows the highway authority to elect its remedy, which
must then be granted by the court. We believe the word
"may" as used throughout section 72-7-104 goes to the
highway authority's discretion with respect to the
selection of a remedy. That is, the statute gives the
highway authority permission, under subsection (1), to

remove an installation or give notice to the offending
person to remove it; under subsection (3), to remove the
installation at the expense of the person if, after giving
notice, the person fails to remove it; under subsection (4),
to recover the costs of removing the installation, the costs
of a lawsuit, and ten dollars a day; and, under subsection
(5), to bring an action to abate the installation as a public
nuisance if the person refuses to remove or permit its
removal. 43 Importantly, however, the statute does not
suggest that the highway authority's chosen remedy must
be granted by a court. Had the Legislature wished to
mandate the award of damages or any of the other
remedies in this section, it could have used the word
"shall." 44 In the absence of such explicit legislative
[***23] intent, we deem the award of ten [**785]
dollars a day in damages, if elected by the highway
authority, to be in the court's discretion. 45
43 Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(1)-(5).
44 See, e.g., Grant v. Utah State Land Bd., 26
Utah 2d 100, 485 P.2d 1035, 1036-37 (Utah
1971) ("[I]f the legislature had intended an
applicant [for reinstatement of certain contracts of
purchase of State land] to have an absolute right
of reinstatement, instead of saying that an
applicant 'may have his contract reinstated,' it
could easily have used the word 'shall' or 'must,'
and thus have rendered a mandatory meaning
clear.").
45 See State v. Wallace, 2006 UT 86, PP 10-12,
150 P.3d 540 (interpreting the term "may" as
permissive because the legislature replaced
"shall" with "may" in the relevant statute and
explaining that "in the absence of any clear
legislative indication to the contrary, we take the
Legislature at its word").
[*P28] In sum, the word "may" in section
72-7-104(4) does give Utah County permission to seek
ten dollars a day in damages for every day the Butlers'
gate remained in place on the Road or to seek an
alternative remedy, but it does not mandate that the trial
court award those damages if sought. Because the
grounds upon [***24] which the trial court based its
decision not to award damages--the sign placed on the
gate by Utah County and the absence of evidence
regarding when the gate was locked--are reasonable, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
award Utah County damages under Utah Code section
72-7-104(4). We therefore reverse the court of appeals'
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determination in this regard and affirm the decision of the
trial court.
CONCLUSION
[*P29] We uphold the court of appeals' affirmation
of the trial court's conclusion that Bennie Creek Road
was abandoned and dedicated to public use because all
three elements of the Dedication Statute were satisfied.
First, we affirm the trial court's finding that Utah County
established by clear and convincing evidence that the
Road was continuously used as a public thoroughfare.
The Butlers introduced no credible evidence of an overt
act or acts intended and reasonably calculated to interrupt
use of the road as a public thoroughfare--the only
interruption sufficient to restart the running of the
Dedication Statute's ten-year period and preclude a
finding of continuous use. Second, we hold that
trespassers are public users capable of establishing
continuous use [***25] under the Dedication Statute and

thus were properly considered by the trial court in its
application of the Dedication Statute. Third, we conclude
that the trial court's finding of a fifty-five year period of
continuous use as a public thoroughfare satisfied the
Dedication Statute's requirement that such use be made
for a period of ten years. Finally, we reverse the court of
appeals' conclusion that Utah County is entitled to
monetary damages under Utah Code section 72-7-104(4)
because the statute permits the election of such remedy
by a highway authority, but does not mandate that the
court award it. We conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in electing not to award damages to
Utah County under this statute. Affirmed in part and
reversed in part.
[*P30] Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief
Justice Wilkins, Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring
concur in Justice Durrant's opinion.
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LEXSTAT UTAH CODE 72-7-104
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright 2008 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
*** Current through the 2008 Second Special Session and the 2008 General
Election ***
*** Annotations current through 2008 UT 75 (10/31/2008); 2008 UT App 418
(11/14/2008) and November 1, 2008 (FEDERAL CASES) ***
TITLE 72. TRANSPORTATION CODE
CHAPTER 7. PROTECTION OF HIGHWAYS
PART 1. PROTECTION OF RIGHTS-OF-WAY
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory
Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 (2008)
§ 72-7-104. Installations constructed in violation of rules -- Rights of highway authorities to remove or require removal

(1) If any person, firm, or corporation installs, places, constructs, alters, repairs, or maintains any approach road,
driveway, pole, pipeline, conduit, sewer, ditch, culvert, outdoor advertising sign, or any other structure or object of any
kind or character within the right-of-way of any highway without complying with this title, the highway authority
having jurisdiction over the right-of-way may:
(a) remove the installation from the right-of-way or require the person, firm, or corporation to remove the
installation; or
(b) give written notice to the person, firm, or corporation to remove the installation from the right-of-way.
(2) Notice under Subsection (1)(b) may be served by:
(a) personal service; or
(b) (i) mailing the notice to the person, firm, or corporation by certified mail; and
(ii) posting a copy on the installation for ten days.
(3) If the installation is not removed within ten days after the notice is complete, the highway authority may remove
the installation at the expense of the person, firm, or corporation.
(4) A highway authority may recover:
(a) the costs and expenses incurred in removing the installation, serving notice, and the costs of a lawsuit if any;
and
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(b) $ 10 for each day the installation remained within the right-of-way after notice was complete.
(5) (a) If the person, firm, or corporation disputes or denies the existence, placement, construction, or maintenance
of the installation, or refuses to remove or permit its removal, the highway authority may bring an action to abate the
installation as a public nuisance.
(b) If the highway authority is granted a judgment, the highway authority may recover the costs of having the
public nuisance abated as provided in Subsection (4).
(6) The department, its agents, or employees, if acting in good faith, incur no liability for causing removal of an
installation within a right-of-way of a highway as provided in this section.
(7) The actions of the department under this section are not subject to the provisions of Title 63G, Chapter 4,
Administrative Procedures Act.
HISTORY: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 135; 1990, ch. 300, § 1; C. 1953, 27-12-135; renumbered by L. 1998, ch. 270, § 174;
2008, ch. 382, § 2112.
NOTES:
AMENDMENT NOTES. --The 1998 amendment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered this section, which formerly
appeared as § 27-12-135; in Subsection (1) substituted "this title" for "this chapter"; and made stylistic changes.
The 2008 amendment, effective May 5, 2008, updated references to conform to the recodification of Title 63.

LexisNexis 50 State Surveys, Legislation & Regulations
Highways
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Damages.
Determination of nature of road.
Nature of remedies.
Removal.
DAMAGES.
Subsection (4) authorizes a county to seek damages for landowners' refusal to remove a gate, but it does not mandate
that the trial court award those damages if sought. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in electing not to award
damages, as the grounds upon which it relied, the county's sign and the absence of evidence as to when a gate was
locked, were reasonable. Utah County v. Butler, 2008 UT 12, 179 P.3d 775.
DETERMINATION OF NATURE OF ROAD.
Whether county officers were immune from suit for trespass after they had removed a locked gate from a roadway
depended upon the public or private nature of the road as determined by the trial court and not the commissioners.
Blonquist v. Summit County, 25 Utah 2d 387, 483 P.2d 430 (1971).
NATURE OF REMEDIES.
None of the remedies of this statute is exclusive, nor are the remedies restrictive of the common-law right to
summarily remove obstructions from a highway. Blonquist v. Summit County, 25 Utah 2d 387, 483 P.2d 430 (1971).
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REMOVAL.
If a road is public, notice that a gate will be removed does not make summary removal unlawful. Blonquist v. Summit
County, 25 Utah 2d 387, 483 P.2d 430 (1971).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AM. JUR. 2D. --39 Am. Jur. 2d Highways, Streets, and Bridges § 362 et seq.
C.J.S. --40 C.J.S. Highways § 223 et seq.
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this article, part, chapter, subtitle,
or title.
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LEXSTAT UTAH CODE 72-5-104
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright 2008 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
*** Current through the 2008 Second Special Session and the 2008 General
Election ***
*** Annotations current through 2008 UT 75 (10/31/2008); 2008 UT App 418
(11/14/2008) and November 1, 2008 (FEDERAL CASES) ***
TITLE 72. TRANSPORTATION CODE
CHAPTER 5. RIGHTS-OF-WAY
PART 1. PUBLIC HIGHWAYS
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 (2008)
§ 72-5-104. Public use constituting dedication -- Scope

(1) A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been continuously used as a public
thoroughfare for a period of ten years.
(2) The dedication and abandonment creates a right-of-way held by the state in accordance with Sections 72-3-102,
72-3-104, 72-3-105, and 72-5-103.
(3) The scope of the right-of-way is that which is reasonable and necessary to ensure safe travel according to the
facts and circumstances.
HISTORY: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 89; C. 1953, 27-12-89; renumbered by L. 1998, ch. 270, § 132; 2000, ch. 324, § 7.
NOTES:
AMENDMENT NOTES. --The 1998 amendment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered this section, which formerly
appeared as § 27-12-89.
The 2000 amendment, effective March 16, 2000, substituted "is" for "shall be deemed to have been" in Subsection (1)
and added Subsections (2) and (3).
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Acceptance.
Appeals.
Burden of proof.
Change in highway.
Control by landowners.
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Estoppel.
Evidence.
Generally.
Intent of landowner.
-- Necessary.
-- Not necessary.
Interruption in use.
Private rights.
"Public" defined.
Rights granted to public.
Rights of subsequent grantees.
Sufficiency of proof of dedication.
"Thoroughfare" and "public thoroughfare" distinguished.
Width of roadway.
ACCEPTANCE.
When owner of land deeded it to city for public use but city never accepted it, no dedication took place and claim of
purchaser from city was invalid as against subsequent purchaser from original owner of land. William J. Lemp Brewing
Co. v. P.J. Moran, Inc., 51 Utah 178, 169 P. 459 (1917).
APPEALS.
Landowners' argument that it was inconsistent for the State to encourage property owners to provide the public with
access to their property for recreational use under § 57-14-1 et seq. while at the same time allowing such use to support
dedication of a road on that property to the public under this section was waived because landowners raised this
argument for the first time on appeal, and did not preserve their right to assert it. State v. Six Mile Ranch Co., 2006 UT
App 104, 132 P.3d 687.
BURDEN OF PROOF.
Where claim is made that a highway has been dedicated to public use, there is a presumption in favor of the property
owner and the burden of establishing public use for the required period of time is on those claiming it. Leo M.
Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211 (Utah 1981).
CHANGE IN HIGHWAY.
A public highway over public lands is established, although there has been no official acceptance, when it has been
used for longer than ten years; if travel has remained substantially unchanged, and practical identity of road preserved,
that is sufficient, although there may have been slight deviations from the common way. Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co.
v. Churnos, 75 Utah 384, 285 P. 646 (1929).
Slight change in course of highway or of its location that does not materially change or affect the general course
thereof or affect its location, nor break or change the continuity of travel or use, does not constitute abandonment or
affect public nature of highway. Sullivan v. Condas, 76 Utah 585, 290 P. 954 (1930).
CONTROL BY LANDOWNERS.
No dedication was shown under identically worded predecessor section where it appeared that an alleyway which had
more or less been used by the public at will for a number of years had from time to time been closed by the abutting
owners, who had at all times exercised control over it. Culmer v. Salt Lake City, 27 Utah 252, 75 P. 620 (1904).
ESTOPPEL.
Municipality may be estopped from asserting dedication by acts and conduct that have been relied on by others to
their prejudice and, likewise, private individual may be estopped in the same way where he stands by and permits others
to improve land claimed to have been dedicated. Premium Oil Co. v. Cedar City, 112 Utah 324, 187 P.2d 199 (1947).
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EVIDENCE.
Evidence showing, among other things, that roadway was used continuously for recreational and agricultural purposes
and for access to other business activities supported the trial court's ruling that the roadway was dedicated or abandoned
to the public. Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Trial court's finding that a county had shown that a road was abandoned and dedicated to public use was reversed
because it had failed to make specific findings as to when the property owners locked gates and posted signs, and
whether trespassers were asked to leave, and if so, when and how many. Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10,
179 P.3d 768.
GENERALLY.
Where all three elements under this section for the establishment of a public highway were satisfied, the court had no
discretion to ignore that fact and erred in concluding that a road was not a public highway. Heber City Corp. v.
Simpson, 942 P.2d 307 (Utah 1997).
INTENT OF LANDOWNER.
-- NECESSARY.
In order for a private road to become a public thoroughfare there must be evidence of intent by the owner to dedicate
the road to a public use and an acceptance by the public. Such intent may be inferred from declarations, acts or
circumstances and use by the general public. Gillmor v. Carter, 15 Utah 2d 280, 391 P.2d 426 (1964) (but see cases
noted under "--Not necessary" below).
For cases discussing landowner's intent to dedicate road to public use, see Wilson v. Hull, 7 Utah 90, 24 P. 799
(1890); Whittaker v. Ferguson, 16 Utah 240, 51 P. 980 (1898); Schettler v. Lynch, 23 Utah 305, 64 P. 955 (1901);
Culmer v. Salt Lake City, 27 Utah 252, 75 P. 620 (1904); Brown v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 36 Utah 257, 102 P. 740
(1909); Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127 (1916); William J. Lemp Brewing Co. v. P.J. Moran, Inc., 51 Utah
178, 169 P. 459 (1917); Barboglio v. Gibson, 61 Utah 314, 213 P. 385 (1923).
-- NOT NECESSARY.
The determination that a roadway has been continuously used by members of the general public for at least ten years
is the sole requirement for it to become a public road; it is not necessary to prove the owner's intent to offer the road to
the public. Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447 (Utah 1981).
To establish a dedication of a road to a public use, it is not necessary to prove landowner's intent to dedicate the road
to a public use. Leo M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211 (Utah 1981).
INTERRUPTION IN USE.
An overt act that is intended by a property owner to interrupt the use of a road as a public thoroughfare, and is
reasonably calculated to do so, constitutes an interruption sufficient to restart the running of the required period of
continuous public use. This rule does not change the burden of the party claiming dedication. Wasatch County v.
Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, 179 P.3d 768.
Owner's 24-hour physical roadblocks in six separate years were overt acts intended and reasonably calculated to
interrupt the use of the road as a public thoroughfare, so that although the owner had not blocked any actual use of the
road because her roadblocks occurred during intermissions in the road's use, her intent and conduct were nevertheless
sufficient to interrupt the road's continuous use for purposes of this section. Town of Leeds v. Prisbrey, 2008 UT 11, 179
P.3d 757.
PRIVATE RIGHTS.
Creation of a private right in a public thoroughfare cannot occur; a prescriptive right is in conflict with the dedication
of land to the use of the general public. Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
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"PUBLIC" DEFINED.
Owners of property abutting or straddling rural road and their personal visitors were not members of public generally
within this provision; burden of proving real public use of that road continuously for ten years was not met in suit by
subdividers who sought to establish that the road had become a public thoroughfare. Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d
376, 438 P.2d 545 (1968).
RIGHTS GRANTED TO PUBLIC.
City still owned fee to strip, acquired under Townsite Act (43 U.S.C. § 718 et seq., now repealed), after alleged
dedication thereof as public street, so that only right that public could have acquired would be right to easement across
strip for traveling purposes, and only additional right contiguous property owners might acquire would be right of
ingress to and egress from their property. Premium Oil Co. v. Cedar City, 112 Utah 324, 187 P.2d 199 (1947).
RIGHTS OF SUBSEQUENT GRANTEES.
Where land is dedicated by owner as highway and is accepted by public as such, all subsequent grantees of abutting
lands are bound by dedication. Schettler v. Lynch, 23 Utah 305, 64 P. 955 (1901).
SUFFICIENCY OF PROOF OF DEDICATION.
Highway over privately owned ground will be deemed dedicated or abandoned to the public use when the public has
continuously used it as a thoroughfare for a period of ten years. Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127 (1916).
For cases finding sufficient evidence to support finding of dedication to public use, see Sullivan v. Condas, 76 Utah
585, 290 P. 954 (1930); Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1, 116 P.2d 420 (1941); Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395, 326
P.2d 107 (1958); Clark v. Erekson, 9 Utah 2d 212, 341 P.2d 424 (1959).
Mere use by public of private alley in common with owners of alley does not show a dedication thereof to public use,
or vest any right in public to the way. Thompson v. Nelson, 2 Utah 2d 340, 273 P.2d 720 (1954).
Though dedication of one's land to public use should not be lightly regarded, where a narrow, private dead-end street
was used by neighboring residents and the general public without interference for at least 25 years, and where the city
had platted it as a public street in 1915 and had thereafter paved it and maintained a public street sign at its entrance,
and where plaintiff who owned the fee simple interest in the land on which the street was situated had not paid any taxes
on the street property for 25 years, this combination of factors was sufficient to justify finding that the street had been
dedicated to public use. Bonner v. Sudbury, 18 Utah 2d 140, 417 P.2d 646 (1966).
Clear and convincing quantum and quality of proof is required for the establishment of a public thoroughfare or taking
of another's property. Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 493 P.2d 639 (1972).
Where the trial court found that public had used north-south road for 12 years and that during this time, the road was
ten feet wide, and the court found that there was insufficient use of an east-west road by the public to make it a public
road, these findings of fact, supported by substantial evidence, compelled a holding that the north-south road was a
public highway ten feet wide and that no public highway existed on the east-west road. Western Kane County Special
Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987).
Because there were material issues of fact as to whether people using a road were members of the general public or
landowners in the area, who had either a private right or permission to use the road, and there were conflicting
statements as to public use of the road for recreational purposes, summary judgment in favor of the proponents of
dedication was erroneous. Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995).
Finding that a road was not a public thoroughfare was proper based on evidence that the road was generally used only
during the deer hunting season and was frequently closed to the public at other times, and that its use during the hunting
season was by permission of the owners. Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Finding that an unimproved mountain road that crossed defendant's property and led to plaintiff's property was a
public road under this section was proper because the road was used as a public thoroughfare, the users of the road were
not adjoining property owners, and use of the road had occurred for at least 10 years. Thus, the road was dedicated and
abandoned to the public. AWINC Corp. v. Simonsen, 2005 UT App 168, 523 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 112 P.3d 1228.
Trial court did not err by determining that a road was a public road by dedication, but that side roads were not;
sufficient evidence supported findings that the road had been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for more than
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10 years as required by this section and that the public was not prevented from using the road, but only from using
private property that abutted the road. State v. Six Mile Ranch Co., 2006 UT App 104, 132 P.3d 687.
Summary judgment was granted in favor of a landowner and against a developer, excavator, and others, because the
landowner presented clear and convincing evidence, including aerial photographs and testimony, that the road in issue
had been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years and had thus been abandoned and
dedicated to the use of the public. Renfro v. McCowan, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84493 (D. Utah Nov. 9, 2006).
A road was properly found to have been abandoned and dedicated to public use because trespassers are public users
capable of establishing continuous use under this section, the county established by clear and convincing evidence that
the road was continuously used as a public thoroughfare for 55 years, and the owners introduced no credible evidence of
an overt act reasonably calculated to interrupt the use of the road. Utah County v. Butler, 2008 UT 12, 179 P.3d 775.
"THOROUGHFARE" AND "PUBLIC THOROUGHFARE" DISTINGUISHED.
Under identically worded predecessor section, a "thoroughfare" was a place or way through which there is passing or
travel. It became a "public thoroughfare" when the public acquired a general right of passage. Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah
243, 161 P. 1127 (1916).
WIDTH OF ROADWAY.
Although there was some incidental evidence in the record regarding the width of the road in question, it was not error
for the district court to refuse to determine the width of the road when that issue was not the focus of the litigation.
Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225 (Utah 1995).
Generally, the width of a public road is determined according to what is reasonable and necessary under all the facts
and circumstances. Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AM. JUR. 2D. --39 Am. Jur. 2d Highways, Streets, and Bridges § 24 et seq.
C.J.S. --39A C.J.S. Highways § 15.
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this article, part, chapter, subtitle,
or title.
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LEXSTAT UTAH CODE 78A-3-102
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright 2008 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
*** Current through the 2008 Second Special Session and the 2008 General
Election ***
*** Annotations current through 2008 UT 75 (10/31/2008); 2008 UT App 418
(11/14/2008) and November 1, 2008 (FEDERAL CASES) ***
TITLE 78A. JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
CHAPTER 3. SUPREME COURT
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102 (2008)
Legislative Alert: LEXSEE 2009 Ut. HB 11 -- See section 41.
§ 78A-3-102. Supreme Court jurisdiction

(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the United
States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue all writs and
process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
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(v) the state engineer; or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources reviewing actions of the Division of
Forestry, Fire and State Lands;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under
Subsection (3)(e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of the United States or this state
unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have original
appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has
original appellate jurisdiction, except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a
capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a
Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act,
in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 78-2-2, enacted by L. 1986, ch. 47, § 41; 1987, ch. 161, § 303; 1988, ch. 248, § 5; 1989, ch. 67, §
1; 1992, ch. 127, § 11; 1994, ch. 191, § 2; 1995, ch. 267, § 5; 1995, ch. 299, § 46; 1996, ch. 159, § 18; 2001, ch. 302, §
1; renumbered by L. 2008, ch. 3, § 344; 2008, ch. 382, § 2209.
NOTES:
REPEALS AND REENACTMENTS. --Laws 1986, ch. 47, § 41 repeals former § 78-2-2, as enacted by Laws 1951, ch.
58, § 1, relating to original appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court, and enacts the above section.
AMENDMENT NOTES. --The 2008 amendment by ch. 3, effective February 7, 2008, renumbered this section, which
formerly appeared as § 78-2-2.
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The 2008 amendment by ch. 382, effective May 5, 2008, updated references to conform to the recodification of Title
63.
This section has been reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel.
CROSS-REFERENCES. --Chief justice to preside over impeachment of governor, § 77-5-2.
Election contest appeals, §§ 20A-4-406.
Extraordinary writs, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 3; U.R.C.P. 65B Utah R. App. P. 19.
Jurisdiction, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 3.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Appellate jurisdiction.
-- Attachment.
-- Final orders and judgments.
-- Formal adjudicative proceedings.
-- Probate orders.
-- Sentence reduction.
-- Timeliness of filing.
Certiorari.
Docketing statement.
-- Citation.
In general.
Original jurisdiction.
-- Equity.
-- Extraordinary writs.
Rehearings.
-- District judge filling vacancy.
-- Newly elected justice.
Scope of review.
Transfer authority.
Zoning appeals.
Cited.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION.
-- ATTACHMENT.
Although this section did not govern a land conveyance because it was not in effect when petitioner filed its writ of
review, this section did not divest the Supreme Court of jurisdiction, because jurisdiction attached under the statute in
effect when the petition for review was filed. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d
909 (Utah 1993).
-- FINAL ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS.
The order granting the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was not a final order because the defendants'
counterclaim and a third party's intervening claim remained pending before the trial court. Therefore, under the final
judgment rule, the court did not have jurisdiction over the appeal because the defendants were not appealing from a
final order or judgment. Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, 397 Utah Adv. Rep. 7.
-- FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS.
Subdivision (3)(e) confers jurisdiction in the Supreme Court only over final orders and decrees that originate in formal
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adjudicative proceedings in agency actions. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Board of State Lands & Forestry, 830
P.2d 233 (Utah 1992).
-- PROBATE ORDERS.
Final orders in probate were appealable under former § 20-2-2, Code 1943. In re Clift's Estate, 101 Utah 343, 122
P.2d 196 (1942).
-- SENTENCE REDUCTION.
When a conviction is reduced under § 76-3-402, the appeal lies in the court having jurisdiction of the degree of crime
recorded in the judgment of conviction and for which defendant is sentenced, rather than the degree of crime charged in
the information or found in the verdict. State v. Doung, 813 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1991).
-- TIMELINESS OF FILING.
Petition for review was dismissed where the Tax Commission's Fourth Order was unambiguously the last final agency
action in the case, and taxpayer's petitions for judicial review in both the Supreme Court and the district court were filed
late, depriving both courts of jurisdiction. Union Pac. R.R. v. State Tax Comm'n, 2000 UT 40, 999 P.2d 17.
CERTIORARI.
Even prior to express statutory authorization, Supreme Court had original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari.
Young v. Cannon, 2 Utah 560 (1880).
Where district court exceeded its jurisdiction on appeal from justice of peace, Supreme Court had power by certiorari
to review jurisdictional question, judgment not being reviewable by further appeal. Oregon Short Line R.R. v. District
Court, 30 Utah 371, 85 P. 360 (1906).
Supreme Court, and not justice thereof, was authorized to issue writ of certiorari, and statute, which conferred such
power on justice of Supreme Court, had to give way to Constitution. Robinson v. District Court, 38 Utah 379, 113 P.
1026 (1910).
Supreme Court can exercise a reasonable discretion in granting or refusing a writ of certiorari. Rohwer v. District
Court, 41 Utah 279, 125 P. 671 (1912).
When exercising certiorari jurisdiction granted by this section, the Supreme Court reviews the decision of the Court of
Appeals, not of the trial court; therefore, the briefs of the parties should address the decision of the Court of Appeals,
not the decision of the trial court. Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992).
DOCKETING STATEMENT.
-- CITATION.
In all cases appealed after January 1, 1987, reference in the docketing statement to this section will be considered
insufficient; instead the appropriate subsection must be included to alert the Supreme Court that it has original appellate
jurisdiction over the case. Gregory v. Fourthwest Invs., Ltd., 735 P.2d 33 (Utah 1987).
IN GENERAL.
Supreme Court is exclusive judge of its own jurisdiction. National Bank v. Lewis, 13 Utah 507, 45 P. 890 (1896).
The Supreme Court is not a court of general original jurisdiction; it is a reviewing court. Nielsen v. Utah Nat'l Bank,
40 Utah 95, 120 P. 211 (1911).
Supreme Court can inquire into its own jurisdiction no matter how that question is called to its attention and
regardless of whether parties desire it to do so. Woldberg v. Industrial Comm'n, 74 Utah 309, 279 P. 609 (1929).
Question of Supreme Court's jurisdiction to hear and determine an appeal is one that can be raised by the court on its
own motion. City of Logan City v. Blotter, 75 Utah 272, 284 P. 333 (1929).
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION.
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-- EQUITY.
Supreme Court no longer possesses any original jurisdiction in equity cases; in making its own findings in such cases,
the court acts merely as an appellate or reviewing tribunal. In re Raleigh's Estate, 48 Utah 128, 158 P. 705 (1916).
-- EXTRAORDINARY WRITS.
Even prior to express statutory authorization, Supreme Court had jurisdiction to issue writ of mandamus in a proper
case. Maxwell v. Burton, 2 Utah 595 (1880).
It did not necessarily follow from fact that Supreme Court had original jurisdiction to issue writs, enumerated in
former Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 4, that it was court's duty to issue such writs in every instance merely on applications
for them. State v. Booth, 21 Utah 88, 59 P. 553 (1899).
Former Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 4, in conferring authority upon the Supreme Court to issue writs of prohibition,
contemplated a writ having the same character and functions as the writ defined by the territorial statute then in
existence. Barnes v. City of Lehi City, 74 Utah 321, 279 P. 878 (1929).
After remittitur had gone down to district court, Supreme Court did not have exclusive jurisdiction to issue a writ of
prohibition in the cause. Plutus Mining Co. v. Orme, 76 Utah 286, 289 P. 132 (1930).
Where situation called for relief more nearly analogous to purpose of writ of mandamus rather than to writ of
prohibition, and neither standing alone would bring about desired result, Supreme Court had authority to issue both
writs of mandamus and prohibition. Child v. Ogden State Bank, 81 Utah 464, 20 P.2d 599, 88 A.L.R. 1284 (1933).
Whether district court had jurisdiction was not determinative of whether Supreme Court would entertain application
for writ of prohibition; whether there was a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law was determinative. Mayers v.
Bronson, 100 Utah 279, 114 P.2d 213 (1941).
Objections to jurisdiction of administrative tribunals are to be first presented to such tribunal before applying to
Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition. Furbreeders Agrl. Coop. v. Wiesley, 102 Utah 601, 132 P.2d 384 (1942).
Supreme Court's discretion was exercised in favor of making writ of prohibition permanent to prevent enforcement of
city court criminal contempt judgment, as against contention that petitioner had plain, speedy and adequate remedy by
appeal, where alleged contempt was not committed in presence of court or judge, and court did not acquire jurisdiction
over either person of petitioner or of offense claimed because of absence of initiatory affidavit required by former §
104-45-3, so that contempt proceedings were void. Robinson v. City Court, 112 Utah 36, 185 P.2d 256 (1947).
The term "original" in Subsection (2) adds nothing to the Supreme Court's writ jurisdiction -- and its absence in
former § 78-2a-3(1) (now § 78A-4-103(1)) takes nothing from the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals -- because
jurisdiction over petitions for extraordinary writs necessarily invokes a court's jurisdiction to consider a petition
originally filed with it as opposed to its appellate jurisdiction over cases that originated elsewhere. Barnard v. Murphy,
882 P.2d 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
REHEARINGS.
-- DISTRICT JUDGE FILLING VACANCY.
A district judge called to sit in lieu of disqualified justice is a member of the court for all purposes so far as his right to
participate in the case and in its decision and should sit in on a rehearing even after the vacancy is filled. In re
Thompson's Estate, 72 Utah 17, 269 P. 103 (1927).
-- NEWLY ELECTED JUSTICE.
Member of Supreme Court, elected after case had been decided, was not entitled to participate in consideration for
rehearing. Cordner v. Cordner, 91 Utah 474, 64 P.2d 828 (1937).
SCOPE OF REVIEW.
In original proceeding in Supreme Court to review proceedings of district court, Supreme Court will ignore mere
irregularities or legal errors in trial court, and would limit review to question of whether district court exceeded its
jurisdiction or was without jurisdiction in making and entering the judgment complained of. Jeffries v. Third Judicial
District Court, 90 Utah 525, 63 P.2d 242 (1936).
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Where no motion was made for directed verdict or new trial, Supreme Court was precluded from reviewing
sufficiency of evidence in cause at law, since under former Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 9 and predecessor of this section
review could be made only on questions of law. Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 24 Utah 2d 292, 470 P.2d 393
(1970).
TRANSFER AUTHORITY.
An appeal by criminal defendant under Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure from the denial of his
motion to declare his sentence illegal was not an appeal of his capital felony conviction and the Supreme Court had the
power to pour it over to the Court of Appeals for decision. State v. Hua, 926 P.2d 884 (Utah 1996).
ZONING APPEALS.
There is no provision that expressly grants the Court of Appeals original jurisdiction over district court review of land
use decisions by local governmental entities. Therefore, the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction over such
cases under the catch-all provision in Subsection (3)(j). Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2003 UT 16, 472 Utah Adv. Rep.
12, 70 P.3d 47.
CITED in Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., 739 P.2d 634 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464
(Utah 1991); Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677 (Utah 1995); Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d
852 (Utah 1998); Clark v. Pangan, 2000 UT 37, 998 P.2d 268; County Bd. of Equalization v. Stichting Mayflower
Recreational Fonds, 2000 UT 57, 6 P.3d 559; Lysenko v. Sawaya, 2000 UT 58, 7 P.3d 783; In re West Side Prop.
Assocs., 2000 UT 85, 13 P.3d 168; Clark v. Clark, 2001 UT 44, 27 P.3d 538; State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, 34 P.3d
767; Houghton v. Dep't of Health, 2002 UT 101, 57 P.3d 1067; State v. E.A., 2002 UT 126, 463 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 63
P.3d 100; Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, 472 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 70 P.3d 35; Comm. of Consumer
Servs. v. PSC, 2003 UT 29, 479 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 75 P.3d 481; State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, 482 Utah Adv. Rep. 19,
78 P.3d 590; Utah DOT v. G. Kay, Inc., 2003 UT 40, 483 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 78 P.3d 612; State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55,
488 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 82 P.3d 1106; ExxonMobil Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2003 UT 53, 487 Utah Adv. Rep.
6, 86 P.3d 706; Thomas v. Color Country Mgmt., 2004 UT 12, 492 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 84 P.3d 1201; Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Wong, 2005 UT 51, 122 P.3d 589; United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mt. Fonds, 2006 UT 35, 140
P.3d 1200; Benjamin v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 UT 37, 140 P.3d 1210; Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, 570 Utah Adv.
Rep. 25, 156 P.3d 739; Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, 578 Utah Adv. Rep. 31, 164 P.3d 366; State v. Greuber, 2007 UT
50, 581 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 165 P.3d 1185.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
UTAH LAW REVIEW. --The Utah Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Phillips and the Bill of Rights in Utah, 1975
Utah L. Rev. 593.
Recent Developments in Utah Law -- The Utah Court of Appeals, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 150.
AM. JUR. 2D. --20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 56 et seq.
C.J.S. --21 C.J.S. Courts § 9 et seq.
A.L.R. --Judgment granting or denying writ of mandamus or prohibition as res judicata, 21 A.L.R.3d 206.
Mandamus to compel disciplinary investigation or action against physician or attorney, 33 A.L.R.3d 1429.
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LEXSTAT UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright 2008 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
*** Current through the 2008 Second Special Session and the 2008 General
Election ***
*** Annotations current through 2008 UT 75 (10/31/2008); 2008 UT App 418
(11/14/2008) and November 1, 2008 (FEDERAL CASES) ***
TITLE 78A. JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
CHAPTER 4. COURT OF APPEALS
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 (2008)
Legislative Alert: LEXSEE 2009 Ut. HB 11 -- See section 42.
§ 78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction

(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission,
State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State
Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and
Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first
degree or capital felony;
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(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction or charge of a first degree
felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving any
other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or
capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons
and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce,
annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify to the
Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original
appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures
Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. 1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988, ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210,
§ 141; 1988, ch. 248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3; 1991, ch. 268, § 22; 1992, ch. 127, § 12; 1994, ch. 13, §
45; 1995, ch. 299, § 47; 1996, ch. 159, § 19; 1996, ch. 198, § 49; 2001, ch. 255, § 20; 2001, ch. 302, § 2; renumbered by
L. 2008, ch. 3, § 350; 2008, ch. 382, § 2210.
NOTES:
AMENDMENT NOTES. --The 2008 amendment by ch. 3, effective February 7, 2008, renumbered this section, which
formerly appeared as § 78-2a-3.
The 2008 amendment by ch. 382, effective May 5, 2008, updated references to conform to the recodification of Title
63.
This section has been reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel.
CROSS-REFERENCES. --Composition and jurisdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15, 39-6-16.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Decisions of Board of Pardons.
Extraordinary writs.
Final order.
Habeas corpus proceedings.
Magistrate bind-over orders.
Post-conviction review.
Scope.
-- Sentence reduction.
Zoning issues.
Cited.
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DECISIONS OF BOARD OF PARDONS.
The Court of Appeals hears appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging decisions of the
Board of Pardons, except when the petition additionally challenges the conviction of or sentence for a first degree
felony or a capital felony. Then the appeal is to be heard by the Supreme Court. Preece v. House, 886 P.2d 508 (Utah
1994).
EXTRAORDINARY WRITS.
The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over a petition for a writ of mandamus directed against a judge of the district
court based on its authority under this section to enforce compliance with a prior order and to issue writs in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. Barnard v. Murphy, 882 P.2d 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
The term "original" in former § 78-2-2(2) (now § 78A-3-102(2)) adds nothing to the Supreme Court's writ jurisdiction
-- and its absence in Subsection (1) takes nothing from the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals -- because jurisdiction
over petitions for extraordinary writs necessarily invokes a court's jurisdiction to consider a petition originally filed with
it as opposed to its appellate jurisdiction over cases that originated elsewhere. Barnard v. Murphy, 882 P.2d 679 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994).
Because, under this section, the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over adjudicative proceedings of state
agencies, and because former § 63-46b-1 (now § 63G-4-102) preserves the availability of extraordinary writ
proceedings to compel agency actions, the court had jurisdiction of a writ seeking to compel the recusal of the presiding
officer appointed to conduct proceedings before the Division of Environmental Response and Remediation. V-1 Oil Co.
v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 893 P.2d 1093 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
FINAL ORDER.
Because an order by the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing converting a citation proceeding from
an informal to a formal proceeding was not a "final agency action," the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider
a petition for review of that order. Merit Elec. & Instrumentation v. Utah Dep't of Commerce, 902 P.2d 151 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995).
Appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider an employer's appeal because its petition for review was filed
prematurely one day before the Labor Commission ruled on its request for reconsideration of a workers' compensation
award. McCoy v. Utah Disaster Kleenup, 2003 UT App 49, 467 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 65 P.3d 643.
HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS.
The language of this section is sufficiently broad to include those cases where a criminal conviction is involved in a
habeas corpus proceeding challenging extradition. Hernandez v. Hayward, 764 P.2d 993 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The Court of Appeals lacked original appellate jurisdiction of an appeal from the denial of an extraordinary writ
involving an interstate transfer of a prisoner which bore no relation to his underlying criminal conviction, except that
"but for" the conviction, he would not have been incarcerated in Arizona and then transferred to Utah. Ellis v. DeLand,
783 P.2d 559 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Appeal from the denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus was properly before the Court of Appeals, where the
writ challenged the post-conviction actions of the board of pardons and did not challenge the conviction in the trial
court or the sentence, and the fact that defendant was serving a sentence for a first-degree felony did not require a
transfer to the Supreme Court under the circumstances. Northern v. Barnes, 814 P.2d 1148 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), aff'd,
870 P.2d 914 (Utah 1992).
Appeal from the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition, in which defendant claimed only that his due process rights
were violated at a hearing before the parole board, lay to the Court of Appeals rather than the Supreme Court; the latter
has jurisdiction only over direct appeals of first degree or capital felony convictions and appeals in habeas corpus cases
where the conviction or sentence is challenged. Padilla v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 820 P.2d 473 (Utah 1991).
MAGISTRATE BIND-OVER ORDERS.
This section does not permit direct interlocutory appeal of magistrate bind-over orders. State v. Quinn, 930 P.2d 267
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(Utah Ct. App. 1996).
A magistrate is not a court of record, so the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over an appeal of an interlocutory
order from a magistrate's binding a criminal defendant over for trial. State v. Fisk, 966 P.2d 860 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
POST-CONVICTION REVIEW.
Post-conviction review may be used to attack a conviction in the event of an obvious injustice or a substantial and
prejudicial denial of a constitutional right in the trial. Gomm v. Cook, 754 P.2d 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Notice of appeal, filed within 30 days of the order denying a motion for a new trial, rather than 30 days from a final
judgment, was untimely, so that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to do anything other than dismiss the action. If
defendant could demonstrate in a motion to the trial court under Utah R. Civ. P. 65C that he had lost his right to appeal
because of counsel's misrepresentations or ineffective assistance, he would be eligible to be resentenced, but a
post-conviction petition was the proper remedy for such situations. (Unpublished decision.) State v. Cox, 2004 UT App
277.
SCOPE.
This statute defines the outermost limits of appellate jurisdiction, allowing the Court of Appeals to review agency
decisions only when the legislature expressly authorizes a right of review. It is not a catchall provision authorizing the
court to review the orders of every administrative agency for which there is no statute specifically creating a right to
judicial review. DeBry v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Appeals, 764 P.2d 627 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
This statute does not authorize the Court of Appeals to review the orders of every administrative agency, but allows
judicial review of agency decisions "when the legislature expressly authorizes a right of review." Barney v. Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing, 828 P.2d 542 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992).
-- SENTENCE REDUCTION.
When a conviction is reduced under § 76-3-402, the appeal lies in the court having jurisdiction of the degree of crime
recorded in the judgment of conviction and for which defendant is sentenced, rather than the degree of crime charged in
the information or found in the verdict. State v. Doung, 813 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1991).
ZONING ISSUES.
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction to hear challenges to land use decisions by municipal
governing bodies. Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2003 UT 16, 472 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 70 P.3d 47.
CITED in Scientific Academy of Hair Design, Inc. v. Bowen, 738 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); In re Topik, 761 P.2d
32 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); State v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Johanson v. Fischer, 808 P.2d 1083
(Utah 1991); Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d
464 (Utah 1991); Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Wisden v. Dixie College Parking
Comm., 935 P.2d 550 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); City of Kanab v. Guskey, 965 P.2d 1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
UTAH LAW REVIEW. --Recent Developments in Utah Law -- Judicial Decisions -- Constitutional Law, 1990 Utah L.
Rev. 129.
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
ARTICLE I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
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Utah Const. Art. I, § 22 (2008)
§ 22. [Private property for public use.]

Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.
HISTORY: Const. 1896.
NOTES:
CROSS-REFERENCES. --Eminent domain generally, § 78-34-1 et seq.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Advance payment of compensation.
Airplane overflights.
Closing street.
Consequential damages.
-- Railroad.
-- Road construction.
-- School construction.
Contract rights.
Defense to condemnation proceeding.
Development exactions.
Elements of taking or damage.
Exhaustion of remedies.
Fair market value.
Garbage collection service.
Highway easement.
Intangible factors.
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Interest in condemnation proceedings.
Inverse condemnation.
Just compensation.
-- Objection waived.
Loss of visibility.
Municipal employment restrictions.
Professional services.
Property interest.
Recovery under section.
Regulatory taking.
Relation to federal provisions.
Removal of personal property.
Ripeness of claim.
Section self-executing.
Statute of limitations.
Taxes.
Water connection fee.
Water rights.
Cited.
ADVANCE PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION.
This section provides merely that the property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation,
and does not require compensation to be paid in advance. Anderson Inv. Corp. v. State, 28 Utah 2d 379, 503 P.2d 144
(1972).
AIRPLANE OVERFLIGHTS.
For discussion of taking issues in an action by landowners alleging that their land has been "taken" by overflights, see
Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., 634 F. Supp. 100 (D. Utah 1986).
CLOSING STREET.
Where city, without notice, petition, or hearing, closes a portion of a street and alley abutting on school board-owned
property on both sides and used for vehicular travel, and thus creates a cul-de-sac as to privately owned property, there
has been a taking requiring just compensation. Boskovich v. Midvale City Corp., 121 Utah 445, 243 P.2d 435 (1952).
Closing of city street and alleged impairment of access to commercial properties was not a "damaging" or "taking"
within the meaning of this section; the alleged damages resulted from a temporary, one-time occurrence and not a
permanent, continuous, or inevitably recurring interference with property rights. Rocky Mt. Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989).
Business's complaint against the Utah Department of Transportation, following the closure of an access route to the
business during a highway reconstruction project, failed to state a claim for inverse condemnation under the takings
clause of this section; the business did not have a protectable property interest in an easement of access through the
blocked routes and the business was accessible from another route during the reconstruction project. Intermountain
Sports, Inc. v. DOT, 2004 UT App 405, 512 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 103 P.3d 716.
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES.
-- RAILROAD.
An action by an abutting owner for damages to his property occasioned by the construction and operation of a
commercial railroad in a public street in front of his property by which ingress and egress to and from the property is
impeded, and the use is otherwise directly affected, comes within this section. Morris v. Oregon S.L.R.R., 36 Utah 14,
102 P. 629 (1909).
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This section does not cover actions for interferences and annoyances in use of church property incident to the
operation of a railroad. Twenty-Second Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Oregon S.L.R.R., 36
Utah 238, 103 P. 243, 23 L.R.A. (n.s.) 860, 140 Am. St. R. 819 (1909). But see O'Neill v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R.R., 38
Utah 475, 114 P. 127 (1911).
-- ROAD CONSTRUCTION.
Where plaintiff brought a mandamus action to require members of the state road commission to initiate eminent
domain proceedings to assess damages allegedly caused by the impairment of ingress to and egress from plaintiff's
property, such procedure was an effort indirectly to do that which could not be done directly. The plaintiff cannot
employ mandamus to compel the state to pay damages, when, because of sovereign immunity, it cannot do so in a direct
suit against the state or the road commission. Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100, 349 P.2d 157 (1960).
This provision does not give consent to be sued, implied or otherwise, and where county and road commission
completed highway project reducing grade below plaintiffs' abutting land and the project was a reasonable and
necessary exercise of the police power to benefit the community as a whole, the abutting landowners were not entitled
to sue for damages without the state's consent. Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 354 P.2d 105 (1960).
Disallowance of item of damages pertaining to injury suffered by plaintiff for increased road noise due to
condemnation of strip of frontage from his property and subsequent movement of highway closer to his house was
proper, since all damages caused by taking or severing of land or manner of construction of improvement are
consequential and not within constitutional provision, unless they would be actionable at common law or would affect
land physically; to recover damages for taking of private property plaintiff had to show some physical injury or damage
to property itself and damages did not include something which merely affected senses of persons who use property.
State ex rel. Rd. Comm'n v. Williams, 22 Utah 2d 331, 452 P.2d 881 (1969).
-- SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION.
Damages to land, by the construction of a public improvement, though no part thereof is taken as provided for under §
78-34-10(3), is limited to injuries that would be actionable at common law, or where there has been some physical
disturbance of a right, either public or private, which the owner enjoys in connection with his property and which gives
it additional value. A definite physical injury cognizable to the senses and with a perceptible effect on the present
market value is required. Where there was no physical injury to condemnees' remaining home tract by the building and
operation of a school on condemned land joining the home tract, an award of damages was improper. Board of Educ. v.
Croft, 13 Utah 2d 310, 373 P.2d 697 (1962).
CONTRACT RIGHTS.
A contract that is terminable at the will of either party does not by itself give rise to a protectable property interest
because the mere expectation of benefits under such a contract does not give the promisor a legally enforceable right
against a promise to provide future service and, therefore, does not by itself provide a basis for compensation for loss of
future business. Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095 (Utah 1995).
Amendment of § 67-19-14.2, reducing the amount of unused sick leave that could be exchanged for insurance benefits
by state employees at retirement, did not effect a taking of property because any property interest the employees had in
the redemption of their sick leave did not vest until they retired. Utah Pub. Emples. Ass'n v. State, 2006 UT 9, 131 P.3d
208.
DEFENSE TO CONDEMNATION PROCEEDING.
Property owners could not defeat condemnation proceedings by state road commission on ground that they would be
without remedy to recover damages done to their property, since in condemnation matters the commission assumes all
liability. Barnes v. Wade, 90 Utah 1, 58 P.2d 297 (1936).
DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS.
In reviewing development exactions, or contributions to a governmental entity imposed as a condition for approving a
developer's project, such as mandatory dedications of land for roads, schools or parks, fees-in-lieu of mandatory
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dedication, water or sewage connection fees, and impact fees, the reviewing body must determine: (1) whether requiring
the exaction serves a legitimate government interest, and (2) whether the exaction is roughly proportional to the impact
of the proposed development. B.A.M. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT App 34, 87 P.3d 710.
Developers did not have a legitimate claim of entitlement to pay water impact fees before having any recognized
development projects or pending building permit applications and, therefore, did not have a protected property interest
entitling them to prepay the fees at the lower rate before a rate increase. Heideman v. Washington City, 2007 UT App
11, 569 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 155 P.3d 900.
ELEMENTS OF TAKING OR DAMAGE.
Complaint alleging the destruction of an underwater brine canal after enactment of the 1984 Great Salt Lake
Causeway Act, which authorized breaching the causeway as a response to the rapid rise of the water level in the lake in
order to prevent widespread flooding, alleged sufficient facts to constitute a "taking" or "damage" under this section.
Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990).
EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES.
In a dispute over noise from amplified outdoor concerts, the trial court erred in dismissing a takings claim by
homeowners on the ground that they had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies because, under the relevant city
ordinances, the homeowners were not required to appeal to the city's Takings Appeal Board as they were not seeking to
have their property developed or subdivided. Whaley v. Park City Mun. Corp., 2008 UT App 234, 190 P.3d 1.
FAIR MARKET VALUE.
The fair market value reimbursement requirement of § 10-2-424 (repealed, see now § 10-2-421) is to be read as
congruent with the "just compensation" requirement of this provision. City of Logan v. Utah Power & Light Co., 796
P.2d 697 (Utah 1990).
GARBAGE COLLECTION SERVICE.
Although plaintiffs, who operated a garbage collection service, were put at a severe, if not fatal, competitive
disadvantage by city ordinance forcing residents to use the city's collection services, the ordinance did not result in a
taking of the private business property. Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095 (Utah 1995).
HIGHWAY EASEMENT.
Erection of electric power lines on public highway easement, the fee to which is not in the public but in the owner of
the abutting property, is within the purview of the easement for highway purposes and is not an additional servitude for
which the abutting owner is entitled to compensation. Pickett v. California Pac. Util., 619 P.2d 325 (Utah 1980).
INTANGIBLE FACTORS.
Intangible factors such as increased noise from new highway should not be segregated and a separate money value
placed thereon in arriving at compensation for condemnation; this is true even where there has been an actual taking of
property; nevertheless it is proper to take intangible factors into account in arriving at market value. State Rd. Comm'n
v. Rohan, 26 Utah 2d 202, 487 P.2d 857 (1971).
INTEREST IN CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS.
Interest is recoverable only from the time of taking possession of the property under condemnation and the failure to
allow interest from the commencement of the action does not violate this section. State v. Peek, 1 Utah 2d 263, 265
P.2d 630 (1953).
INVERSE CONDEMNATION.
Actions for inverse condemnation are recognized and cognizable in the State of Utah without enabling legislation.
Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., 634 F. Supp. 100 (D. Utah 1986).
Damages recoverable under this section must be physical and either permanent, continuous, or recurring. Farmers
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New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1990).
If the damages are not a direct and necessary consequence of the construction or operation of a public use, they are not
recoverable in an inverse condemnation action. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241
(Utah 1990).
Where there was no evidence that the injuries incurred by the landowner were unavoidable or necessary to the city's
construction or use of the culvert, summary judgment for the city was proper. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v.
Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1990).
Landowner's inverse condemnation action involved claims under this section, which is self-executing; it did not arise
out of, and was not dependent on, a waiver of immunity contained in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (see Title
63, Chapter 30d). Therefore, landowner was not required to comply with the notice provisions of the governmental
immunity chapter. Heughs Land, L.L.C. v. Holladay City, 2005 UT App 202, 525 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 113 P.3d 1024.
JUST COMPENSATION.
Just compensation for property taken for a public use means compensation in money, and other property cannot be
substituted therefor, no matter how valuable, against the wishes of the condemnee. Shurtleff v. Salt Lake City, 96 Utah
21, 82 P.2d 561 (1938).
A standard of what is "just compensation" in the ordinary case is the market value of the property taken, however,
where proof of market value is not readily ascertainable because there is little possibility of a sale on an open market,
opinion evidence of what the property would probably sell for on the market if there were others who could use it,
would be a proper basis for determining such value. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arthur, 10 Utah 2d 306, 352 P.2d 693 (1960).
Tenant who voluntarily contracted away the right to compensation to his landlord, thereby allowing the landlord to
negotiate a fair market value sale of the landlord's property to a city, was not constitutionally entitled to just
compenation from the city. W. Valley City v. Martin, 2004 UT App 327, 509 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 100 P.3d 248.
-- OBJECTION WAIVED.
Where each of the affected landowners accepted the tendered amount of money without raising any objections to the
taking, or reserving any issues related to the taking, including the date of valuation, the statutory date of valuation and
the date from which interest accrues on that value could not be changed. DOT v. Ogden & Sons, 805 P.2d 173 (Utah
1990).
LOSS OF VISIBILITY.
This section does not create a protectable interest in the visibility of commercial property from an abutting highway.
A claim for loss of visibility is simply a claim for compensation of lost business profits, and an owner has no
protectable property interest in the mere hope of future sales from passing traffic. Ivers v. Utah DOT, 2007 UT 19, 154
P.3d 802.
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS.
City had the power, by implication, to enact ordinances requiring appointive officers and employees to be residents of
the city as a condition of employment and prohibiting certain political activities while working for the city,
notwithstanding contention that the ordinances violated provision of this section prohibiting the taking of private
property without just compensation. Salt Lake City Fire Fighters Local 1645 v. Salt Lake City, 22 Utah 2d 115, 449
P.2d 239, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906, 89 S. Ct. 1748, 23 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1969).
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES.
This section does not make county liable to an attorney for services rendered by him in defending an indigent person.
Pardee v. Salt Lake County, 39 Utah 482, 118 P. 122, 36 L.R.A. (n.s.) 377, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 200 (1911).
PROPERTY INTEREST.
Electric service district, which had notice that all or part of its service area could be annexed and its exclusive
business privilege limited or terminated, had no protected property interest in its certificate of public convenience and
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necessity. Strawberry Elec. Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870 (Utah 1996).
RECOVERY UNDER SECTION.
To recover under this section, a claimant must possess a protectable interest in property that is taken or damaged for a
public use. Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095 (Utah 1995).
REGULATORY TAKING.
If the effect of denying a conditional use permit is to leave property economically idle, the property owner has
suffered a taking. Diamond B-Y Ranches v. Tooele County, 2004 UT App 135, 498 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 91 P.3d 841.
RELATION TO FEDERAL PROVISIONS.
This provision is broader in its language that the similar provision in the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095 (Utah 1995).
This section protects all types of private property that are protected by the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095 (Utah 1995).
REMOVAL OF PERSONAL PROPERTY.
Where court ordered required owners of condemned property to show cause why they had not removed personal
property from condemned realty or declare it abandoned, such order was not taking or damaging property without just
compensation and there was no obligation on the state to pay the cost of removing personalty from the condemned land.
Utah Road Comm'n v. Hansen, 14 Utah 2d 305, 383 P.2d 917 (1963).
RIPENESS OF CLAIM.
Because ranch owner had not made any attempt to file an inverse condemnation action under this section, his claim
that the county made an unconstitutional taking without just compensation when it declared the ranch roads public was
not ripe for review. J.B. Ranch, Inc. v. Grand County, 958 F.2d 306 (10th Cir. 1992).
Developers' claim that city's conditions on development were unreasonable and amounted to an unconstitutional
taking of developers' property was unripe because developers had not sought just compensation under this section.
Anderson v. Alpine City, 804 F. Supp. 269 (D. Utah 1992).
SECTION SELF-EXECUTING.
This section needs no legislation to activate it; it is mandatory and obligatory as it is. Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.,
795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990); Hamblin v. City of Clearfield, 795 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1990).
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Right to recover consequential damages for injury to private property by reason of making public improvements is
based upon this section, and therefore statute of limitations applicable to liabilities created by statute does not govern.
Webber v. Salt Lake City, 40 Utah 221, 120 P. 503, 37 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1115 (1911).
TAXES.
Statute which authorized supervisors of drainage district to add 15% to amount of taxes to be assessed in drainage
district did not violate the provisions of this section. Elkins v. Millard County Drainage Dist. No. 3, 77 Utah 303, 294 P.
307 (1930).
WATER CONNECTION FEE.
An ordinance requiring plaintiff, a shareholder in mutual irrigation company, to transfer shares to the city in exchange
for connection to the municipal secondary water system when those without water shares could pay cash for their
connection did not effect an unconstitutional taking of plaintiff's water shares. Whitmer v. City of Lindon, 943 P.2d 226
(Utah 1997).
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WATER RIGHTS.
Measure of damages for diversion and taking of water is not the difference in the value of the land with and without
the water, but where the market value is not ascertainable the value of the water can be determined by the uses to which
it has been put, and the owner is entitled to be compensated for the full measure of his loss. Sigurd City v. State, 105
Utah 278, 142 P.2d 154 (1943).
Where landowner had not appropriated underground waters or controlled waters of a river adjacent to his land, he was
not entitled to damages for any diminution of the moisture in his soil by reason of water conservancy district's
impounding, under an established right, the river's waters in a reservoir. Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v.
Gailey, 8 Utah 2d 55, 328 P.2d 175 (1958).
CITED in Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 795 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1990); Walker v. Brigham City, 856 P.2d 347 (Utah
1993).
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Inverse condemnation state court class actions, 49 A.L.R.4th 618.
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STATE RULES
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PART III. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS
URCP Rule 7 (2008)
Review Court Orders which may amend this Rule.
Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; motions, memoranda, hearings, orders, objection to commissioner's order.
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a counterclaim; an answer to a cross-claim, if the
answer contains a cross-claim; a third-party complaint, if a person who was not an original party is summoned under the
provisions of Rule 14; and a third-party answer, if a third-party complaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed,
except that the court may order a reply to an answer or a third-party answer.
(b) (1) Motions. - An application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made during a hearing
or trial or in proceedings before a court commissioner, shall be made in accordance with this rule. A motion shall be in
writing and state succinctly and with particularity the relief sought and the grounds for the relief sought.
(2) Limit on order to show cause. An application to the court for an order to show cause shall be made only for
enforcement of an exiting order or for sanctions for violating an existing order. An application for an order to show
cause must be supported by an affidavit sufficient to show cause to believe a party has violated a court order.
(c) Memoranda.
(1) Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times. All motions, except uncontested or ex parte motions, shall be
accompanied by a supporting memorandum. Within ten days after service of the motion and supporting memorandum, a
party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in opposition. Within five days after service of the memorandum in
opposition, the moving party may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited to rebuttal of matters raised in the
memorandum in opposition. No other memoranda will be considered without leave of court. A party may attach a
proposed order to its initial memorandum.
(2) Length. Initial memoranda shall not exceed 10 pages of argument without leave of the court. Reply memoranda
shall not exceed 5 pages of argument without leave of the court. The court may permit a party to file an over-length
memorandum upon ex parte application and a showing of good cause.
(3) Content.
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(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall contain a statement of material facts as to
which the moving party contends no genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact set forth in the moving
party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the responding
party.
(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain a verbatim restatement of each of the
moving party's facts that is controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. For each of
the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any
dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For any additional facts set
forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to
supporting materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials.
(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of argument shall contain a table of contents and a table of authorities
with page references.
(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions of documents cited in the memorandum,
such as affidavits or discovery materials.
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete, either party may file a "Request to Submit for
Decision." The request to submit for decision shall state the date on which the motion was served, the date the opposing
memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been
requested. If no party files a request, the motion will not be submitted for decision.
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion. A party may request a hearing in the motion, in a
memorandum or in the request to submit for decision. A request for hearing shall be separately identified in the caption
of the document containing the request. The court shall grant a request for a hearing on a motion under Rule 56 or a
motion that would dispose of the action or any claim or defense in the action unless the court finds that the motion or
opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been authoritatively decided.
(f) Orders.
(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute order entered in writing, not included in a
judgment. An order for the payment of money may be enforced in the same manner as if it were a judgment. Except as
otherwise provided by these rules, any order made without notice to the adverse party may be vacated or modified by
the judge who made it with or without notice. Orders shall state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion
or the court's initiative.
(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial memorandum, or unless otherwise
directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other
parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within
five days after service. The party preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an objection
or upon expiration of the time to object.
(3) Unless otherwise directed by the court, all orders shall be prepared as separate documents and shall not
incorporate any matter by reference.
(g) Objection to court commissioner's recommendation. A recommendation of a court commissioner is the order of
the court until modified by the court. A party may object to the recommendation by filing an objection in the same
manner as filing a motion within ten days after the recommendation is made in open court or, if the court commissioner
takes the matter under advisement, ten days after the minute entry of the recommendation is served. A party may
respond to the objection in the same manner as responding to a motion.
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HISTORY: Amended effective November 1, 2003; April 1, 2004; November 1, 2005; April 1, 2008
NOTES:
Advisory Committee Note. -- The practice for courtesy copies varies by judge and so is not regulated by rule. Each
party should ascertain whether the judge wants a courtesy copy of that party's motion, memoranda and supporting
documents and, if so, when and where to deliver them.
Paragraph (f) applies to all orders, not just orders upon motion.
Amendment Notes.-- The 2004 amendment inserted "or in proceedings before a court commissioner" in
Subdivision (b); substituted the first paragraph in Subdivision (c)(2) for a list of maximum lengths for different types of
memoranda; in Subdivision (f)(2), substituted "serve upon the other parties" for "file" in the first sentence and added the
last sentence; in Subdivision (g), substituted "recommendation" for "recommended order" several times and substituted
"made in open court" for "entered" and added the clause beginning "or, if" in the second sentence; and added the second
paragraph of the Advisory Committee Note.
The 2005 amendment added Subdivision (f)(3).
The 2008 amendment added Subdivision (b)(2) and redesignated former Subdivision (b) as Subdivision (b)(1).
Compiler's Notes. -- This rule is similar to Rule 7, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References.-- Amendment of pleadings to conform to evidence, motion for, U.R.C.P. 15(b).
Commencement of action, U.R.C.P. 3.
Consolidation of defenses made by motion, U.R.C.P. 12(g).
Counterclaim and cross-claim, U.R.C.P. 13.
Defenses and objections, U.R.C.P. 12.
Denial of motion, pleading after, U.R.C.P. 12(i).
Directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, motion for, U.R.C.P. 50.
Dismissal of actions, U.R.C.P. 41.
Eminent domain proceedings, contents of complaint in, § 78-34-6.
Evidence in support of motion, U.R.C.P. 43(b).
Execution and proceedings supplemental thereto, U.R.C.P. 69A et seq.
Extraordinary relief, U.R.C.P. 65B.
Forcible entry or detainer, proof required, § 78-36-9.
Form of pleadings, U.R.C.P. 10.
"Judgment" defined, U.R.C.P. 54(a).
One form of action, U.R.C.P. 2.
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Partition of property, complaint to set forth interests of all parties, § 78-39-2.
Pleading special matters, U.R.C.P. 9.
Relief from judgment or order, U.R.C.P. 60.
Requirements of signature, U.R.C.P. 11.
Service and filing of motions, pleadings and other papers, U.R.C.P. 5.
Special forms of writs abolished, U.R.C.P. 65B(a).
Supreme Court, rulemaking power of, § 78-2-4.
Temporary restraining orders, setting aside, U.R.C.P. 65A.
Time for service of written motions, U.R.C.P. 6(d).
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Memorandum opposing summary judgment
Motions.
-- Amendments.
-- -- Complaint.
-- -- Prayer for relief.
-- New trial.
-- -- Particularization.
-- Setting aside conditional order.
Orders.
-- Correction.
-- Necessity
-- Submission to court
Reply memorandum.
Cited.
Memorandum opposing summary judgment
Failure of memorandum opposing summary judgment to set forth disputed facts in numbered sentences in a
separate section as required by former R. Jud. Admin. 4-501(2)(B) was harmless, as the disputed facts were clearly
provided in the body of the memorandum with applicable record references. Salt Lake County v. Metro W. Ready Mix,
Inc. 2004 Utah LEXIS 55.
Motions.
-- Amendments.
-- -- Complaint.
Investors who lost money in a failed investment venture and whose multi-count complaint stemming from their
losses was dismissed were properly denied the opportunity to amend their complaint because they never filed an actual
motion, but merely cited Rule 15 without articulating any reasons why leave to amend their 136-page, 725-paragraph
complaint was merited. Coroles v. Sabey 2003 Utah App. LEXIS 101.
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-- -- Prayer for relief.
Although a trial court may deny a motion to amend the complaint for a movant's failure to present a written motion
and a proposed amended complaint, that rule does not apply to the prayer for relief because, under Rule 54(c), the
prayer does not limit the relief which the court may grant. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983).
-- New trial.
-- -- Particularization.
Only purpose for requiring particularization of grounds for motion for new trial is to inform court and other party of
theories upon which new trial is sought; where defendant filed affidavit with motions setting forth theories, and
judgment had been on pleadings, court and parties were sufficiently advised as to grounds for motion. Howard v.
Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149, 356 P.2d 275 (1960).
-- Setting aside conditional order.
Where court on own initiative lowered from $ 2,000 to $ 1,000 value of building as found by jury and entered
conditional order granting new trial unless plaintiff consented to reduction, court could restore jury findings under
authority of this Rule, since plaintiff filed motion to set aside conditional order for new trial within ten days. National
Farmers' Union Property & Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d 249, 61 A.L.R.2d 635 (1955).
Orders.
-- Correction.
Where judge made perfunctory or clerical mistake resulting from erroneous assumption that order prepared by
counsel correctly reflected judgment of Supreme Court and trial court, judge could correct order on his own motion.
Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 5 Utah 2d 196, 299 P.2d 827 (1956).
-- Necessity
Unless the court explicitly directs that no order needs to be submitted, no finality will be ascribed to a
memorandum decision or minute entry for purposes of triggering the running of the time for appeal. Code v. Utah Dep't
of Health 2007 Utah LEXIS 106.
-- Submission to court
If the prevailing party fails to submit an order within the 15-day period required by this rule, any party interested in
finality, including the non-prevailing party, may submit an order. Code v. Utah Dep't of Health 2007 Utah LEXIS 106.
Reply memorandum.
District court had the discretion to consider points raised in a reply memorandum submitted in support of summary
judgment although the original motion addressed only one cause of action, but other causes of action were addressed in
the reply. No supplemental briefing was filed after the moving party stated it was seeking summary judgment on all of
the claims, despite a request for leave to supplement an opposition document. Dimick v. OHC Liquidation Trust 2007
Utah App. LEXIS 58.
Cited in Boskovich v. Utah Constr. Co., 123 Utah 387, 259 P.2d 885 (1953); Thomas v. Heirs of Braffet, 6 Utah 2d
57, 305 P.2d 507 (1956); Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook 2002 Utah LEXIS 64 2002 UT 38 supreme court of utah, 48 P.3d
895 (Utah 2002); Code v. Utah Dep't of Health 2006 Utah App. LEXIS 112.
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. -- 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions, Rules, and Orders § 1 et seq.; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 31 et seq., 665
C.J.S. -- 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders § 1 et seq.; 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 63 to 210, 140 et seq., 211 et seq
A.L.R. -- Proceeding for summary judgment as affected by presentation of counterclaim, 8 A.L.R.3d 1361.

Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action as affected by opponent's motion for summary judgment, judgment on
the pleadings, or directed verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113.
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B. NEW TRIALS
12-59 Moore's Federal Practice - Civil § 59.13

AUTHOR: by Martin H. Rcdish
§ 59.13 Grounds for New Trial

|1] No Fixed Standard for Rule 59 Relief

No fixed standard applies to the grant or denial of Rule 59 relief; rather, the applicable standard applied by the trial

court in its exercise of discretion varies with the grounds for which relief is sought.nl The general grounds for a new
trial arc that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, that the damages arc excessive, that the trial was not
fair, or that substantial errors occurred in the admission or rejection of evidence or the giving or refusal of
instructions.n2 Further, a district court has broad discretion to grant a new trial when necessary to prevent injustice.n3
These bases are discussed in [2] (jury trials) and [3] (court trials), below; insufficient grounds are discussed in [4],
below.
|2| Jury Trial
[a| Reasonable Basis Test

As a general rule, courts will not disturb jury verdicts in the absence of extreme circumstances, such as a case of
manifest injustice or abuse of the jury's function. Courts will sustain jury verdicts if reasonable bases exist to uphold the
verdict. In ruling on a Rule 59 motion, the court will search the record for evidence that could reasonably lead the jury

to reach its verdict, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict winner.n4 However, a jury's verdict can be

against the great weight of evidence, and thus justify a new trial, even if there is substantial evidence in support of the
verdict sufficient to defeat a motion for judgment as a matter of Iaw.n4.1 But this does not mean that the district court
should grant a motion for new trial simply because the court would have come to different conclusion.n4.2
|b] Judicial Error or Misconduct
[i] Legal Errors
[A) Prejudice Required

Any error of law (see [B]-[E], below) that is prejudicial is a sufficient ground for a new trial.n5
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In defense of the "maximum recovery" rule, the Second Circuit has argued that "[t]o obtain a 'fair'judgment on damages
in a case such as this, the law has traditionally deferred to the decision of a jury of laymen drawn from the community at
large, and not to the 'seasoned judgment' of the trial judge."n 134 On the other hand, while the "minimum recovery"
standard could arguably be viewed as an undue invasion of the jury's province, it has been defended as necessary "in
order to protect the party obliged to pay against a judge's assessment of damages."n 135
[C] Agreement to Remittitur Precludes Subsequent Appeal of Rcmittitur Order

It is well established that when a party agrees to remittitur, that party may not thereafter appeal the remittitur ordcr.nl 36
Though this rule is a venerable one, its wisdom is subject to serious question. If a plaintiff agrees to a rcmittitur only to

avoid the loss of a verdict and a new trial, such agreement can hardly be deemed a voluntary waiver. If the plaintiff
refuses to accept the rcmittitur, the court will order a new trial, which is a non-final, unappealable order. Thus, a
plaintiff who disagrees with the remittitur is effectively denied any opportunity to obtain appellate review of the trial
court's decision.

Despite the general prohibition on appeal of a rcmittitur, however, if the defendant argues on appeal that items were
inappropriately included in the damage award, the plaintiff may be entitled to raise the inappropriatcness of a rcmittitur
that he or she has acceptcd.nl37
[3] Actions Without Jury

(a] Grounds Similar to Jury Trial Bases

A new trial may be granted in a nonjury action if a new trial might be obtained under similar circumstances in a jury
action {see [2], o6ove).nl38 Although addressed to the broad discretion of the trial court.nl 39 a motion for new trial in
a nonjury case should be based on a manifest mistake of fact or error of law; the court should find substantial reasons
before setting aside a judgment.nl 40
|b] Effect or Motion

On a motion for new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered,
take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions,nl41
and direct the entry of a new judgment.nl 42
[c] Motion to Reopen Distinguished

A Rule 59 motion is distinct from a motion to reopen to take additional testimony. A Rule 59 motion is made only after
the entry of a judgment, whereas a motion to reopen is most commonly made before the jury has returned its
verdict,nl43 or while the judge has the case under advisement in nonjury actions. In a motion to reopen, the movant
seeks to enter additional testimony into the record; because no judgment exists, the moving party is not seeking
modification of an existing judgment. Although similar to a Rule 59 or Rule 60(b) motion based on newly discovered

evidence, a motion to reopen does not require that the evidence be newly discovered or that it could not have been
discovered during the pendency of the trial by a party acting with due diligence (see j>* 59.13[2j[cj).n\44
Like a Rule 59 motion, a motion to reopen may be granted or denied in the district court's discrction.nl 45 The court
must decide the motion in the interest of fairness and justice. A motion to reopen a bench trial is more likely to be

granted than a motion to reopen a jury trial.nl46 Similarly, a motion made during the early deliberations of a jury is
more likely to be granted than a motion made later in the deliberations, or after the jury has given some indication of its
verdict.
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This matter comes before the Court on remand from the Utah Supreme Court. In a ruling
filed February 12,2008 (Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10), the Supreme Court instructed
this Court to enter "specific findings of fact regarding the Okelberrys' evidence of interruption in the

use of the Four Roads as public thoroughfares." 2008 UT 10 f 20. The Court has reviewed the file,
reviewed trial transcript, considered the memoranda of both parties, heard oral argument, and now
issues the following findings of fact and ruling:
SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Several of Plaintiff s witnesses testified at trial that they used some or all of the four roads

(Circle Springs Road, Ridge Line Road, Thorton Hallow Road, Parker Canyon Road) at issue here
during various periods between 1957 and 2004.
2. Deon Sabey testified that he used all four roads several times beginning in the 1950s. He

testified that when using the roads he never saw "no trespassing" signs on any of the roads, but did
see gates on the roads. He never saw or encountered locks on any of the gates. He saw no markers
on the gates. He saw others using the roads at various times, and was never asked to leave the roads,
nor did he get permission to use any of the roads.
3. Moroni Besendorfer testified that he used all four roads several times beginning in the
1960s. He testified that he saw others on the road every year from the 1960s through the 1980s. He

testified that he saw others use the roads and camp on adjoining property with their vehicles. He did
not see any "no trespassing" signs until 1999. He saw no locked gates until "a few years" prior to
the trial. He was never kicked off the roads or asked to leave, and never obtained permission to use

the roads.

4. Martin Wall testified that he used Circle Springs Road and Ridge Line Road regularly
beginning in the 1950s, for hunting and gathering firewood. He testified that he never saw "no

trespassing" signs.

He saw gates on the roads, but they were not locked.

He never received

permission to traverse the roads.
5. Jake Thompson testified that he has used Circle Springs Road and Ridge Line Road
regularly since the 1950s, and Thorton Hallow Road since at least the 1970s. He testified that he
never saw "no trespassing" signs on the roads. He saw gates, but they were not locked. He never
received permission to travel the roads, and was never kicked off the roads.
6. Ed Sabey testified that he has used all of the roads regularly since about the 1960s. He
testified that he never saw "no trespassing signs," nor signs on Parker Canyon Road saying "no

motorized vehicles." He saw gates, which were not locked. He had seen others on the roads. He
never got permission to use the roads. He testified that about "15 years ago" (which would have

been 1989), people were stopped from using Ridge Line Road.
7. Richard Baum testified that he used Ridge Line Road for biking about "20 years ago"
(1984). He was never kicked off the road, and never saw "no trespassing signs." He did see "orange
painted wood signs" on the road.
8. Brandon Richins testified that he has used Circle Springs Road, Ridge Line Road, and

Parker Canyon Road starting in the late 1980s. He testified that he first saw "no trespassing" signs
about 15-16 years ago (1988-89) on Circle Springs Road. He saw locked gates on Ridge Line Road
since 2001. He never saw locked gates on Parker Canyon road, but saw "no motorized vehicle"

signs. He never had permission to use the roads, and saw others on them.
9. Benny Gardner testified that he started using Circle Springs Road, Thorton Hallow Road,
and Parker Canyon Road in about 1966. He testified that he did not see "no trespassing" signs until
the 1990s.

He saw the gates on the roads, but testified that they were not locked until "more

recently." He testified that he saw others on the roads, was never kicked off the roads, and never got
permission to use the roads.
10. Mark Buttars testified that he used all the roads starting in the 1960s, except Parker

Canyon Road, which he started using in 1972. He testified that he saw "partial trespassing" signs
on Thorton Hallow Road and Circle Springs Road starting in about 1992. He saw no signs prior to
1992. He never received permission to use the roads, and saw others on the roads. While he saw

gates on the roads, he testified that they were never locked.
11. Defendants called several witnesses who also testified regarding public access to the
roads between 1957 and 2004.
12. JeffJefferson mainly testified regarding the condition of the roads. He testified that each
of the roads was rocky and would require a 4-wheel drive vehicle to pass, but that sometimes gates

were left open. He testified that he asked Mark Buttars to leave the roads twice sometime after 2000.
He also testified that the sign on a tire at the start of Circle Springs Road was put up in about 1992.
13. Melvin Price also testified about the condition of the roads: that they were only passable
by 4-wheel drive vehicles. He testified that there have been locked gates and "no trespassing" signs
on Ridge Line Road for at least 20 years. He testified that there were signs and locked gates on the
other roads at some point, but did not specify a time frame. He testified that he got permission from
the Okelberrys each year he used the roads, and that there was not much traffic or many others on
the roads.

14. Lee Okelberry testified that his father purchased property surrounding the roads in 1957.
He testified that the roads had gates and fences. He testified that Thorton Hallow Road and other

roads were "better than a trail," but that the public was not there much in the 1950s. He testified that
he occasionally he stopped and talked to people on Parker Canyon Road in the 1950s. He stated that
"as the years went by there was a little more traffic" on the roads. He testified that in 1957 there was
no need for "no trespassing" signs because "[t]here was no, not that much trespass up there." He
further stated that there were no locks on the gates in 1957, but instead "[w]e put fasteners on them

and we wired them to a post." "We never did lock anybody out of there," he stated. He testified that
he asked wood gatherers to get off private land on occasion. He also testified that he "never locked"

the gates. He testified that a locked gate shown to him as an exhibit was "put there after I left."
Finally, he testified that "I think we stood up for the public quite a bit. If there was any that needed
to go through there in any way, shape or form they could ask or they could go through there. We

never turned nobody down that had any business down in there."

15. Glen Shepherd testified that there are now signs on all of the roads. He said he had
permission for years from the Okelberrys to use the roads, who are "pretty free" with giving
permission. He stated that the roads are generally seen as private rather than public roads, and that
there have always been gates of some sort on the roads.

16. Shane Ford testified that the condition of the roads is pretty similar now (in 2004) to their
condition in 1994. He testified that gates are now locked during hunting season. He believed that

the roads have not been open to the public for continuous use.
17. Bruce Huvard testified that the roads were "very rough." He testified that he first went

to the property in 1966, and saw "keep out" and "private" signs on the property at that time. He
testified that he obtained permission from the Okelberrys each year from 1966 to 1990 to use the
roads. He testified that there were always gates upon entering the roads between 1966 and 1990.

He testified that there were others who used the roads without permission, but that they were not
very numerous. He kicked people off the Okelberry property who were not "supposed to be on
there" between 1966 and 1990. He testified that "some" of the gates were locked between 1966 and
1990, but did not specify exact dates.
18. Brian Okelberry testified that he started working on the property around the roads in the
early 1970s. He testified that there have always been gates on the road since he's been there, and
that one of the purposes of the gates was to control vehicles "from going up and down the roads."

He has given people permission to use roads at times. He testified that there were "keep out" signs
on some of the gates. He testified that some of the gates have been locked "over periods of time."
He testified that he started taking an active role in preventing trespassing around the late 1980s, and
began putting up signs then. He testified that the first boundary locks were placed on the gates in
the 1980s.

19. Ray Okelberry testified that there were gates on the roads beginning in 1957, and that as
time passed more people came. He has told people to leave the roads "on occasion." He gave
permission to Brian Gardner and others to use the roads. He began charging people for "trespass
permits" beginning in the 1990s. He testified that there were locks on the gates in the 1990s and
2000s. He testified that the sign on the tire at the entrance to the Circle Springs Road was there
"about 20 years." He testified that they started locking the Circle Springs and "1080 gate" (going
into the Ridge Line Road) either the first or second year he was there. He testified that people may

have cut the locks from gates at some points. He testified that he began putting up signs in 1957-59,
but that "they didn't stay up," and hypothesized that the "wind blew them away." He also testified:
"I'm not saying the gate was opened or locked all summer, but when I was getting ready to get those
sheep out of there I locked those gates. And I've always had trouble keeping locks there."
20. The Court finds that there were gates at the entrances to each of the roads from 1957 to
2004.

21. The Court also finds that there may have been signs at various locations reading "keep
out" and "private" beginning in the 1960s. However, the evidence shows that these signs did not
restrict travel on the roads themselves, and it is unclear whether they were intended to refer to
keeping off the roads or the surrounding property. None of Defendants' witnesses clarified whether

the signs were intended to refer to the roads or the property. Ray Okelberry testified that the signs
he placed "didn't do any good" anyway. More signs were placed by Brian Okelberry and others
beginning in the late 1980s and 1990s.
22. The Court finds that occasionally persons may have been told to leave the property

beginning in the 1950s, but this did not restrict travel on the roads. Restrictions on use of the roads
began in the 1980s at the earliest. There was no evidence presented that the Okelberrys regularly

kicked people off the roads at any time before the 1980s; the evidence instead shows that they freely
intended to let others use the roads.
23. The Court finds that while some people obtained permission to use the roads, getting
specific permission was not enforced, and many used the roads from 1957 to the 1990s without
permission.
24. The Court finds that though the Okelberrys may have locked some of the gates at some

points between the 1950s and 1990s, this did not restrict travel on the roads. There was no credible
evidence presented that the Okelberrys intended to or actually did restrict travel prior to the 1990s
due to the locking of gates. While Ray Okelberry testified that he locked gates beginning either in
1957 or 1958, he did not testify that he intended to keep the public from accessing the roads at this

time. Lee Okelberry and Brian Okelberry, both Defendants' witnesses, testified that the boundary

gates at the entrances of the roads were never locked until at least the 1980s. Several of Plaintiffs

witnesses also testified to this effect.
RULING

The issue before the Court here is a fairly narrow one, though it must be decided based on
a large amount of testimony and evidence. The Utah Supreme Court, on February 12,2008, issued

a written decision ordering this Court to enter "specific findings of fact regarding the Okelberrys'
evidence of interruption in the use of the Four Roads as public thoroughfares." Wasatch County v.

Okelberry, 2008 UT10 U 20. This Court has reviewed the evidence and made those specific findings
of fact above, and will presently apply those findings to the now-applicable law.
In its February 12 decision, the Supreme Court articulated a "bright-line rule" to determine

whether a road is dedicated and abandoned for use to the public under Utah Code Annotated § 72-5104. This rule is as follows:
An overt act that is intended by a property owner to interrupt the use of a road as a

public thoroughfare, and is reasonably calculated to do so, constitutes an interruption
sufficient to restart the running of the required ten-year period under the Dedication
Statute.

Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10 U 15.
The new rule thus contains three requirements: 1) there must be an overt act; 2) there must be a show

of intention by a property owner to interrupt the public use of a road; 3) the overt act must be
reasonably calculated to interrupt road use by the public.

The Supreme Court explained that

"credible evidence" which meets these three requirements "simply precludes a finding ofcontinuous
use." Id.

Defendants argue that they have presented evidence of "at least four types of acts" which
would satisfy the above standard: "locked gates, unlocked gates, asking trespassers to leave, and
posting signs."

(Memorandum Opposing Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law ("Opp. Memo"), at 2.) The Court now addresses each of these.
The evidence at trial showed clearly that there were unlocked gates at the entrances to the

roads (boundary gates) as well as some interior gates during all the years relevant to this issue. The
question is whether unlocked gates would satisfy the requirements explained above. The Court holds

that they do not.

Defendants argue, using language from various cases in other states, that an

unlocked gate creates a "presumption that any use was permissive." (Opp. Memo, at 11.) But the
testimony at trial shows otherwise. Several witnesses testified ofunlocked wire or metal gates which
were used to control cattle, but none testified that this interrupted their use of the roads, or that they

supposed that their use was permissive based on the presence of the gates.

Perhaps most

importantly, the simple existence of gates clearly does not constitute an overt act.

The gates were

apparently there even before Defendants took control of the property, and the requirement that
travelers open and close such gates for the purpose of controlling livestock does not show intent to
interrupt public use. The gates themselves "were not meant to restrict public travel on the Road[s]."
Utah County v. Butler, 2008 UT 12 f 16.
Defendants claim that "asking people to leave the roads" constitutes an overt act under the
Supreme Court's standard. Indeed, multiple witnesses, including Bruce Huvard, Melvin Price, and

Glen Shepherd testified that they obtained permission to use the roads. Some testimony was also
presented at trial that, on occasion, the Okelberrys and others asked people to leave property

surrounding the roads. The evidence did not show, however, that this interrupted public use of the

roads generally. Several of Plaintiff s witnesses testified that they used the roads freely during the
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s without any resistance. Lee Okelberry testified that the Okelberrys "never

turned nobody down" who had legitimate business using the roads. None of Defendants' witnesses
testified that there was a regular policy of requiring permission or approval to use the roads during
that period, nor that asking persons to leave the property was intended to restrict public access to the
roads themselves. As the Supreme Court stated in Utah County v. Butler, when individuals are not
removed from the roads themselves, simply removing them from the adjoining property is not

sufficient to constitute an overt act reasonably calculated to interrupt continuous use. See 2008 UT
12 U17. The evidence shows that it was not until the late 1980s and 1990s that the Okelberrys began
requiring hunting permits and other permission to use the roads. As a result, the Court finds that
these instances ofasking persons to leave the property do not rise to the level of an overt act intended
to interrupt public use of the roads prior to the 1990s.

Another possible interruptive act alleged by Defendants was the posting of "keep out" and
"no trespassing" signs on the gates and the property surrounding the roads. The Utah Supreme Court
has held that "it is clear that the posting of the signs constituted an overt act," but that less clear was
whether posting the signs showed an intent to interrupt public use of the road and whether the act
was reasonably calculated to do so. Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10 ^f 18. It appears that
a majority of the "no trespassing" and "keep out" signs on the property at the time of trial were
placed there in the late 1980s and 1990s. Ray Okelberry testified that he began putting up signs as

early as 1957 or 1958, but that it "didn't do any good" to put the signs up. He also testified that the
early signs "didn't stay up." Bruce Huvard testified that he saw signs as early as 1966 saying "keep

out" and "private." Yet none of Defendants' witnesses at trial specified their intent when putting up
the signs in the years prior to the 1980s and 1990s. Further, many of Plaintiffs witnesses testified
that they never saw "no trespassing" signs until the late 1980s or 1990s, and that none of them were

deterred in their travels along the roads by signs. The Utah Supreme Court held, in Utah County v.
Butler, that "[s]igns posted against travel on property adjacent to the Road do not constitute an
interruption of travel on the Road itself." 2008 UT 12^17. Without credible evidence showing that
the signs were meant to apply to the roads themselves, the Court cannot infer an intent to interrupt
the use of the roads from the posting of signs in the 1950s, 1960s, or 1970s, nor can it conclude that
the earlier signs were "reasonably calculated" to interrupt public road use prior to the late 1980s or
1990s.

Finally, Defendants submit that evidence of locked gates constitutes an overt act sufficient
to satisfy the Supreme Court's standard. The Supreme Court held that "[t]he locking of gates for
several days at a time constitutes an overt act intended to interrupt public use and reasonably

calculated to do so." Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10 *\ 19. However, the Court also held
that "factual questions remain as to whether and when such an event or events occurred." Id. Ray

Okelberry testified that he started locking the Circle Springs and "1080 gate" (going into the Ridge
Line Road) either the first or second year he was on his property. He testified that "when I was
getting ready to get those sheep out of there I locked those gates." (Transcript of Bench Trial, June
30,2004, at 138.) He also stated that "I've always had trouble keeping locks there," but that "I was
there I might have been there a week or ten days that I had those gates locked." Id. at 138-39.
The Utah Supreme Court explained that evidence of an overt act must be "credible" to
preclude a finding of continuous use under the dedication statute. Wasatch County v. Okelberry,
2008 UT 10 Tf 15. That Court has previously held that a trial court has "the prerogative to judge the

/F^\

credibility of the witnesses and to determine the facts." Casida v. Deland, 866 P.2d 599,602 (Utah

1993) (citing Hanks v. Turner, 508 P.2d 815, 816 (Utah 1973)). In making this determination, the
Court is "not obliged to believe the self-serving testimony" of the witness. Id. Further, while a trial
judge "should not arbitrarily reject competent, credible, uncontradicted testimony, nevertheless he
is not compelled to believe evidence where there is anything about it which would reasonably justify
refusal to accept it as the facts, and this includes the self-interest of the witness." Id. (citing Strong
v. Turner, 452 P.2d 323, 324 (Utah 1969)).
Though the Court properly takes into account Ray Okelberry's self-interest in assessing the

credibility of his testimony, that alone is not dispositive. The main problem with Ray Okelberry's

trial testimony regarding locked gates is that it contradicts not only the testimony of several of
Plaintiffs' witnesses (specifically, Deon Sabey, Moroni Besendorfer, Martin Wall, Jake Thompson,
Ed Sabey, Brandon Richins, Benny Gardner, and Mark Buttars), it also contradicts the testimony of
Defendants' own witnesses, Brian and Lee Okelberry. Plaintiffs' witnesses who testified on the
issue testified that they encountered no locked gates while using the roads until at least the late 1980s
or 1990s, and some not until the 2000s.
Brian Okelberry testified that the first boundary locks were placed on gates in the 1980s. Lee
Okelberry testified that "[w]e never did lock anybody out of there," that he personally never locked

any gates, and that any locks on gates shown to him as exhibits were put there "after I left," which
would have been in the 1990s, as he testified he stopped going to the area "about six years ago."
(Transcript of Bench Trial, June 29,2004, at 198.) He specifically testified that locks were not put

on the gates in 1957, but instead "[w]e put fasteners on them and we wired them to a post." These
statements by Brian and Lee Okelberry are especially significant because they are statements against
interest. Brian Okelberry is a party to this case, and both were witnesses called by Defendants.
Plaintiffs witnesses also contradict Ray Okelberry's testimony.

Defendants argue that

Plaintiffs witnesses are "sporadic users" of the road and that their testimony regarding locked gates
should not be given as much weight as a result.

(Opp. Memo, at 9.)

But the Supreme Court

explained that "a road may be used continuously even if it is not used constantly or frequently."
Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10 ^j 16. "For example, a road may be used by only one

person once a month, but if this use is as often as the public finds it 'convenient or necessary,' and
the landowner has taken no action intended and reasonably calculated to interrupt use, the use is

continuous. The one-month period oftime between uses is a mere intermission, not an interruption."
Id.

The Court finds that while there may have been occasions in which Mr. Okelberry locked the
gates in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, these were few and far between, were not intended to restrict
public access, and were not reasonably calculated to interrupt public use of the roads. The Court
finds that his testimony, to the extent it contradicts the testimony of Lee Okelberry, Brian Okelberry,
and several of Plaintiff s witnesses (that the gates were not locked with that intent until at least the
1980s), is not credible evidence under the Supreme Court's standard. Defendants' other witnesses
testifying about the existence of locked gates did not specify timeframes in which the gates were
locked; therefore the testimony of the Okelberrys are Defendants' only evidence on this subject. As

in Utah County v. Butler, the Court finds here that between the 1950s and at least the 1980s "the

gates . . . were not erected or locked with the requisite intent and therefore did not interrupt the
public's continuous use of the Road." 2008 UT 12 f 16.
CONCLUSION

This Court ruled previously that "it is clear that individuals using the roads beginning in the

late 1950s until the late 1980s or early 1990s used the roads without interruption, they used the roads
freely, and though not constantly, they used the roads continuously as they needed." (Findings of

Fact and Conclusions ofLaw, 22 September 2004, at 6-7.) Plaintiffs at trial made a showing by clear
and convincing evidence that Circle Springs Road, Ridge Line Road, Thorton Hallow Road, and
Parker Canyon Road were abandoned to the public. Defendants have offered no credible evidence

of overt acts sufficient to change this determination under the Utah Supreme Court's newly created
standard. Therefore the Court holds that under Utah Code Annotated § 72-5-104( 1) each of the four
roads was "dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public" by continuous use as a public

thoroughfare for over 10 years.

Signed this 23 day of October, 2008.

LD1EYRE

Distric Court Judge
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I:

A SINGLE INTERRUPTION OF USE DURING THE RELEVANT
PERIOD IS SUFFICIENT TO PREVENT DEDICATION AS A

PUBLIC ROAD.

The decision of the Utah Supreme Court1 has now established a bright line test for whether
the use of a road was continuous:
An overt act that is intended by a property owner to interrupt the use
of a road as a public thoroughfare, and is reasonably calculated to do
so, constitutes an interruption sufficient to restart the running of the

required ten-year period under the Dedication Statute.2
This Court has previously found there was no public vehicular use prior to the 1950s3 and
that gates were locked at least by the 1990s.4 In light of this decision and the Court's prior findings,
the issue now presented to the Court is very narrow: was there an interruptive act at least once every

ten years from the late 1950s through the late 1980s. In other words, proof ofjust three interruptive
acts, one each in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, would defeat the County's claim.
Defendants presented evidence of at least four types of acts that prevent a finding oi"
continuous use: locked gates, unlocked gates, asking trespassers to leave, and posting signs. Any
one

of these acts would be sufficient interruption; defendants presented proof of numerous

[Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10. Hereafter cited as Okelberry.
2Okelberry,^\5.

bindings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ^j 10 on page 4.
4Supplemental Findings of Fact and Ruling on Motion to Amend Judgment, ^ 5.
2

interruptions. The law regarding these interruptions will be presented below along with a summary
of the evidence.
II:

PRIVATE

PROPERTY

RIGHTS

ARE

CONSTITUTIONALLY

PROTECTED AND CAN BE OVERCOME ONLY BY CLEAR AND

CONVINCING

EVIDENCE;

ANY

CREDIBLE

EVIDENCE

OF

INTERRUPTION PRECLUDES A FINDING OF CONTINUOUS USE.

Private property rights have constitutional protection. Section 22 of Article I of the Utah
Constitution declares: "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just

compensation." The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution similarly states: "nor shall
private property be taken for public use without just compensation."

Wasatch County seeks a declaration based on Utah Code § 72-5-104, which provides a road
will be deemed donated or dedicated to the public ifthe road has been "continuously used as a public
thoroughfare for a period of ten years." Consistent with the constitutional prohibition of taking
without just compensation, "a party seeking to establish dedication and abandonment under this

statute bears the burden ofdoing so by clear and convincing evidence."5 Additionally, the trial court
is required to view the evidence in these cases in light of the "presumption" that exists "in favor of

the property owner."6

5Okelberry, H 9.

bDraper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995) {quoting Leo M.
Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211,213 (Utah 1981)).

The reason for requiring this higher standard of proof in public road cases is clear.

As

explained by the Utah Supreme Court, "[t]he law does not lightly allow the transfer ofproperty from
private to public use

This higher standard ofproof is demanded since the ownership ofproperty

should be granted a high degree of sanctity and respect."7 hi an earlier public roads case, the Utah
Supreme Court similarly stressed that"[w]here individual property rights are at stake, we must not

treat such rights lightly."8
The reported cases are illustrative. In Draper City, the Utah Supreme Court considered a

case in which the city had brought suit against a rural landowner under § 72-5-104's predecessor

statute.9 The trial court had granted summary judgment on behalf of the city; the Supreme Court
reversed.10 In holding that the evidence did not support the public road determination, the Supreme
Court emphasized the fact that there had been intermittent interruptions in the public's right to use

the roads. Specifically, the evidence had shown that (1) the landowners had, on occasion, stopped
persons who were using the roads and asked them to leave; (2) the owners had posted "no
trespassing" signs at the entrance to the roads; (3) the owners had blocked the roads by digging
trenches, stacking concrete blocks, and creating obstructive piles of dirt and rocks; and (4) the

draper City, 888 P.2d at 1099.
*Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376,438 P.2d 545, 546 (1968).

9See generally 888 P.2d at 1098-99.
i0Id. at 1101.
4

owners had erected a gate at the entrance to the roads.11

All of these acts were identified as

interruptive acts by the Supreme Court.

In Campbell v. Box Elder County,12 this court similarly affirmed a decision of a lower court
holding that a public road had not been established.13 In so doing, this Court determined that the
continuous use requirement had not been satisfied because of evidence showing (1) that the owners

had placed a gate across the road in question, and (2) that the gate had been locked during certain

(but not all) months of the year.14 As in Draper City, the court thus concluded that an interruption
ofpublic access, however brief, is still sufficient to break offthe ten year period ofcontinuous public*,
use, thereby preserving the landowner's private property rights.

In contrast, the cases in which the Utah appellate courts have concluded that § 72-5-104 has
been satisfied have been those in which the uncontroverted evidence showed that there had been

absolutely no interruption of the public's right to use the roads during the requisite period. In Heber

City Corp. v. Simpson,15 for example, the Supreme Court affirmed a continuous use determination
because ofthe fact that the "uncontradicted evidence demonstrates that the public made a continuous

M/rf. atllOO.

l2962 P.2d 806 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
l3See generally 962 P.2d at 807-08.
i4Id. at 808-09.
15942P.2d 307 (Utah 1997).
5

and uninterrupted use" of the contested roads.16 Similarly, in Kohler v. Martin}1 the court affirmed
a public road dedication where there was "abundant, unrebutted evidence in support" showing

continuous use.18 Specifically, the court emphasized the fact that the landowners had "not fence[d]
off the roadway," had "not post[ed] any signs, and in general [had] made no attempts to limit the

passage of the public."19
In short, the controlling legal test is well-established. In order to ensure that § 72-5-104 is
not used to arbitrarily and unfairly deprive a landowner of his or her property rights, the courts have
insisted that the continuous use requirement is only satisfied when the evidence showing
uninterrupted use is unrebutted and uncontradicted. Ifthere has been competent or credible evidence
of interruption, the continuous use requirement has simply not been satisfied, and § 72-5-104 is
inoperative.

It follows that while the county must prove its case by clear and convincing evidence, the

same standard does not apply to defendants. At most, defendants need establish an interruption only
by a preponderance of the evidence. The clear and convincing standard applies to Wasatch County

16942 P.2d at 311 (emphasis added).
"916 P.2d 910 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

l%Id. at 913.
i9Id.
6

because the county is attempting to take private property without compensation. Defendants are only
trying to protect their property and do not face that constitutional hurdle. In fact, this Court must

indulge a "presumption" in favor of defendants.20
Ill: PUBLIC USE WAS INTERRUPTED BY LOCKED GATES.

A locked gate is clearly an interruption.21 This Court found: "At various times in the past,
the Okelberrys and their employees have locked these gates. Beginning in the 1990's, the Okelberrys

began locking these gates on a more permanent basis"22 The finding that the post-1990 locking was
"on a more permanent basis" implies that the gates were at least occasionally locked prior to then.
Ray Okelberry testified he locked the gates every year since 1957 when moving the sheep

out.23 It does not matter that there was no evidence of anyone who was actually blocked by the

locked gates. The Supreme Court's decision in Town ofLeeds v. Prisbrey24 case established it is the
act of blocking, not the result, that is important.25

20See Draper, 888 P.2d at 1099.
21Okelberry, ^ 19.
"Supplemental Findings of Fact and Ruling on Motion to Amend Judgment, J 5.

"Transcript June 30, 2004, page 138.

242008UTll.
25Id. % 7.

Other witnesses also testified concerning locked gates. Jeff Jefferson, who had been on the

property since 1977,26 testified the cable lock on the Circle Springs gate as shown in Exhibit 7 has

always been there.27 Mel Price also testified that gate was locked.28 He further testified that the gate
on the Ridge Line road has been locked for twenty years.29 Deon Sabey, a Wasatch County witness,

testified the gates have been locked since the 1980s.30 Dick Baum, another Wasatch County witness,
acknowledged the gates could have been locked about twenty years ago (i.e., about 1984).31
As for the question of whether the gates were locked, the evidence that was presented at trial
indicated that the Okelberrys had in fact locked the gates that controlled access to their roads. Ray
Okelberry, for example, specifically testified that he had begun locking the exterior gates since the
late 1950s, and that he had also made a habit of locking the gates every year while moving his own

sheep.32 His assertion that the gates were at least periodically locked was also supported by Mel
Price.33

26Transcript June 29,2004, page 129.
21Id. page 146.
2iId. page 161.

29Id. page 160.
30Transcript June 28,2004, page 42.
3lTranscript June 28,2004, page 314.
32Trial Transcript, June 30 at 138-39.

"Trial Transcript, June 29 at 160,170.
8
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It is true that many ofthe County's witnesses testified that they had not encountered locks on
the gates until the late 1980s. This discrepancy is, however, explainable on at least two levels. First,
the testimony at trial was that the gates and the locks were repeatedly torn down through the years

by trespassers and hunters. For example, Jeff Jefferson, the longtime Okelberry employee, testified
that one wire gate had ultimately been replaced by an iron gate "because every week—you could put

up the gate and the next day it would be ripped out."34
Second, none of the witnesses who testified on behalf of the County were anything but

sporadic users ofthe roads. With slight variations in frequency, the testimony was generally that the
roads were used by these witnesses on a limited number of occasions during the summer, and then
again during the 2-3 week long hunting season in the fall.
In terms of claimed usage, the notable high point in the County's case was Mark Butters. In
spite of the fact that virtually all of the evidence supported the notion that these roads are rough and
very difficult to traverse, as well as the fact that the County's other witnesses generally claimed usage
rates of no more than 5-6 times during a given summer, Mark Butters nevertheless testified that he
uses the Ridge Line and Circle Springs roads approximately 20 times per summer.

Assuming

arguendo that this particular statement was true, and that by the term "summer" Mr. Butters was
referring to the months of June, July, and August, it is worth noting that Mr. Butters was still only

34Trial Transcript, June 29 at 134; accord Trial Transcript, June 29 at 186-87, 197-98
(testimony of Lee Okelberry); Trial Transcript, June 30 at 137-39 (testimony of Ray Okelberry).

asserting that he used these roads at a rate of somewhere close to 11/2 times per week. The other
witnesses, of course, were claiming usage at rates much lower than that.
Ray Okelberry testified that he was at the very least locking the gates for a short period every
summer while he moved his sheep. Depending on the vagaries of chance and timing, such short
term, periodic locking would not necessarily have impacted the County's collection of admittedly
intermittent witnesses.

Given the intermittent nature of these witnesses' claimed usage, it is therefore clear that even

the County's most persistent witnesses were by their own terms simply not in a position to rebut Ray
Okelberry's testimony that he locked the gates when moving the sheep out.

Lee Okelberry operated on a different part of the property,35 and thus had no occasion to go
through some of the gates locked by Ray Okelberry when the sheep were being moved.36 His
testimony does not contradict the testimony of Ray Okelberry.

IV:

PUBLIC USE WAS INTERRUPTED BY UNLOCKED GATES.

It was undisputed that there have always been unlocked gates across these roads during the

time considered by the Court.37 Although individuals were able to open the gates and still use the
roads, the presence of those gates created a presumption that the use was permissive and therefore

"Transcript June 30, 2004, page 141.

3<Transcript June 29,2004, page 201.
"Transcript June 29,2004, page 158.
10
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interrupted use of the road "as a public thoroughfare." Use by permission does not count as "public

use" under the dedication statute.38
Other states have ruled that an unlocked gate creates a presumption that any use was
permissive. As stated by one court, "where a landowner places gates across a road through his land,
it is notice to the public that they thereafter are passing through the land by permission and not by

right, so that no prescriptive right to the use of the road can be acquired."39 Another court similarly
held, in a case dealing with unlocked gates: "The erection of a gate across a road tends to evidencean intention on the part ofthe owner to assume and assert ownership and possession of the land over

which the road runs."40 The court said such obstruction "is a strong indication that the use by others
is permissive only?41 Another court holds that unlocked gates "conveys the clear message that any
public use of that road is with the landowner's permission only," although that presumption is not

conclusive.42
This presumption of permissive use is consistent with Utah cases. The question under the
continuous use requirement is whether the public's right to use the road was interrupted or

^Draper City v. Estate ofBernardo, 888 P.2d 107, 1099 (Utah 1995).
"Bergerv. Berger, 88 N.W.2d 98,103 (N.D. 1968).
^Williams v. Prather, 196 So. 118, 120 (Ala. 1940).
4lId.

42McIntyre v. Board of County Commissioners, 86 P.3d 402, 412 (Colo. 2004).
11

"limited."43 Though some cases have considered the impact of locked gates on the continuous use
inquiry,44 it is significant that a number ofthe cases have also considered the presence of gates as an

interruptive force without deeming it necessary to even note whether those gates were locked.45
There are strong policy reasons for allowing a gate to act as an interruptive force, even in the
absence of any evidence showing that that gate was locked. As indicated above, the Utah courts

have long sought to achieve a balance between the competing interests that are at work in the § 72-5104 cases. On the one hand, the government clearly has an interest in preserving the public's right
to use roads that have been left to the public for a lengthy period of time. It is instructive in this

regard that the statute itself only calls for public dedication where the landowners have "abandoned"

the road.46 In a very real sense, the prevailing logic here is one of reliance.

If an owner has

completely "abandoned" a particular road for such a lengthy period of time, it stands to reason that
the public will have developed collective patterns of travel, commerce, and development during that
time that would track and be reliant upon the existence ofthis "public thoroughfare." This is exactly
what happened, for example, in the Heber City case.

In that case, the road in question had

4iHeber City, 942 P.2d at 311 n. 9.

"See, e.g., Campbell, 962 P.2d at 809.
4SSee, e.g.. Draper City, 888 P.2d at 1100; AWINC Corp. v. Simonsen, 2005 UT App 168,
IP, 112 P.3d 1228,1229 ("fence wire drop gate"); Kohler, 916 P.2d at 913.

A6See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1).
12

continuously been used by the public from 1947 until 1989.47 Not only did a "number ofbusinesses"
spring up alongside the road, but the road also became a primary means of reaching the airport.48
In such circumstances, it would indeed be unjust to allow a long absent landowner to suddenly
emerge, claim ownership, and restrict the public's right to use a road that had never before been
treated as anything but public.

On the other hand, where the landowner has taken some recognizable steps to assert some
control over the roads, the public will be under no such illusions. For example, in a case involving
rural roads that are crossed by unlocked gates, a member of the public who wished to use the roads

would still have to physically stop their car, get out, open the gate, drive through the gate, and then
get out again to close the gate before proceeding onward. This is precisely what happened here, for

example, with many of the County's own witnesses testifying that the gates were always kept closed

as a means of keeping the Okelberrys1 livestock within the property.49 As such, the members of the
public who used these roads were always presented with a reminder upon both ingress and egress
that these roads belonged to some other party, and that use of these roads was solely at the pleasure
of that owner.

47942P.2dat313.
A%Id. at 312.

49See. e.g., Trial Transcript, June 28 at 40 (testimony of Dee Sabey); Trial Transcript, June
28 at 314 (testimony of Dick Baum); Trial Transcript, June 29 at 119, 123 (testimony of Mark
Butters).
13
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As indicated above, the law does not lightly allow the public takeover of a private property

owner's land. The statute at issue in this case does not require a landowner to come up with an
expensive, elaborate, or foolproof system for keeping out all trespassers. Instead, the statute allows

the property owner to preserve his or her rights by simply creating some interruptive obstacle that
limits the public's access to the private roads. Given the large number of rural ranches and farms in
this state that are separated from the highways by nothing more than a wire fence or gate, this Court
should reject the trial court's decision to read into the statute a heretofore non-existent requirement
that all of those gates and fences actually be locked. Instead, this Court should affirm the obvious,
common-sense reading of the statute, thereby holding that a landowner who has preserved and
maintained a gate or fence across his or her road cannot be said to have "abandoned" that road under
§ 72-5-104.

For this reason, this Court can and should conclude that there was not clear and

convincing evidence showing that the roads involved in this appeal were ever abandoned to the
public.

This presumption of permissive use from unlocked gates is consistent with the evidence in

this case. Lee Okelberry testified, for example, that there were unlocked gates on all the roads but
that in the early years he never saw people using the roads that didn't have legitimate business to be

14

there.50 Where they did encounter someone whose business they didn't know, they stopped the

individual to find what business he had.51 In other words, Okelberrys asserted the right to control
the roads (by stopping individuals to question them), and then decided whether to give permission
to continue that use.

The presumption of permissive use is also mandated by constitutional considerations. A
landowner may, through inaction, dedicate or abandon his or her property, but the public cannot take
that property without compensation if the owner takes reasonable measures to retain its private
character. A Louisiana court recognized this distinction, holding that the public authority could not

take a road unless the landowner's knowing acquiescence in public use and maintenance "amounts
to a tacit dedication by the landowner—a giving by the landowner rather than a taking by the public

authority."52 A gate, even an unlocked gate, clearly communicates to the public that the property is
private. The public constitutionally cannot take the property where the landowner takes reasonable
measures to communicate and retain its private character.

50Transcript June 30, 2004, page 180.

51Id. at page 185.
52 Vaughn v. Williams, 345 So. 2d 1195,1199 (La. Ct. App. 1977).
15
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V:

PUBLIC USE WAS INTERRUPTED BY DEFENDANTS ASKING
INDIVIDUALS TO LEAVE.

Asking someone to leave the property must be considered an "overt act'' that satisfies the new
test adopted by the Utah Supreme Court. Several witnesses testified to asking people to leave the
roads.

Bruce Huvard testified he used the roads by permission beginning in 1966, but also, at the

request of Okelberrys, would ask people to leave if they had not obtained permission.53 Jeff
Jefferson, who started working for the Okelberrys in 1977, also testified he asked people to leave the

roads if they did not have permission.54
Several other witnesses testified they stopped those traveling on the roads to inquire as to
their business. Such stops must also be considered an "overt act" preventing uninterrupted public

use. Lee Okelberry testified he made such stops starting in 1957 when then purchased the property.5'
This evidence is corroborated by the many individuals who testified they recognized the

property as private and asked permission to use it. Mel Price testified he obtained permission to use

the roads.56 Lee Okelberry testified he gave permission to the Taylors, Thompsons, Youngs, and

"Transcript June 29,2004, pages 254-56.

54Transcript June 29,2004, pages 140-41,149.
"Transcript June 29,2004, pages 183-85.
56Transcript June 29,2004, page 163; Exhibit 20.
16
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others.57 Shane Ford testified his mother, whose family had previously owned the property, would

ask permission.58
VI:

POSTED

"KEEP

OUT"

AND

"NO

TRESPASSING"

SIGNS

INTERRUPTED ANY PUBLIC USE.

The Utah Supreme Court clarified that a "no trespassing" or similar sign referring to the

roads would be sufficient to interrupt use.59 The Okelberrys presented substantial evidence to
establish that there had been no-trespassing signs alongside the roads.

Many of the witnesses

discussed the presence of signs alongside the road system in general terms.60 Other witnesses were
more specific as to the particular signs they saw upon particular roads. With respect to Parker
Canyon, both Mel Price and Glen Shepher testified that they had in fact seen no trespassing signs

on that road.61 With respect to Thornton Hollow, Mark Butters, testifying for the County, testified

"Transcript June 29,2004, page 202.
"Transcript June 29,2004, page 231.

Trial Transcript, June 30 at 137 (testimony of Ray Okelberry); Trial Transcript, June
29 at 257-58,268-69 (testimony of Bruce Huvard); Trial Transcript, June 29 at 160 (testimony of
Mel Price); Trial Transcript, June 30 at 25 (testimony of Brian Okelberry); Trial Transcript, June 29
at 135 (testimony of Jeff Jefferson).

6iSee Trial Transcript, June 29 at 161; Trial Transcript, June 29 at 212.
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that he had seen no trespassing signs as well.62 Similar testimony was elicited with respect to Circle
Springs.63
The county challenges this evidence by asserting the signs referred to the property adjoining

the road, not to the roads themselves. Many of the signs, however, were posted at the entrances to

the property.64 JeffJefferson testified that all entrances were posted.65 Signs posted at the entrances,
even if a few feet away from the gate, obviously prohibit any travel beyond the gate and thus apply

to both the roads and the surrounding property.
VII:

THE COURT SHOULD ALLOW ORAL ARGUMENTS.

Defendants concur with Wasatch County's request that the Court allow oral arguments. Trial
occurred four years ago and spanned three days. Oral arguments would allow counsel an opportunity

to clarify any questions the Court may have.

62Trial Transcript, June 29 at 106.
"Trial Transcript, June 29 at 161 (testimony of Mel Price).

"Eg., exhibits 6, 8,45,47.
"Transcript June 29, 2004, page 135.
18

VIII:

A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED OR THE COURT SHOULD
ALLOW ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE.

Counsel for defendants understand that Judge Eyre is no longer assigned to this case. In the

event the matter is heard by another judge, a new trial should be granted. Resolution of the case may

turn on credibility issues. Determination of credibility cannot be made from a written transcript.66
In addition, a new trial should be granted, or the parties should be permitted to reopen and
present additional evidence.

Wasatch County has acknowledged that the Utah Supreme Court

adopted a new test to determine interruption. Fairness counsels the parties should be permitted to

present evidence specifically focused on that test.
CONCLUSION

The Court determined the subject roads were not public and that the county could not take
those roads, into which defendants had invested so much time and money, without paying just

compensation. The evidence at trial still supports that decision. The Court should enter the findings
and conclusions proposed by defendants, and reaffirm its prior order.

DATED this £^day of May, 2008.

DON R. PETERSEN and

LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants

665ee In re Estate of Cassity, 656 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1982) (new trial not required
because only legal conclusions were at issue; otherwise a new trial would be required).
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DON R. PETERSEN (2576), and

LESLIE W. SLAUGH (3752), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C.
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
Our File No. 25774-!

P.O. Box 1248

Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Attorneys for Okelberry and West Daniels Defendants

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASATCH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

WASATCH COUNTY, a body politic of the
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ENTRY

State of Utah,

OF SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS AND

Plaintiff,

CONCLUSIONS; OR ALTERNATIVELY
FOR NEW TRIAL OR PRESENTATION

OF ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE

vs.

E. RAY OKELBERRY, BRIAN

Oral Argument Requested

OKELBERRY, ERIC OKELBERRY, UTAH
DIVISION OF WILDLIFE RESOURCES,

Case No. 010500388

WEST DANIELS LAND ASSOCIATION,

Judge Donald J. Eyre

and John Does 1-25,
Defendants.

Defendants E. Ray Okelberry, Brian Okelberry, Eric Okelberry, and West Daniels Lan.i
Association hereby request that the Court enter the attached Second Supplemental Findings of Fad
and Conclusions of Law, or alternatively that the Court grant a new trial or allow the presentation

of additional evidence.

The grounds for this motion are as follows:

1.

The Utah Supreme Court remanded this matter for further proceedings, and the

evidence presented at trial supports the requested findings and conclusions.
2.

If Judge Eyre is not assigned to this case, Rule 63(a) allows the court to rehear the

evidence or some part of it, and justice requires that be done because resolution ofthe case may turn
on credibility issues.

3.

The applicable law has changed since the original trial, and defendants are entitled

under Rule 59(a)(7) to a new trial or to present additional evidence to respond to the new standard
adopted by the Utah Supreme Court.

This motion is supported by the Memorandum Opposing Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed herewith.
Defendants further request that the Court schedule and receive oral arguments on this motion.

DATED this -T^day of May, 2008.

DON R. PETERSEN, and
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C.

Attorneys for Defendants

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following,

postage prepaid, this S^ day of May, 2008.
Thomas Low
Scott H. Sweat

805 West 100 South
HeberCity.UT 84032
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DON R. PETERSEN (2576), and
LESLIE W. SLAUGH (3752), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C.
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street

P.O. Box 1248

Our File No. 25774-1

Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Attorneys for Okelberry and West Daniels Defendants

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASATCH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

WASATCH COUNTY, a body politic of the
State of Utah,

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
Plaintiff,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

Case No. 010500388
E. RAY OKELBERRY, BRIAN

Judge Donald J. Eyre

OKELBERRY, ERIC OKELBERRY, UTAH

DIVISION OF WILDLIFE RESOURCES,
WEST DANIELS LAND ASSOCIATION,
and John Does 1-25,

Defendants.
This case was tried to the Court on June 28, 29, and 30, 2004.

Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law were entered October 22,2004, and Supplemental Findings of Fact and Ruling
on Motion to Amend Judgment was entered February 23,2005. Following an appeal by both parties,

the Utah Supreme Court remanded the case to this Court for further proceedings. The Court now
enters the following:

SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

Since 1957, the Okelberrys and their employees have constructed and maintained

gates at all points where the roads enter the property of defendants.
2.

The gates have generally been kept closed except during the winters from 1957 to the

present.

3.

The presence of the gates has interrupted the travel of those traveling on the roads.

4.

The presence of the unlocked gates reasonably communicated to those traveling on

the road that the roads were private, but that the owners permitted other persons to use the roads.
5.

Ray Okelberry or his employees have locked the gates at least once each decade from

1957 to 1990.

6.

Beginning in the 1990's, the Okelberrys began locking these gates on a more

permanent basis.

7.

Beginning in 1957 and continuing to the present, the Okelberrys or their employees

have posted "no trespassing" signs at the entrances to the defendants' property.
8.

Beginning in 1957 and continuing through 1990, the Okelberrys or their employees

or permittees would occasionally stop persons traveling on the road, ask their business, and ask the
persons to leave if the business was not deemed legitimate or the persons had not otherwise received
permission to use the roads. This occurred at least once in each decade during that time.
The Court having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, now makes and enters the following:

loll

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

The presence of unlocked gates interrupts public use and creates a presumption that

any use of the roads is permissive, and Wasatch County did not rebut the presumption ofpermissive
use.

2.

The actions of the defendants in stopped persons using the road to inquire of their

business constitutes an overt act interrupting public use even if the person is then permitted to
continue travel on the road.
3.

Wasatch County has not established by clear and convincing evidence that the roads

were used continuously by members of the public during any 10 year period of time.
4.

This Court's previous order, determining that the roads were not public, should

remain in force.

DATED this

day of May, 2008.
BY THE COURT:

DONALD J. EYRE
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
l:\Okelbeny Ray 25774-l\Road caseVsuppicmenlal findings.wpd
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biATE OF UTAH

DEREK P. PULLAN, #6633

vv a > * i c h c o un r y

Wasatch County Attorney

,*, ,,,.-, ,

MARK K. MCIFF, #8238

(
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Deputy Wasatch County Attorney

805 West 100 South

Heber City, Utah 84032
Telephone: (435) 654-2909
Fax: (435) 654-2947

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
V

WASATCH COUNTY, a body

*

politic of the State of Utah

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY
*

JUDGMENT & QUIET TITLE

Plaintiff,
vs.
*

E. RAY OKELBERRY, BRIAN
OKELBERRY, ERIC OKELBERRY,

Case:
*

Judge

UTAH DIVISION OF WILDLIFE

RESOURCES, WEST DANIELS LAND

*

ASSOCIATION, and John Does 1-25
*

Defendants.

COMES NOW the plaintiff, by and through counsel, and for cause of action against
Defendants complains and alleges as follows:
1.

The plaintiff Wasatch County (hereinafter "the County"), is a political subdivision

of the State of Utah.
2.

The Wasatch County Commission has authorized the Wasatch County Attorney to

file this action on behalf of the County.

3.

E. Ray Okelberry is a record owner of certain parcels of real property ("subject

property") located in Wasatch County in Township 5 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and

Meridian, and more particularly depicted by way of map attached hereto as Exhibit A.
4.

Brian Okelberry is a record owner of certain parcels of real property ("subject

property") located in Wasatch County in Township 5 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, and more particularly depicted by way of map attached hereto as Exhibit A.

5.

Eric Okelberry is a record owner of certain parcels of real property ("subject

property") located in Wasatch County in Township 5 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, and more particularly depicted by way of map attached hereto as Exhibit A.

6.

The Utah Division of Wildlife Resources is a record owner of certain parcels of

real property ("subject property") located in Wasatch County in Township 5 South, Range 5
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and more particularly depicted by way of map attached
hereto as Exhibit A.
7.

The West Daniels Land Association is a record owner of certain parcels of real

property ("subject property") located in Wasatch County in Township 5 South, Range 5 East,

Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and more particularly depicted by way of map attached hereto as
Exhibit A.

8.

John Does 1-25 represent any and all persons or entities who now or will claim

any interest, known or unknown, in the subject property.

9.

Each portion of the subject property is located in Wasatch County, State of Utah,

and jurisdiction and venue are therefore proper in the above entitled court.
10.

Various roadways run through, along, or about the subject property, including, but

not limited to, the following: (1) the road commonly known as Ridge Line Road (depicted as

Road 1 on Exhibit A); (2) the road commonly known as Parker Canyon Road (depicted as Road

2 on Exhibit A); (3) the road commonly known as Thorton Hollow Road (depicted as Road 3 on
Exhibit A); (4) the road commonly known as Circle Springs Road (depicted as Road 4 on Exhibit

A) and (5) the road commonly known as Maple Canyon Road (depicted as Road 5 on Exhibit
A).

11.

The entire roadway commonly known as Ridge Line Road (Road 1 on Exhibit A)

has previously been used continuously as a public thoroughfare for a period often years and is
therefore dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public under Utah Code Annotated
§ 72-5-104 and other applicable law.

12.

The entire roadway commonly known as Parker Canyon Road (Road 2 on

Exhibit A) has previously been used continuously as a public thoroughfare for a period often

years and is therefore dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public under Utah Code
Annotated § 72-5-104 and other applicable law.

13.

The entire roadway commonly known as Thorton Hollow Road (Road 3 on

Exhibit A) has previously been used continuously as a public thoroughfare for a period often
years and is therefore dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public under Utah Code
Annotated § 72-5-104 and other applicable law.

14.

The entire roadway commonly known as Circle Springs Road (Road 4 on

Exhibit A) has previously been used continuously as a public thoroughfare for a period often
years and is therefore dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public under Utah Code
Annotated § 72-5-104 and other applicable law.

15.

The entire roadway commonly known as Maple Canyon Road (Road 5 on

Exhibit A) has previously been used continuously as a public thoroughfare for a period often

years and is therefore dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public under Utah Code
Annotated § 72-5-104 and other applicable law.

16.

The scope of the right of way on each of these roads is defined by UCA § 72-5-

104 as that which is reasonable and necessary to ensure safe travel according to the facts and
circumstances.

17.

Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Defendants which permanently decrees

as valid the public rights of way and which quiets title to such rights of way in favor of plaintiff
and for the State of Utah for each of the roadways at issue in this complaint.

18.

Plaintiff is likewise entitled to a permanent injunction preventing defendants

from fencing or restricting access to the subject roads.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests judgment as follows:
A.

Recognizing and affirming the public's right of way to each of the
roadways listed; (1) Ridge Line Road, (2) Parker Canyon Road, (3)
Thorton Hollow Road, (4) Circle Springs Road and (5) Maple Canyon
Road.

B.

Quieting fee title to each roadway in favor of the County and the State of
Utah;

C.

Defining the scope of the rights of way and title as that which is

reasonable and necessary to ensure safe travel according to the facts and

circumstances, as provided in UCA § 72-5-104 and other applicable
provisions.

D.

Permanently enjoining Defendants as well as any subsequent purchasers or
assignees from fencing, gating, or otherwise restricting public access or

travel upon the subject roads;

E.

For costs and attorney's fees as the Court deems appropriate.

F.

For such other and further relief as to the Court seems just and equitable in
the premises.

DATED and signed this

2*f-&-

day of August, 2001.

DEKEK"P>ULLAN
MARK KvMCIFF
Attorneys for Wasatch County

DON R. PETERSEN (2576), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C.
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248

Our File No. 25.774

Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Attorneys for Defendants Okelberry

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASATCH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

WASATCH COUNTY, a body public of
the State of Utah,

AFFIDAVIT OF LEE OKELBERRY
Case No. 010500388
Judge Donald J. Eyre

Plaintiff,
vs.

E. RAY OKELBERRY, BRIAN
OKELBERRY, ERIC OKELBERRY,
UTAH DIVISION OF WILDLIFE
RESOURCES, WEST DANIELS LAND
ASSOCIATION, and JOHN DOES 1-25,
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF UTAH

;

ss.

LEE OKELBERRY, being duly sworn, states:

1.

I am the brother of the defendant E. Ray Okelberry.

2.

I owned a one-half interest in the property and sold the same to my brother, E.

Ray Okelberry, and his two sons.

v

3.

I am very familiar with the property and what have been referred to as "roads,"

which are nothing more than trails. These "roads" and/or trails were constructed by myself, my
brother, and/or our predecessors.

4.

I remember going up in the 1950s with a TD9 International tractor. This was the

time when the "roads" were improved and created. This was done to help manage the sheep and
to utilize the forage that hadn't been utilized in the past.
5.

These roads have never been open to the public.

1 sold the property to my

brother and his family in the 1980s. There was control over the "roads," with fences and gates.
6.

On occasion, permission has been granted to people who wanted to use the

property for hunting, camping and obtaining firewood.

I remember specifically granting

permission tor those purposes.

7.

During the time when I was an owner of the property up until the middle of the

1980s, there was not public access to these "roads" and trails. I have been on the property on
occasion since that time, and I have noted that the "roads" have been blocked with gates and
fences, and that the gates were locked.

DATED this

^

day of March, 2003.

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this

¥ day of

• 2003.

NOTARY PUBLIC

NAN S TAYLOR

120 E Main Si
Santaquln. Ut 84655
My Commission Expires
August 30. 2006

STATE OF UTAH

NOTARY PUBLIC

//A

DON R. PETERSEN, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Defendants Okelberry

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed,

postage prepaid, this (" day of Fejraiary, 2003, to:
Derek P. Pullan
Wasatch County Attorney
Mark E. Mclff
Deputy Wasatch County Attorney
805 West 100 South
Heber City, UT 84032

Secretary
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4TH DISTRICT COURT - HEBER COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WASATCH COUNTY,
Plaintiff,

Case No: 010500388 PR

VS.

WEST DANIELS LAND ASSOCIATION
Et al,
Defendant.

Clerk:

: MINUTES
: BENCH TRIAL

: Judge:
: Date:

DONALD J. EYRE
June 28, 2004

roseb

PRESENT
Defendant(s): E RAY OKELBERRY
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): SCOTT H SWEAT
Defendant's Attorney(s): DON R. PETERSEN
RYAN D TENNEY
Audio
Tape Count: 9:00

TRIAL
This is the time set for bench trial. Both sides are ready to
proceed.
Mr. Petersen would move the Court to envoke the exclusionary rule.
Granted. All potential witnesses are sworn and excused from the
'courtroom.
TIME: 9:05 AM Opening statement given by Mr. Scott Sweat.
Opening statement given by Mr. Petersen.
TIME: 9:10 AM MS. ELIZABETH M. PALMIER, previously sworn, is
questioned on direct by MR. SWEAT.
CROSS EXAMINATION by MR. PETERSEN. Witness excused.
TIME: 9:15 AM MR. DON J WOOD, previously sworn, is questioned on
direct by MR. SWEAT. Plaintiff's Exhibits #1, #2, #3, #4 and #5
are marked, offered and received.
TIME: 9:25 AM CROSS EXAMINATION by MR. PETERSEN.
RE-DIRECT by MR. SWEAT.
RE-CROSS by MR. PETERSEN. Witness excused.
.
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Date:
TIME: 9:31 AM MR. DEE SABEY, previously sworn, is questioned on
direct by MR. SWEAT.
TIME: 10:10 AM CROSS EXAMINATION by MR. PETERSEN. Defendant's
Exhibits #6, #7, #8, and #9 are marked.
TIME: 10:50 AM RE-DIRECT by MR. SWEAT. Witness excused.
Recess 10:55 a.m. Reconvene 11:05 a.m.
MR. JAMES MORONI BESENDORFER, previously sworn, is questioned on
direct by MR. SWEAT.
Reces 11:50 a.m. Reconvene 1:00 p.m.
CROSS EXAMINATION by Mr. Petersen. Defendant's Exhibits #10, #11,
and #12 are marked. Defendant's Exhibit #10 is offered, refused by
the Court.
TIME: 1:55 PM RE-DIRECT by MR. SWEAT.
RE-CROSS by MR. PETERSEN. Witness excused.
TIME: 2:00 'PM MR. MARTIN E. WALL is sworn and questioned on
direct by MR. SWEAT.
TIME: 2:20 PM CROSS EXAMINATION by MR. PETERSEN.
RE-DIRECT by MR. SWEAT.
RE-CROSS by MR. PETERSEN. Witness excuserd.
Recess 2:40 p.m. Reconvene 2:55 p.m.
TIME: 2:55 PM MR. ROY DANIELS, previously sworn, is called to
testify. Mr. Petersen would move to exclude this witness whereas
he has been conversing with other witnesses after they have
completed their testimony, outside the courtroom.
Mr. Daniels is questioned by the Court. The Court will not allow
Mr. Daniels to testify and will exclude him as a witness
TIME: 3:05 PM MR. GERALD THOMPSON, previously sworn, is
questioned on direct by MR. SWEAT.
TIME: 3:25 PM CROSS EXAMINATION by MR. PETERSEN.
RE-DIRECT by MR. SWEAT.
RE-CROSS by MR. PETERSEN. Witness excused.
TIME: 3:50 PM MR. JAMES ED SABEY is sworn and questioned on
direct by MR. SWEAT.
TIME: 4:10 PM CROSS EXAMINATION by MR. PETERSEN. Defendant's
Exhibits #13 and #14 are marked.
TIME: 4:40 PM RE-DIRECT by MR. SWEAT. Witness excused.
TIME: 4:45 .PM MR. RICHARD MORGAN BAUM is sworn and questioned on
direct by MR. SWEAT.
TIME: 4:50 PM CROSS EXAMINATION by MR. PETERSEN.
TIME: 4:55 PM RE-DIRECT by MR. SWEAT. Witness excused.
Court will recess at this time until 9:00 a.m. tomorrow morning.
TIME: 9:07 AM Court in session this 29th day of June, 2004.
MR. BRANDON T RICHINS is sworn and questioned on direct by MR.
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SWEAT.
CROSS EXAMINATION by MR. PETERSEN. Defendant's Exhibits #15, 16
and #18 are marked. Defendant's Exhibit #9 is offered and
received. Defendant's Exhibit #15 is offered and received.
RE-DIRECT by MR. SWEAT.
RE-CROSS by MR. PETERSEN. Witness excused.
TIME: 9:55 AM MR. DON WOOD, still under oath from yesterday, is
recalled and questioned on direct by MR. SWEAT. Plaintiff's
Exhibits #17 and #18 are marked, offered and received.
CROSS EXAMINATION by MR. PETERSEN. Defendant's Exhibit #19 is
marked.
RE-DIRECT by MR. SWEAT.
RE-CROSS by MR. PETERSEN.
RE-DIRECT by MR. SWEAT. Witness excused.
TIME: 10:15 AM MR. BENNY GARDNER, previously sworn, is
questioned on direct by MR. SWEAT.
CROSS EXAMINATION by MR. PETERSEN. Witness excused.
Recess 11:00 a.m. Reconvene 11:20 a.m.
MR. MARK BUTTERS is sworn and questioned on direct by MR. SWEAT.
TIME: 11:35 AM CROSS EXAMINATION by MR. PETERSEN. Witness
excused.
Plaintiff rests.
Mr. Petersen would move to dismiss and would submit without
argument. Motion denied.
Recess 12:00 p.m. Reconvene 1:15 p.m.
Defendant, Okelberry, will proceed at this time.
TIME: 1:15 TM MR. JEFF JEPPERSON is sworn and questioned on
direct by MR. PETERSEN. Defendant's Exhibit #6, #7 and #8 are
offered and received.
TIME: 1:34 PM CROSS EXAMINATION by MR. SWEAT. Witness excused.
TIME: 1:45 PM MR. MEL PRICE is sworn and questioned on direct by
MR. TENNEY. Defendant's Exhibits #20 and #21 are marked, offered
and received.
TIME: 2:00 PM CROSS EXAMINATION by MR. SWEAT. Witness excused.
TIME: 2:05 PM MR. LEE OKELBERRY is sworn and questioned on
direct by MR. PETERSEN.
CROSS EXAMINATION by MR. SWEAT.
RE-DIRECT by MR. PETERSEN.
RE-CROSS by MR. SWEAT.
RE-DIRECT by MR. PETERSEN. Witness excused.
Recess 2:55 p.m. Reconvene 3:10 p.m.
MR. GLEN SHEPHERD is sworn and questioned on direct by MR. TENNEY.
CROSS EXAMINATION by MR. SWEAT.
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Date:
RE-DIRECT by MR. TENNEY. Witness excused.
TIME: 3:30 PM MR. SHANE FORD is sworn and questioned on direct
by MR. PETERSEN.
TIME: 3:45,PM CROSS EXAMINATION by MR. SWEAT. Witness excused.
TIME: 3:55 PM MR. BRUCE HUVARD is sworn and questioned on direct
by MR. PETERSEN.
TIME: 4:15 PM CROSS EXAMINATION by MR. SWEAT. Witness excused.
Court will recess at this time until 9:00 a.m. tomorrow morning.
Recess 4:20 p.m.
Court in session this 30th day of June, 2004.
TIME: 9:00 AM MR. WAYNE ROBERTSON is sworn and questioned on
direct by MR. PETERSEN. Defendant's Exhibit #22 is marked.
CROSS EXAMINATION by MR. SWEAT
RE-DIRECT by MR. PETERSEN.
RE-CROSS by MR. SWEAT.
RE-DIRECT by MR. PETERSEN.
RE-CROSS by MR. SWEAT. Witness excused.
TIME: 9:25 AM MR. BRIAN OKELBERRY is sworn and questioned on
direct by MR. PETERSEN. Defendant's.Exhibits #23 and #24 are
marked, offered and received.
CROSS EXAMINATION by MR. SWEAT.
RE-DIRECT by MR. PETERSEN.
RE-CROSS by MR. SWEAT. Witness excused.
TIME: 10:10 AM MR. JOSEPH FORD is called to testify. Objected to
by Mr. Sweat, indicating that this witness was never designated as
a witness, until last Friday by Mr. Petersen.
Response by MR. PETERSEN.
The Court will not allow this witness to testify. Potential
witness, Mr. Joseph Ford, is excused.
Recess 10:05 a.m. Reconvene 10:30 a.m.
Mr. Petersen addressed the Court and argued on behalf of allowing
Mr. Ford to testify. Denied by the Court.
TIME: 10:35 AM MR. RAY OKELBERRY is sworn and questioned on
direct by MR. PETERSEN. Defendant's Exhibits #25, #26, #27, #28,
#29, and #30 are marked by the Court. Defendant's Exhibits #25,
#26, #27, #28, #29 and #30 are offered and received.
Defendant's Exhibits #31, #32, #33, and #34 are marked by the
clerk. Defendant's Exhibits #19, and #22 are offered and received.
Defendant's EXhibits #11 and #12 are offered and received.
Defendant's Exhibits #13, #14 and #16 are offered and received.
Defendant's Exhibit #35 is marked. Defendant's Exhibits #31, #32
and #33 are withdrawn as duplicates. Defendant's Exhibits #36, 37,
and #38 are marked by the Clerk. Defendant's Exhibit #34 is offered
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and received.
Defendant's Exhibits #35 is offered and received. Defendant's
Exhibit #36 is offered and received. Defendant's Exhibits #37 and
#38 are offered and received.
Defendant's Exhibits #39, #40, #41, #42, #43 are offered and
received. Defendant's Exhibit #44 is withdrawn as a duplicate.
Defendant's Exhibit #45 is marked, offered and received.
Defendant's Exhibits #46 and #47 are marked. Defendant's Exhibit
#46 and 47 are offered, and received: Defendant's Exhibits #48,
#49, #50, #51 are marked. Exhibits #48, #49, #50 are offered and
received. #51 is withdrawn as duplicate.
Defendant's Exhibits #52 and #53 are marked, offered and received.
'Defendant's Exhibits #54, #55, #56, and #57 are marked.
Defendant's Exhibits #54 and #55 offered and received. Defendant's
Exhibit #56 is offered and received.
Defendant's Exhibit #57 is offered and received.
Recess 12:00 p.m. Reconvene 1:15 p.m.
MR. OKELBERRY, still under oath, is questioned on direct by MR.
PETERSEN. Defendant's Exhibits #58 and #59 are marked, offered and
received.
Defendant's Exhibits #60 and #61 are marked, offered and received.
TIME: 1:30 PM CROSS EXAMINATION by MR. SWEAT. Witness excused.
Counsel discussed with the Court the timeline of the case and the
defendant has one more witness to call.
The Court will allow both sides to file simultaneously proposed
Findings of Fact in lieu of closing arguments to be filed by July
16, 2004.
Recess 1:50 p.m. Reconvene 1:55 p.m.
Mr. Petersen addressed the Court and indicated that the defendant
will rest at this time.
Court will take the matter under advisement until proposed
Findings of Fact are filed by both sides. After reviewing all the
evidence and notes, the court will make a written ruling.
-
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASATCH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

WASATCH COUNTY, a body public of
the State of Utah,

Plaintiff,

ORDER

Case No. 010500388
Judge Donald J. Eyre

vs.

E. RAY OKELBERRY, BRIAN
OKELBERRY, ERIC OKELBERRY,

UTAH DIVISION OF WILDLIFE
RESOURCES, WEST DANIELS LAND

ASSOCIATION, and JOHN DOES 1-25,
Defendants.

This matter came on for trial on July 28, 29 and 30, 2004.

The Court heard the

testimony of various witnesses and received various exhibits. Counsel was directed to prepare

proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Court reviewed the file, considered the
memoranda filed by the parties, heard oral arguments, and now having heretofore entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and being fully advised in the premises, makes and
enters the following:

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

As provided by statute, a private road must meet a three part test to become

dedicated and abandoned to a public highway. The three requirements are (1) continuous use, (2)
as a public thoroughfare, (3) for a period often years. Ut. Code Ann. 72-5-104(1) (2003). The
three elements must be proved by "clear and convincing evidence" by the party claiming the road
has been abandoned to public use. Thomas v. Condas. 493 P.2d 639 (1972). Once established,

a public road continues to be a public road until it is "abandoned or vacated by order of the
highway authorities having jurisdiction or by other competent authority." Utah Code Ann.
72-5-105(1) (2004).

2.

First, the road must have been subject to "continuous use." Utah Courts have

interpreted "continuous use" in various instances to mean the public has used the roads
"extensively," Bertaenole v. Pine Meadow Ranches. 639 P.2d 211 (Utah 1981), "frequently and
freely," Thurman v. Brvam. 626 P.2d 447 (Utah 1981). However, continuous does not mean
constant. The supreme court has stated that "use may be continuous though not constant ...

provided it occurred as often as the claimant had occasion or chose to pass. Mere intermission is
not interruption." Campbell v. Box Elder County. 962 P.2d 806, 809 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998)

(quoting Richards v. Pines Ranch. Inc.. 559 P.2d 948 (Utah 1977). Similarly, in Bover v. Clark.
326 P.2d 107, 108 (Utah 1958), the supreme court found as a matter of law that a public highway
existed even though "the use of the road was not great because comparatively few people had need
to travel over it, but those of the public who had such need, did so."
3.

The Okelberrys have argued that use was not constant because at the time of

purchase in 1957 there were gates in place, concededly though, they were not always locked and

r

did not prevent travel. The Okelberrys claim that beginning in the 1960s the gates were
periodically locked for several days at a time and that signs were also posted on the gates and
property which stated "No Trespassing-Private Property." Thus, they argue that any interruption
of public access during the relevant periods is enough to prevent use from being continuous.

Plaintiffs deny the Defendant's factual assertions claiming that while there were gates on the
roads, they were not locked until the 1990s and that once signs were posted, they seemed to refer
only to the property abutting the roads and not the roads themselves.

4.

This Court finds the facts of the present case similar to the facts of Boyer v.

Clark wherein at issue was Middle Canyon Road that had been used for wagon and horse traffic.
As previously stated, the Boyer court noted that the public, "though not consisting of a great many
persons, made a continuous and uninterrupted use of middle canyon road ... as often as they
found it convenient or necessary." Taking even the Defendants' factual assertions as true, it is
clear that individuals using the roads beginning in the late 1950s until the late 1980s or early

1990s used the roads without interruption, they used the roads freely, and though not constantly,
they used the roads continuously as they needed. Therefore, that Court finds that prior to the

interrupting mechanisms being put in place the roads in question were subject to continuous use
and Plaintiffs met their burden proving the first element of the statute.
5.

Second, the continuous use must have been as a "public thoroughfare." The

Supreme Court of Utah has stated that a place becomes a public thoroughfare when the public has
a "general right of passage." Heber City v. Simpson. 942 P.2d 307 (Utah 1997). It is sufficient
to show that the road was used freely by the general public. Thurman v. Bvram. 626 P.2d 447,
449 (Utah 1981). The general public, however, does not include adjoining land owners or
individuals with permission of adjoining land owners.

Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888

P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995). "Use under a private right is not sufficient" to establish a public
right. Heber City v. Simpson, 942 P.2d at 311. Also, as once was the case, it is no longer

necessary to prove the land owner's intent or consent to offer the road to the public. See Thurman
v. Bvram. 626 P.2d at 449.

6.

In making the public thoroughfare determination, trial courts are "permitted some

reign to grapple with the multitude of fact patterns that may constitute a public thoroughfare."
Kohler v. Martin. 916 P.2d 910, 913 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996). The defendants claim they gave

permission to individuals to use the roads and unauthorized individuals were removed. Plaintiffs
claim that while some individuals who have used the roads were permissive users, the majority
were using the roads without permission from the land owners. None of the individuals who
testified on behalf of the Plaintiff own property adjacent to or along the roads. The Court finds
that the individuals who have used the roads have been members of the general public who used
the roads as a thoroughfare to public lands and/or for recreation. Prior to the locking of the gates
in the early 1990s the roads were used as public thoroughfares.

7.

Third, and lastly, the continuous use as a public thoroughfare must have lasted

for a period of ten years. From the facts that have been presented, it is clear to the Court that the
continuous use as a public thoroughfare continued for at least ten years, if not much longer, or
for multiple periods of ten years. Starting in 1960 until the early 1990s when the Okelberrys

began locking the gates and selling hunting permits the roads were accessible and used by the
general public as they found necessary and convenient. It is clear that the third statutory element
has been easily met.

8.

The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Plaintiff has not met

their burden in regards to Maple Canyon Road. The Court finds that there was evidence that

Maple Canyon Road had been locked at the Wallsburg end prior to the locking of the other roads,
and that it has a history of washing out and therefore, there was no evidence of continuous use
for ten years. The Court also finds that the Plaintiff has in fact met their burden as to Ridge Line
Road, Circle Springs Road, Thorton Hollow Road, and Parker Canyon Road, that they were used

continuously by the public as a public thoroughfare for a period of well over ten years prior to
1989 when the Okelberrys began locking the gates. Finding that there were abandoned to public
roads, the Court finds the width of the roads to be two-track, approximately ten feet in width. The
Court also finds that the public has been effectively cut off from use of these public roads since

1989.
9.

After finding the roads to be public roads, the Court now turns to the issue of

whether they continue as public roads after a twelve year period of nonuse and private control
exerted by the defendants over the roads.
10.

The Court finds that while public roads once dedicated can be abandoned or

vacated only "by order of the highway authorities having jurisdiction or by other competent

authority." Ut. Code Ann. 72-5-015 (2004). Prior to 1911, a public road could be vacated after

a five-year period of nonuse. The statute has since been amended by deleting that provision. The
Court held that the legislature clearly intended to limit the method of vacating public roads to the
specific statutory requirements and no longer allow forfeiture through nonuse. Henderson v.

Oseuthorpe. 657 P.2d 1268, 1270-1271 (Utah 1982). However, this Court finds the principle of
estoppel is dispositive in the present case.
11.

In Premium Oil v. Cedar City. 187 P.2d 199 (Utah 1947), the supreme court

held that a strip of land once dedicated as a public road had been used in a manner directly in
conflict with the land's dedication as a public road. The court stated that "the manner in which

the city used the strip was openly hostile to the public use as a street and should have been notice
to all that any dedication, if previously intended, has been abandoned. Under the facts of die case,

the court held that the Plaintiff would be estopped to claim an improper abandonment or vacation,
this Court finds that while the roads at issue were properly abandoned to public use by compliance

with the statutory requirements, the Defendants for a period of twelve years exerted control and
used the roads in an openly hostile manner to the public use of the streets. Applied to the present
case, the County having failed to bring an action for twelve years must now be estopped from
doing so.
12.

As further stated in Premium Oil, "in many cases where cities attempt to open

dedicated street for the benefit of the public, the courts have estopped the city from enforcing a
dedication because the city authorities and the public itself has taken no action over a period of
years, to prevent the erection of valuable improvements." 187 P.2d at 204. Allowing the County
to open the roads as public roads now would ruin the Okelberry sheep and cattle operation as well
as eliminate the hunting unit now being operated by Shane Ford. Admittedly little improvements
have been made to the roads themselves, but doubtless large amounts of time and money has been

expended on behalf of these business operations and the Defendants have relied on their private

use of the road to sustain and build their businesses. It would be inequitable to now, after twelve
years of clearly private use of the roads, to allow the County to open the roads to the Defendants'
detriment.

13.

By clear and convincing evidence the Court finds that the roads in question were

abandoned to public roads, but the County is now estopped from opening them to public

use because of their failure to bring an action against the Okelberrys who asserted private control
years in
in opposition
opposiuo
over the roads for twelve years
to their public status.

DATED this 1^1 day of September, 2004.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

SCOTT H. SWEAT, ESQ.
Deputy Wasatch County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY

TO:

SCOTT H. SWEAT, ESQ.
You will please take notice that the undersigned, attorney for Defendants Okelberry, will

submit the above and foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Court for

signature upon the expiration of the time permitted for the filing of a written objection pursuant
to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this \^\ day of September, 2004.

DON R. PETERSEN, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN

Attorneys for Defendants Okelberry

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed,

postage prepaid, and also transmitted by facsimile to the fax number listed below this I S day
of September, 2004, to:

Scott H. Sweat
Deputy Wasatch County Attorney
114 South 200 West
Heber City, UT 84032

G:\DRP\OKELBERY.ORD

DON R. PETERSEN (2576), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C.
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120 East 300 North Street
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Provo,
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Box 1248
Utah 84603
(801) 373-6345
(801) 377-4991

Our File No.

Attorneys for Defendants Okelberry

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASATCH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

WASATCH COUNTY, a body public of
the State of Utah,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

Case No. 010500388
Judge Donald J. Eyre

vs.

E. RAY OKELBERRY, BRIAN

OKELBERRY, ERIC OKELBERRY,
UTAH DIVISION OF WILDLIFE
RESOURCES, WEST DANIELS LAND
ASSOCIATION, and JOHN DOES 1-25,
Defendants.

This matter came on for trial on July 28, 29 and 30, 2004.
testimony of various witnesses and received various exhibits.
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

The Court heard the

Counsel was directed to prepare

The Court has now reviewed the file,

considered the memoranda filed by the parties, heard oral arguments and now, being fully advised
in the premises, makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

The Plaintiff Wasatch County (hereinafter "County") is a political subdivision

of the State of Utah.

2.

The Defendants E. Ray Okelberry, Brian Okelberry, and Eric Okelberry

(hereinafter "Okelberrys") are the owners of real property located east and north of the town of
Wallsburg in Wasatch County, Utah.
3.

Several roads or portions of roads cross through portions of this property. These

roads have been designated as Maple Canyon Road, Circle Springs Road, Thorton Hollow Road,
Parker Canyon Road, and Ridge Line Road.
4.

All of these roads are mountain roads and, except for keeping the roadway clear,

have had little maintenance, if any. Specifically, the County has never maintained the roads. These

roads are typically accessed by pickup truck, snowmobiles, and all-terrain vehicles.
5.

The property in question where the roads are located is generally not accessible

until mid-May or later and is generally not accessible after November 15 s h
6.

All of these roads begin and end at points outside of the defendants' property

or connect with other roads which begin and end at points outside of the Okelberry and West
Daniels Land Association property.

7.

West Daniels' Land Association is a record owner of certain parcels of real

property located in Wasatch County over which the Ridge Line Road and the Parker Canyon road
traverse. West Daniels Land Association property adjoins the Okelberry property. West Daniel's

Land Association initially appeared through counsel who later withdrew. No successor counsel
was appointed. West Daniel's Land Association failed to respond to Plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment and its default was entered. Evidence regarding the use of those portions of
the roads at issue which are located in West Daniel's Land Association property was submitted

at trial.

6.

Circle Springs Road, Parker Canyon Road, and the portion of the Ridge Line

Road from where it enters the Okelberry property on the southeast to where it connects with
Parker Canyon Road are designated as Forest Service Roads on the map currently sold to the

public by the Forest Service. Circle Springs Road, Thorton Hollow Road, and Parker Canyon
Road cross thorough into forest land some distance before they end.
7.

Utah Division of Wildlife Resources is a record owner of a certain parcel of real

property located in Wasatch County in Township 5 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian. Pursuant to a stipulation entered into between the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources

and the property owners, certain portions of a road known as Ridge Line Road and Fish and Game
Road were abandoned and dedicated to the use of the public subject to certain restrictions. As of
the date of trial on June 28, 29 and 30, 2004, gates along said road were still locked and access

was obstructed by barricades that had been placed there by the Utah Division of Wildlife
Resources.

8.

There are signs on the property of the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources

stating that no motorized vehicles are allowed on the property. The evidence is such that in certain
areas, it is extremely steep and rocky and only accessible by a 4-wheel-drive vehicle. Portions of
the Ridge Line Road over property owned by the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources were built

after 1957. The road, at best, can be described as narrow, rocky and very difficult to traverse.
9.

At the time of the purchase of the property by the Okelberry's in 1957, the

property was bordered on the east and the south by fences separating the Okelberry property and
the United States Forest public property. There were also multiple gates along the roads: two

gates controlled access from the "Big Glade" area, one gate controlled access to the Circle Springs

Road, and one gate controlled access to the Ridge Line Road, the gates were wire gates; whoever

went through the gates had to open them and close them behind them.
10.

At trial the Court specifically found that there was no public use of the various

roads in the 1940s or before and also that no evidence of vehicular use prior to the 1950s existed.
11.

At trial the County presented testimony of various individuals who allegedly used

the roads for many more than ten years for recreational purposes. These individuals testified that
even though there were no-trespassing markers they were able to freely use the roads. They also

stated they were members of the general public without any private right to use the roads.
12.

Plaintiff presented evidence that there were gates located on the roads, but they

were not locked until the early 1990's. Prior to the gates being locked, the existence of the gates
did not interrupt the public's use of the roads.
13.

Plaintiff concedes that occasionally between the late 1950's and late 1980's the

Okelberry's or their agents informed members of the general public who had left the subject
roadways and were using the surrounding Okelberry property that they were trespassing,
however, not until the 1990's did they impede traffic on the road themselves.
14.

At trial the Okelberrys presented testimony of individuals that Ridge Line Road

and Parker Canyon Road were never at any time open to public use.
15.

The Okelberrys testified that there were large numbers of people in the

community who asked for permission to use the roads or their property, thus indicating that the
roads were not generally recognized as public.
16.

At trial the Okelberrys presented testimony of various individuals, including

employees who testified that there was not continuous use of the roads and that if they saw
someone using the roads, they asked them to leave.

17.

At trial the Okelberrys testified that improvements made to the roads were for

the sole purpose of facilitating their sheep and cattle operation, that the gates were generally
closed from the beginning of their ownership to control their sheep and cattle and to restrict travel
on the roads.
18.

In the early 1990s the Okelberrys started selling trespass permits to persons

wanting to use the Okelberry property for wood gathering, camping, or hunting.

19.

In the mid 1990s the Okelberrys allowed their land to be placed into a

Cooperative Wildlife Management Unit "CWMU" (a.k.a. a Private Hunting Unit "PHU"). Said

property is currently still part of a CWMU.
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact, now makes and enters the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

As provided by statute, a private road must meet a three part test to become

dedicated and abandoned to a public highway. The three requirements are (1) continuous use, (2)
as a public thoroughfare, (3) for a period often years. Ut. Code Ann. 72-5-104(1) (2003). The
three elements must be proved by "clear and convincing evidence" by the party claiming the road
has been abandoned to public use. Thomas v. Condas. 493 P.2d 639 (1972). Once established,
a public road continues to be a public road until it is "abandoned or vacated by order of the
highway authorities having jurisdiction or by other competent authority." Utah Code Ann.

72-5-105(1) (2004).
2.

First, the road must have been subject to "continuous use." Utah Courts have

interpreted "continuous use" in various instances to mean the public has used the roads

"extensively," Bertaenole v. Pine Meadow Ranches. 639 P.2d 211 (Utah 1981), "frequently and
freely," Thurman v. Brvam. 626 P.2d 447 (Utah 1981). However, continuous does not mean

constant. The supreme court has stated that "use may be continuous though not constant ...
provided it occurred as often as the claimant had occasion or chose to pass. Mere intermission is
not interruption." Campbell v. Box Elder County. 962 P.2d 806, 809 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998)
(quoting Richards v. Pines Ranch. Inc.. 559 P.2d 948 (Utah 1977). Similarly, in Bover v. Clark.
326 P.2d 107, 108 (Utah 1958), the supreme court found as a matter of law that a public highway
existed even though "the use of the road was not great because comparatively few people had need

to travel over it, but those of the public who had such need, did so."
3.

The Okelberrys have argued that use was not constant because at the time of

purchase in 1957 there were gates in place, concededly though, they were not always locked and
did not prevent travel. The Okelberrys claim that beginning in the 1960s the gates were

periodically locked for several days at a time and that signs were also posted on the gates and
property which stated "No Trespassing-Private Property." Thus, they argue that any interruption

of public access during the relevant periods is enough to prevent use from being continuous.

Plaintiffs deny the Defendant's factual assertions claiming that while there were gates on the
roads, they were not locked until the 1990s and that once signs were posted, they seemed to refer
only to the property abutting the roads and not the roads themselves.

4.

This Court finds the facts of the present case similar to the facts of Boyer v.

Clark wherein at issue was Middle Canyon Road that had been used for wagon and horse traffic.

As previously stated, the Boyer court noted that the public, "though not consisting of a great many
persons, made a continuous and uninterrupted use of middle canyon road ... as often as they
found it convenient or necessary." Taking even the Defendants' factual assertions as true, it is
clear that individuals using the roads beginning in the late 1950s until the late 1980s or early

1990s used the roads without interruption, they used the roads freely, and though not constantly,

they used the roads continuously as they needed. Therefore, that Court finds that prior to the
interrupting mechanisms being put in place the roads in question were subject to continuous use
and Plaintiffs met their burden proving the first element of the statute.
5.

Second, the continuous use must have been as a "public thoroughfare." The

Supreme Court of Utah has stated that a place becomes a public thoroughfare when the public has
a "general right of passage." Heber City v. Simpson. 942 P.2d 307 (Utah 1997). It is sufficient
to show that the road was used freely by the general public. Thurman v. Bvram. 626 P.2d 447,

449 (Utah 1981). The general public, however, does not include adjoining land owners or
individuals with permission of adjoining land owners. Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo. 888

P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995). "Use under a private right is not sufficient" to establish a public
right. Heber Citv v. Simpson. 942 P.2d at 311. Also, as once was the case, it is no longer

necessary to prove the land owner's intent or consent to offer the road to the public. See Thurman
v. Bvram. 626 P.2d at 449.
6.

In making the public thoroughfare determination, trial courts are "permitted some

reign to grapple with the multitude of fact patterns that may constitute a public thoroughfare."
Kohler v. Martin. 916 P.2d 910, 913 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996). The defendants claim they gave

permission to individuals to use the roads and unauthorized individuals were removed. Plaintiffs
claim that while some individuals who have used the roads were permissive users, the majority
were using the roads without permission from the land owners. None of the individuals who

testified on behalf of the Plaintiff own property adjacent to or along the roads. The Court finds
that the individuals who have used the roads have been members of the general public who used
the roads as a thoroughfare to public lands and/or for recreation. Prior to the locking of the gates

in the early 1990s the roads were used as public thoroughfares.

7.

Third, and lastly, the continuous use as a public thoroughfare must have lasted

for a period of ten years. From the facts that have been presented, it is clear to the Court that the
continuous use as a public thoroughfare continued for at least ten years, if not much longer, or

for multiple periods of ten years. Starting in 1960 until the early 1990s when the Okelberrys

began locking the gates and selling hunting permits the roads were accessible and used by the
general public as they found necessary and convenient. It is clear that the third statutory element
has been easily met.

8.

The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Plaintiff has not met

their burden in regards to Maple Canyon Road. The Court finds that there was evidence that
Maple Canyon Road had been locked at the Wallsburg end prior to the locking of the other roads,

and that it has a history of washing out and therefore, there was no evidence of continuous use
for ten years. The Court also finds that the Plaintiff has in fact met their burden as to Ridge Line
Road, Circle Springs Road, Thorton Hollow Road, and Parker Canyon Road, that they were used

continuously by the public as a public thoroughfare for a period of well over ten years prior to
1989 when the Okelberrys began locking the gates. Finding that there were abandoned to public

roads, the Court finds the width of the roads to be two-track, approximately ten feet in width. The

Court also finds that the public has been effectively cut off from use of these public roads since
1989.
9.

After finding the roads to be public roads, the Court now turns to the issue of

whether they continue as public roads after a twelve year period of nonuse and private control
exerted by the defendants over the roads.

10.

The Court finds that while public roads once dedicated can be abandoned or

vacated only "by order of the highway authorities having jurisdiction or by other competent

authority." Ut. Code Ann. 72-5-015 (2004). Prior to 1911, a public road could be vacated after
a five-year period of nonuse. The statute has since been amended by deleting that provision. The
Court held that the legislature clearly intended to limit the method of vacating public roads to the
specific statutory requirements and no longer allow forfeiture through nonuse. Henderson v.

Oseuthorpe. 657 P.2d 1268, 1270-1271 (Utah 1982). However, this Court finds the principle of
estoppel is dispositive in the present case.

11.

In Premium Oil v. Cedar City. 187 P.2d 199 (Utah 1947), the supreme court

held that a strip of land once dedicated as a public road had been used in a manner directly in
conflict with the land's dedication as a public road. The court stated that "the manner in which
the city used the strip was openly hostile to the public use as a street and should have been notice
to all that any dedication, if previously intended, has been abandoned. Under the facts of the case,
the court held that the Plaintiff would be estopped to claim an improper abandonment or vacation,
this Court finds that while the roads at issue were properly abandoned to public use by compliance

with the statutory requirements, the Defendants for a period of twelve years exerted control and
used the roads in an openly hostile manner to the public use of the streets. Applied to the present
case, the County having failed to bring an action for twelve years must now be estopped from
doing so.
12.

As further stated in Premium Oil, "in many cases where cities attempt to open

dedicated street for the benefit of the public, the courts have estopped the city from enforcing a

dedication because the city authorities and the public itself has taken no action over a period of
years, to prevent the erection of valuable improvements." 187 P. 2d at 204. Allowing the County
to open the roads as public roads now would ruin the Okelberry sheep and cattle operation as well
as eliminate the hunting unit now being operated by Shane Ford. Admittedly little improvements

have been made to the roads themselves, but doubtless large amounts of time and money has been
expended on behalf of these business operations and the Defendants have relied on their private
use of the road to sustain and build their businesses. It would be inequitable to now, after twelve

years of clearly private use of the roads, to allow the County to open the roads to the Defendants'
detriment.

13.

By clear and convincing evidence the Court finds that the roads in question were

abandoned to public roads, but the County is now estopped from opening them to public use

because of their failure to bring an action against the Okelberrys who asserted private control over
the roads for twelve years in dppositionjo t^eir public status.

DATED this zffi day of I

SSSSKfcJifc^
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

SCOTT H. SWEAT, ESQ.
Deputy Wasatch County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY

TO:

SCOTT H. SWEAT, ESQ.
You will please take notice that the undersigned, attorney for Defendants Okelberry, will

submit the above and foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Court for

signature upon the expiration of the time permitted for the filing of a written objection pursuant
to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this

day of September, 2004.

DON R. PETERSEN, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Defendants Okelberry
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed,

postage prepaid, and also transmitted by facsimile to the fax number listed below this |S
of September, 2004, to:

Scott H. Sweat
Deputy Wasatch County Attorney
114 South 200 West
Heber City, UT 84032
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WASATCH COUNTY, a body public of

the State of Utah,
Plaintiff,

SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF

FACT AND RULING ON MOTION
TO AMEND JUDGMENT

V.

E. RAY OKELBERRY, BRIAN

OKELBERRY, ERIC OKELBERRY,
UTAH DIVISION OF WILDLIFE
RESOURCES, WEST DANIELS LAND

Case No. 010500388
Judge Donald J. Ewe

ASSOCIATION, and JOHN DOES 1-25,
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on December 17,2004, on Plaintiffs Motion To Alter
Judgment or Amend Findings of Fact. Plaintiff was represented by Scott H. Sweat, Deputy

Wasatch County Attorney. Defendants were represented by Don R. Petersen and Ryan D.
Tenney. The Court has reviewed the file, considered the parties memoranda, heard oral
arguments, and being fully advised on the premises issues the following supplement:
FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Testimony was presented at trial showing that though the roads at issue in this case are
in many places rough and difficult to traverse, Wasatch County (the County) has not made any
efforts in the past to pave, grade, or otherwise improve the condition of these roads.
2. Testimony was also presented at trial indicating that Wasatch County currently has no

plans to improve these roads in the future.

3. Due to the rough nature of these roads, the Okelberrys and their employees have at
certain times in the past made efforts to improve the conditions of these roads. Specifically, they
have used heavy equipment to grade and level certain sections of the roads and have spent
considerable time and energy removing fallen trees.

4. The Okelberrys and their employees have constructed and maintained gates that are
placed at various points along the contested roads. Due to problems with vandalism, the
Okelberrys have found it necessary to repair and maintain some of these gates. Their repair
efforts have included the use of concrete as a means of permanently securing the fence posts.
5. At various times in the past, the Okelberrys and their employees have locked these
gates. Beginning in the 1990's, the Okelberrys began locking these gates on a more permanent
basis. Prior to the filing of this suit, Wasatch County had taken no official action to prevent the
Okelberrys from locking these gates.

6. The Okelberrys and their employees have posted "no trespassing" signs at various
places along these roads. Prior to the filing of this suit, Wasatch County had taken no official

action to prevent the Okelberrys from posting such signs.
7. Testimony was presented at trial indicating that the Okelberrys and their employees

have at various times asked persons to leave the property surrounding the roads. Beginning in
the 1990's, the Okelberrys began restricting access to the roads. Prior to the filing of this suit,
Wasatch County had taken no official action to prevent the Okelberrys from restricting the access
to these roads.
8. The Okelberrys and their employees have sold trespass permits to members of the
public, thereby granting those members permission to use the Okelberry property and
surrounding roads. Prior to the filing of this suit, Wasatch County had taken no official action to

•*■

prevent the Okelberrys from selling these trespass permits.

9. Beginning in the mid-1990's, the Okelberrys entered into a contractual relationship
that allowed private hunters to access their land in return for a significant monetary payment.
These hunting contracts were administered as part of a Cooperative Wildlife Management Unit
(CWMU).

10. Shayne Ford is currently the operator of the CWMU that has access to the Okelberry
property. At trial, Shayne Ford testified that his CWMU would no longer use the Okelberry
property if the contested roads were made open to the public.
11. No evidence was provided at trial to suggest the Wasatch County had ever
affirmatively represented to the Okelberrys or anyone that it intended to abandon the public roads
at issue or to otherwise not enforce the public's right to access these roads.
RULING

Under Utah law, in order to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel, a party must meet
three elements: (1) a statement, admission, act, orfailure to act by one party inconsistent with a

claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on the basis of the
first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to the second party that
would result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission,
act, or failure to act. The View Condo. Owners Assn. v. MS1CO, L.L.C., 2004 UT App 104, 33,
90 P.3d 1042 (quoting Eldredge v. Utah State Ret. Bd.t 795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)

(emphasis added)).
First, the Court finds that for at least ten years the County failed to act as if the roads were

public and that failure to act is inconsistent with their present assertion that those roads are
public. Though the County is claiming to have had an ownership interest in the roads, they failed

to act in any way as owners until the filing of this action. Specifically, the Okelberrys placed
gates across these roads, locked those gates for periods of time, asked persons to leave,

completely controlled access to the roads since 1989, and have even sold trespass permits to
persons wishing to use these roads. Each of these activities are clearly hostile to any claim of
ownership by any other entity. If a private citizen constructed a toll booth across a residential
road, for example, it would clearly be expected that the municipality would take immediate steps
to reassert control. Here, the Okelberrys have controlled access to these roads for over a decade
and have in fact actually received money from persons who wished to gain access.

In further support, the Okelberrys have expended some effort in the past to maintain and
improve these roads, while the County has not expended any efforts in this regard. See Premium
Oil v. Cedar City, 187 P.2d 199,203 (Utah 1947) (holding that it was "important" that "[n]o

attempt was made by the city or the public to improve the property so as to indicate the presence
of a street"); Wall v. Salt Lake City, 168 P. 766,768 (Utah 1917) (noting that the private
landowner had made certain "improvements" by "leveling and filling in low places" in partial
reliance on the municipality's own inaction). No witness at trial even suggested that the County
had undertaken any specific action during the time periods to assert the public' rights to those
roads (such as forcibly removing gates or locks, or by taking any efforts at all to maintain or
improve those roads), nor was there any suggestion that any previous action had been filed in any
court to obtain a declaration that the roads were in fact public. Thus, the Court finds the first
prong of the estoppel analysis has been met.
Second, the Court finds that the Okelberry's have taken reasonable actions based on the

County's failure to assert any ownership interest in these roads. Specifically, the Okelberrys
have constructed and maintained gates across the roads, have spent time and energy improving

and maintaining the roads (rather than calling on county personnel to do so), and have developed

and maintained a livestock operation that incorporates and uses all of the roads in question
(rather than purchasing and moving their livestock operations). Also, the Okelberrys have

entered into a business relationship with the CWMU that is operated by Shayne Ford. This
business relationship has continued for almost a decade, and is by Shayne Ford's testimony,

expressly predicated on the Okelberrys' continued control over these roads. The Court concludes
that the Okelberrys would not have undertaken these activities had the County asserted any
ownership rights over these roads, thus satisfying the second prong of the estoppel analysis.
Third, the Court finds that the Okelberrys would suffer injury if the County were now
allowed to assert ownership rights over these roads. The most significant injury would be the
loss of income due to the expected departure of the CWMU. The Okelberrys also testified at trial
that they would suffer certain injuries to their own ongoing livestock operation if these roads

were opened to the public. Opening the roads to the public would in effect destroy the
Okelberrys' sheep and cattle operation. These losses clearly satisfy the third estoppel factor.
The Plaintiff, County, asserts that estoppel may not be found against a government entity.

The Supreme Court of Utah did state that the "general rule is that estoppel may not be asserted
against a governmental entity." Weese v. Davis County Comm 'n, 834 P.2d 1,4 (Utah 1992)

(emphasis added). However, the Supreme Court of Utah has applied the principle of estoppel in
pais "to exceptional cases where the elements calling for its exercise appear to have been an
abandonment to the public use for the prescriptive period, inclosure and expensive
improvements, such as large and costly buildings, acts of the municipality inducing the abutter to

believe that there is no longer any street, and the expenditure of money in reliance upon the acts
of the municipality." The Court further stated that "the absolute bona fides of the abutter or

adverse possessor is a most important factor where is estoppel in pais is claimed. The acts relied
on must be of such character as to amount to a fraud, if the city were permitted to claim

otherwise." Wall 168 P. at 772.

This Court finds the present case to be exceptional so as to

invoke the exception.
The Court finds it significant that the roads in question are located on private property
and the roads themselves were private property prior to their abandonment to public use by their

constant use. Prior to the filing of this action, the County has never asserted any type of
ownership control over the roads. The County has never made any improvements on the roads.

The County has itself treated the roads as the Okelberrys' private property by collecting property
taxes on the land. The Walls court stated that the property in dispute in that case had been

recognized by the county as private "not only by the plat, but by assessing it and enriching its
own coffers by tribute exacted in the form of taxes." Wall at 771 (emphasis added).
Relying on the "bona fides of the abutter," the Court finds that the Okelberrys absolutely

believed the roads in question were their private property and as such asserted their ownership
control by erecting fences and issuing trespass permits onto the property and these actions were
uninterrupted by the County for over a decade. Clearly the Okelberrys' reasonably believed the

roads were their property and acted consistent with that belief and the County did not challenge

their belief for a substantial period of time. While erecting fences does not rise to the level of
erecting "large and costly buildings," the Court finds the Okelberrys' improvements and more

importantly their business investments on the land to be significant. Thus, this Court finds that
estoppel may properly asserted against the County.

The County then asserts that the exception to applying estoppel to a governmental entity
is limited to situations where allowing the government to disavow its own affirmative act would

cause grave injustice to the other party and where estoppel may result in the loss of a public road,
the courts have also required substantial conflicting improvements on what has been the road by
the relying land owner. It is true that some cases have indicated that an affirmative action is
required in order to assert estoppel against a government entity. See The View Condo. Assn.,
2004 UT APP 104 at 34, n.2; See also Wall v. Salt Lake City, 168 P. 766, 769 (Utah 1917).

However, this requirement does not appear to have been universally applied by the courts.1
In Premium Oil v. Cedar City 187 P.2d 1999 (Utah 1947), the Utah Supreme Court held
that it is a "general rule" that a "municipality may be estopped to assert a dedication by acts and
conduct which have been relied upon by others to their prejudice." Id. at 203. The Premium Oil
Co. court further held that "in many cases where cities attempt to open dedicated streets for the

benefit of the public, the courts have estopped the city from enforcing a dedication because the
city authorities and the public itself has taken no action over a period of years" to prevent the
private landowner from acting in an otherwise hostile manner. Id. at 204. The Premium Oil
court made no mention of an affirmative action requirement.

Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court held in Western Kane County Special Service District
No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987), that estoppel against the government is

appropriate where the landowner has "substantially altered his position to his detriment in

1 This view is well-supported by the commentators. One respected commentator has thus
noted that though "the application of estoppel doctrines against municipal corporations is not
favored," a municipal corporation is "[nonetheless ... subject to the rules of estoppel in those

cases where equity and justice require their application." 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver
Section 152. Further, "a municipality may be estopped to open or use a street theretofore created,
still existing in point of law, and never opened, or, if once opened in use since fallen into disuse
and seemingly abandoned." 39 Am. Jur. 2d Highway and Streets, and Bridges Section 179; See
Also 11A McQuillen The Law ofMunicipal Corporations Section 33.62 ("The municipality itself
may be stopped to assert a dedication by acts and conduct which have been relied on by others to
their prejudice.").

t

reliance on the asserted nonuse of the roadway by the public." Id. at 1378. In Western Kane the
Utah Supreme Court refused to apply equitable estoppel against the government because the
"landowner had not substantially altered his position to his detriment in reliance on the asserted
nonuse of the roadway by the public." Id. The roads in Western Kane were located on the edges
of the property and no more than ten feet wide. The Court did not discuss any evidence that the
landowners had made any improvements, but the Court did mention that the County paid 75
percent of the cost of the land into the court.

Here, the Court finds that "equity and justice" do require the application of estoppel to the
present case. The Okelberrys have acted as if they owned the roads in question for over a decade.
In addition to the time and labor that they have personally spent on these roads, they have also
developed a business relationship with a CWMU-thereby potentially passing on other business

or land development opportunities that may have existed in the interim. To allow the County
now to assert an ownership interest in these roads would cause the Okelberrys injury, would be
unjust, and therefore cannot be sanctioned by this Court.
As such, the Court holds that the County is hereby estopped from asserting an ownership

interest over these roads, and the County's Motion to Amend Judgment is hereby DENIED.
Counsel for the Defendants shall prepare an order consistent with this ruling.

DATED this
lis /O
Jo day of February,
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RESOURCES, WEST DANIELS LAND

Judge: Donald J. Eyre

ASSOCIATION, and John Does 1-25

Defendants.

Plaintiff hereby moves the Court, to enter the proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law attached hereto as Exhibit A. The basis for this motion is that on
February 12, 2008, the Utah Supreme Court remanded this case to the district for further factual

findings. This motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support of Motion for Entry of
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Findings of Fact and Request for Oral Arguments filed concurrently herewith. Wasatch County
requests oral arguments on this matter.

Dated this Q of ^/l^cU , 2008.

Scott H Sweat
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Deputy County Attorney
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EXHIBIT A

THOMAS L. LOW, #6601

Wasatch County Attorney

SCOTT H SWEAT, #6143
Deputy Wasatch County Attorney

805 West 100 South
Heber City, UT 84032

Telephone: (435) 654-2909
Fax: (435) 654-2947

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WASATCH COUNTY, a body politic
of the Stale of Utah

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
Plaintiff,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.

E. RAY OKELBERRY, BRIAN
OKELBERRY, ERIC OKELBERRY,

Case No. 010500388

UTAH DIVISION OF WILDLIFE

RESOURCES, WEST DANIELS LAND

ASSOCIATION, and JOHN DOES 1-25

Judge DONALD J. EYRE, JR.

Defendants.

The above-entitled case was tried to the Court, the Honorable Donald J. Eyre, sitting without a

jury, on June 28, 29 and 30, 2004. Both parties appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the equitable
estoppels holding and upheld the road dedication holding. The Utah Supreme Court remanded the case
lo this Court for further factual findings on the dedication issue. Upon Motion of the Plaintiff, and after

yfl^^?v

f^^fy\

opportunity for briefing by the parties the Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law.

SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF TACT
NO TRESPASSING SIGNS

1.

All of the witnesses brought by the county testified that no trespassing signs were not present on

any of the roads prior to the late 19S0's or early 1990's
2.

Benny Gardner testified that when no-trespassing signs were first put up they were placed along
the roads through the Okelberry property. This indicates that while Defendants tacitly

acknowledged the roads as public, they considered it trespassing to leave the roadway and go
onto the Okelberry Property. This testimony is supported by trial exhibits 35 and 40 which show

no trespassing signs inside the boundaries of the Okelberry property at locations where side
roads leave the main roads which are subject of this action.
3.

The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that that from 1960 to the late 1980's or early
1990's there were no signs or markers present on the subject roads indicating no-trespassing.

LOCKED GATES

4.

All of the witnesses brought by the county testified that there were never any locked gates on
any of the roads prior to the late 1980's or early 1990's

5.

Ray Okelberry testified that he placed locks on the Circle Springs Road gate and the Ridge Line

Road gate in 1957. He also testified that he locked the gates every year when he moved his
sheep.

6.

Brian Okelberry, the son and current partner of Ray Okelberry and one of the defendants herein
testified that locks were not put on the gales until the 1980's.

7.

Moroni Besendorfer was a shareholder in West Daniels Land Association. Lee Okelberry, is the

older brother of Ray Okelberry, was a partner with Ray Okelberry in the livestock operation and
owned approximately one half of the property currently owned by the Okelberry defendants.
Lee Okelberry sold his property to his brother and nephews in 1991.
8.

Both Moroni Besendorfer and Lee Okelberry testified that there were never any no-trespassing

signs or markers or any locks on any of the gates on the roads in question from at the 1950's up
until the late 1980's. Both testified that members of the public were not stopped from using the
roads between the 1950's up until the late 1980's.

9.

The Court finds these witnesses testimony especially credible on this issue because it is contrary

to their apparent interests in this case, making fabrication on this issue unlikely.

10.

The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence, that from 1960 to the late 1980's none of the
gates on the subject roads were ever locked.
ASKING PEOPLE TO NOT USE THE ROADS

11.

All the witnesses called by Wasatch County testified to using the roads without any permission,
many for decades and that they were never stopped from using the road prior to the 1990's.

12.

Okelberry Witnesses gave many examples of asking persons found off the road on the

surrounding Okleberry properly leave. None gave any example of asking people using only the
roads to leave prior to the 1990's.

13.

The Okelberrys themselves gave no testimony of ever stopping persons from using the roads or
of having a policy of stopping people from using these roads prior to the 1990's.

14.

The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that from al least 1960 to the late 1980's there
was no policy of slopping people from using the roads nor were persons stopped from using
these roads.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Having made and entered findings of fact which were established by clear and convincing evidence, the
Court now makes and enters the following Conclusions of Law.

1.

Prior to placement of no-trespassing markers or locked gates on these roads or stopping persons from

using these roads, Ridge Line Road, Circle Springs Road, Thorton Hollow Road, and Parker Canyon
Road had been used by the general public for periods ranging from at least 10 years to 30 or more
consecutive years for motor vehicle and other travel over their entire length and whenever members of
the public found it necessary or convenient.

2.

Ridge Line Road, Circle Springs Road, Thorton Hollow Road, and Parker Canyon Road, are public

roads dedicated and abandoned to the public in accordance with Section 72-5-104, Utah Code Ann.,
1953 and its predecessor. Section 27-12-89, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended.

4.

Judgment should be entered in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants declaring, ordering and
adjudging as follows:

(a)

Ridge Line Road, Circle Springs Road, Thorton Hollow Road, and Parker Canyon

Road, each in their entirely are Public roads dedicated and abandoned to the public.
(b)

The Defendants shall forthwith remove or cause to be removed the locks from any

gates crossing these roads and no longer place any lock or device on the gates that prohibits
ingress and egress through the gates by members of the public. Defendants shall permit access
through the gates and along the roads whenever and at such times as either necessary or
convenient to members of the public.
(c)

A permanent injunction be issued enjoining the Defendants, their grantees,

successors, assigns, heirs, agents and invitees from maintaining gates across these roads in a
closed and locked condition and from obstructing or preventing access by the public to the use of
these roads.

DATED this

day of March, 2008.
BY THE COURT

DONALD J. EYRE
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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9:00 a.m.

June 28, 2004
PROCEEDINGS

2
3
4

THE COURT: Good morning. We'll go on the

5

record in the case of Wasatch County verses E Ray

6

Okelberry and other defendants. The matter is set for

7

trial at this time. Mr. Sweat, do you want to make an

8

opening statement?

9
10
11
12
13

MR. SWEAT: Yes, your Honor.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we would invoke

the witness exclusionary rule at this time.
THE COURT: Why don't you indicate the

witnesses that you anticipate calling, Mr. Sweat.

14

MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, and I anticipate

15

THE COURT: And if they're present in the

16

courtroom if you'd stand.

17

MR. SWEAT: I anticipate calling Liz Palmier,

18

Don Wood, Dee Sabey, Moroni Besendorfer, Martin Wall, Roy

19

Daniels, Dick Baum, Jack Thompson, Benny Gardner, Jackie

20

Mecum and Ed Sabey.

21
22
23
24
25

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Petersen, do you have

any witnesses here other than the parties?
MR. PETERSEN: No, we don't we just have our

parties here today.
THE COURT: Okay. If all the people that

4

were indicated as witnesses, if you'd please stand and
raise your right hand and take the witness oath.
CLERK: Do you and each of you do solemnly

swear that the testimony you shall give in the matter now
before this court shall be the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth, so help you God?
WITNESS: I do.
WITNESS: We do.

THE COURT: Okay. If you'd all go out in the

foyer and stay there until you're called to be a witness.
You're not to discuss your own testimony with anyone else
or after you've testified review it with anybody. Thank
you. Okay. Mr. Sweat, you may make an opening
statement.
MR. SWEAT: Thank you, your Honor. Your

Honor, this case is about historical use and public
access. It was brought about because roads that have
been used by the public for as long as most people can
remember have been closed by defendants. The evidence
today will show that members of the public used these
roads when ever they found it convenient or necessary.
Evidence will show that up until around the
1990's the public was never stopped or denied use of
these roads. It will further show that up until about
the 1990's there were never any signs or other
5

notification asking them not to use the roads. The
evidence will show that not until the 1990's, long after
these roads had become public by operation of law, did
the defendants make any attempt to restrict access to
these roads.
Evidence will also show that some of these
roads are the only vehicle access to portion of forest
land and that the public has, for many years, freely used
these roads to access these portions of the forest. Of
all of the witnesses will give evidence of unobstructed
and interrupted use of the roads for well over the
required ten years, certain witnesses will give key
evidence of public use.
One of our first witnesses, Dee Sabey, will
show that Maple Canyon Road was used by sheep ranchers
from Utah County and Wasatch County to move vehicles
trailing sheep herds into the Strawberry Valley each
summer. Martin Wall will testify before he ever had a
four-wheel drive he and friends modified automobiles,
which they freely drove on these roads.
Roy Daniels will testify that as the district
ranger for the forest service between 1971 and 1991 he
used these roads to check on campers camp fires in the
portions of the forest accessed by these roads. He will
show that the forest has designated at least two of these
6

roads as part of the forest transportation system. He
will also testify that the forest has provided
maintenance on some of these roads.
Dick Baum will testify that he used one of
these roads during winter and summer for biking and
skiing since the 1970's. Your Honor, plaintiffs believe
that the evidence will be clear and convincing that all
of these roads are public roads by operation of law.
Thank you.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Sweat. Mr.

Petersen.
MR. PETERSEN: Thank you, your Honor.

Counsel, I appreciate the efforts of counsel and Court.
Your Honor, the counsel is correct when they say the
burden is on them. The burden is clear and convincing
evidence, clear and convincing evidence. We're concerned
with five separate roads here. In essence they've got to
show by clear and convincing evidence that these five
separate roads were used for a continuous period of at
least ten years. We don't think they can even come close
to that.
The evidence will show, your Honor, that in
1957 my clients and their family purchased this property.
That in 1957 there were fences and roads that were
blocking off this property. The Court has an opportunity
7

1

to go up there. On the east side of the property it is

2

bounded by Forest Service property. When they were there

3

and they purchased that property there were fences across

4

these roads in 1957.

5

The evidence will show that those fences and

6

those roads have been there continuously since 1957. Not

7

only have there been gates there, but they -- Beginning

8

in about the 19, late 1970's they began to lock those

9

gates. We would concede that there have been trespassers

10

that have gone up there that have blown off blocks and so

11

fourth, but that is not what the case law calls open to

12

the public. Open to the public means it has to be open

13

to the public. There's no gates, there's no obstruction.

14

Counsel mentioned Maple Canyon Road. The

15

evidence on Maple Canyon Road, your Honor, will be such,

16

you can't travel that with a four-wheel, with a vehicle.

17

If you're going to travel that you're going to have to go

18

up by a horse, maybe an ATV. And that's true with these

19

other roads as well. They're just -- You can't

20

navigate them with a vehicle. Even with a four-wheel

21

drive vehicle.

22

The evidence will be that there are

23

obstacles, that there are gates, that there are signs,

24

that those signs have been there for a considerable

25

length of time. And there's no way that they're going to
8

1

be able to meet a ten year provision as set fourth by the

2

law. Your Honor, we sent up to the Court a trial

3

memorandum. If the Court has seen that or not?
THE COURT: Yes, I've seen that and I've

4
5

reviewed it.

6

MR. PETERSEN: Thank you.

7

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Sweat, you may call

8

your first witness.
MR. SWEAT: Thank you, your Honor. The

9
10

Plaintiff would call Liz Palmier.
THE COURT: Ms. Palmier, if you'd come

11
12

forward to the witness stand. Have a seat right up here.

13

MR. SWEAT: Thank you, your Honor.

14

DIRECT EXAMINATION

15
16
17
18
19

BY MR. SWEAT:

Q.

Ms. Palmier, with you please state your name

and address for the record?
A.

Elizabeth M. Palmier, 1415 South 3350 East,

Cedar City, Utah.

20

Q.

And what --

21

A.

P-A-L-M-I-E-R.

22

Q

And what is your occupation?

23

A.

I'm a Wasatch County recorder.

24

Q.

Is this an elective position?

25

A.

Yes, it is.

.

9

Q.

How long have you held this position?

A.

Since 1995.

Q.

What is the job of the county recorder?

A.

We record maps, documents and we prepare all

the maps for the taxing purposes for the county.
Q.

Ms. Palmier, I'm going to show you what we're

going to mark as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.
MR. SWEAT: May I approach the witness, your

Honor?
THE COURT: You may.
MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, for the Court and

counsel's information this exhibit is the exact exhibit
that I submitted at summary judgment. Rather than
re-doing it I've just asked the clerk if we could put it
and use it as an exhibit here at trial.
THE COURT: That's fine.

Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) Ms. Palmier, do you recognize

what has been marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Could you tell us what it is?

A.

These are the aerial photos that have been

maintained in the county recorder's office.
Q.

Do you recognize, as you look at these, these

specific photos?
A.

Yes.
10

Q.

These are copies

-_

MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we'd be willing to

stipulate that this is a, what it's represented to be.
THE COURT: And having objection to be

received by MR. PETERSEN: No, no, your Honor.
THE COURT: It's received.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1
was received into evidence.)
MR. SWEAT: Thank you, your Honor. So we've

had it admitted?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. SWEAT: I have no further questions for

this witness at this time.
THE COURT: I think Mr. Petersen has a

couple.
MR. SWEAT: Okay.

THE WITNESS: Okay.
CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETERSEN:
Q.

Ma'am, as a county recorder would you be

aware if the county ever made any improvements on what
they're trying to designated as roads?
A.

Not on -- All we do is maintain the maps.

We keep them there. We don't draw any of the maps.
11

Q.

You wouldn't know if the roads were ever

surveyed or improved in anyway by the county? You have
to answer audibly.
A.

No.
MR. PETERSEN: That's all.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything, Mr. Sweat? You

may step down.
MR. SWEAT: Call Don Wood, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Wood, if you'd come forward

and have a seat here in this chair. You may proceed.
MR. SWEAT: Thank you, your Honor.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. SWEAT:

Q.

Mr. Wood, would you please state your name

and address for the record?
A.

My name is Don J. Wood. I live at 1116 East

270 North Heber City, Utah.
Q.

What is your occupation?

A.

I'm the information system director for

Wasatch County.
Q.

How long have you held this position?

A.

For the past seven years.

Q.

And how long have you been involved or worked

as an information system director or, in this type of
occupation?
12

A.

Well, concerning the mapping side of things

I've been working with the county for 10 years or 11
years in that profession.
Q.

What is that typically called?

A.

It is geographic information systems.

Q.

And how long have you worked as part of

geographic information system field?
A.

11 years for Wasatch County, 1 year for the

U.S. Forest Service.
Q.

And have you had any sort of training for

this type of work?
A.

Yes, I have a degree from Weber State

University in geography.
Q.

With the county as a GIS person, what are

your duties?
A.

GI person, our job is to, short of parcel

maps for the county, we take care of all other mapping
operations. We map road locations, we map streams, basin
boundaries, we take care of voting maps, other political
maps for the county, zoning maps, ect.
Q.

Do you ever make maps?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

What information do you use when you make a

A.

Any existing information that's available

map?

13

1

from state or federal sources are from outside surveyors

2

and such. We also generate our own information if that

3

information is not available through use of GPS and other

4

technologies.

5

Q.

Would you consider yourself to have more or

6

less experience in working with maps than the average

7

person?

8

A.

Yes, sir.

9

Q.

More or less?

10

A.

Oh, more, yes.

Sorry, sir.

MR. PETERSEN: If counsel wants to introduce

11
12

some maps, your Honor, we'd stipulate to them. I think

13

we've all seen them.

14
15

MR. SWEAT: I've got several. Do you want to

look at all of them?
THE COURT: Why don't you

16

Why don't you,

17

when you review them, see if you have any problems with

18

the maps (INAUDIBLE).

19

MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, I appreciate Mr.

20

Petersen's willingness to stipulate.

21

just so we have a record of what maps each of these are.

22
23
24
25

I'll go through,

THE COURT: Okay.
Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) Mr. Wood, do you recognize

what's been marked as Exhibit No. 2?
A.

Yes, sir.
14

1

Q.

Would you tell the Court what that is?

2

A.

It's a map of this round valley region with

3

some property ownership identified.

4

Q.

Who created that map?

5

A.

My department, sir, myself.

6

MR. PETERSEN: Is this Exhibit 2?

7

MR. SWEAT: This is Exhibit 2, yes.

8

THE COURT: Any objection to No. 2?

9

MR. PETERSEN: No, sir.

10

THE COURT: It's received.

11

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2
was received into evidence.)

12
13

Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) Mr. Wood, I'm handing you

14

what has been marked as Exhibit 3. Do you recognize

15

that?

16

A.

Yes, sir.

17

Q.

Could you tell the Court what it is?

18

A.

It's a map that was prepared by the U.S.

19

Geological Survey. It was published in 1907 it appears.

20

MR. SWEAT: I'd move to admit, your Honor.

21

MR. PETERSEN: No objection.

22

MR. SWEAT: With counsel's stipulation.

23

THE COURT: It's received.

24

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3

25

was received into evidence.)
15

(BY MR. SWEAT) Mr. Wood, have you reviewed

1

Q.

2

this map?

3

A.

Yes, I have.

4

Q.

Now, are you aware of the roads that are the

5

subject of this litigation?

6

A.

Yes, sir.

7

Q.

How are you aware of those roads?

8

A.

I first became aware of them through contact

9

with the Wasatch County Commission and County Attorney's

10

Office. In subsequent time we had the pleasure of

11

driving some of the roads and have studied maps from

12

various agencies and organizations concerning the roads.

13
14

Q.

Now, this map that you are looking at here

you said it's dated 1907; is that correct?

15

A.

On the map, yes.

16

Q.

And does it show any of the roads that are

17

the subject of this matter today?

18

A.

Yes, sir, it does.

19

Q.

Which one does it show?

20

A.

Specifically the road Maple Canyon.

21

Q.

That's 1947. Mr. Wood, I'm now showing you

22

what has been marked as Exhibit 4. Have you seen this

23

before?

24

A.

Yes, sir.

25

Q.

Can you tell us what it is?
16

A.

It's a map of the international forest.

Q.

Can you tell who published that map?

A.

The Forest Service published this map.

Q.

And what date was that map published?

A.

As for the map 1947.

Q.

And does it show any of the roads which are

the subject of this litigation here?
A.

Yes, sir, it shows Maple Canyon and Circle

Springs, specifically these roads.
Q.

Anything else? Does it show anything with

A.

Yes, it does. It shows s trail at Thorton

Q.

Does that trail on the map go all the way and

trails?

Hallow.

connect in with -A.

Yes, sir, it does.
MR. PETERSEN: Connect with -- I missed

that. Connect with what?
MR. SWEAT: Connect with Maple Canyon Road.
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, it connects with the

road coming out of Maple Canyon.
THE COURT: Any objections to No. 4?
MR. PETERSEN: No objection.
THE COURT: It's received.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 4
17

was received into evidence.)
Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) Mr. Wood, I'm now showing you

what has been marked as Exhibit No. 5. Do you recognize
this?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Can you tell us what it is?

A.

It's a map of the international forest.

Q.

From looking at it can you tell who published

A.

It was published by the U.S. Forest Service.

Q.

And does this -- And what date was this map

it?

published?
A.

1964.
MR. SWEAT: For the record, your Honor, this

has a small map. And up in the top corner I have
attached a blowup of the section of the area, which you
are, which is the subject of today's matter.
Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) Mr. Wood, does this map show

any of the roads which are the subject of this matter?
A.

Yes, sir, it does.

Q.

Could you tell us what roads are on this map?

A.

It shows the road going down to Thorton

Hallow, a road going along the ridge line that connects
Thorton Hallow and Parker Canyon together with the access
to the Forest Service on top. And it shows the Circle,
18

or the road going to Circle Springs.
Q.

Tell me again which one it shows.

A.

The road going to Circle Springs, Ridge Line

Road going down to Parker Canyon and Thorton Hallow
connecting to Ridge Line Road. It also shows a trail
going down Maple Canyon.
MR. SWEAT: Again, I'd move to admit, your

Honor.
THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. PETERSEN: No objection, your Honor.

THE COURT: It's received.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5
was received into evidence.)
MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, I want to go back and

create a little bit better record than what I've done.
Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) Mr. Wood, returning your

attention to what's been marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit
No. 2. You indicated you created that; is that correct?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And at my request did you designate certain

roads with certain colors and certain names?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

What color did you designate what we've

designated as Maple Canyon Road?
A.

On this particular map it's magenta.
19

MR. PETERSEN: It's what?
THE WITNESS: Magenta, kind of a pink color.
MR. PETERSEN: Pink?
MR. SWEAT: Kind of a pink, purple.
Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) What color did you designate

Circle Springs Road?
A.

Circle Springs is green.

Q.

What color have you designated Ridge Line

A.

Ridge Line Road is red.

Q.

What color have you Parker Canyon Road?

A.

Parker Canyon is orange.

Q.

And what color have you designated for

Road?

Thorton Hallow Road?
A.

Thorton Hallow (INAUDIBLE) or light blue.

Q.

On the road designations, are those just the

designations that I asked you to put on them?
A.

Yes, you did.

Q.

You don't have any independent knowledge that

that's what that road is necessarily called other than
the maps you've seen?
A.

Other than the maps I've seen, no, sir.

Q.

Would it surprise you if different portions

of the roads were called different thing by different
people?
20

1

A.

Oh, not at all, it happens constantly.

2

MR. SWEAT: Did I get them all admitted?

3

THE COURT: You did.

4

MR. SWEAT: I have no further questions at

5

this time.
THE COURT: Okay. Any cross-examination, Mr.

6
7

Petersen?

8
9

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETERSEN:

Q.

10

Mr. Wood, the mere fact that the document

11

shows a road, U.S. geological map or something, that

12

doesn't necessarily make it a road to the public, does

13

it?

14

A.

Not, not necessarily.

15

Q.

Some of these, which you've called roads are

16
17

nothing more than trails, are they not?
A.

The roads on the maps, if it's a trail it's
If it's a road it's

18

signified as a dashed single line.

19

shown as a two line symbol. So the maps delineate for

20

themselves whether it's classified as a trail or a road.

21
22
23

Q.

Now, did I hear you say that you went up and

traveled on these roads?
A.

I've not been on all of them, but I did go

24

with Mr. Okelberry, I believe, two years ago or so in

25

November.
21

1

Q.

Is that the only time you went up there?

2

A.

That's the only time I've been on the Ridge

3

Line Road as it goes through Mr. Okelberry's property,

4

Thorton Hallow and Parker. I've never traveled Maple

5

Canyon.

6

Q.

So the only time that you've been on those

7

roads is when you accompanied Mr. Okelberry and

8

representatives of Wasatch County then?

9

A.

That is correct, sir.

10

Q.

Other than that you wouldn't have any first

11

hand knowledge whether these were roads, trails or what

12

they are?

13

A.

Other than maps, no, sir.

14

Q.

When you traveled on those roads with Mr.

15
16

Okelberry it was with permission, was it not?
A.

Yes, sir.

17

MR. PETERSEN: That's all.

18

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Sweat?

19

MR. SWEAT: Just a couple, your Honor.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION

20
21
22

BY MR. SWEAT:

Q.

Mr. Wood, in your opinion typically when a

23

map shows a road and place, does it signify any meaning?

24

MR. PETERSEN: I object, your Honor, I think

25

that this goes beyond his expertise. All he is is a
22

1

mapper. He's not up there to

-

-

2

THE COURT: He has a degree in geography.

3

THE WITNESS: Would you repeat the question,

4

please?

5
6
7

Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) Typically when a road is

shown on a map does it have any significance?

8

A.

9

property.

10

Q.

What do you mean by that?

11

A.

Well, it means that someone has tried a road

Well, it certainly shows access to the

12

and people are using that for access. Unfortunately

13

those maps -- When they make the maps they don't go out

14

and research every road to see exactly who is using those

15

roads for access.

16

Q.

Directing your attention to what has been

17

admitted as Exhibit No. 1. Have you seen those aerial

18

photographs before?

19

A.

Yes, sir.

20

Q.

Have you looked at these photographs here?

21

A.

Yes, sir.

22

Q.

And have you looked at them -- Are you able

23
24
25

to see the roads in place on these photographs?
A.

Sitting right here I would have to look

through them and such, but we have in the office and
23

1

such, gone through and been able to identify them, yes,

2

sir.

3

Q.

Specifically Ms. Palmier testified that these

4

aerial photographs were of 1962. Is that your

5

understanding also?

6

A.

This is my understanding.

7

Q.

Can you take a moment and look at them?

8

A.

Sure.

9

Q.

Now, you deal with photographs of this sort

10

in making maps all the time; is that a true statement?

11
12
13
14

A.

We deal with aerial photography quite a lot,

Q.

If you look at there on those can you see

sir.

what looks to be roads in the place at that time?

15

A.

Yes, sir.

16

Q.

Did you look long enough to see if all the

17
18

roads are shown on these aerial photographs?
A.

I followed Ridge Line, Thorton, Maple, and

19

the beginning of Parker and Circle Springs. So I believe

20

they're all representatives.

21

MR. SWEAT: No further questions, your Honor.

22

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Petersen?

23

RECROSS-EXAMINATION

24

BY MR. PETERSEN:

25

Q.

Well, Maple Canyon, Mr. Wood -- Maple
24

Canyon shows as a trail, does it not?
A.

On the photograph?

Q.

Right. Or on your maps?

A.

On some of the maps, yes, sir.

Q.

Isn't that true that some of the roads that

you call roads are designated as actually trails?
A.

On some of the maps (INAUDIBLE) yes, sir.

Q.

So when you show it as a road and the map

shows it as a trail, do you think there's a conflict
there in anyway?
A.

Based upon our information to date it's a

road, but what it was historically as for those maps I
cannot speak. It was the same as a trail.
Q.

You said that typically if it's a road it

shows access?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Is that correct?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Isn't it true that you went up there you went

through gates?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And isn't it true that the county has never

made any improvements on those so-called roads?
A.

I wouldn't know that, sir.

Q.

You've had dealing with the county
25

1

commissioner in regards to this matter, have you not?

2

A.

Yes, sir, some people.

3

Q.

And you've never been informed by the county

4

commissioner or anyone from the county that they, at any

5

time, have ever made any improvements up there?

6

A.

No, I have not been told that.

7

MR. PETERSEN: That's all.

8

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Sweat?

9

MR. SWEAT: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: You may step down. Thank you.

10
11

Next witness.
MR. SWEAT: The Plaintiff would call Dee

12
13

Sabey, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Sabey, if you'd come

14
15

forward and have a seat (INAUDIBLE). Go ahead.

16

MR. SWEAT: Thank you, your Honor.

17

DIRECT EXAMINATION

18
19
20

BY MR. SWEAT:

Q.

Mr. Sabey, would you please state your full

name and address for the record?

21

A.

Deon Sabey.

22

Q

And your address?

23

A.

Wallsberg.

24

Q

What is your birthday?

25

A.

.

.

May the 6th in '36.
26

Q.

How long have you resided in Wasatch County?

A.

All my life.

Q.

How long have you resided in Wallsberg?

A.

All my life.

Q.

Are you familiar with the area east and a

little bit north of Wallsberg?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Could you tell us why you're familiar with

that area?
A.

Well, when I was a kid, 13, 14 years old, I

was up there with June Tough. He bought that ground
about year and I worked for him for approximately seven
years, I think.
Q.

And have you remained familiar with that area

throughout your life?
A.

Right.

Q.

Do you own or have you ever owned any

property up in that area?
A.

Not right at that area. I own a little

property down off of the, towards Wallsberg from there.
Q.

I'm looking at what has been designated as

Exhibit No. 2. Do you recognize that?
MR. SWEAT: May I have an Exhibit No?
THE COURT: You may.

Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) Do you recognize the area

27

1

depicted in that map?

2

A.

Oh, yeah.

3

Q.

Is the property that you own on that area?

4

A.

Well, yeah, it's down off this -- It's

5

along that fishing game road down, back the hill is what

6

we call it over there. It's east of Wallsberg.

7

Q. Can you see the maps that have been

8

designated on that, or the roads that have been

9

designated, or designated as roads on that map?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

In highlighted color?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Do any of those roads access your property?

14

Do you have to go on any of those roads to get to your

15

property?

16

A.

Yes, the one that comes down off of -- I

17

can't see too good. I left my glasses out in the truck.

18

But it's the one from down off the fishing game, down

19

into Wallsberg. I got the

20

Q.

(INAUDIBLE)?

21

A.

Well, it's right down in here some where. I

22

guess this is the town of Wallsberg here.

23

Q.

The town of Wallsberg is here.

24

A.

Oh, in here?

25

MR. PETERSEN: May the record show that the

28

witness incorrectly identified the town of Wallsberg.
THE COURT: It makes no (INAUDIBLE). And it

also should reflect that he left his glasses.
THE WITNESS: I can't see.
MR. SWEAT: Do you wear glasses?
THE WITNESS: Yes, I do. And I'm sorry, I

just ran
THE COURT: Would it be helpful if you went

out and got them in your truck?
THE WITNESS: Pardon?
THE COURT: Would it be helpful if you went

out and got them in your truck?
THE WITNESS: I don't have them in my truck.

They're left at home.
Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) See what we've designated as

Wallsberg on the map, Mr. Sabey, right here?
A.

Oh, yes. Is this the road from down off the

fish and game?
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, I object. The

witness is asking the questions.
THE COURT: Why don't you orient him. Orient

him on the map and then ask your questions, Mr. Sweat.
Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) Here's Wallsberg.

A.

Okay. It's right over back there, that

little piece there. I know where it is.
29

Q.

Do you see the
MR. PETERSEN: They're leading and suggestive

questions. I think we need to have a certain amount of
leeway here, but coaching him in this manner
THE COURT: He hasn't coached him yet. Go

ahead, Mr. Sweat.
Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) Mr. Sabey, do you see this

road that's highlighted here?
A.

Right.

Q.

Do you see this road highlighted here?

A.

Right.

Q.

Do you see this road highlighted here?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you see this road highlighted here?

A.

Right.

Q.

Do you see this road highlighted here?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you have to use any of those roads to get

to your property?
A.

No, no.

Q.

Because you left your glasses at home I won't

ask you to refer to the map any more. Mr. Sabey, are you
aware of property that's owned by Mr. Okelberry?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And are you aware of roads that cross that
30

1

property?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

Are you aware of property that's owned by

4

West Daniels Land Association?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

And are you aware of roads that cross that

7

property?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

Have you ever used any of those roads?

10

A.

Yes, I've used them all.

11

Q.

Mr. Sabey, do you have a general idea about

12

when the Okelberry family first purchased property in

13

this area?

14

A.

I believe it was '57, I think, '58.

15

Q.

And you've indicated that you're aware of who

16

owned that property prior to the Okelberry family?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

Who was that?

19

A.

June Tough owned prior to Okelberrys.

20

Q.

Do you know how long June Tough owned the

21

property?

22

A.

I think he owned it for seven years.

23

Q.

Are you aware of a road called the Circle

24
25

Springs Road?
A.

Yes.
31

Q.

Have you ever used the Circle Springs Road?

A.

Lots of times.

Q.

When do you recall first using this Road?

A.

I was just a small kid. We was trailing

sheep up through there. My father use to work for
(INAUDIBLE). I' went through there with him. That was
in the 40's when we was trailing sheep up there there.
Q.

And that was along the Circle Spring Road?

A.

Right.

Q

And where does that the Circle Spring Road

.

travel to and from?
A.

It goes from the Big Glade to Circle, down

through Bear Wall and into Circle.
Q.

And what portions of that road have you used?

A.

All of it.

Q.

When did you last use the road?

A.

Oh, it's -- I can't remember the year. I

heard that Ray and those guys had locked the gates. So I
never went back inside the, even go back down in there.
Q.

So you don't remember the year. Do you

remember the decade?
A.

Well, it was in the 80's, I'm sure, right in

there. The middle 80's, some where along that.
Q.

During when you first used the road in the

1940's when you last use the road in the 1980's, about
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1

how often would you use that road an a yearly basis

2

thing?

3

A.

Oh, when I was up there working I was on it

4

practically every day, but after that I'd take my family

5

down there to Circle two or three times a summer and we'd

6

stay down there in a tent.

7
8
9

Q.

And about what years would you take your

family down?
A.

Oh, it was in the 60's probably.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, I'm going to

10
11

object. We don't have anything. We're talking in such

12

general terms from the 1940's to the 1980's. Unless we

13

can be more specific, your Honor, I'd move to strike the

14

testimony.
THE COURT: Well, he's now testified that he

15
16

used it for family camping in the 1960's is I believe

17

what he said right now. Go ahead, Mr. Sweat.
MR. SWEAT: Thank you, your Honor.

18
19

Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) Now, you've indicated you

20

used this road for camping and that you've used it while

21

working for people up in that area. Did you ever use it

22

for anything else?

23
24
25

A.

Well, we used it to go down and hunt deer

practically every fall.
Q.

When you first used this road did ever see
33

any no trespassing signs or any markers indicating no
trespassing?
A.

I've never seen a no trespassing sign on it.

Q.

When you first use this road was there gates

across the road?
A.

No.

Q.

Was there fences up when you first used the

A.

Not at first, no.

Q.

Do you recall when the fences were placed up?

A.

I can't -- I can't remember the year they

road?

were put up, no.
Q.

When you used this road did you ever see

others use the road?
A.

Lots of people.

Q.

Were they typically the Toughs or the

Okelberrys that owned the land?
A.

No.

Q.

Do you know who they were?

A.

A lot of them was strangers and some that had

livestock down in that country.
Q.

Do you know why they were using the road?

A.

Well, that's the only road into Circle

Springs.
Q.

Do you recall when -- You don't recall
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when -- Do you recall when a gate was put up in front
of this road?
A.

I can't remember the year. I can remember

when the fence was built, but I can't remember the year
it was built.
Q.

Do you remember the decade it was built?

A.

I can't.

Q.

When the fence was first put up was there a

gate across this road at that time?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Was the gate locked?

A.

No.

Q.

When did you first see a locked gate on the

A.

I never did see the locked gate on the road.

road?

They told me these guys had locked it and I never did go
back in there any more.
Q.

During the time that you used the road from

when you first started till you quit using the road, were
you ever asked by anyone not to use the road?
A.

Never.

Q.

Were you ever kicked off the road?

A.

No, never.

Q.

During that same time did you ever see anyone

else be stopped from using the road?
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1

A.

No, I never did.

2

Q.

Did you ever see anyone kicked off from using

3

the road?

4

A.

No.

5

Q.

Are you aware of a road called Ridge Line

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

And can you tell us about where Ridge Line

6

9
10

Road?

Road runs?
A.

Well, it runs all the way down, down the

11

ridge, down through White Pole and down into Horse Gravel

12

and down into Big Hallow.

13

Q.

Where does it start?

14

A.

Big Glade.

15

Q.

And have you ever used the Ridge Line Road?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

When did you first use the Ridge Line

18
19

Or

what portions of the Ridge Line Road have you used?
A.

Well, from the Big Glade to White Pole. And

20

then after they built the fish and game fence they built

21

a road that continued on down into Wallsberg and down off

22

the top, but I can't remember what year that they built

23

the fish and game fence. But the Ridge Line Road did

24

just go to the other side of White Pole, up onto that

25

little point, and then it quit. It was always a good
36

trail beyond there, but it was never a road.
Q.

What did people -- Did any people use the

A.

Oh, yeah, we use to go down there hunting

trail?

deer in there all the time.
Q.

How did you use the trail?

A.

On horse back.

Q.

Did you ever see other people using the

A.

Oh, yeah, lots of people.

Q.

Going back to Ridge Line Road, you've

trail?

indicated that you don't -- Was the road built in
stages, is that what you're telling us?
A.

Well, now from the Glade to White Pole,

there's been a road there as long as I can remember. And
then from White Pole to Parker, that's down at Robinson
Reservoir, down the head of Parker. That road was built
1950. I was there when that road was built.
Q.

Is that's what's known as the Parker Canyon

A.

Yes.

Q.

So the Ridge Line Road was built from the Big

Road?

Glade at least to the Parker Canyon, we'll designate as
the turnoff, at least in the 1950's; is that correct?
A.

It was before the 50's because I was there in
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the 50's and there was a road there then.
Q.

When you used the Ridge Line Road, typically

what did you use it for?
A.

Well, we use to go down there hunt deer every

fall. And then a lot of times in the summer we'd go down
there and camp for the weekend down on White Pole.
Q.

Do you have to use Ridge Line Road to access

Parker Canyon?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And do you have to use Ridge Line Road to

access Thorton Hallow?
A.

Yes.

Q.

During the time that you used this road about

how often would you use the road?
A.

Oh, several times in the summer -- In the

summer we'd go done there. Specially in the fall. When
it was getting time to hunt deer and that we'd be down
there several times in the fall.
Q.

Did you use the road for anything other than

to hunt deer?
A.

Well, we use to come down there in the summer

sometimes and camp for a couple days to get away from
people and that.
Q.

Now, during the time that you used the road

did you ever see other people use the road?
38

A.

Oh, yeah, lots of them.

Q.

Do you recall what they were using the road

A.

Well, they was down in there hunting and

for?

looking around. I don't know. There was several people
in there.
Q.

When you first used this road did you see any

no trespassing signs on the road?
A.

Never.

Q.

Did you see any sort of marking indicating

that there was a no trespassing intent?
A.

Nope, never.

Q.

When you first used this road was there any

gates across the road?
A.

There was always gates across the roads.

Q.

Where were the gates at?

A.

Well, there was one coming off down into

Thorton Hallow on the forest line, where you go off the
forest line into Okelberrys, there was a gate there. And
then there was -- Where you go into the West Daniels,
there's two over at the head of Maple Creek. And then
when you go into the West Daniels there's one there.
Q.

What kind of gates are they?

A.

Just wire gates.

Q.

During the time you used the road did you
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1

ever see any no trespassing signs or markers at any of

2

those gates?

3

A.

No.

4

Q.

During the time you used the road did you

5

ever see any locks on the gates?

6

A.

Never.

7

Q.

Were the gates always closed?

8

A.

Well, yeah, they just keep them closed, try

9

to keep the sheep and cattle separated.

10

Q.

Are there any cattle guards across this road?

11

A.

There's one where you come off the forest

12

into Okelberry, I believe, years ago, but it was so full

13

of mud you couldn't hardly tell it.

14
15

Q.

I don't remember if I asked you, were the

gates ever locked across the Ridge Line Road?

16

A.

I never did see them locked, no.

17

Q.

Did you ever see anyone not use the road

18

because the gate was there?

19

A.

No, I never did.

20

Q.

What would people typically do when they used

21

the road?

22

A.

23
24
25

Well, they'd come down there to go, some of

them go camping and hunting down in there.
Q.

During the time that you used the road did

anyone ever ask you to stay off the road?
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1

A.

No, never.

2

Q.

Did anyone ever kick you off the road?

3

A.

No.

4

Q.

Did you ever observe anyone that you saw

5

using the road be stopped or

6

A.

I never did, no.

7

Q.

Were you aware of a road called Thorton

8

Hallow Road?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

I think you already testified that it

11

branches off of Ridge Line Road; is that correct?

12

A.

Right.

13

Q.

Have you ever used Thorton Hallow Road?

14

A.

Yes, lots of times.

15

Q.

And what did you use Thorton Hallow Road for?

16

A.

Well, we use to go down
MR. PETERSEN: I think this has been asked

17
18

and answered, hasn't it?

19
20

THE COURT: No, this is a -- This is a

different one.

21

MR. PETERSEN: I thought he testified he used

22

it several times in the summer and several times in the

23

fall.

24
25

THE COURT: That's Ridge Line.
Q

(BY MR. SWEAT) What did you use Thorton

41

1

Hallow Road for?

2

A.

We use to go down Thorton Hallow in the

3

summer several times, not several, but we use to go down

4

there off and on to look for deer up on that big open

5

side hills and use to go up there and ride around.

6
7

What portions of Thorton Hallow Road have you

A.

Well, all the way through, just as far as it

used?

8
9

Q.

goes, down to the pond.

10

Q.

Do you recall when you first used this road?

11

A.

When I first used it was in the 50's when I

12

was working for June Tough.

13
14

Q.

And do you recall when you last used the

A.

Oh, it's been several years. Like the other

road?

15
16

one, they started locking the gates and had that happened

17

up there, I've never went back.

18

Q.

Do you think you used the road in the 60's?

19

A.

Oh, yeah, it was in the 60's, but it was

20

nearly 80's when we quit using it.

21
22

Q.

And when you were using Thorton Hallow Road

did you ever observe others using that road?

23

A.

Oh, yeah.

24

Q.

How often would you see others using the

25

road?
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1

A.

Oh, every time you was up there when you

-

-

2

There was lots of people use to go down there to look for

3

elk and deer and that on that big open side hill.

4
5

Q.

When you say go down there in the big open

side hill, is that on Okelberry's property?

6

A.

No, that's on the forest.

7

Q.

But to access it you have to use the Thorton

8

Hallow Road?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Is that what you're saying? When you first

11

started using this road did you see any no trespassing

12

signs on the road?

13

A.

Never.

14

Q.

When you first used this road were there

15

gates across the road?
MR. PETERSEN: Now, is this the gate from

16
17

where to where?

18
19
20
21
22
23

MR. SWEAT: We'll get into it. If there was

a gate I'll ask him where it was?
Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) Were there any gates on

Thorton Hallow Road?
A.

The only gate there was when I was up there

is where you go off Okelberry's onto the forest.

24

Q.

Do you ever recall that gate being locked?

25

A.

No, never.
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Q.

During the time that you used Thorton Hallow

Road did you ever kicked off the road by anyone?
A.

No.

Q.

Were you ever asked not to use the road?

A.

No.

Q.

During the time that you used the road did

you ever see or hear of anyone else being stopped from
using the road?
A.

Never.

Q.

Are you aware of a road called Parker Canyon?

A.

Yes.

Q.

I believe you already testified that Parker

Canyon was built in the 1950's?
A.

Right.

Q.

Do you know who built it?

A.

Rothusburger built the road.
MR. PETERSEN: Who?
THE WITNESS: Rothusburger.
MR. PETERSEN: Rothusburger?
THE WITNESS: Right.

Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) Who was Rothusburger?

A.

He owned a, a little construction outfit.

But Clark Robinson was the -- The Forest Service put
the road in. Clark use to own the piece of ground down
on Boomer.
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1
2

Q.

Regarding Parker Canyon Road, what portions

of the road have you used?

3

A.

All the way along.

4

Q.

And the county has designated for purposes of

5

this matter that Parker Canyon Road branches off of Ridge

6

Line Road?

7

A.

Right.

8

Q.

Where does it end up?

9

A.

Down onto Parker, down the head Parker on

11

Q.

And is that Okelberry land?

12

A.

No, that's West Daniels.

13

Q.

Does it go through -- So Parker's not

10

14

Boomer.

located on Okelberry land at all; is that correct?

15

A.

No.

16

Q.

Where does Parker Canyon Road end?

17

A.

It is -- It ends at the head of Parker.

18

Q.

And is that West Daniels' land?

19

A.

Yes, that and the Forest Service.

20

Q.

Does it go through to the Forest Service?

21

A.

Pardon?

22

Q.

Does Parker Canyon Road go through into the

23

Forest Service?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

How far through does it go?
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A.

Well, the forest line is right, right head

Q.

Do you recall when you first used Parker

Parker.

Canyon Road?
A.

It was in the early 50's when they first

built the road. We went down and help Clark pull his
camp down there on Boomer.
Q.

What else -- When did you last use the

A.

Well, that probably been a couple years ago.

road?

I road a horse down there.
Q.

During your time when you first and last used

the road, did you use the road how often?
A.

Oh, we use to use it several times a year.

Q.

And what did you use it for?

A.

Well, we use to use it for hunting, mostly.

Q.

Now, you've indicated a couple of times that,

for instance, your first use of Parker Canyon was to help
someone pull a sheep camp down; is that right?
A.

That was after the road was built, yes.

Q.

Would you classify or consider that most of

your use was in helping landowners or for other purposes?
A.

Well, I use to help, help people that owned

the land and I was also down there hunting deer. We use
to go down there hunting deer every fall. We use to camp
46

1

there on White Pole and then we'd take that road on down

2

to Boomer.

3
4

Q.

When you first used this road did you ever

see any no trespassing signs?

5

A.

Never.

6

Q.

Were you ever asked to leave the road or not

7

use the road?

8

A.

No.

9

Q.

And was there any gates across this road when

10

you first used it?
A.

11

MR. PETERSEN: At what point are we talking

12
13

No.

about here?

14

THE COURT: Ever he said.

15

MR. PETERSEN: Well, on Parker Canyon, but

16

are we talking about on the Forest Service end or are we

17

talking up on the other end? What are we talking about?
MR. SWEAT: I asked him for any gates.

18

Q.

19
20

(BY MR. SWEAT) Is there any gates at all on

Parker Canyon?

21

A.

Well, yes, there's an a gate where you go off

22

of the Cattle Association onto Parker, down Parker

23

Canyon.

24

Q.

Do you recall when that gate was put up?

25

A.

I can't.
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Q.

Was it there when the road was first built?

A.

No.

Q.

Have you ever seen that gate locked?

A.

No.

Q.

Have you ever been denied access because of

that gate?
A.

No.

Q.

During the time that you used this road did

you ever see other people use the road?
A.

Oh, yeah.
MR. PETERSEN: Well, your Honor, I'm going to

object to that question, unless he can be more specific.
Just to say generally -- Give us a day, time, place, so
fourth.
THE COURT: He said first he used -- This

is -- We're talking about Parker Canyon. He said he
first used it in the early 1950's when it was first
built. And he said he's never been prohibited from using
it. And he said last time he used it was a couple years
ago when he rode a horse down it.
MR. PETERSEN: Right, but he's also

testifying about other people. And so that's what I
object to.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I think, the

question was specifically asked to him?
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1
2

Q.

MR. SWEAT: To him. It was if he's ever seen

any other people use Parker Canyon Road?

3

THE WITNESS: Yes, lots of people.

4

MR. PETERSEN: That I want -- I want to be

5

specific.

6

THE COURT: Well, yes. Let's ask -- That

7

is too general of a question. Ask him when he seen other

8

people, specifically when he seen other people use it.

9
10

Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) When the road was first built

did you ever see anyone use that road in the 50's?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

What did you see them using the road for?

13

A.

Well, they use to use it to go down there and

14

hunt deer.

15

Q.

16

the road?

17

A.

During the 60's did you ever see anyone use

In the fall, yes. There's a lot of people

18

-- That was about the only time I was up there in the

19

60's is when we was hunting deer.

20
21

Q.

Did you ever see or hear of anyone during the

50's or 60's be prohibited from using that road?

22

A.

No.

23

Q.

Have you heard of a road called Maple Canyon

A.

Yes.

24
25

Road?
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Q.

Do you know it by any different names?

A.

No, just Maple Creek Road.

Q.

Maple Creek Road?

A.

Well, Maple Canyon, Maple Creek.

Q.

Are both names used?

A.

Yes, both of them.

Q.

Where does that road go?

A.

Well, it takes off from the Ridge Line Road

up to the head of Maple Creek and goes to Wallsberg,
comes out down to John Youngs.
Q.

Does it connect to a road as John Youngs?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What road does it connect to?

A.

The county road.

Q.

Have you ever used Maple Canyon Road?

A.

Yes.

Q.

When did you first use Maple Canyon Road?

A.

Well, when we was kids -- See, that was the

bottom of the sheep trail. They use to go up Maple Creek
and then up Circle Hallow, they called it, and come out.
Q.

When you say, "they", who are you referring

A.

Well, there was several herds of sheep. You

to?

use to go up there and they use to trail sheep and cattle
up there. •oundies, Nickels, Davis, Robinsons.
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1
2

Q.

Now, would the sheep trail ride up Maple

Canyon Road?

3

A.

No, no, they wouldn't go up Maple Canyon very

4

far. They'd go up there at about where the, where they

5

camp now and go up that canyon.

6

Q.

What's that canyon called?

7

A.

Circle Canyon.

8

Q.

So did any part, any of the sheep people that

9

went up through there, did they use Maple Canyon Road for

10

anything?

11

A.

12

had teams.
MR. PETERSEN: Objection, your Honor. If

13
19

he's got first hand knowledge, not what other people did.
THE COURT: Let me hear what you observed.

15
16
17

Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) What did you observe when you

went with the sheep up there?
MR. PETERSEN: Can we have a date and time on

18
19

Yeah, they used both camps up there when they

this?

20

THE COURT: It's in the 50's, I believe.

21

THE WITNESS: No, 40's.

22

THE COURT: 40's. Okay.

23

THE WITNESS: They stopped trailing --

24

THE COURT: Lay some foundation as to when he

25

first went up with them.
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(BY MR. SWEAT) When did you first go up with

1

Q.

2

the sheep herd?

3

A.

4

trailing up there after that for not too long.

5
6

Q.

A.

Well, they use to pull their camps up and

come back down into Circle.
MR. PETERSEN: Objection, he's not answering

9
10

And when you used it did you see any part of

those sheep herds or use Maple Canyon Road?

7
8

It would been mid 40's, cause they stop

the question, your Honor.

11

Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) Did you see anyone use that?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

You indicated they use to pull their camps,

14

what do you mean by that?
A.

15

Well, they'd pull them with a team at that

16

time. And they'd pull the camps up around and meet the

17

back in, on Circle.

18

Q.

Why didn't they follow the sheep?

19

A.

There was no road up there. All it is is

20

trail, up Circle Canyon.
MR. PETERSEN: Are we talking Circle Canyon

21
22

or are we talking Maple Canyon?

23

THE COURT: I think -- Well, why don't you

24

-- He said he went up a portion of Maple Canyon over to

25

Circle.
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THE WITNESS: Right.

1

Q.

2
3

Maple Canyon then go to Circle?
A.

4
5

8
9
10

11
12

Yes, they use bed them right there at John

Young's, right there on Maple Creek.

6
7

(BY MR. SWEAT) Did the sheep start out in

Q.

And did the camp go up the same route as the

A.

No, they use to go up Maple Creek, up where

sheep?

the road goes now and back into Circle.
Q.

That was the way they followed the sheep was

to go around?
A.

Right, that -MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, what "they" is

13
14

what he saw and observed at a certain point in time. Not

15

what -THE COURT: Yeah, it's not too helpful to the

16
17

court, Mr. Sweat.
MR. SWEAT: I apologize, your Honor.

18
19

Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) When you observed the sheep

20

trailing up through there you observed the camps go up

21

Maple Canyon Road; is that correct?

22

A.

Right.

23

Q.

Is that reputation the community of regarding

24
25

the use of that road and that trail by sheep herds?
A.

Well, sheep herds
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MR. PETERSEN: I missed that. What was the

1
2

question again?
MR. SWEAT: Is that a reputation in the

3
4

community regarding the use of both that trail and road

5

to trail sheep?

6

MR. PETERSEN: That I object to, your Honor.

7

THE COURT: Well, we're going -- You can

8

only rely upon what he, what he's observed and what his

9

experiences were, not the reputation of what the

10

community was.
MR. PETERSEN: Okay.

11
12
13
14

Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) When did you last use this

A.

Oh, gosh, I don't know. Maybe -- Maybe ten

road?

15

years ago. Now, I didn't go clean through it ten years

16

ago, I just went up to Okelberry's corral. I went up and

17

helped them up there with the sheep.

18
19

Q.

When you used it -- Have you ever used it

that you went the entire length of the road?

20

A.

Oh, yeah, lots of times.

21

Q

When would be the first time that you used it

22

to go the entire length of the road?

23

A.

It would be the early 50's.

24

Q.

When was the last time you think you used it

25

to go the entire length of the road?
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A.

Oh, it'd be the -- It'd be in 80's.

Q.

During between the 50's and the 80's

approximately how often would you use the road in a given
year?
A.

Well, I've -- Of course, I use to help --

We've pulled camps up there for Lee, that's Ray's
brother. I helped him pull the camps up. Then we'd go
up to the forest, up where the spring was, we'd go up
there in the summer and camp once in a while.
Q.

Did you ever use this road when it wasn't on

behalf of Lee or one of the landowners?
A.

Oh, yeah, lots of times.

Q.

For what purpose?

A.

Well, we'd go up there camping and go up

there in the summer and stay a couple days up to the
spring, recreation.
Q.

Do you think there were any year from when

you first started to when you last used the road to go
all the way through, that you didn't use the road?
A.

Pardon? I didn't hear that.

Q.

Are there any years that you didn't use Maple

Canyon Road?
A.

Oh, probably not.

Q.

During the time that you used the road did

you ever see a no trespassing sign on the road?
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A.

No.

Q.

Did you ever see a gate across the road?

A.

Yes, the -- Oh, later years they put a

fence across the bottom of it.
Q.

Do you recall when that was?

A.

I can't remember, no.

Q.

When they put a fence across you're

indicating they put a gate up; is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you ever recall that gate being locked?

A.

Yes, I've seen that gate locked.

Q.

When was that gate locked?

A.

I really don't know. It was probably the

late 80's or right in there sometime.
Q.

During the time that you used the road were

you ever asked by anyone not to use the road?
A.

No.

Q.

Did you ever have to break a lock off or

anything to use the road?
A.

No.

Q.

During the time you used the road did you see

others using the road?
A.

Oh, yeah.

Q.

Would they have been the Okelberrys?

A.

No, they was just people up there.
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Q.

During the time that you used the road were

you ever asked not to use the road or kicked off the
road?
A.

No.

Q.

Did you ever see anyone else be asked not to

use the road or get kicked off the road?
A.

No.

Q.

Did you ever ask -- We've talked about

several roads. And we've just been talking about Maple
Canyon, but regarding all the roads we've talked about
did you ever ask anyone permission to use these roads?
A.

No, never.

Q.

You indicated that before the Okelberry

family purchased the property up there that it was owned
by June Tough?
A.

Right.

Q.

To your knowledge did June Tough ever post no

trespassing signs?
A.

Never.

Q.

To your knowledge did June Tough ever lock

any gates?
A.

Never.

Q.

To your knowledge did June Tough ever kick

anyone off the property?
A.

Never.
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1

Q.

Did he ever kick anyone off the roads?

2

A.

No.

3

Q.

Were you aware, generally, when the

4
5

Okelberrys purchased the property?
A.

MR. PETERSEN: He's already been asked and

6
7

answered that.
THE COURT: Yeah, he's already answered that

8
9
10

Yes.

(INAUDIBLE).
Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) When they first purchased the

11

property did you see any changes in signage or fencing or

12

gate use?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

Do you have an opinion regarding why the

15

Okelberrys started keeping people off the roads.
MR. PETERSEN: Objection, it's immaterial and

16
17

irrelevant.

18

THE COURT: How's it relevant?

19

MR. SWEAT: I think it's going to just show

20

that -- Your Honor, it's our contention that there's a

21

time period that the Okelberrys did, in fact, start

22

locking gates, putting up signs saying no trespassing.

23

And I think it's relevant because it shows the reason

24

why, when they started it's tied to an event that

25

happened.
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THE COURT: Well, why they did it is not

1
2

really relevant to the determination the Court has to

3

make, and that is whether there was sufficient use to

4

establish public use.
MR. SWEAT: I do think it helps tie down when

5
6

they started doing it.

7

THE COURT: Well, if it --

8

MR. PETERSEN: You'd almost have to be a mind

9

reader to find out why.
THE COURT: Well, you can ask him when it

10
11

was, if he knows when it was that they started to

12

restrict the use. I think he's testified that was in the

13

late 80's.

14

MR. SWEAT: I think he has, yes.

15

MR. PETERSEN: I believe it was the mid 80's,

16

your Honor.

17

THE COURT: Time in the 80's.

18

MR. PETERSEN: Sometime in the 80's.

19

Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) Mr. Sabey, to your knowledge

20

has West Daniels Land Association ever tried to keep

21

people from using any of the roads across their property?

22
23
24
25

A.

Not that I'm aware of.
MR. SWEAT: No further questions at this

time, your Honor.
THE COURT: Any cross, Mr. Petersen?
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1

MR. PETERSEN: Thank you, your Honor.

2

CROSS-EXAMINATION

3

BY MR. PETERSEN:

4

Q.

Mr. Saybe, you were born in 1936?

5

A.

Right.

6

Q.

What month in 1936?

7

A.

May the 6th.

8

Q.

So that would make you 58?

9

A.

Right, 68.

10

Q.

68, excuse me. And you said you started

11
12

working up there in the mid 40's?
A.

No, I started working for June Tough in the

13

first, 50's. I use to trail sheep up there with my

14

father when they took them up.

15
16

Q.

When did you actually become employed where

you were up there working, is that the 50's?

17

A.

In 1950.

18

Q.

Okay. So from 1936 to 1950 you were not up

19

there working or doing anything, you were just in the

20

general area?

21

A.

Well, before June Tough bought the property

22

my uncle owned it. And we use to go up there with the

23

kids and play with his kids. Andersons owned it before

24

June Tough got it.

25

Q.

Okay. So your knowledge of this area would
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be about in 1950 forward, would it not?
A.

'54?

Q.

From 1950 forward.

A.

Right.

Q.

Now, how many months a year are these roads

open up there from whether?
A.

Oh, probably from the 1st of June until the

1st of November.
Q.

Okay. So June 1 to November 1, that's about

the only time that the roads are open, would that be
true?
A.

Well, it all depends on the weather.

Q.

Well, sure. But as a general rule, June 1st

to November 1st. Other than that there's going to be too
much snow and they're not going to be passable?
A.

Well, now days they go up there with

snowmobiles and down
Q.

Oh, okay. But I'm just asking you.

A.

Oh, yeah, right.

Q.

Okay. So we're talking about five months of

the year that you can go up there?
A.

Well, it would be more than that. It would

be June, July, August, September, October, November,
probably.
Q.

So your knowledge would be five months of the
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year beginning at about 1950 then; correct?
A.

Right.
MR. SWEAT: I want to object. I think he

said six months if you add those up.
THE COURT: Well, he said -- He's

indicating that he thinks that you can access some of the
roads through November is what he's saying.
Q.

(BY MR. PETERSEN) As a general rule though,

if there's too much snow after say mid November to get up
there, isn't it, isn't that true?
A.

Well, yeah.

Q.

Now, Mr. Saybe, you said that there were

locks, gates across these roads; would that be true?
A.

Locks?

Q.

Gates?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay. So when you first started going up

there in the 19, say 1950, this property in yellow is the
Okelberry property?
A.

Right.

Q.

And it crosses from Forest Service property

onto what is called this Ridge Line Road. There was a
gate there, was there not?
A.

Right.

Q.

And as it crosses over into Forest Service
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1

property onto Okelberry property, this ones called Circle

2

Springs, there was a gate there?

3

A.

Not when I was first up there, no.

4

Q.

No gate on that one?

5

A.

No.

6

Q.

Okay. Where was -- There was a gate here

7

going onto the Okelberry property, then you said there

8

were other gates too. This was a gate from leaving the

9

Okelberry property onto the West Daniels property?

10

A.

Right.

11

Q.

Was there a gate as it goes from West Daniels

12

back onto Okelberry property?

13

A.

Right.

14

Q.

And then as it leads to the Okelberry

15

property back on West Daniels, was there a gate there?

16

A.

Right.

17

Q.

And was there a gate as it goes from the West

18

Daniels back on the Okelberry property?

19

A.

No.

20

Q.

There wasn't a gate there? I'm looking at

21

the top of what is Exhibit 2, you say there was not a

22

gate there?

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

As it leaves the Okelberry property and goes

25

back down onto the West Daniels property, was there a
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gate at the very top?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Isn't it true, Mr. Sabey, that there were

pretty much gates every where controlling access to those
roads?
A.

Yes, between sheep and cattle there were,

Q.

They were gates and they were put up, weren't

yes.

they? And when you would go through them you'd have to
take them down, drive through and put them backup again,
would you not?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And you did that every time?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, when you started going up there you were

working for property owners, were you not?
A.

At first, yes.

Q.

And so when you went up you went with

permission?
A.

Well, when I was up there I was employed

there, yes.
Q.

Sure so when you say that you're hauling a

sheep camp or something like that up there, you're doing
it on behalf of the property owner?
A.

In the early 50's, yes.
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Q.

And what time did you stop working for

property owners up there?
A.

I stopped working for June in '57 when they

sold it to Okelberry.
Q.

And you worked for Mr. Okelberry for a period

of time, did you not?
A.

I was never -- I helped Okelberry, but I

was never on the payroll.
Q.

When you say you helped you were up there

with permission then? You were doing something?
A. I was asked. I was never up on there. When
I helped Okelberrys and that I helped them in the trials
mostly.
Q

You helped move some sheep camps, did you

A.

I helped Lee, yes. I helped Lee pull a camp

not?

up there.
Q.

Okay. So you were there with permission,

were you not?
A.

That one day, yeah.

Q.

Now, in regards to these so-called roads,

this Circle Springs Road, and all these other roads, you
haven't really been up there in the last 20 years, have
you?
A.

Oh, I've been -- It's been since 20's.
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1

I've been up there since 20 years.

2

Q.

Well, you told us about an occasion where you

3

road your horse, I believe, in the Parker Canyon. That

4

was two years ago?
A.

5

I road my horse up Thorton Hallow, but I

6

never go up into Ray's and them. I just didn't want to

7

be, for the hassle and that. I road my horse up Thorton

8

and over into Parker, Cummings and back down.
Q.

9
10

years since you've been up there in a motorized vehicle?
A.

11
12

Isn't it true then it's been at least 20

Let's see, 20 -- Well, give or take a

little bit probably, yes.
Q.

13

Now, when you say you go up there to go

14

hunting and you come into this Parker Canyon Road, isn't

15

it true that there was a sign on the Forest Service

16

property that would say, "no more motorized vehicles"?
A.

17
18

bottom road.
Q.

19
20

23

Did you ever see a sign off the Thorton

Hallow Road that says, "no motorized vehicles"?

21
22

I've never witnessed no sign down on that

A.

Where in Thorton Hallow, at the top or the

Q.

As you begin -- As you enter into the

bottom.

24

Forest Service property, a sign that says, "no motorized

25

vehicles"?
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1

A.

I don't understand your question. Which -

2

Q.

Well, you said you've gone into Thorton

3

Hallow; is that correct?

4

A.

Yes, from the highway, Highway 40.

5

Q.

Oh, from Highway 40. You didn't come in off

6

Ridge Line Road then?

7

A.

Nope.

8

Q.

Have you ever come off Ridge Line Road into

9

Thorton Hallow?
A.

10

Year ago, yes.
MR. SWEAT: I think -- Is Mr. Sabey talking

11
12

about the last ride he took or is he talking about years

13

ago? I think we need to pin it down.
THE WITNESS: I don't know what he's talking

14
15

about.
THE COURT: Well, let's lay foundation for

16
17

your questions.

18

Q.

(BY MR. PETERSEN) In the last 20 years have

19

you taken a motorized vehicle off Ridge Line Road into

20

Thorton Hallow?

21

A.

No.

22

Q.

When you -- When was the last time you took

23

a motorized vehicle from Ridge Line Road into Thorton

24

Canyon?

25

A.

It would be middle 80's, right in there, '84,
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'85, something like that.
Q.

When you got to the Forest Service boundary

was there a sign that says, "no motorized vehicles"?
A.

No, I never seen one.

Q.

Likewise, down there on this Circle Springs,

is there a sign as you come off of that into the Forest
Service property that says, "no motorized vehicle"?
A.

I haven't been down there for a few years,

but I never seen no sign, no.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, if we could have a

few exhibits marked here.
THE COURT: You may.
Q.

(BY MR. PETERSEN) While they're marking

those exhibit -- Mr. Sabey, have you ever driven along
what is called Ridge Line Road coming off Main Canyon
Road?
A.

Right.

Q.

All the way over to the gun club?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You've driven that in a car, in a vehicle?

A.

Not in a vehicle. I have on four-wheeler.

Q.

Okay. You've never driven that in a vehicle,

but only in an ATV I call?
A.

Well, from Horse Gravel up from the Glade to

Wallsberg I've driven a car down off there, but clean up
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over and down into Daniels, no, I never have.
Q.

Okay. That is not a passable road with a

four, with anything less than an ATV or a horse, isn't
it?
A.
have never

I have seen trucks up on there, yes, but I
-

-

Q.

You've never driven it?

A.

No, I have in an AT, four-wheeler.

Q.

Isn't it a fact that when you get up into

this Okelberry property here, what you call White
Pole
A.

Yep.
it's awfully steep, is it not?

Q.
A.

Not too bad there.

Q.

That's not too -- Is it ever very steep up

in that area?
A.

In White Pole?

Q.

Yeah, as you go north out of White Pole?

A.

There's one little pitch before you leave

White Pole, for may be a hundred feet there it's kind of
steep and other than that it's not.
Q.

Would it be your testimony that a person

could drive a vehicle now from Main Canyon Road, all the
way up over Ridge Line Road, down to the gun club?
A.

I've

I haven't been on that bottom end.
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I've been down into Horse Gravel where the road goes down
off into Wallsberg.
Q.

But that's not a road that's a subject of

that litigation, is it?
A.

That's part of the Ridge Line Road I'd say.

Q.

Well, it cuts off Ridge Line and goes down to

Wallsberg, does it not?
A.

Yes.

Q.

That's not part of this litigation?

A.

Well, I don't know what you're

Q.

How many years has it been since you've been

on the north side of that Ridge Line Road?
A.

North side, from where?

Q.

You know where the gun club is?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You been up that road?

A.

Not in a vehicle, no.

Q.

It's blocked off, is it not?

A.

I don't know. I've never been up to the gun

club for several years.
Q.

So you wouldn't know if you could traverse

that or not. Are you aware of any gates that are over on
that side of the road?
A.

Yeah, there use to be a gate there at the gun

club, but I don't know whether it's locked or not.
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1
2

Q.

Would it surprise you to learn that as of

June 1st that gate was locked.

3

MR. SWEAT: Objection, relevance.

4

THE COURT: What does it matter? That's not

5

part of this litigation. It's off Okelberry's property.
MR. PETERSEN: It is off of Okelberry's

6
7

property, your Honor, but it goes to the credibility of

8

the witness. If the witness says that he can travel that

9

road, and the gates that are locked, and it's too steep,

10

you can't do it. It goes to his credibility.
THE COURT: Well, he's testified he's never

11
12

been on a vehicle, he's been on a four-wheeler, that's

13

his testimony.
MR. PETERSEN: I think his testimony was that

14
15

you could drive over it.
THE COURT: He said he seen -- He said he

16
17

seen other vehicles on it.
MR. SWEAT: I think his testimony was he

18
19

drove down and off, into Horse Gravel, which is off the

20

Okelberry's property, down another road in the fish and

21

game into Wallsberg.

22

THE COURT: How is that relevant?

23

MR. PETERSEN: Well, I think it goes to his

24
25

credibility, your Honor. In fact, it's quite -Q.

(BY MR. PETERSEN) Can you identify what's
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1

been marked as Exhibit No. 9, Defendant's Exhibit No. 9?

2
3

MR. SWEAT: Can I see the picture, your

Honor, before
THE COURT: Why don't you show it to Mr.

4
5

Sweat.
THE WITNESS: I don't know what the picture

6
7

is.
THE COURT: He doesn't know what it is.

8
9
10

Q.

(BY MR. PETERSEN) You couldn't identify what

Exhibit No. 9 is?

11

A.

I don't know where it's at, no.

12

Q.

You wouldn't know if that's part of the Ridge

13
14

Line Road or not?
MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, I'd like to make an
..■

15

objection. I think that we've made a record already that

16

Mr. Sabey did not bring his glasses today. And maybe we

17

could ask him how well he sees some of these exhibits.

18

MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, he's here as their

19

witness. And if he doesn't bring his glasses -- He's

20

got to be able to (INAUDIBLE). He says he can't identify

21

Exhibit No. 9.

22
23
24
25

THE COURT: Look at it again. See if you

know, Mr. Richins.

If you don't that's fine.

THE WITNESS: Well, I don't know whether

there's a special location of it is.
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Q.

(BY MR. PETERSEN) That's fine, Mr. Sabey.

Mr. Sabey, I want to show you what's been marked as
Exhibit No. 6 and then ask you
THE COURT: Show it to Mr. Sweat first.

Q.

(BY MR. PETERSEN) Mr. Sabey, can you

identify Exhibit No. 6? Excuse me, that's -- Pardon
me. Let me get this one (INAUDIBLE). That's Exhibit No.
6.
A.

That's up there by the Glade some where.

Q.

Do you know where?

A.

It looks like probably where you come off the

cattle country onto Okelberrys.
Q.

Does that look like the way it was in 1950

when you first went up there?
A.

You mean the fence?

Q.

Sure. And the gate?

A.

Well, there's some signs there now, but there

was no signs when I was up there.
Q.

Okay. But I'm asking you about the fence and

the gate. Is that about the way it looked in the 1950's.
A.

Well, it's hard to say. There was a gate

there then. So
Q.

Hard to say. But that does look like

generally the area as you come off the Forest Service,
the Glade onto the Okelberry property?
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1
2

A.

Well, yes, I'd say that's probably where it

Q.

Okay. I'm showing you what's been marked as

is.

3
4

Exhibit No. 7 and ask you if that looks like the gate

5

that comes off the Forest Service onto the private

6

property?

7

A.

Well, that's hard to say where the location

8

is. You can see a chain around there with a lock on it.

9

I've never seen the gate since they've been locked. I've

10

never been up there since they've been locked.
Q.

That's been at least 20 years then, has it

13

A.

Yeah, pretty close.

14

Q.

I'm showing you what's been marked as Exhibit

11
12

15

not?

No. 8 and ask you if you can identify that?
MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, I'm going to object.

16
17

There's no foundation to where these gates or fences are.

18

And Mr. Sabey has indicated that he doesn't recognize

19

them?
THE COURT: Well, he has -- If he has

20
21

If he's able to identify them he can do so.

22
23

(BY MR. PETERSEN) Can you identify that in

A.

I've never -- I've never seen that gate,

anyway?

24
25

Q.

no.
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Q.

You've seen that sign that says, "keep out"?

A.

I see it there, but I've never seen it.

Q.

You wouldn't know how long that gates been

there or how long that signs been there?
A.

I have no idea.

Q.

Now, the Circle Springs Road, you indicated

that you trailed sheep up that road; is that correct?
A.

Not up the road, no.

Q.

Down the road?

A.

There use to be a trail off, off of the

Okelberry's property, right along the forest, and you'd
come in at the Glade from Circle.
Q.

Okay. But -

A.

There -- The road comes up through

Okelberry's, up through Bear Wallow. And the old sheep
trail was down along the forest line.
Q.

Okay.

I'm just trying to get it in my mind.

Circle Springs Road, my notes indicated that you said you
trailed sheep on that road; is that correct?
A.

I said we brung the sheep up Circle Spring's

Canyon to Circle. And then they would go from Circle to
the Big Glade, but they wouldn't go up the road. That's
private beyond the road.
Q.

So you never trailed sheep up Circle Springs

Road then?
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1

A.

No.

2

Q.

Then what use would you have for going on

3

Circle Springs when you were working with the Toughs?

4

A.

5

property.

6

Q.

7
8
9
10
11

Circle Springs Road went through the Tough

Right. But you just said you never trailed

sheep up it.
A.

Well, when I worked for June there was sheep

on the road up and down there, but it was private
property. They was not being trailed.
Q.

All right. Well, then it would be correct to

12

say, Mr. Sabey, that you never trailed on the Circle

13

Springs Road?

14

A.

I don't understand your question.

15

Q.

Well, you trailed sheep up in that area, did

16

you not?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

You said you worked for the Toughs?

19

A.

Right.

20

Q.

You know where the Circle Springs Road is?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

My question was did you ever trail sheep up

23

or down that road?

24

A.

June Tough's sheep, yes, I have.

25

Q.

Okay. And that was in the 1950's?
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1

A.

Right.

2

Q.

And then at that time you were there by

3

permission, were you not?

4

A.

Right.

5

Q.

Now, you say that you came back on occasion,

6

up until the mid 80s, and you would travel on that road

7

every fall?
A.

8
9

We use to go down there hunting deer every

fall and then several times in the summer. We'd go down

10

there and pitch a tent, me and my family, and we'd stay

11

there at Circle Springs.

12
13

Q.

Now, what kind of vehicle were you using when

you say you did that?

14

A.

Pickup truck.

15

Q.

Is it your testimony that you can drive a

16

pickup truck that's nota

-- Was it a four-wheel drive?

17

A.

No.

18

Q.

Is it your testimony that you can drive a

19

pickup truck, that's not a four-wheel drive, on the

20

Circle Springs road all the way to the Forest Service

21

property?

22

A.

At that time, yes.

23

Q.

Tell me exactly when you did that in a pickup

A.

It would be in the 60's.

24
25

truck?
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Q.

What kind of road was it?

A.

It was rough, but you could go up and down

Q.

How rough?

A.

Well, just a mountain road.

Q.

A lot of rocks?

A.

There a few rocks, yes.

Q.

Steep?

A.

Not too steep, no.

Q.

Did you ever have to cut trees off the road?

A.

Nope.

Q.

Never cut a tree off the road?

A.

Not when I was going up there camping in the

there.

summer, no.
Q.

Are you aware of any time when trees have had

to be cut off that road?
A.

In the spring of the year when we'd take the

sheep up there, we use to cut one once in a while.
Q.

That was a fairly common occurrence, wasn't

A.

Oh, not really a common, but yes,

it?

occasionally there was a tree across the road.
Q.

Now, do you think that road has changed any

from today than what it was in the 1960's?
A.

I have no idea. I haven't been up there for,
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probably for 18, 20 years.
Q.

If there was testimony in this Court that

it's barely passable in a four-wheel drive vehicle, would
that be incorrect?
A.

Well, I have no idea what it is now. But I

know at that time we use to pull camps and that down in
Circle.
Q.

You'd pull camps, but that was for the

owner's property, was it not?
A.

Well, yeah, when we'd get down in there

camping or in the tent we'd get down there.
Q.

Now, you say you would go there in the fall

of the year to hunt, would that be correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Wouldn't it be much more convenient to park,

to stop on the Main Canyon Road and then to walk up the
trails and hunt rather than drive all the way around?
A.

Absolutely not.

Q.

Absolutely not. How long does it take you to

drive from Wallsberg to the Big Glade?
A.

Oh, 35 minutes.

Q.

Is that a pretty good road?

A.

Up Main Canyon?

Q.

Yeah.

A.

Yes.
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1

Q.

As it exists right now?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

And 35 minutes to go to the Big Glade. Then

4

how long would it take to go from the Big Glade to the

5

bottom of the Circle Springs Road?
A.

6
7

I

don't have no idea.

8
9

Gosh, I don't know. Maybe another

Q.

No idea. Could be as long as 45 to 60

minutes?

10

A.

Oh, no, no, no.

11

Q.

Where as Wallsberg you could be up there

12

within a half hour or less, could you not, if you wanted

13

to hunt that area?

14

A.

From Wallsberg?

15

Q.

Sure.

16

A.

Absolutely not.

17

Q.

There are trails, are there not, off Main

18

Canyon Road, up into that Forest Service area?

19
20

A.

Yes, there's a road or trail from there up

onto Circle.

21

Q.

And there are people that do that park on the

22

Main Canyon Road and will hunt in that area, are there

23

not?

24
25

A.

Well, I can't tell you what other people

does.
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Q

Have you ever see anybody hunt that area that

3

A.

Lots of them.

4

Q.

A lot more people hunt it that way than

1
2

5

way?

coming around the other way, is it not?

6

A.

No, years ago it wasn't.

7

Q.

Now, when you would come around in the 60's

8

and get on that Circle Springs Road, you would have to

9

open and shut the gate?

10

A.

Yeah.

11

Q.

And you would do that?

12

A.

Sure.

13

Q.

The Ridge Line Road, likewise, you testified

14

that there were several gates that you would have to open

15

and close to traverse on that road?

16

A.

Right.

17

Q.

This road that you say that was built in

18

Parker Canyon in the 1950's, that was not built by the

19

Forest Service, was it?

20

A.

Now, I really don't know. Clark Robinson, he

21

was the guy that owned the land down there. He told me

22

that the Forest Service and himself built the road.

23

Q.

If you come down that Ridge Line Road off the

24

Forest Service property, and you're on your way to

25

Parker, is that a rocky road?
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A.

1
2

Line Road.
Q.

3
4

It's not the Forest Service off the Ridge

Well, maybe you misunderstand me. You're on

the Big Glade.

5

A.

Okay.

6

Q.

You drive to Parker Canyon and you're on the

7

Ridge Line Road.

8

A.

Oh, right. Okay. I follow ya.

9

Q.

Is that a rocky road?

10

A.

I haven't been up there for a while, but

12

Q.

When you drove it 20 years ago

13

A.

Not too bad, no. It was a mountain road.

14

Q.

Not too rocky? Was there ever any trees

11

15
16
17
18
19

i t --

crossing it?
A.

Oh, sometimes, once in a while or maybe one

blow across or something.
Q.

Did you ever take a chain saw with you or an

ax to remove trees?

20

A.

Yeah, we'd take an ax.

21

Q.

Did that happen on many occasions?

22

A.

Not very many, no.

23

Q.

How often do you think that would happen?

24

A.

Not very often.

25

Q.

Is it very steep in many areas?
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1

A.

Not too bad, no.

2

Q.

Was it anything more than a trail?

3

A.

A trail?

4

Q.

Yes.

5

A.

There was good road down there.

6

Q.

No wider than seven or eight feet, wasn't it?

7

A.

Well, it was -- It was wide enough for a

8
9

car to go down there nice. You didn't scrape your place.
Q.

You went down those roads and you never

10

scraped on any trees or branches were never hanging over

11

or anything like that?

12

A.

They was mountain roads. Sure they was

13

Q.

It would scratch up a vehicle, would it not?

14

A.

Oh, not too bad, not at that time.

15

Q.

But it would do that, would it not?

16

A.

Oh, sure.

17

Q.

You didn't mind scraping up your vehicle to

18

go down that road?

19

A.

Not too much, no.

20

Q.

When you would go through there would you

21

always close the gates as you went through?

22

A.

You bet ya.

23

Q.

You figured that that was one of your

24
25

responsibilities to close the gates?
A.

Absolutely.
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Q.

Now, you indicated that you -- As I

understand it, you came up in the Thorton Hallow area,
you would actually stop on Highway 40, you've done that,
and hunted or hiked up into that area; is that correct?
A.

Not hiked, I've never hiked.

I've rode a

horse up in there.
Q.

Okay. You'd ride a horse from Highway 40 up

in there?
A.

Right.

Q.

Would you ever hunt in that matter?

A.

No, I've never hunted up in that for, I have

years ago, but not for the last 15, 20 years, no?
Q.

And once again it's been 20 years or so since

you've been in that area; is that correct?
A.

Probably.

Q.

That Thorton Hallow Road, is it very steep?

A.

No, Thorton Hallow Road (INAUDIBLE) not very

steep, no.
Q.

To get down to the Forest Service property,

that isn't very steep to get down in there?
A.

No.

Q.

Did you ever scrape your vehicle on trees or

anything of that nature?
A.

Oh, there'd be probably a few branches

sticking out, yes. You'd probably -- It's a mountain
84

road.
Q.

Have you ever driven a vehicle off of Ridge

Line Road down Thorton Road?
A.

Yes, several times.

Q.

What kind of vehicle?

A.

Pickup trucks.

Q.

Did it have four-wheel drive?

A.

No.

Q.

Could you make it down there and back without

four-wheel drive without any difficulties?
A.

Absolutely. There use to be an old docking

trail down there. We use to take two-ton trucks down
there.
Q.

No problem getting up and down that road?

A.

Absolutely not.

Q.

When you say an old docking trail, you were

working for somebody to do that, were you?
A.

Sure.

Q.

So if there's testimony during the course of

this trial that that's a steep road, rocky, you need a
four-wheel drive to get up and down it, that would be
incorrect?
A.

Well, I don't know what it is now, but when

we was up there absolutely.
Q.

Do you think it's changed over the years?
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1

A.

I have no idea.

2

Q.

Now, this Parker Canyon Road, did you ever

3

drive a vehicle down that road?

4

A.

From the Ridge Line Road?

5

Q.

Yes.

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

When was the last time you did that?

8

A.

Probably about the same time as

9

Q.

20 years ago?

10

A.

Probably.

11

Q.

Is it steep?

12

A.

Oh, it's really not too steep. There's a few

13

little steep places in it.

14

Q.

Any rocks?

15

A.

It's a mountain road, of course, there's

17

Q.

Did you scrap your vehicle in anyway?

18

A.

Well, a little, yes.

19

Q.

When you went down was it with permission

16

20

rocks.

when you traveled down there?

21

A.

No.

22

Q.

For what purpose did you go down there?

23

A.

Well, we'd be down there hunting deer and

Q.

And when you got to the bottom of Parker

24
25

that.
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1

Canyon and you came to the Forest Service property, was

2

there a gate there?
A.

On Parker? Yeah, there's a gate down at

5

Q.

Would you drive on the Forest Service

6

property?

7

A.

No.

8

Q.

You never drove on Forest Service property?

9

A.

No, we'd stop there to the, that pond just

3
4

10

Parker.

the side of the forest line.

11

Q.

12

property?

13

A.

14
15
16

Why wouldn't you drive on the Forest Service

Well, that road don't -- It just barely

goes on the forest property, there's nowhere to go.
Q.

You mean the roads dead ends on Forest

Service property?

17

A.

Yeah.

18

Q.

So this would be inaccurate then when it

19

shows the road coming, on Exhibit 2, it shows the road

20

continuing on on the Forest Service property for a

21

period, a distance anyway?

22
23

A.

Oh, you can go on Forest Service property a

little ways, but not very far.

24

Q.

But you never did it?

25

A.

Well, we use to stop there at the fence and
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1

hunt around in there.

2

Q.

You'd open the gate and go through the gate?

3

A.

Well, if we had horses, yeah.

4

Q.

Most the times when you went down that road

5

it was with, you had business there. You were working

6

for some of the owners with the sheep in that area. It

7

was usually West Daniels, was it not?

8

A.

No, we was down in there hunting deer mostly.

9

Q.

Well, you said -- Part of your testimony

10

was that's, how you got introduced to Parker Canyon, you

11

were helping the landowners.
A.

12
13

there one time, down onto Parker or Boomer.

14
15

I have. I've helped them pull camp down

Q.

You said you never saw any signs on the West

Daniels' property?

16

A.

No, I never did.

17

Q.

Private property, keep out, never saw any

19

A.

No.

20

Q.

You never saw any signs on the Forest Service

18

21

signs?

property either then?

22

A.

Oh, I've seen Forest Service signs, yes.

23

Q.

Okay. What did they say?

24

A.

They just -- Them yellow signs, the Forest

25

Service property.
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1
2

Q.

Did it say anything? No motorized vehicles

or any restrictions in anyway?

3

A.

No, not at that time, no.

9

Q.

Do you know if there's any restriction on

5

that Forest Service property as to use of motorized

6

vehicles?

7

A.

Well, you -- You can't -- I really don't

8

know. I haven't been down there for years. I don't

9

know.
Q.

10

Now, this Maple Canyon Road, have you ever

11

driven that from the Wallsberg side up to the Ridge Line

12

Road?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

When was the last time you did that?

15

A.

I can't tell you when the last time. It was

16

probably been maybe 15 years ago or so.

17
18
19
20

Q.

Why haven't you driven it in the last 15

A.

I've just never had no, nothing to go up

years?

there for.

21

Q.

No reason to use it then?

22

A.

No.

23

Q.

If there was testimony in this case, in this

24

trial, that it's impassable, even with a four-wheel drive

25

vehicle, would that be incorrect?
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A.

1

I have no idea. I haven't been up there

2

The last time I was up there is when I pulled up sheep

3

camp up there for Lee. And I don't know how long ago

4

that's been.

5
6

Q.

So the last time you went up there was with

permission by the owner?

7

A.

Right.

8

Q.

Would it surprise you to know that there,

9

that part of the road is washed out?

10

A.

I have no idea.

11

Q.

Was it ever washed out that you ever saw?

12

A.

I seen it get pretty darn rough, yes.

13

Q.

That's a pretty rough road, is it not?

14

A.

It's been pretty rough, yes.

15

Q.

Now, as I understand when you herded sheep

16

you never went all the way up Maple Canyon with your

17

sheep, you'd go up part way and then turn off; is that

18

correct?

19

A.

No, we'd take sheep all the way up to

20

Q.

All the way to the Ridge Line?

21

A.

When I worked there, yes.

22

Q.

And you'd pull a camp up that road?

23

A.

Absolutely.

24

Q.

Was it difficult to pull a sheep camp up that

25

road?
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A.

Not too bad.

Q.

Would you describe that road as steep?

A.

Oh, yeah, it was kind of steep and rocky.

Q.

Did you ever have to cut any trees off the

A.

Probably.

Q.

It's not an uncommon occurrence, is it?

A.

Well, in the spring there's always a few

road?

trees on them mountain roads.
Q.

I thought, and maybe I'm incorrect, Mr.

Sabey, that you said that you never trailed sheep all the
way up Maple Canyon, but you would turn off at a certain
point at Circle?
A.

When I was employed there we'd let the sheep

go all the way up Maple Creek, but when we was trailing
them for somebody else we never did.

Q.

You really don't have any need or use for

that road now, do you?
A.

No, I don't.

Q.

You don't care if that's public road or not

A.

Well, yeah, I care if it's there.

then?
If I ever

want to go up there on a four-wheeler or something I Q.

That's the only way you'd go on it would be a

four-wheeler or with a horse, is it not?
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A.

Absolutely.

Q.

You'd never drive a car up there would you?

A.

I do a lot of horseback riding. I ride

around in the hills a lot.
Q.

So if you're going to use that area it would

be with a four wheeler or by horse?
A.

Well, probably.

Q.

You indicated at the bottom of that Maple

Canyon Road going to Wallsberg is that there is a gate?
A.

Yeah, there's a gate there now, I think.

Q.

And it's locked.

A.

I have no idea.

Q.

You never been close enough to look?

A.

Yes, I've been through it. I was up there a

few years ago and helped Ray and them ship their lambs
out of Maple Creek, but I never seen whether the gate was
locked. It wasn't locked when I went through.
Q.

How far up that Maple Canyon Road did you go?

A.

Probably a mile.

Q.

You sure didn't go the whole way, did you?

A.

No, I didn't.

Q.

You've been up there in the last 20 years,

I didn't have no

have you not, where you've seen locked gates?
A.

Well, no, I -- I never have. I never seen

the gate locked. There's a gate there, but I've never
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1

seen it locked.

2

Q.

3

when you've seen no trespassing signs, have you not?
A.

4
5

Q.

A.

Not when I was up there helping these guys,

Q.

Mr. Sabey, though your testimony is such that

no.

10
11

So whether they were there or not you

wouldn't pay any attention to that?

8
9

I don't -- I never paid no attention

whether there's trespassing signs or not.

6
7

You've been up there in the last 20 years

when you first started going up there there were gates?

12

A.

Not when I first started going up, no.

13

Q.

When you went up -THE COURT: Describe which road you're

14
15

talking about, Mr. Petersen.
MR. PETERSEN: I thought that we established

16
17

that this road coming off the Big Glade onto the

18

Okelberry -THE COURT: Well, you were talking about the

19
20

Maple Canyon Road.

21

THE WITNESS: Yeah.

22

THE COURT: Now are you talking about the

23

MR. PETERSEN: Oh, excuse me, your Honor.

24

THE COURT: Are you talking about Ridge Line

25

_-

now?
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MR. PETERSEN: Let's go back.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

(BY MR. PETERSEN) Were there any gates on

Q.

the Maple Canyon Road at all?
A.

Not when I was first was going up there, no,

there was not.
Q.

But there was some gates on some of the other

roads then?

8

A.

Up on top, yes.

9

Q.

Well, but we established, did we not, there

10

was a gate that came off the Forest Service property onto

11

the Okelberry property?

12

A.

Right.

13

Q.

And that gate was there when you first went

14
15

up with the Toughs?
A.

Right.
MR. PETERSEN: Can I have just a moment, your

16
17

Honor, to confer with my client?

18

THE COURT: You may.

19

MR. PETERSEN: That's all, your Honor.

20

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Sweat?

21

MR. SWEAT: Just briefly, your Honor.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

22
23
24
25

BY MR. SWEAT:

Q.

I apologize if I've asked these questions and

forgot, but when you used Maple Canyon Road 94

1

A.

Yes, I've used it.

2

Q.

Several times you used it it was on behalf of

3

the property own; is that correct?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

Did you ever use it for reasons completely

6

personal, but not having anything to do with the property

7

owners or people with sheep?

8
9

12

Yes, I've went up and down there for a ride,

Q

And what type of vehicle did you use to do

A.

Oh, I use to have a -- Well, I went up

yes.

10
11

A.

that?

13

there in a four-wheel drive and before that I had a

14

two-wheel drive I've went up and down there.

15
16

MR. SWEAT:

I think that's all the questions

I have, your Honor.

17

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Petersen?

18

MR. PETERSEN:

19

THE COURT:

20
21
22
23
24
25

No, sir.

You May step down. Okay. Let's

take our morning recess. We'll be in recess until 11:05.
(A brief recess was taken.)
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Sweat, you may call

your next witness.
MR. SWEAT: Thank you, your Honor. Plaintiff

calls Moroni Besendorfer.
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THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Besendorfer, come

1
2

forward and have a seat in the witness chair there. If

3

you can get to it there. You may proceed.

4

MR. SWEAT: Thank you, your Honor.

5

DIRECT EXAMINATION

6

BY MR. SWEAT:

7
8

Q.

Mr. Besendorfer, would you please state your

full name and address for the record?

9

A.

James Moroni Besendorfer. I live on 1291

10

South Casper Hill Road. That's my address in Heber,

11

Utah.

12
13

MR. PETERSEN: What's city? I missed that,

your Honor.

14

THE COURT: Heber City.

15

MR. PETERSEN: Heber City.

16

Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) And what is your birth date?

17

A.

January the 27th, 1928.

18

Q.

How long have you lived in Wasatch County?

19

A.

76 and a half years.

20

Q.

Is that your entire life?

21

A.

My entire life. Well, I'm not quite 76 and a

22
23
24
25

half. I will be in another month, I think.
Q.

Are you familiar with a area east and a

little bit north of Wallsberg?
A.

Yes, most of it.
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1
2
3
4

Q.

Do you own any property or own an interest in

any property in that area?
A.

I own some stock in the West Daniels Land

Association.

5

Q.

And when did you first acquire this stock?

6

A.

Well, my dad acquired it back in the 50's.
I

7

And then I got my stock from my parents since

8

don't know. I've had it for probably 30 years or 35.

9
10

Q.

Other than the stock in West Daniels land did

you owned or leased any property in this area?

11

A.

In Wasatch County?

12

Q.

No, in the area north or east of Wallsberg.

13

A.

Well, I haven't personally, but our land

14
15
16

association has several times.
Q.

Have you ever used any of the roads that are

in this area?

17

A.

Ever since I was 12 years old.

18

Q.

Mr. Besendorfer, I'm pointing now to what has

19

been marked Plaittiff's Exhibit No. 2. Can you see that

20

very well?

21
22
23
24
25

A.

Pretty well.
MR. SWEAT: Can I hand it to him, your Honor,

to look at a second?
THE COURT: Why don't you have him come down

to the, there. He'd probably look at it better if he
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1
2
3

doesn't have to hold it. You can go down to the map.
Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) Do you recognize the area

depicted in this map?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

Do you believe that the map is a fairly

6
7
8
9

accurate portrayal of the area?
A.

Well, it looks like it's okay to me as best

as I can tell.
Q.

As you're looking at the map can you see a

10

road highlighted in red that has a designation of Ridge

11

Line Road?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Are you familiar with that road?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

Can you see a road highlighted, I believe, in

16

blue, Thorton Hallow Road?

17

A.

Oh, yes.

18

Q.

Are you familiar with that road?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Can you see a road highlighted, I believe, in

21

a yellow labeled Parker Canyon Road?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Are you familiar with that road?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

You see a road highlighted in green labeled
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1

Circle Springs Road?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

Are you familiar with that road?

4

A.

Yes, but I didn't travel that one as much as

5

I did the others.

6
7
8

Q.

Can you see a road highlighted kind of in a

-- I've been told it's magenta? It looks kind of pink
purplish labeled as Maple Canyon Road?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Are you familiar with that road?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

Are you comfortable with looking at the

13

exhibit or would you like to stay there by it? Or you

14

may return to your seat. Okay. You go ahead and return

15

to your seat. Mr. Besendorfer, are you familiar with the

16

property that's owned by the Okelberry family?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

And do you have a general idea about when the

19

Okelberry family first purchased this property?

20
21
22
23
24
25

A.

I -- I don't remember when they purchased

Q.

Do you know who owned the property prior to

it.

the Okelberry family?
A.

I just remember a sheep herder, but that's

all I know about that.
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1

Q.

Directing your attention to the road that has

2

been designated as Circle Spring Road, have you ever used

3

that road?

4
5

A.

I've been on it a few times, quite a few, but

I didn't make it a habit of using it all the time.

6

Q.

What portions of the road have you been on?

7

A.

Well, the whole thing.

8

Q.

Do you recall when you would of first used

9
10
11

that road?
A.

No, I, I couldn't give you any dates on it.

It's been a lot of years ago.

12

Q.

Do you recall when you last used the road?

13

A.

Maybe -- Well, it's probably been ten years

14

ago. The years go by fast. I think it would be that

15

many years ago when I was on it last.

16

Q.

17

per year?

18

A.

Two, three time a year.

19

Q.

When you used it did you always travel the

20
21
22
23
24
25

Typically how often would you use this road

entire length of the road?
A.

Yes, I hauled salt for the cattle up that

road a few times and -Q.

When you were using this road did you ever

observe others using this road?
A.

Well, there was always people going up and
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1

down it, but I don't know who they were.

2

Q.

Did you ever observe people at the end of the

4

A.

Which end are you talking about?

5

Q.

The Circle Spring on the forest end.

6

A.

Yes, I've seen people up there.

7

Q.

What would they do up there?

8

A.

Well, some of them were camping and --

3

road?

9

MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, I object. We

10

really need a foundation. What are we talking about in

11

the last 10 years, 20, 30, 50?

12

THE COURT: Well, he said he hasn't been on

13

that road for the last, 10 years ago. So why don't you

14

-- Why don't you lay some foundation, Mr. Sweat, as to

15

what time period you are asking questions concerning.

16
17

MR. SWEAT: Thank you, your Honor.

Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) You indicated you were last

18

up there about 10 years ago. Prior to that time about

19

how many times per year did you use that road?

20

A.

Just maybe a couple of times each year.

21

Q

And do you think it's -- 10 years ago would

.

22

be in the 90's. Do you think during the 80's you used

23

that road a couple times a year?

24

A.

Yes, in the 80's.

25

Q.

During the entire 80's, from '81 to '89?
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A.

1

Well, I use to use it every spring. And

2

quite often during the summer we'd make a trip up there

3

also when we'd go into that area.

4

Q.

Do you think you used it during the 70's?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

The entire decade of the 70's?

7

A.

Yes, I think so.

8

Q.

Do you think you used it during the 60's?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

The entire decade of the 60's?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

During each of those decades you used it a

13

couple times a year?

14

A.

Well, in those earlier years we used it most.

15

Q.

Why did you use it more?

16

A.

Well, it was a good area to get into and it

17

was a short way for us to get up there for us to take

18

salt into salt our cattle. It was a shorter distance, so

19

that's the reason we used it.
Q.

20

During those -- During the 60's did you

21

ever observe people camping on the forest there at Circle

22

Springs?

23
24
25

A.

Well, there was always people camping up

Q.

During the 60's did you see people

there.
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1

MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, I object to always

2

people camping. You know, unless we can specify

3

something.
THE COURT: Well, that's his testimony. You

4
5

can cross-examine him.
MR. PETERSEN: Wouldn't it be fair though,

6
7

your Honor, if we could pin this down in some date, time,

8

place?
THE COURT: We're talking about the 60's,

9

He's testified that he used it, that

10

70's and 80 1 s.

11

road, 2 to 3 times a year during those decades.
MR. PETERSEN: That I understand, but then to

12
13

say, I always saw people up there camping, your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, that's what his testimony

14
15

is.

I can't change it.
MR. PETERSEN: Well, I object to it. It's

16
17

not being -- There's no foundation for that type of

18

testimony.

19

THE COURT: Overruled. This is -- I'll

20

make this comment. He's testified that he saw people

21

camping on the forest, not on
MR. PETERSEN: All right.

22
23
24
25

Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) During the 70's did you see

people camping on the forest of Circle Springs?
A.

Yes.
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Q.

Did you ever see during the 60's or 70's

those people camping, did they have vehicles?
A.

They all had vehicles. And most of them were

camping with tents. Some of them had camp trailers and
stuff like that.
Q.

Other than what has been designated as the

Circle Springs Road is there any other way to access
those camping sites that you saw with a vehicle?
A.

Well, if they -- If they come down the, I

guess it's referred to there as the Ridge Line Road, they
could come in from that area.
Q.

Would they have to connect into the Circle

Spring Road?
A.

Yes.

Q.

During the times that you used this road, the

60's, the 70's and the 80's, did you ever see locked
gates on this road?
A.

No.

Q.

Did you ever see gates on this road?

A.

No, I never did see any gates on that

particular road.
Q.

Did you ever see any signs or marks

indicating that there was no trespassing on this road?
A.

No, never.

Q.

Did you ever encounter a locked gate on this
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1

road when the entire

2

MR. PETERSEN: We back at Circle Springs?

3

THE COURT: We're still at Circle Springs.

4

THE WITNESS: No, I never did.

5

Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) Now, when you used this road

6

you were using it to salt the cattle; is that correct,

7

you've indicated?
A.

8
9
10

Usually that's what we did. We would haul

our salt up that road and take it up on the top, the
ridge.

11

Q

12

that --

And that was as a permittee on the forest, is

13

A.

Well, we had permits on the forest, yes.

14

Q.

Is that where you were taking salt to was the

A.

Yes, and on our own private land up there

18

Q.

Did you have private land on Circle Springs?

19

A.

No.

20

Q.

Specifically with Circle Springs, when you

15

forest?

16
17

also.

21

were talking salt up that road or traveling on that road,

22

was it in conjunction with your status as a permittee

23

with the Forest Service?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

Did you ever use it for any other purpose?
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A.

1

Well, I went up there once or twice just to

2

hunt deer, that sort of thing, but it was always used

3

with the association.

4
5

Q.

During the time that you used the road did

ever hear or see anybody kicked off the road?

6

A.

No.

7

Q.

Or prohibited from using the road?

8

A.

No.

9

Q.

You can see on the map what has been

10

designated as Ridge Line Road. Is that what you know the

11

road as?
A.

12

Yes, I'm not sure when it was given that

13

name, but that's -- I guess the Forest Service gave it

14

that name.

15

Q.

Have you ever used the Ridge Line Road?

16

A.

Many, many times.

17

Q.

What portions have you used?

18

A.

From Daniels Summit on through to Big Hallow.

19

Q.

How did you use the road?

20

A.

Well, I used it for many different things. I

21

rid my horse down there lots and lots of times. I've

22

driven vehicles down there lots of times. I've driven my

23

snowmobile across there many times. So it's a very many

24

times.

25

Q

When did you first use Ridge Line Road?
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1

A.

When I was 12 years old.

2

Q.

What did you use it for?

3

A.

I went up there as a, with a group of boy

4

scouts. We camped between the Big Glade and Burnt

5

Springs, on the side of the road. There was ten of us

6

and our scout master. And we went down -- We hiked

7

from there down passed the Big Glade down to the head of

8

Thorton Hallow. And we trimmed the bark off of Aspen

9

Trees for a couple of men that had an accessor plant in

10
11
12

Charleston.
Q.

And you used the Ridge Line Road for that

purpose?

13

A.

Yes, that's right.

14

Q.

Did you also use the Thorton Hallow Road

15

where it's depicted there?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

Just for the Court's information and the

18

record, can you indicate on the exhibit where the Big

19

Glade is?
MR. SWEAT: Do you have any objection if he

20
21

shows me where Big Glade is?

22

MR. PETERSEN: No, no objection.

23

THE WITNESS: This map shows the road. Let's

24
25

see, it's the (INAUDIBLE).
Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) Right where
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1
2

A.

There's a road that goes up to the peak,

strawberry Peak, and that's where

3

Q.

For the record --

4

A.

-- (INAUDIBLE) just off from the peak road

5

there about a quarter of a mile.

6

Q.

For the record the witness is pointing to

7

where Ridge Line Road and Circle Spring Road come

8

together on the south end of Ridge Line Road; is that

9

correct?

10

A.

That's right.

11

Q.

When did you first use Ridge Line Road from

12

the top all the way to the bottom?

13

A.

You mean from Daniel Summit?

14

Q.

From Big Glade to --

15

A.

Big Hallow.

16

Q.

Big Hallow.
MR. PETERSEN: Excuse me. Where's Big Hallow

17
18

now?
THE COURT: Why don't you show him -- Why

19
20

don't you have him show him on the map.
MR. SWEAT: Show us on the map where Big

21
22
23
24
25

Hallow is.
THE WITNESS: Big Hallow is where the road

comes out at the gun club.
MR. PETERSEN: Oh, all the way to the
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THE WITNESS: Clear down here. There's Big

1
2

Hallow comes out down here at the gun club.

3
4

Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) Do you recall when you first

used the road that entire length?
A.

5

Well, yes, I do.

I can't give you the exact

6

year, but I can tell you a little bit about it. I had an

7

international scout. And I hauled salt clear along that

8

ridge in the back of that scout. It was four-wheel drive

9

and it's the only way we could get through there was with

10

that scout. It was two or three places in there where it

11

was quite rocky and we could use that to get the salt in.

12

I had the back of it full of salt for the cattle.

13

Q.

You say you don't remember the exact year.

14

Can you give us an estimate of what, within two or three

15

years of when it may have been?
A.

16

I don't know that I could give you exact --

17

I'd have to look back and see how old that scout is cause

18

I just bought it. And I can't tell you the exact year,

19

but it's been a lot of years ago. That's all I can tell

20

you.

21

Q.

Do you recall -- Or what is the first year

22

you specifically recall the year that you would of used

23

that road, that you're absolutely sure you used that

24

road?

25

A.

1940, I was 12 years old.
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1

Q.

All the way to the bottom?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

What did you use it for then?

41

A.

Well, we walked through it. I rode my horse

5

through it. Well, I didn't ride my horse through until I

6

was 14, but I walked through that many times hunting deer

7

with my dad.

8

Q.

When did you last use Ridge Line Road?

9

A.

Last year.

10

Q.

What portions of it did you use last year?

11

A.

I went from Daniels Summit down to the first

12

gate that was locked. That would be -- I'd have to

13

tell you -- It's just north of Clides Reservoir. And

14

that's the first gate that's locked. There's a cattle

15

guard there and the gate was locked. That's as far as I

16

went and turned around and came out.

17

Q.

When was the last time you used Ridge Line

18

Road and went clear through off of what or onto what is

19

now the state property there?

20
21
22

A.

(INAUDIBLE) state property, the Forest

Service or just state?
Q.

No, the fishing game.
(INAUDIBLE) the blue.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. SWEAT: Yeah.

25

THE COURT: The blue designated -110

MR. PETERSEN: Do you have a map?
THE WITNESS: Yeah.

Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) Do you know whose property is

designated in yellow?
A.

I think that's Mr. Okelberry.

Q.

Do you know whose property is designated in

A.

That's West Daniels' land.

Q.

-- brown color?

A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

Do you know whose property is designated in

this

this pink?
A.

I think that's fish and game.

Q.

Do you know whose property is designated in

this blue?
A.

Well, that would be state property.

Q.

When was the last time that you rode the

entire length of the Ridge Line Road from the Big Glade
area down to the state fish and game property?
A.

Oh, well, I rode it every year until the

gates were locked, which has been maybe four or five
years ago. Since the game permits were let by Mr.
Okelberry. And I couldn't get through, so I didn't go.
4.

So you rode it every year up until five years

ago, is that your testimony?
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A.

About that time.

Q.

And you indicated that you first saw a locked

gate at that time?
A.

Yes, that's the first time I ever saw a gate

Q.

During your time of -- When you first

locked.

recall taking salt down and five years ago when you again
used the entire length, you indicated you used it at
least once a year?
A.

Well, prior to the time the gates were locked

we used it lots of times each year, many times.
Q.

Prior to the gates being locked were there

gates in place?
A.

Not in my early years, but later on when the

fences were built there were gates put on them, but they
were never locked. You could just open the gates up,
shut them and go through.
Q.

Do you ever recall seeing no trespassing

signs along Ridge Line Road?
A.

No, not until just the last four or five

Q.

During the 60's did you ever see any other

years.

people use Ridge Line Road?
A.

Yes, there were lots of people up there.
MR. PETERSEN: I object, your Honor. Lots of

112

people -- what the heck does that THE COURT: Why don't you -- Why don't you

have him qualify -- Ask him what he means by lots.
Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) What does that mean by lots

of people?
A.

Campers, people on horse back or people that

were gathering cattle and this sort of people. They were
there all the time. All the time. Even in the
wintertime there were people up there.
Q.

Did you go up in the wintertime?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What did you go up for in the wintertime?

A.

Snowmobiling.

Q.

When did you first go snowmobiling on Ridge

Line Road?
A.

First year I went up there was 1969.

Q.

Where there any no trespassing signs when you

went snowmobiling?
A.

No.

Q.

Where there any locked gates?

A.

No.

Q.

The gates on Ridge Line Road where they

always kept closed?
A.

Not always, but when the cattle -- When

they put our cattle out there we usually put the fences
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1
2

up and we'd shut the gates, but they ever never locked.
Q.

When you were up snowmobiling was it in

3

conjunction with accessing your land or was it purely

4

recreation?

5

A.

Purely recreation.

6

Q.

Where did you usually snowmobile when you

7

snowmobiled on Ridge Line Road?

8

A.

Well, we went the full length of it.

9

Q.

That's down to Big Hallow?

10

A.

Clear down to Big Hallow.

11

Q.

And how often -- You say you went first in

12
13

1969. When did you last go snowmobiling up there?
A.

Let's see. Probably about in 1980, along in

14

there someplace. That's the last snowmobile I bought.

15

So it would be about 1980. I can't be exactly sure, but

16

I think that's pretty close.

17

Q.

When you were snowmobiling up there between

18

1969 and 1980 did you ever see anyone else snowmobiling

19

on that road?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Did you ever see any no trespassing signs on

22

that road?

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

When you first used this road was there any

25

cattle guards across the road, Ridge Line Road?
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1

A.

No.

2

Q.

Do you know if there are any there now?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

Where are they?

5

A.

Well, there's the -- When you

When you

6

take the Ridge Line Road the first one is -- Just as

7

you -- Well, I don't know how to explain it to you. If

8

you go up Hobble Creek and turn back towards the north

9

there's the first cattle guard right there. And the next

10

cattle guard is over at Shingle Hallow.

11

Q.

And these are on Ridge Line Road?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Can you point them out on the map on Ridge

14

Line Road?

15

A.

I don't think it shows some of this here.

16

Q.

Can you point out any cattle guards that are

17
18

on the road depicted on the map as Ridge Line Road?
A.

There's one cattle guard back here and then

19

the other way down there. Let's see. Here in Thorton

20

there's one -- There's one just as Thorton, it would be

21

right in there someplace.

22

Q.

Now, as a property or a shareholder in West

23

Daniels land did you use Ridge Line Road to access your

24

property?

25

A.

Yes.
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1
2

were locked?

3
4

A.

Q.

I don't know if any of the

Do you have another way you access the West

Daniels land?

7
8

I haven't.

property owners have been up there or not.

5
6

Have you been able to use it since the gates

Q.

A.

Not down on the lower end, unless we come up

Big Hallow. And we can't come up there any more.

9

Q.

You've already indicated that you first used

10

Thorton Hallow Road when you were 12 years old; is that

11

correct?

12

A.

That's correct.

13

Q.

When did you last use Thorton Hallow Road?

14

A.

Well, I walked down it -- Do you want -

15

Are you saying to use it as a vehicle or just walk on it.

16

Q.

MR. PETERSEN: Which road are we talking

17
18

Tell us both, when you last -

about?

19

THE COURT: Thorton Hallow

20

MR. SWEAT: Thorton Hallow?

21

Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) When you last

22

A.

Thorton Hallow Road, I walked down it about

23

four years ago.

24

Q.

25

And when did you last drive a vehicle down

it?
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1

A.

And the last time I drove a vehicle down

2

there has been quite a while, it's been at least ten

3

years ago.

4
5

Q.

And when you used Thorton Hallow Road what

portions of the road did you use?

6

A.

The whole thing, the entire road.

7

Q.

I mean onto the Forest Service property?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

Between when you first used this road and 10

10

years ago when you last used this road, how often per

11

year would you think you used the road?

12
13

A.

Well, we would use -- After the gates were

locked we quit using it. We couldn't get in there.

14

Q.

And that was?

15

A.

Year before last, two years ago.

16

Q.

Prior to that how often per year would you

17

use the road?

18

A.

Probably about six times a year.

19

Q.

What would you use the road for?

20

A.

Sometimes recreation, sometimes moving

21

cattle, sometimes just driving down it, family members

22

and what not.

23

0.

Did you ever use it in the wintertime?

24

A.

The upper part of it, the part that's close

25

to Ridge Line Road.
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1

Q.

What would you use it for?

2

A.

Snowmobiling.

3

Q.

During -- From the time you first used it

4

until you last used it, let's say the 10 years ago, did

5

you ever see no trespassing signs on Thorton Hallow Road?

6

A.

No, never.

7

Q.

Was there ever any gates blocking access to

8

the road?

9

A.

No. Well, the gates were there, but you

10

could open them.

11

Q.

Where were gates at on Thorton Hallow Road?

12

A.

Well, the gates right -- I don't know how

13

to explain that to you. They're right at the upper part

14

of it. There's a fence right through it, but that's down

15

on the forest. The gate that was locked is right up on

16

Ridge Line Road.

17

Q.

So once you're through -- Once you're on

18

the Ridge Line Road then there's not a gate down into

19

Thorton Hallow?

20

A.

Not till you get down in there. Then there's

21

a drift fence that was put up in there. And they've had

22

a gate on it.

23

Q.

Was that gate ever locked when you

24

A.

No.

25

Q.

When you get to the forest is there a fence
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1

between Okelberry's property and the forest? As you

2

come -- As you come kind of southeast on Thorton Hallow

3

Road and it comes to the forest boundary, is there a

4

fence there?
A.

Yes, there's a fence that goes clear across

7

Q.

Is there a gate there?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

Is there a cattle guard there?

10

A.

Not on that fence there isn't.

11

Q.

During the 60's did you use that road for the

5
6

12

there.

purposes you've already indicated?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

Did you ever see any other people using the

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

Do you know what they were using the road

A.

Well, people came in there with tents and for

15

18
19

road?

for?

20

recreation purposes. We drove cattle through there all

21

the time.

22

Q.

Did they --

23

A.

There was a -- We hauled salt down in there

24

for our cattle.

25

Q.

The campers you saw did they camp on the
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Okelberry property?
A.

Well, there'd be campers along that whole

Ridge Line Road. So some of them probably were on
Okelberry's property. Some of them would be on the
forest. Some of them are on West Daniels Land
Association. So they -- I've seen campers all the way
through there, many times.
Q.

Did you ever see anyone prohibited from using

Thorton Hallow Road?
A.

From the top end you mean?

Q.

Yeah.

A.

I haven't seen anybody that was stopped

there, accept since the gates were locked on the upper
Ridge Line Road that's where it stalled them off and you
couldn't go any further.
Q.

Did you ever get permission to use Thorton

Hallow Road?
A.

No.

Q.

Were you required to use Thorton Hallow Road

to get access to West Daniels property?
A.

Not West Daniels, no. You could go across

the Blaze Trail and get onto it, but it wasn't, it wasn't
called a road. It was Blaze Trail.
Q.

So if you needed to move cows from West

Daniels up pass the Okelberry's there was a Blaze Trail
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1

you could use?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

Is that typically how you would move the

A.

Well, we used the Blaze Trail, but we also

4

cows?

5
6

used the Ridge Line Road all the way through.

7

Q.

Did you ever get permission to use that road?

8

A.

No.

9

Q.

You've seen what's been designated as Parker

10

Canyon Road. Is that your understanding what that roads

11

called?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Have you ever used Parker Canyon Road?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

When was the first time you used Parker

16
17

Canyon Road?
A.

Probably -- Well, as a boy I used it, but

18

not to drive a vehicle on, but I walked it with my dad

19

many times. And after I got to the age of 14 we drove

20

cattle through there all the time. I mean every summer

21

we moved cattle through there.

22
23
24
25

Q.

Where would you move cattle from to when you

used that road, from what location to what location?
A.

Well, we moved cattle in going both

directions. In the spring we would move cattle through
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there. And the Forest Service line is right at Parker
Hallow. And that would be the first zoned area that we
would put our cattle onto. And then in the fall when
we'd come back through we would cross over that?
Q.

Have you ever used Parker Canyon for

something other than in conjunction with the cattle?
A.

Yes, I hunted deer in there many times. I

got -- Maybe I shouldn't even tell you, but I won a
prize from a big buck I shot there.
Q.

Where did you shoot the big buck?

A.

Right in Parker.

Q.

On the Forest Service side?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You would have used the road on that day?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you ever see others using the road into

Parker Canyon?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Typically what would they be using the road

A.

Well, most of them used it for recreation

for?

during deer season. There were lots of campers up there
at the head of Parker.
MR. PETERSEN: Well, your Honor, this

rambling discussion -- I mean, what -- Certainly we
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1

can pin that down in some way.
THE COURT: Well, I want you to ask him how

2

He's

3

often he went hunting and how often he

4

testified that he used it, this area, from the time he

5

was 14 until -- Well, you haven't asked him when the

6

last time he used it.
MR. SWEAT: I haven't.

7
8
9

Q.

used Parker Canyon Road?
A.

10
11

Q.

Did you see anybody using Parker Canyon at

that date?
A.

14
15

I walked up Parker Canyon two years ago clear

to the top of the canyon.

12
13

(BY MR. SWEAT) When was the last time you

No, the gates were locked and nobody could

get in there.

16

Q.

Prior to the gates -- Let me start over.

17

During the 60's did you ever see people use Parker Canyon

18

Road?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Would they use it to access the forest?

21

A.

It's the only way they could get onto it.

22

Q.

Did you ever see people camp on the forest at

23

Parker Canyon?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

Did they use vehicles?
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1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

Did you see that you think every year during

3

the 60's?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

Did you ever see people use Parker Canyon to

6

camp on the forest in the 70's?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Do you think that there were people that

9

camped on the forest in Parker Canyon every year during

10

the 70's?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

Do you ever remember a year during the 60's

13

or 70's they didn't use it?

14

A.

No.

15

Q.

Did you ever see people park, or camp on the

16

forest in the 70's?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

Was there ever a year or did you ever see

19

people use or camped at Parker Canyon in the 80's?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Did they have vehicles?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Did you ever see people using Parker Canyon

24
25

Road in the 80's?
A.

Yes.
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Q.

Did you ever see people using Parker Canyon

Road in the 70's?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Is there any other way to camp in Parker

Canyon with a vehicle accept by using Parker Canyon Road?
A.

Not unless they walked in. If they used

vehicles that's the only way they could get in.
Q.

When do you first recall seeing a no

trespassing sign that would of kept someone off of the
Parker Canyon Road?
A.

It would have been probably five or six years

ago. It's when the gates were locked.
Q.

Did you see a no trespassing signs prior to

the gates being locked?
A.

No.

Q.

The two events kind of happened

simultaneously?
A.

I guess.

Q.

Now, you were a shareholder in West Daniels

Land Association; is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Did anybody ever come to you to get

permission to use Parker Canyon Road?
A.

No.

Q.

Did anybody ever come to you to get
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permission to use portions of the Ridge Line Road that
went through West Daniels?
A.

No.

Q.

Are you aware of anyone coming to West

Daniels to get permission to use those roads?
A.

Not that I know of.

Q.

Do you think you would of•heard about it if

some on had?
A.

I heard about it when they did, but I never

heard about it before that.
Q.

When they -MR. PETERSEN: Heard about -- Shoot, I

missed the answer. You heard about when they came to get
permission?
THE COURT: Yes.

Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) Did some one finally come get

permission, come and ask permission?
A.

They didn't from me cause I, I was a

stockholder, but they did from the resident.
Q.

When did they ask -- When did they first --

A.

And I can't tell you the exact time when they

did, but -Q.

Can you give us an estimate?

A.

But the gates were locked. So there was no

permission to be given.
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Q.

So it was after the gates were locked?

A.

Right.

Q.

Prior to the gates being locked --

A.

No permission, they just went through, people

Q.

You've seen what's been designated as Maple

did.

Canyon Road; is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Have you ever used Maple Canyon Road?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you recall when you first used Maple

Canyon Road?
A.

Like I said, I don't recall when we first

used it. It's been too many years ago.
Q.

Do you recall when you last used Maple Canyon

A.

Used it about -- Let's see. When did I go

Road?

down there?

It's probably been 10, 12 years ago that I

went through it?
Q.

How did you use it? Did you drive a vehicle?

Did you ride a horse?
A.

Drove a vehicle, international scout.

Q.

You don't remember when you first used the

road. Do you think you used the road during the 60's?
A.

We probably did, but I can't say for sure.
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Q.

Do you think you used it during the 70's?

A.

Same answer.

Q.

Did you use this road as much as you used the

other roads up there?
A.

No, not as much as we did the Ridge Line.

Q.

When you used the road do you ever remember

any no trespassing signs on the road?
A.

No.

Q.

Do you remember any locked gates on the road?

A.

No.

Q.

Do you remember any gates on the road?

A.

Just at the very bottom of the hill.

Q.

What kind of gate was it?

A.

Just a wire gate.

Q.

Was there any no trespassing sign on the

A.

No.

Q.

Was there anything in the vicinity indicating

gate?

no trespassing for the road?
A.

No.
MR. SWEAT: I have no further questions at

this time, your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Petersen, cross?

My cross is

MR. PETERSEN: Do you want

going to go for a while. If you want to

-

-
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1

THE COURT: Well, how long do you expect?

2

MR. PETERSEN: Well, it will go into the

3

lunch hour. I don't know if the Court wanted to break

4

now or
THE COURT: Well, let's -- Okay. We'll

5
6

take a noon break. We'll have

7

at 1:00.

We'll resemble again

(The noon recess was taken.)

8
9

THE COURT: We'll return to the case of

10
11

Wasatch County verses Okelberry. Mr. Besendorfer, will

12

you come and return to the witness stand. You may

13

proceed, Mr. Petersen.
MR. PETERSEN: Thank you, your Honor.

14

CROSS-EXAMINATION

15
16

BY MR. PETERSEN:

17

Q.

Mr. Besendorfer, you indicated that the

18

Circle Springs Road -- I'm looking at Exhibit 2. The

19

one in green coming down here, that's the road that you

20

would take salt down to cattle?
I don't think that's the right road. You got

21

A.

22

the wrong road.

23

Q.

I think it was your testimony, was it not,

24

that you went down Circle Springs Road to take salt to

25

cattle?
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A.

Went up Circle Spring Road to take salt, not

down it, up.
Q.

How would you go up it?

A.

Well, we went in over to Wallsberg and the

road comes out right down in Wallsberg.
Q.

That's Maple Canyon, is it not?

A.

Well, that's the road that goes on it, yeah.

Q.

As I understand your testimony before was

that the Circle Springs Road, you went down that road to
take salt to cattle?
A.

No, we went up the road to take salt to

cattle, not down.
Q.

Well, could you step over to the exhibit and

explain to me how you go up to Circle Springs Road?
A.

Start right here and this is Wallsberg, up

around there, and over onto the Ridge Road. Then we
follow down that.
Q.

This is Circle Springs down here?

A.

Well, that's -- Yeah, that's probably part

of it. This is Maple Spring right here.
Q.

Maple Canyon. You can return to the witness

stand. My notes indicate, Mr. Besendorfer, that your
testimony was that you used the Circle Springs Road to
take salt to cattle, would that be an error then?
A.

Well, we use Maple Creek most the time.
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Q.

Okay.

A.

The Circle Spring Road is the one that maybe

I was confused on, but the other one I'm not.
Q.

Okay.

Well, it's a fact, is it not, that the

permits that were owned by shareholders of West Daniels
Cattle, those permits were not south of this property in
question, but was east, isn't that true?
A.

That's true.

Q.

So there would be no need for you to take

salt and cattle down Circle Springs Road cause there was
no permits over there owned by any of the West Daniels
shareholders?
A.

Not at that time.

Q.

So could we not say then, Mr. Besendorfer,

that in respect to your testimony as to Circle Springs
Road, that you never took salt down that road for the
cattle?
A.

Yeah, we never did take salt down, we always

took it up.
Q.

No, no, no. I'm not talking about Maple

Canyon, I'm talking about Circle Springs?
A.

Well, if we took salt up there I used that

road, but I can't tell you exactly when.
Q.

Once again, I'm talking about this green

road, marked on Exhibit 2, that's called Circle Springs
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road?
A.

Okay. Then I'll backup and say Maple Creek

Road. We always used that one all the time. We use
Circle Spring Road occasionally, but not like we did
Maple Spring.
Q.

But my question is though, when you testified

that you took salt down Circle Springs Road to cattle
that would be incorrect, would it not?
A.

Yes, cause we never went down, we always went

Q.

So you were miss -- You were not correct in

up.

using the Circle Springs Road, you meant the Maple Creek
Road?
A.

Well, we used them both, but we didn't use

the Circle Spring Road as much as we did Maple Creek
Road.
Q.

Okay. Now, you said that you went down

Circle Springs Road two or three times a year to haul
salt, but we concluded that would not be correct then?
A.

We didn't go down. If I said down I said it

wrong, cause we went up it.
Q.

No, no, no. I don't want to be labor this

point.
MR. PETERSEN: And I think the Court

understands where we're coming from?
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THE COURT: Go to the next.

1
2

Q.

(BY MR. PETERSEN) We are clear, are we not,

3

that going up Circle Springs Road there were no permits

4

that was owned by West Daniels shareholders?

5

A.

That's correct.

6

Q.

So to be hauling salt you'd be using the Main

7

Canyon Road, would you not, Ridge Line Road?

8

A.

Sometimes, not all the time.

9

Q.

Okay. Now, when you said you testified --

10

When you testified that you used the Circle Springs Road

11

two or three times a year, that would be incorrect,

12

because we've now learned that you didn't use that road

13

to haul salt?

14

A.

We didn't use it to haul salt all the time.

15

We did once in a while. It depended on the weather in

16

the springtime when we used it. But we used that, that

17

road a lot.

18
19
20
21
22
23

Q.

I'm talking about the Circle Springs, not the

Maple Creek
A.

I'm talking about Circle Springs. Maple

Creek we used more, it was a better road.
Q.

Circle Springs, you never used that road in

connection with any cattle that you owned?

24

A.

Not only to haul salt up it.

25

Q.

No. Circle Springs, the road in red, you
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never used that -A.

That's green, Maple Spring is the other one.

Maple Creek is the red one.
Q.

Okay. The one in green, you never used that

road in connection with any cattle that you owned, did
you?
A.

I don't quite understand your question. We

used the road to haul salt up there to get onto the Ridge
Line Road, but we didn't use that road as often as we did
the Maple Creek Road.
Q

.

Mr. Besendorfer, we're making a record here.
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Petersen, you've asked

him four times. Clearly the Court can see there's a
portion of Circle Creek Road that connects onto the Ridge
Line Road. If you want -- He might not of gone down
the Circle Creek Road, but -MR. PETERSEN: I'm just talking, your Honor,

about the Okelberry property. He would not of ever used
the Circle Springs Road on the Okelberry property with
his cattle.
THE COURT: Well, he can use a portion of it,

that's his testimony, but you can cross-examine him
again.
MR. PETERSEN: Well, I don't -- I don't see

where there would be any portion. The Circle Springs
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1

Road comes over here and connects to Ridge Line Road, but

2

if --

3

THE COURT: Well, as you -- Look at this

4

map that he used (INAUDIBLE). There's a very small

5

portion before it kind of makes a U-turn and goes back

6

down, going south.
MR. PETERSEN: Well, that doesn't line up

7
8

with this Exhibit 2. That's not designated as the Circle

9

Springs Road.

10

MR. SWEAT: It is in our complaint. It's

11

designated as parts of Ridge Line Road, but it didn't

12

(INAUDIBLE).
MR. PETERSEN: It looks like you (INAUDIBLE)

13
14

maps here.

15

THE COURT: (INAUDIBLE) I can recall from

16

our, that, from our, just looking at it on the ground

17

that that road goes and then, and then connects onto

18

another road and then it goes on down (INAUDIBLE).

19

MR. PETERSEN: Just

20

THE COURT: Ask your next question.

21

MR. PETERSEN: Okay.

22

Q.

--

(BY MR. PETERSEN) Okay. Just for the

23

record, Mr. Besendorfer, you never used what is called

24

the Ridge Line Road to access cattle on Forest Service

25

property?
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1

A.

Now, how did you say that? I missed --

2

Q.

Okay. Let me

3
4

THE COURT: Are you talking about Ridge Line

now?
MR. PETERSEN: I'm talking about Ridge Line,

5
6

excuse me.

Q.

7

(BY MR. PETERSEN)

You never used the

8

No, I'm talking about Circle Springs. You never used the

9

Circle Springs Road to access Forest Service property for

10

your cattle?

11
12
13
14
15

A.

Well, yes, we did. We used a part of it,

Q.

Well, no, I'm talking about the very end of

yes.

it when it goes on to Forest Service property?
A.

Well, that's how we got onto the Forest

16

Service property was through the use of that road. It

17

came off of Forest Service property, then it went through

18

Mr. Okelberry's, then it came back onto Forest Service

19

property.

20

Q.

Do you see where I'm pointing my --

21

A.

Yes.

22

THE COURT: Why don't you go down to the map,

23

Mr. Besendorfer, and testify or even point out on the map

24

where the area of the road he's talking about.

25

Q.

(BY MR. PETERSEN) Let me ask you this. Do
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you see where my pen is pointing like this? Did you ever
go down to that point to service any of your cattle?
A.

No, we didn't go down that way ever to

service the cattle cause our cattle was back the other
way.
Q.

Right, right. So there was no need to use

this road going down to the Forest Service property was
there?
A.

For salt, yes.

Q.

Right where my pen is pointing, you never did

put salt down there?
A.

No, not there we didn't.

Q.

The salt would be over this way?

A.

Yes, and on down and it came up this way and

it was all in this area.
Q.

Now, we concluded, Mr. Besendorfer, that you

were not traveling this road down to the Forest Service
property in connection with the use of your cattle?
A.

Well, I guess that would be pretty near being

correct. There might be times when we used it, but -Q.

So when you said that you traveled it two or

three times a year that would be incorrect as well, would
it not?
A.

No, because I've traveled it a lot of times.

Not every year, but most every year I went down the
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1

Circle Springs Road clear down and backup several times,

2

but we didn't use it in connection with some of the

3

salting procedures that we had for our cattle.

4
5

Q.

Now, why would you need -- You said you

didn't travel it every year, but almost every year?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Now, why would you go down there if you had

8

no need for your cattle?
A.

9

Well, because I was just a guy that went up

10

and enjoyed the Forest Service and those roads. And I

11

rode them a lot, all over. Not just that one, but many

12

others.
Q.

13

Now, when you said you traveled it two or

14

three times a year though that would be incorrect

15

because

16

A.

No, I don't think so.

17

Q.

-- this would only be for recreation?

18

A.

Well, it would be for recreation mostly, but

19

sometimes we used it for the cattle salting and other

20

stuff like that too.

21

Q.

(INAUDIBLE).

My notes indicate, Mr. Besendorfer, your

22

testimony was you used it two or three times a year.

23

Part of those two to three times a year was to haul salt

24

to cattle.

25

A.

We hauled salt up there, but I couldn't tell
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1

you. I think it was -- It could of been two or three

2

times some year and maybe another year not at all. I

3

took it up there with an international scout. And I

4

found out a bunch of times how old my scout was.

5
6

Q.

Last time you traveled that road was ten

years ago.

7

A.

Probably.

8

Q.

That's what your testimony was.

9

A.

That's about right.

10

Q.

How would you describe that road?

11

A.

Not a very good road, but it was usable.

12

Q.

Not a very good road. Does that mean it was

14

A.

Yes, in places it was rocky.

15

Q.

Was it steep?

16

A.

In places quite steep.

17

Q.

Did you ever have to remove any trees from

18

the road?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Did that happen frequently?

21

A.

Well, it depended on the time year. If I

13

rocky?

22

went down that early in the spring, yes. We moved logs

23

and trees off of it that had fallen during the winter

24

months.

25

Q

How did you remove them?
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1

A.

Saws.

2

Q.

Take a chain saw?

3

A.

No, crosscut, two handed crosscut saw. In

4

those days they didn't have chain saws.
Would you have to do that every year you'd go

5

Q.

6

down that road?

7

A.

Almost every year we ever went through there

8

we removed a few trees. Sometimes we could move them

9

just by hand. Sometimes I hooked my scout onto them and

10

pulled them out with a chain.
Q.

11

Mr. Besendorfer, let's me show you what's

12

been marked as Exhibit 6 and ask you if you can identify

13

that?

14

A.

I think this is at the head -- I can't tell

15

you the name of those roads that come together up there

16

at the head of Thorton.

17

Q.

That's not around the Circle Springs Road?

18

A.

It isn't since I've been there in ten years.

19

Q.

Show you what's been marked as Exhibit 7 and

20
21

ask you if you can identify that?
A.

Well, I guess that could be any number of

22

places, but I can't tell you just by looking at two poles

23

where it's at.

24

Q.

Okay. And Exhibit 8, can you identify that?

25

A.

Yeah, this is a portion of that road down
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there.
Q.

Circle Springs?

A.

I think that's where it's at.

I'm not

positive, but I think. Just I can't get enough view of
everything, but

--

Q.

The keep out sign, does that look familiar?

A.

Never did see it.

Q.

Never?

A.

Nope.

Q.

Now, you said that you traveled that road,

we're talking about Circle Springs, a couple sometimes a
year in the 1970's?
A.

And I think it's before that, cause I went

back and checked the age of my International Scout. And
I bought the Scout in 1964. And so we traveled it
several times after that.
Q.

Tell me the exact date in 1964 when you went

down that road?
A.

Oh, I couldn't tell you the exact date.

It

was in the early spring.
Q.

Are you sure?

A.

Well, if my memory serves me. That's the

best I could tell you.
Q.

Did you make note of it anywhere or write

anything down?
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A.

No.

Q.

What time of year would that have been?

A.

In the spring.

Q.

What time?

A.

Oh, probably about middle May, towards the

end of May, some where around there.
Q.

End of May, 1964?

A.

Probably some where in there.

Q.

But you can't give us an exact date?

A.

No, I can't.

Q.

Who was with you?

A.

My dad.

Q.

What time of day was it?

A.

We started up there probably about 10:00 in

the morning. After we loaded up with salt and started up
there about 10:00 in the morning. And we got up to
We got up to the Ridge Road probably 11, 11:30, some
where in there.
Q.

Well, now, was this 1964, the day you're

telling about, for the purpose of taking salt to cattle?
A.

That particular time it was.

Q.

Now, there were no cattle though on the

Forest Service in 1964 at the end of Circle Springs Road?
A.

That's right, but the cattle were up further.

They were -- We had to go up that way to get down to
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where we could take the salt to.
Q.

Once again, why would you travel to the end

of Circle Springs Road onto the Forest Service property
to deliver salt?
A.

Well, when I took the salt up, the reason I

took it is because they couldn't get up there with a
two-wheel drive truck. And so our cattle association
asked me if I'd take it up with the Scout, it was
four-wheel drive. So I took -- I think I took -- One
spring I took three loads up there. And we dumped them
out on the Ridge Line Road. And then a guy by the name
of Duke Johnson went up there with his pack horse and
scattered that salt.
Q.

Okay. But we're talking about the spring of

A.

Well -

Q.

You said you went down Circle Springs Road.

1969.

There would be no need to go down that to carry salt,
cause you didn't have any cattle down there?
A.

No, but we put salt out early in the spring

and then it was delivered and spread out during the
summer months. That was the need for it.
Q.

But the salt, you just said, was up on the

Ridge Line Road?
A.

Well, that's where we scattered it up there,
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1

but we went up -- The only way we could get to Ridge

2

Line Road at that particular time was to go up that other

3

road.

4

Q.

And you're back on Maple Creek, Maple Canyon

6

A.

At that time, yes, two of those.

7

Q.

Well, I'm down here on the Circle Springs?

8

A.

I'm talking about Circle Spring too.

9

Q.

Well, there's no need in 1964, when you say

5

Road?

10

you went up with your father, to take salt, there would

11

be no need to go down Circle Springs cause you didn't

12

have any cattle down in Circle Springs?
A.

13

We always had cattle over through that area,

14

after, during the summer months. We didn't in the

15

spring, no, but in the summer months we always had cattle

16

through there.
Q.

Okay. When was the next time you went in

19

A.

What do you mean the next time?

20

Q.

The next time you went down to Circle Springs

22

A.

Well, I can't tell you the exact date.

23

Q.

Are you sure you went?

24

A.

I guess, as near as I sit here I remember it.

25

Q.

Tell me when you went in 1965.

17
18

21

1964?

Road?
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A.

I don't think we went up Circle Springs Road

in '65. I think we went up Hearts Gravel in '65.
Q.

So we can take '65 out of it. What about

A.

Well, I can't -- I couldn't tell you exact

'66?

years every year that we hauled salt up there cause we've
hauled it so much and so many times.
Q.

Well, basically what you're testifying to are

times that you delivered salt to cattle?
A.

Well, delivered it up on the hill so that our

riders could scatter the salt. And they scattered it
clear up to the head of Boomer clear up to, clear across
Buck Springs, Murdock and clear through that country.
Q.

Now, Mr. Okelberry is a shareholder in West

Daniels, is he not?
A.

I guess.

Q.

And Mr. Okelberry gave permission to other

shareholders to cross over his property, did he not?
A.

Not then.

Q.

He didn't give permission?

A.

No, cause we -- There was nothing to stop

you, you just went through it.
Q.

Well, there were gates, were there not?

A.

I don't recall that there were ever any

fences when I was, when I went through there the first
145

1

few times. Maybe a lay down fence and some of them were

2

not even up at that time of year.
Q.

3

Well, now, looking at this area from the

4

Forest Service property onto Mr. Okelberry's property has

5

there not always been a fence there?

6

.A.

7

Q.

Not always a fence?

8

A.

Not always.

9

Q.

Hasn't there always been a gate there?

10

A.

No, there were never any fences there when I

11

was young. They put the fences up later in years.

12
13

No, not always.

Q.

So there was no fence separating the private

property from the Forest Service property?

14

A.

That's correct.

15

Q.

You're absolutely sure on that?

16

A.

Well, I remember it. That's the way it was.

17

I remember when they put those fences in there. I was

18

just a young kid. And I helped them put a lot of them

19

up.

20

Q.

There was no gate then over here on, coming

21

from the Forest Service property onto the Circle Springs

22

Road?

23

A.

That's correct.

24

Q.

There's no fence in that area either?

25

A.

No fence, not at first. It was later, but
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1

not at first.

2

Q.

Well, when's later?

3

A.

Well, maybe -- See, the sheep and the

4

cattle ran together there for years and years when I was

5

a young kid. Then they started putting fences up. And

6

those fences probably put up in the 50's.

7
8
9
10

Q.

And did you have any business up there in the

50's? Did you have cattle up there?
A.

Yes, I did. My dad did and I roped for him

all the time.

11

Q.

Is that part of the West Daniel's property?

12

A.

Yes, part of it and the Forest Service.

13

Q.

And on this private property did you have any

14

business up on the private property?

15

A.

Which private property are you talking about?

16

Q.

Well, I'm talking about the Okelberry

17

property.

18

A.

19
20
21
22

Well, probably had no business on it, but we

were there.
Q.

Now, tell me when you used this Circle

Springs Road in the 1970's?
A.

Well, it would be about the same time of year

23

every year as we used it to haul salt and whatever up

24

there. I can't tell you exact dates.

25

Q.

The same for the 80's then?
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1

A.

About the same.

2

Q.

So really the reason why you're up there

3

using the Circle Springs Road is for the salt, to get the

4

salt to the cattle?

5

A.

That's usually what it was for.

6

Q.

You said that you saw people up there. Give

7

me a date when you saw people, other than yourself, in

8

the 60's, 70's or 80's using that Circle Springs Road?

9

A.

Well, when I went through there you would

10

almost always see a camp and people doing recreational

11

things up there along that road, almost always.
Now, we're talking about the Glade, are you

12

Q.

13

not, down there

14

A.

No, I'm talking about clear along that Ridge

15

Line Road and ahead of Circle Spring and Maple Creek,

16

there were always camps along there.

17

Q.

I haven't even gotten to that yet. I'm

18

talking about when you saw people camping on Forest

19

Service property that comes off this Circle Springs Road.

20

In the 60's, the 70's or the 80's, when did you ever see

21

people camping there?

22

A.

It would be in June.

23

Q.

Give me a date?

24

A.

Oh, I can't give you an exact date.

25

Q.

Can you give me a year?
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A.

Well, it was up there almost every year. So

it would have to be almost every year.
4.

So every time you took salt up there -- We

concluded you didn't take salt to the end of Circle
Springs Road?
A.

Right.

Q.

Did you see people camping there?

A.

Not at the end of the road, no.

Q.

Where were they camping?

A.

Where it joins onto these other roads we did.

Up on the Forest Service there.
Q.

Well, we're black in the Glade area, are we

A.

No, no, you're off the Glade.

Q.

Well, on Mr. Okelberry's property?

A.

No, we were -- The Forest Service -- The

not?

Circle Spring Road runs along part of forest property
there. Now, I -- Right in there. Yeah.
Q.

Okay. Well, that's Forest Service property.

That's where you see people camping?
A.

Yes. And along the Ridge Road all the way

through.
Q.

Okay. What I'm

I've got my finger

pointed here. This is the east of the Okelberry
property. That's where you see the campers?
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A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, on Ridge Line Road, you said that you

have gone from Daniels to Big Hallow?
A.

Right.

Q.

So that would be from what is called Glade,

would that be true?
A.

Well, the Glade is just about middle of it.

Q.

Right in here?

A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

All the way over

A.

To Big Hallow.

Q.

-- to the gun club?

A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

You said you've traveled that on horse?

A.

I've traveled on horse.

I've traveled on

snowmobile.
Q.

Okay. Okay. Let's go back. When was the

last time you traveled on horse?
A.

Oh, about 15 years ago on a horse.

Q.

Now, you had to go through gates, did you

A.

Not in that area we didn't.

Q.

You didn't have to open any gates here as you

not?

get off the Forest Service property onto the Okelberry
property?
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1

A.

No. Last time I went through there on my

2

horse there weren't any gates up. There were gates, but

3

they were not up.

4

Q.

They were not up. So you just would ride

5

your horse (INAUDIBLE). Were there any gates as you left

6

the Okelberry property onto the West Daniels property?

7

A.

No, there were gates, but they were not up.

8

Q.

Tell me when you did that.

9

A.

Last time I went through there was about 15

10

years ago.

11

Q.

What time a year was it?

12

A.

It was in about the 20th of September.

13

Q.

And for what purpose did you do that?

14

A.

Moving cattle.

15

Q.

So you were not just on the Ridge Line Road

16

you were all over the place, were you not?

17

A.

No, we drove the cattle right on the Ridge

18

Line Road. In fact, we followed that all the way through

19

clear out to the Strawberry pasture.

20
21

Q.

Now, when you did this 15 years ago you

weren't in a vehicle, you were on a horse?

22

A.

I was on a horse that time, but there were

23

vehicles with us that followed along with us, along the

24

road.

25

Q

How is that Ridge Line Road? Is it a good
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road?
A.

We called it the CC Road. There's nobody

around here that remembers that but me. And they
improved that road. It was always a road, but it was
never improved until the CCC, civil conservation core
came in there and improved that road. And then there
were a lot of people that started to use it. And that's
when I was a very young boy.
Q.

Well, we're talking about 15 years ago, Mr.

Besendorfer
A.

Well --

Q.

-- when you went up that road?

A.

This -- The

Q.

You say there were some vehicles that were

with you.
A.

Yes.

Q.

Whose vehicle was with you 15 years ago?

A.

Duke Johnson's.

Q.

What kind of vehicle was it?

A.

It was a Chevrolet truck.

Q.

Four-wheel drive?

A.

No.

Q.

You could drive that road without four-wheel

A.

Well, that part of it he could, yes.

drive?
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Q.

Now, did he drive all the way from the Glade

over to the gun club?
A.

No.

Q.

He couldn't do that because you can't

traverse that without four-wheel drive or more than that,
would that be true?
A.

Well, some of them did. I never did, but I

took my four-wheel drive vehicle through it several
times.
Q.

Okay. You tell me 15 years ago you said you

rode your horse over there and there were vehicles that
made that. Which vehicle -- Oh, give me the name of a
person that drove a vehicle 15 years ago over that road.
A.

Now, where are you talking from? Which parts

of the road?
Q.

I'm talking about from the Glade all the way

over to the gun club?
A.
THE COURT: Well, he's -- He's told you

when he did it on his horse he didn't go all that way.
He just drove cattle. Are you asking him
MR. PETERSEN: No, I thought he said he went
the whole way.
THE WITNESS: I did, on my Scout,

International Scout, but that wasn't the year. That was
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1

15 --

2

MR. PETERSEN: Maybe I misunderstood.

3

THE COURT: You asked him -- We got this 15

4

years ago. You asked him when the last time he rode on a

5

horse on the Ridge Line Road and he said 15 years ago

6

driving cattle. But that was not

7

not the last time he rode a horse all the way through it.

8
9
10
11

The question was

MR. PETERSEN: I'm sorry, your Honor.
Q.

(BY MR. PETERSEN) Tell me the last time you

rode a horse all the way.
A.

I -- I can't remember when I rode a horse

12

clear from the Daniels Summit to the Big Hallow. I had

13

my knees replaced and I couldn't ride horse any more.

14

Q.

Well, I misunderstood then. 15 years ago

15

there were not other vehicles that you saw going all the

16

way over there?

17

A.

Oh, yes, I saw vehicles go all the way over.

18

Q.

15 years ago?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Tell me the name of the person that drove the

21
22
23

vehicle over there?
A.

Well, there were a lot of people that went

through there, recreational people.

24

Q.

Okay. Give me the name of one person.

25

A.

Well, I don't -- My son for one, Jeffery
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1

Besendorfer.

2

Q.

15 years ago drove his vehicle over?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

Was it a four-wheel drive vehicle?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Did you see him drive it?

7

A.

Well, I saw him come out of Big Hallow.

8

was down there to meet him.

9

Q.

No gates blocking it off?

10

A.

No gates.

11

Q.

Is it very steep in that area?

12

A.

Places, there are some real steep places,

13
14
15
16
17

couple places really steep and rocky.
Q.

Show you what's been marked as Exhibit 9 and

ask you if you can identify that?
A.

I think this is just up out of White Pole

just as you go over the top of the ridge.

18

Q.

That would be the Ridge Line Road?

19

A.

No -- Well, it would be a part of it, yeah.

20

Q.

Is that very steep in that area?

21

A.

Yeah, it's pretty steep.

22

Q.

You can do that without having a four-wheel

23
24
25

drive vehicle?
A.

Some of them did, but I never did. Deer

hunters went over there all the time.
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1
2

Q.

Give me the date that you saw deer hunters

driving up over Ridge Line Road on, where this picture --

3

A.

Oh, I can't give you a date.

It would be

4

during deer season. It would have been in October any

5

time after the 20th of October, between that and the last

6

of October. That's when we hunted in there almost every

7

day.

8
9

Q.

You, yourself, drove that in your

International Scout?

10

A.

Right.

11

Q.

How many times?

12

A.

I don't know how many times, several.

13

Q.

Two?

14

A.

More than that.

15

Q.

Three?

16

A.

I'd guess probably 15 times.

17

Q

15 times you drove that road?

18

A.

19

.

A lot of times. Several times a year. I did

it ever since I owned a Scout.

20

Q.

Why would you drive it 15 times?

21

A.

When?

22

Q.

Why?

23

A.

Why? Just for the fun of it. We went

24

through there looking for deer. We went through there

25

for recreational purposes. We drove that

I mean, I
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1

lived in that area. So that was the reason that we went

2

through it. We just enjoyed being there. And we did it

3

several times, many times.
Q.

4
5

Okay. Now, tell me again, when was the last

time you drove your Scout over that road?

6

A.

I can't tell you the exact time. I think we

7

drove that, let's see, 1970 -- I can't give you the

8

exact year, but it was a 1970 International Scout V-8 and

9

we drove it up through there. And I had my dad and I had

10

my two sons with me.

11

Q.

Okay. Give me

12

A.

And we picnicked up on the top there after we

13

went up on White Pole.

14
15

Q.

Give me the last time you drove your

International Scout?

16

A.

Last time I drove it?

17

Q.

Over that road, yeah.

18

A.

I'd say about 1975, '74.

19

middle of the summer.

20
21

It would be in the

Q.

Okay. So approximately 30 years ago is the

last time you went over that road with your Scout?

22

A.

With the Scout, yes.

23

Q.

Since that time you've been over it with a

A.

Not with a horse, but with snowmobiles lots

24
25

horse?
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of times.
Q.

Okay. So other than the snowmobile the last

time you drove it it was '74, '75?
A.

About then. It's as near as I could put it

down. I didn't write it down or anything, I just did it.
Q.

And when you said you drove that with a

snowmobile, when is the last time you did that?
A.

I bought a 1969 Alpine Snowmobile Bombadier

640E and I drove that up there. I bought it in January.
And I drove it across there about the 15th of February
the first time I went over with that snowmobile. And I
drove it several years after that.
Q.

Okay. You're telling me the first time, when

was it, 15th of February when?
A.

1969.

Q.

1969. And then you drove that again several

times later?
A.

Several times later.

Q.

So we got two or three times more then you

went on it?
A.

Oh, more than that. We drove it two, three

times a year for at least ten years.
Q.

Now, when you're on a snowmobile how deep was

the snow up there?
A.

If you're up around Strawberry Peak it's six,
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1

seven feet deep, eight feet. I marked it on trees in

2

several areas. Down there it wasn't that deep. It may

3

be three feet deep, maybe up as high as four in some

4

drift areas.

5
6
7

Q.

How would you know you were on Ridge Line

A.

Cause you can see it right through there.

Road?

8

You can see where the Aspen and the roads have been

9

marked. And you can see them. Sometimes we would get

10
11
12
13

off the road, but most often we were on the road.
Q.

Well, wouldn't you, when you're up in an area

like that, go out in the open fields and drive around?
A.

There aren't many open -- There aren't any

14

open fields up there. You get out in the Aspen sometimes

15

and back off the road and there are some areas where

16

there's not quite so many. But we generally stayed right

17

on the road. The only open place I can think of down

18

through there that was fairly open is where we had the

19

oil well, and that's long gone.

20
21

Q.

When you went up on there did you ever

trespass on Mr. Okelberry's property?

22

A.

Not there we didn't.

23

Q.

Where did you trespass?

24

A.

Cause that wasn't his land. We went down the

25

road -- We came -- When we came through there
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1
2

Q.

Just answer my question. You said you didn't

trespass on his property.

3

A.

Well, we went across -- We stayed on the

4

Ridge Line Road. And I guess that went through his

5

property.

6

Q.

7

his property?

8
9

You never got off it? Never trespassed on

A.

No, we stayed on there, Ridge Line Road most

all the way down there.

10

MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, I'm going to object

11

to his using the word trespass until he shows that there

12

was trespassing signs in place.

13
14

MR. PETERSEN: It's cross-examination, your

Honor.

15

THE COURT: Well, mis-characterization

-

-

16

You asked him if he was on Okelberry's property or if he

17

ever got off the road on Okelberry's property, but that's

18

kind of a legal conclusion whether he was trespassing or

19

not.

20
21

Q.

(BY MR. PETERSEN) Did you ever get off Mr.

Okelberry's property?

22

A.

Did we get off from it?

23

Q.

Uh-huh.

24

A.

Yes, we were always off from it, into the

25

Forest Service and all those areas down there we went on,
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1

but there were no trespassing signs. So I guess we

2

wouldn't ever know if we were trespassing or not.

3

Q.

Now, looking at Exhibit No. 8 could that no

4

trespassing sign been covered up with snow when you were

5

up there with a snowmobile?

6
7

A.

I don't think it would have been covered up

with snow. It might have been close to it, but --

8

Q.

Would you go over the fences?

9

A.

Fences were let down.

10

Q.

Did you go over gates?

11

A.

They were let -- They were -- Most all

12

those fences up there were let fences. There were only

13

two electric fences.

14
15

Q.

Are you aware of any locked gates over on the

fish and game side of that Ridge Line Road?

16

A.

Any what?

17

Q.

Locked gates?

18

A.

Locked?

19

Q.

Yes.

20

A.

No, not on the fish and game. At Big Hallow

21

after a while they locked that one gate, but they opened

22

it up later.

23
24
25

Q.

Now, are you aware of a gate as you begin

that road, Ridge Line Road, just by the gun club?
A.

Yes, there's a gate there. There didn't
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There wasn't a gate there until later years.
Q.

Well, we're speaking about right now.

Is

there a gate there right now?
A.

Well, I haven't been up there this year, so I

don't know if there's one there or not.
Q.

Was there one last year?

A.

There wasn't the last year. You could go

through it. My son went through it with his snowmobile
three to four times, up this forest oil well.
Q.

Would it surprise you to learn that that gate

was there and locked as of June 1st this year?
A.

It probably was. I don't know.

Q.

When you go up the road a little bit further

there's another gate, isn't there?
A.

That's right.

Q.

Do you know if they keep that gate locked or

A.

I don't know now whether they do or not. It

not?

wasn't there then.
Q.

Are you aware of any signs in that area that

say no motorized vehicles?
A.

I think they put one up last year. I'm not

sure, but might of have done. I don't know.
Q.

Prior to last year are you aware of any signs

that said no motorized vehicles?
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1

A.

No, no, I never saw any.

2

Q.

Do you feel that you have a right to drive on

3
4
5
6
7

that, up in that area on your snowmobile?
A.

Well, I don't know if we have a right or not,

but we went up the road.
Q.

Now, this Thorton Hallow Road, you're

familiar with that?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

I think your testimony was that you have not

10

driven a vehicle on that road in the last ten years?

11

A.

I haven't.

12

Q.

When you drove on that road ten years ago

13

would you describe it?

14

A.

The road?

15

Q.

Uh-huh.

16

A.

I can tell you when it was built.

17

Q.

No, just

18
19
20

I want you to describe what it

was like ten years ago.
A.

It wasn't too bad of a road. I hauled a deer

up out of there, out of the head of Thorton on my car.

21

Q.

Was it rocky?

22

A.

In places it's kind of rocky, but not so you

23

couldn't travel it.

24

Q.

Was it steep?

25

A.

No, not too bad.
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1

Q.

Was it very narrow?

2

A.

In places, yes.

3

Q.

Would you scrape the sides of your vehicle?

4

A.

No.

5

Q.

You never scraped it on trees or shrubs or

6

anything?

7

A.

No, I don't think I ever did.

8

Q.

Now, you said that you had occasion to use

9
10

that because that's the road that you would move cattle
up and down.

11

A.

Right.

12

Q.

And that would be true, would it not, because

13

you were -- You had permits over in this area over in

14

here with the Forest Service.

15

A.

Right.

16

Q.

Cattle permits.

17

A.

Right.

18

Q.

So you could go up and down this road,

19

-

Thorton Hallow Road, to get your cattle in and out.

20

A.

Right.

21

Q.

And when you were on Mr. Okelberry's

22

property, isn't it true that he gave you permission? He

23

gave permission to everybody that was a member of the

24

West Daniels to use that road?

25

A.

Not to my knowledge.
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1
2

Q.

He had cattle himself, did he not, to put in

that area?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

And without that permission you would not of

5

been able to move that, the cattle up and down that road,

6

would you?

7

A.

Well, I don't know if they ever got

8

permission, but we had to move our cattle through there

9

all the time.

10

Q.

You said that you used that road

11

approximately six times a year. And that was in

12

connection with moving cattle, wasn't it?

13
14
15

A.

Usually, yes. I went down in there for just

other, just to drive around, but
Q.

Now, at the end of this Thorton Hallow Road

16

did you ever see a sign on the Forest Service property

17

that said no motorized vehicles?

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

When did you sell your Forest Service

20

permits?

21

A.

Me?

22

Q.

Yes.

23

A.

Well, let's see

I'll have to look -- I

24

can't remember the exact date. I sold it to a doctor.

25

And I think it was about in 19, probably about 1985, '84,
165

along there.
Q.

About 20 years ago?

A.

About -- Maybe not quite that many.

Q.

Well, since you've sold your Forest Service

permit you really don't have any need for it, do you?
A.

Any need for?

Q.

To go up and down the Thorton Hallow Road.

A.

I don't have any real need, no.

Q.

There's a gate, was there not, between the

Okelberry property and the Forest Service property?
A.

Just recently.
MR. SWEAT: Where -- Where

Q.

(BY MR. PETERSEN) Well, on Thorton Hallow

Road it goes from private property, Mr. Okelberry's to
the Forest Service, does it not?
A.

That does.

Q.

Isn't there a gate?

A.

Are you talking about by the pond?

Q.

Well, I'm just talking where ever that

boundary fence is.
A.

Well, that's the boundary line.

Q.

Okay. There's a fence there, is there not?

A.

Yes, it was put up by the Forest Service.

And it had a gate on it, but it was never locked. And
there's a pond right by the side of it.
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Q.

1

Okay. Well, that gate, you say it was never

2

locked, but it was up. And if you'd go through it you'd

3

open it up and close it again, would you not?
A.

4

Yes, during the time that we had cattle up

5

there. But when we didn't have cattle there the gate was

6

never up, it was always open. They just dug it out the

7

side and that's where it was always open.

8
9
10

Q.

cattle up and down. And when you did that you would open
and close the gate?
A.

11
12

Well, you used that mostly when you put

Well, in the early years it, there was no

fence in there. That was put in later.
Q.

13

If the testimony should be, in this Court,

14

that that fence has been there since the 1930's, would

15

that be incorrect?

16

A.

That's incorrect.

17

Q.

And if the testimony is that there's been a

18

gate there since the 1930's, that would be incorrect as

19

well?

20

A.

That would be incorrect.

21

Q.

Now, when did you buy your cattle permit?

22

A.

Me?

23

Q.

Yes.

24

A.

I didn't buy one. I got it from my parents.

25

Q.

When did you obtain that?
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A.

Well, I can't tell you the exact time.

I'd

have to go back and look on my records. But I can't tell
you the exact, when I bought that or when I got it. And
I --

Q.

50's, 60's?

A.

Let's see. How old is my oldest son? I

can't remember his age. He's 50. So 50 years ago is
when I've had it. About -Q.

50 years ago you obtained the cattle permits?

A.

About 50 years ago.

Q.

And by virtue of being a shareholder in West

Daniels you were allowed to use those permits?
A.

Yes. Well, we obtained them and they were

Forest Service permits.
Q.

Now, you said that on this road, we're

talking about the Thorton Hallow Road, that you would see
people there?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What people did you ever see in the 1950's?

A.

I did see too many in the 50's, but I saw

people in there all the time hunting deer. And some of
them were camped out.
Q.

Were they on Mr. Okelberry's camped out or

were they on Forest Service property?
A.

Well, I know they're on the Forest Service.
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1

And I don't know if they're on Mr. Okelberry's or not. I

2

couldn't testify yes or no on it, because they are camped

3

along that road in many areas. And I don't know if they

4

were on his property or somebody elses.

5
6

Q.

Can you give us one date that you can confirm

that you saw people using that road in the 1950's?

7

A.

Using the Thorton Road in the 50's?

8

Q.

Yes.

9

A.

I can't give any exact date, no. I just --

10

Q.

Can you give us an exact date for the 1960's

11
12

when you saw people using that road?
A.

No, I couldn't give you a date.

I just went

13

down through there and I just saw people. I don't know

14

what date it was, but I saw them.

15

Q.

Can you give us a date in the 1970's?

16

A.

No, not an exact date.

17

Q.

Now, the Parker Canyon Road, that goes over

18

property owned by West Daniels Association?

19

A.

Right, part of it does.

20

Q.

Do you know who the president of West Daniels

21

Land Association is?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Let me show you what's been marked as Exhibit

24

No. 10 and ask you if you can identify that?

25

MR. SWEAT: Is that this letter?
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1

MR. PETERSEN: Yeah, that's that --

2

THE WITNESS: Well, Dan Rite is the president

3

of it.

4
5

MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, I'm going to object

to this.

6

THE COURT: What's your objection?

7

MR. SWEAT: It's hearsay.

8

THE WITNESS: And I don't --

9

THE COURT: Just a second.

10

THE WITNESS: Okay.

11

THE COURT: Well, he hasn't offered it yet.

12
13

Q.

signature as Mr. Rite's?

14
15

A.

Q.

And he's the president of the association, is

A.

Yes.

he not?

18
19
20

I can identify it. I -- As near as I can

tell it's Dan Rite's.

16
17

(BY MR. PETERSEN) You can identify that

MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we'd offer Exhibit

No. 10.

21

THE COURT: Well, you haven't laid any

22

foundation as to what it is. When you can do so I might

23

consider it.

24
25

Q.

(BY MR. PETERSEN) Mr. Besendorfer, this is a

letter, is it not, that's dated August 7th, 2000.
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Well, that's what it says on it. And that's

1

A.

2

all I can go by.

3

Q.

And it says to who it may concern?

4

A.

That's what it says.

5

Q.

And the letter itself is in connection with

6

all the roads on the West Daniels Land Association.

7

That's what it --

8

A.

That's what it says.

9

Q

And it refers to all the roads on the West

10

Daniels Land Association property are private?

11

A.

That's what it says. That all's I can go by.

12

Q.

All right.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we'd offer Exhibit

13
14

No. 10.
THE COURT: I won't receive it unless you can

15
16

lay some foundation. He's never seen it before. He

17

doesn't know what, where it came from and what the basis

18

for it is.

19

MR. PETERSEN: Well, he's, can identify Mr

20

Dan Rite's signature. He can identify Mr. Rite as being

21

the president of West Daniels Land Association.

22

THE COURT: But he's -- If you're going to

23

receive -- On what exception of the hearsay rule are

24

you receiving it.

25

MR. PETERSEN: Well, I don't think it is an
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exception, your Honor, because he can identify the
signature.
THE COURT: Well, it's still hearsay. It's

-- It either comes in as a business record or a public
record or, you know, if this was personal correspondence
that he had any involvement of, but I'm not going to
receive it at this point in time.
Q.

(BY MR. PETERSEN) Well, Mr. Besendorfer,

would you agree with the conclusion here that the roads
on the West Daniels Land Association property are
private.
A.

Well, I guess as far as you could say that

they're private.
Q.

So as far as you're concerned then Parker

Canyon Road is a private road?
A.

I can't answer that yes or no because it's

been used by many other people. And it goes on to the
Forest Service. And during deer season there's a lot of
people down there. And they cross over West Daniels land
to get to there.
Q.

Once again, can you give me a day, time and

place in the 1950's when you saw people using Parker
Canyon Road?
A.

No, I can't give you an exact date.
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Could you give me -172

It's too many years ago.

1

A.

2

Q.

3

A.

I couldn't.

4

Q.

The 1980's?

5

A.

I know when I used it.

6

Q.

Other than yourself.

7

A.

And our hunting group used it.

8

Q.

But as far as when you say other people you

9
10

in regards to the 1970's?

can't give us a specific date or even close to a date,
can you?
A.

11

I can tell you that it would be during deer

12

season from about the 20th of October through the 30th of

13

October, 31st. I think the season was 11 days. And I

14

know our party used it all the time. And we used it from

15

about 19, about 1950.

16

Q.

And that's for deer hunting?

17

A.

At that time particular time, yes, but we

18

used it with the cattle also. But that was for deer

19

hunting. That's the last -- You asked me last time and

20

that's, that's when we used it.

21

Q.

In regards to this Maple Canyon Road, you

22

said that you've used that road, but the last time was 10

23

to 12 years ago?

24

A.

25

Some where in there. I can't give an exact

date.
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Q.

Now, in connection with this Maple Canyon

Road, did you go from one end to the other here, starting
not far from Wallsberg all the way up to Ridge Line Road?
A.

Yes.

Q.

You drove that? Was it in a vehicle or was

it in a truck?
A.

It was my Scout.

Q.

Your International Scout?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And for what purpose did you do that?

A.

That's when I hauled salt up there too.

Q.

Okay.

A.

We hauled salt in three different roads to

get up there.
Q.

And this is about 10 to 12 years ago?

A.

No, it's been longer than that when I drove

up there.
Q.

But how long has it been since you drove that

Maple Canyon Road?
A.

Oh, you mean since I drove it personally?

Q.

Yeah.

A.

Oh, it's probably been 20 years ago or

longer. I don't know when I drove it last.
Q.

Okay. So it's been 20 years or more since

you've traveled that whole Maple Canyon Road?
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1
2
3
4

A.

The whole thing clear through, but the upper

part I've been on it several times since.
Q.

Could it be as long as 30 or 40 years ago

that you drove the whole thing?

5

A.

No, it wasn't that long ago.

6

Q.

So we're going back 20 years ago when you

7
B

9
10

drove the whole road?
A.

About, I can't say exactly.

I'd just have to

guess. It could of been 21 years. It might of been 22
years ago.

11

Q.

Is it a rough road?

12

A.

In places, yes.

13

Q.

Is it steep?

14

A.

In places.

15

Q.

Is it narrow?

16

A.

In places.

17

Q.

Not a road that you would travel unless you

18
19
20

had a real reason to travel, is it?
A.

Well, I don't know. I had a reason to travel

it. That's why I was on it.

21

Q.

And that was to take the salt?

22

A.

And we went up there for deer hunting. We

23
24
25

went through it. We didn't -- I guess that's a reason.
Q.

Do you know if that road has ever been washed

out from time to time?
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A.

In some two or three places it was pretty

well washed out, but -Q.

And that happens periodically, doesn't it, on

that Maple Canyon Road?
A.

Occasionally, yes, it does.

Q.

It gets washed out?

A.

It gets partly washed out, so that it makes

it difficult to get across those places.
Q.

Do you know if you can even drive it today?

A.

I hadn't been on it that -- I couldn't tell

you today what it's like.
Q.

You wouldn't know whether or not you could

travel that road today then?
A.

I couldn't tell you today.

Q.

Now, you said that you saw people using that

A.

Up on the top up toward the Ridge Line.

Q.

Okay. So I'm pointing with my pen, here.

road?

We're talking Ridge Line Road. That's where you saw
people using the road?
A.

No, up right -- Where it goes back and it

doubles back up there. A little further in than that.
Right in there in places.
Q.

Okay. We're looking at, I think this is

section 24. You didn't see down further, Maple Canyon
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1

Road -- You didn't see people using it down further

2

then?

3

A.

No, I never saw anybody down there.

4

Q.

And you never saw anybody drive from one end

5

of the road to the other?
A.

6
7

So I never saw anybody.

8
9

I never -- They weren't driving with me.

Q.

These people that you saw in the upper end,

could you give us a date on that?
A.

10

Well, all I can say would be the sometime

11

when I delivered salt up there. And that would have been

12

some where the middle of May and the first of June.

13

Q.

Every year?

14

A.

Almost every year we did that.

15

Q.

If I were to give you a specific -- In the

16

50's, if you could give us a specific date you would not

17

be able to do that?

18

A.

No, I couldn't give you an exact date.

19

Q.

And you couldn't give us an exact date in the

21

A.

No.

22

Q.

Or the 70's?

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

Or even the 80's?

25

A.

Not an exact date. It would have to be

20

60's?
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1

approximately.
MR. PETERSEN: Can I have a minute with my

2
3

client, your Honor?
THE COURT: You may.

4
5

Q.

(BY MR. PETERSEN) Mr. Besendorfer, let me

6

show you what's been marked as Defendant's Exhibit No.

7

11, it's a picture, and ask if you can identify that.

8
9
10

A.

No, this is something that's been put in

there later. I can -- I can't tell you.
Q.

You wouldn't know where that's at? How about

11

Exhibit No. 12, Defendant's Exhibit No -- Can you

12

identify that?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

This is a picture of a sign, Mr. Besendorfer,

15

that says road closed to motorized vehicles. Did you

16

ever see any signs like that on any Forest Service

17

property?

18

A.

Not up there I didn't, I haven't.

19

Q.

Did you ever see

20

A.

I never seen -- Okay. Go ahead.

21

Q.

Did you ever see a sign like that on any of

22

the fish and game property?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Okay. Where did you see the sign like that

25

on the fish and game property?
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A.

I think they got one up there by the gun

3

Q.

Okay. Anywhere else?

4

A.

No, I've never seen any anywhere else, unless

1
2

5
6

club.

it was down around Wallsberg someplace, but I
Q.

So this is a sign that says closed to

7

motorized vehicles, you said it's down by the gun club,

8

but you indicated several years back you actually

9

traveled that in your International Scout?

10

A.

I did.

11

Q.

And that would be contrary to this sign then?

12

A.

I don't know if it would or not.

13

MR. PETERSEN: That's all, your Honor.

14

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Sweat?

15

MR. SWEAT: Just a couple, your Honor.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION

16
17
18
19

BY MR. SWEAT:

Q.

Mr. Besendorfer, you indicated that you sold

out on your cow permit 20 years ago, is that correct?

20

A.

That was a forest permit, yes.

21

Q.

Since that time have you ever used the Parker

22

Canyon Road?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Into the forest?

25

A.

Yes.
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Q

Have you used Thorton Hallow Road into the

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

You just indicated when Mr. Petersen showed

1
2

forest?

5

you a picture that had a sign, that you didn't really

6

know where that sign sat?

7

A.

That's right.

8

Q.

But you did say that you'd seen one up by the

9

gun club?

10

A.

Right.

11

Q.

Do you recall when you saw it up by the gun

A.

About a year ago I think I saw it for the

12
13

club?

14

first time. I think it's probably been in there longer

15

than that, but that's the first time I saw ever saw it?

16

MR. SWEAT: No further questions.

17

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Petersen?

18

MR. PETERSEN: Just briefly

19

RECROSS-EXAMINATION

20

BY MR. PETERSEN:

21

Q.

You indicated you sold your forest permits

22

about 20 years ago and you've used these roads since

23

then, but you can't give us a date, time or place when

24

you've done that?

25

A.

Pardon me? I didn't hear.
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Q.

1

In the last 20 years since you've sold your

2

Forest Service permits you can't give us a date, time,

3

when you used those roads?
A.

4
5

Well, I've -- I can give you a date last

year when I used all of that road.

6

Q.

You're talking the Ridge Line Road?

7

A.

I'm talking Ridge Line, I'm talking about

8

Thorton, I'm talking about Parker, I'm talking about

9

White Pole, I'm talking about part of this Circle Springs

10

Road and I'm talking about part of the Maple Creek Road

11

and Hearts Gravel.

12
13

Q.

Well, Hearts Gravel isn't even a subject of

this lawsuit, is it?
I don't know.

14

A.

I guess not.

15

Q.

Now, when you did that a year ago you had to

16

go through gates, did you not?
A.

The gates were not up. The gates were all

19

Q.

Were the locks blown off?

20

A.

No, they -- They were just open. They

17
18

down.

21

hadn't been -- No one had been up there to put them up.

22

And when we went through last spring my son and I, we cut

23

the trees out clear down through, clear down to White

24

Pole.

25

Q

Where did you cut trees out at?
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1

A.

Along the Ridge Line Road.

2

Q.

So all along Mr. Okelberry's property you cut

4

A.

We cut trees that had --

5

Q.

How many trees did you cut?

6

A.

-- fallen across. Probably two or three.

7

Q.

You wouldn't of been able to traverse that

3

8

trees?

road without cutting those trees out?
A.

9

Not at that time we wouldn't. We went

10

through from one piece of property to the next and the

11

next.

12
13

Q.

Did you tell Mr. Okelberry you were cutting

trees that was on his property?

14

A.

No.

15

Q.

You just went and did it?

16

A.

Well, they were across the road and we had to

17

get down onto our property. So there was no other way to

18

get in there.

19
20

Q.

Now, your purpose of doing that was to get

done on the West Daniels property?

21

A.

Right.

22

Q.

And Mr. Okelberry has always given permission

23

to the members of the West Daniels Land Association to

24

travel on that road, has he not?

25

A.

I guess, I don't really know.
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1

Q

All right.

2

MR. PETERSEN: That's all.

3

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Sweat?

4

MR. SWEAT: No, your Honor.

5

THE COURT: You may step down. Thank you.

6

Next witness.
MR. SWEAT: The plaintiff would call Martin

7
8

Wall.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Wall, come forward. I

9
10

assume you were sworn this morning?

11

MR. SWEAT: He was not, your Honor.

12

THE COURT: Okay. Come forward. Okay.

13

Raise your right hand and the clerk will give you an

14

oath.
CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the

15
16

testimony you shall give in the matter now before this

17

Court shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing

18

but the truth, so help you God?

19

THE WITNESS: I do.

20

THE COURT: Have a seat.
DIRECT EXAMINATION

21
22
23
24
25

BY MR. SWEAT:

Q.

Mr. Wall, would you please state your full

name and address for the record?
A.

Martin E. Wall, 1245 East Main Canyon Road,
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1

Wallsberg.

2

Q.

Do you go by Martin?

3

A.

Martin or Ed, either one.

4

I'll answer to

pretty near anything.

5

Q.

How do most people know you by?

6

A.

Ed.

7

Q.

What's your birth date?

8

A.

January 15, '36.

9

Q.

How long have you lived in Wasatch County?

10

A.

Most of my life.

11

Q.

Do you recall when you moved to Wasatch

13

A.

I beg your pardon?

14

Q.

Do you recall when you moved to Wasatch

16

A.

Oh, I was born and raised in Wasatch County.

17

Q.

Oh, okay.

18

A.

In Wallsberg, yeah. I moved away for a short

12

15

19
20
21

County?

County?

time when I was working construction.
Q.

Now, are you familiar with the area over east

of the City of Wallsberg?

22

A.

Yes, sir.

23

Q.

Why are you familiar with that area?

24

A.

Oh, that's our old stomping grounds I guess

25

that's the best way you could describe it. Do a lot of
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hunting, picnicking, traveling around through that
country.
Q.

Do you own any property up in the mountains

east and north of Wallsberg?
A.

No, sir.

Q.

Have you ever leased any property up in that

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Have you ever worked for anyone that owns

area?

property up there?
A.

No, sir.

Q.

Have you ever worked for anyone that has

leased property up there?
A.

No, sir.

Q.

I want to show you what has been marked as

Exhibit No. 2. And I don't know if you've ever seen this
exhibit, but if you want you can step down and take a
look at it for a minute.
MR. SWEAT: With the Court's permission?
THE COURT: If you want to go down and

examine it closer so you can orient yourself.
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

Okay. Uh-huh.
Why don't you point out to him

where Wallsberg is. That might help him orient himself.
THE WITNESS: Okay. And this could be the
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1

Ridge Road, Ridge Line. Uh-huh. Maple Canyon. Okay.

2
3

Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) You just discussed several

roads. Are you familiar with those roads?

4

A.

Yes, I am.

5

Q.

Let's start with Circle Springs Road. Are

6

you familiar with that road?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Do you understand it to be about where it's

9

depicted on this map?

10

A.

Uh-huh, correct.

11

Q.

Have you ever traveled upon that road?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

What portions of that road have you traveled?

14

A.

The whole length of it.

15

Q.

When did you first use that road?

16

A.

Oh, good grief. Mid 50's, exact dates I

17

couldn't tell you, but through the mid 50's until it was

18

impossible to get in there any more.
Q.

When was it impossible to get in there any

A.

When Mr. Okelberry put up the no trespassing

23

Q.

Do you remember when that was?

24

A.

Oh, I can't remember, sir, no. I'm getting

19
20

more?

21
22

25

signs.

old. My memory isn't what it use to be.
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Q.

Was it 30 years ago?

A.

No, it's not been that long, no, no.

Q.

Ten years ago?

A.

Yeah, that area. Ten years ago, uh-huh.

Q.

Why did you first use this road?

A.

Why?

Q.

Why?

A.

Hunting, and we used it in the wintertime,

snowmobiling.
Q.

Did you have a snowmobile in the mid 50's?

A.

No, no.

Q.

So your first use would have been

A.

Hunting, uh-huh.

Q.

Typically from the mid 50's up until

approximately 10 years ago, how often would you use
Circle Springs Road in a given year?
A.

Oh, I would say two or three times on hunting

trips. You know, you wouldn't go in there every year,
but when you was hunting that area you would go in there
two or three times in the -- You know, we hunted the
whole valley, we didn't just hunt that side. So it
depended on where we was, you know.
Q.

From the time that you first started going in

till you stopped when the no trespassing signs come up,
did you ever run into locked gates?
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1

A.

No.

2

Q.

Were there fences and gates across that road?

3

A.

There was, yes.

4

Q.

Could you tell us where the gates were?

5

A.

Well, the Ridge Road forks just after you get

6

off the Main Canyon Road. You're going north, that road

7

forks, the one -- They both actually continue along the

8

ridge, but the left fork of that goes down in there and

9

cuts down into Circle.

10

Q.

Is there a gate some where along there?

11

A.

Yes, there is.

12

Q.

Where at?

13

A.

It's not too far from where that road forks.

14

Q.

Is it fair to say it's where it crosses into

15

Mr. Okelberry's property?

16

A.

Uh-huh.

17

Q.

Is there another gate where it crosses back

18

into the forest property on the south end?

19
20
21
22
23

A.

The two roads come back together on the south

Q

I'm speaking particularly about Circle

end.

Springs Road back here.
A.

Circle Springs Road -- No, Circle Springs

24

does not go back onto the forest. It ends at the forest

25

boundaries there.
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1

Q.

Ends at the forest boundary?

2

A.

Uh-huh.

3

Q.

Can you get into the forest from there?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

Is there a gate there?

6

A.

I would say there -- No -- There use to

7

be a gate off to the left of the springs there, as I

8

recall.

9

Q.

When you

10

A.

I wouldn't want to swear to that, but it

11

seems like there was.

12

Q.

What kind of gates were they?

13

A.

Wire gates.

14

Q.

Were they always closed when you used the

A.

Uh-huh, yes, yeah, most of the time. Now,

15
16

road?

17

the ones on the main roads there, like the road that

18

drops down into Circle, if there was no stock in there

19

they would be open.

20
21

Q.

Yeah, let's speak just about, just this green

road, Circle Springs Road.

22

A.

Uh-huh.

23

Q.

Are the gates always up on that road?

24

A.

If there was no stock in there they'd be

25

down. During the summer when there was stock, why the
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stock, would have them closed. And we would honor them,
leave them the way we found them.
Q.

During the time that you used that road were

you ever asked by anyone not to use it?
A.

No.

Q.

Did you ever seek permission from anyone to

use that road?
A.

No.

Q.

Did you ever see or were you ever with other

people that used that road?
A.

Oh, yes, there was the family, our hunting

companions and one thing or another.
Q.

Did any of them own property up in this area

that you're aware of?
A.

No.

Q.

Did you ever hear or see of others being told

to stop using that or not to use that road between the
50's and approximately 10 years ago?
A.

Not -- Not until Mr. Okelberry was, posted

in there.
Q.

Now, are you aware of the road depicted in

red, the Ridge Line Road?
A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

Have you ever traveled on that road?

A.

Yes, sir, many times.
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Q.

When do you think you first traveled on the

Ridge Line Road?
A.

I think in mid 50's.

Q.

Why did you use the Ridge Line Road?

A.

Oh, we'd use that to get into Circle and to

get through White Pole and off on the other side into
Thorton Canyon, that area out in there. I mean, that
give you access to the whole top of that mountain there.
Q.

When did you last use this road?

A.

Last year, deer hunting.

Q.

Was there any gates in place?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Were there no trespassing signs?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Were the gates locked?

A.

Yes.

Q.

How did you go through?

A.

I beg your pardon?

Q.

How did you use the road to go through?

A.

I just used the road up to the gates and

that's it.
Q.

Oh.

A.

That was the end of it.

Q.

When was the last time you used that entire

length of the Ridge Line Road from where it enters Mr.
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1

Okelberry's property?

2
3

A.

I would say approximately oh, 20, 25 years ago.

4
5

You know, I -- I could not give you a date.

Q.

And the last time you used it was there any

no trespassing signs?

6

A.

No, sir, there was not.

7

Q.

Was there any locked gates?

8

A.

No.

9

Q.

Do you recall if there were any gates across

10

the road?

11

A.

There's gates there, yes.

12

Q.

Typically when you'd use it would you leave

13

the gate open?
If the gate was closed I would close it when

14

A.

15

I went through.

16

Q.

Did you ever see others using the road as you

18

A.

Yes, sir.

19

Q.

Typically -- Or when you saw others do you

17

20
21

did?

know what they were using the road for?
A.

Same thing I was. Just get out and tour the

22

country. You know, get out, get out in the woods and

23

hunt. Do a little camping, whatever the occasion was,

24

you know.

25

Q.

And were you ever asked by anyone not to use
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1

the Ridge Line Road?

2

A.

No, sir.

3

Q.

Do you ever recall seeing any no trespassing

4

signs during that time?

5

A.

No, sir.

6

Q.

Do you recall ever seeing locked gates during

7

that time?

8

A.

No, sir.

9

Q.

I want to bring your attention to what has

10

been designated as Thorton Hallow Road, this blue section

11

on the map.

12

A.

Uh-huh.

13

Q.

Have you ever driven on that road?

14

A.

Just the upper end of it, but, you know, just

15

for a short distance off from the Ridge Road. I've never

16

been clear down into Thorton Canyon all the way, no. But

17

I have done it to, you know, access the upper part of

18

Thorton and them canyons.
But you've never went clear through into the

19

Q.

20

Forest Service?

21

A.

I haven't, no.

22

Q.

About how much of it --

23

A.

Well, yeah. Now, as I understand it the

24

forest ain't, is not very far from what we call White

25

Pole. And you'd go into White Pole and then take that
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1

road that lead off towards Thorton.

2

Q.

Reach about Thorton Hallow?

3

A.

Uh-huh.

4

I don't know exactly where the,

where the property line is through there.

5

Q.

And why were you using the road?

6

A.

Hunting.

7

Q.

Have you ever heard of a road called Parker

8

Canyon Road?
A.

9
10

it? Or forks off from it.

11
12

Q.

Is Thorton Hallow and Parker Canyon the same

A.

I believe they're, you know -- They both

canyon?

13
14

Yes, yes, it's basically the same road, isn't

come up right into that same area.

15

Q.

Have you ever been down into Parker Canyon?

16

A.

I haven't, no.

17

Q.

Have you ever been down into Thorton Hallow?

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

Are you aware of a road called Maple Canyon

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Have you ever driven on Maple Canyon Road?

23

A.

Yes, sir, many times.

24

Q.

When did you first drive on Maple Canyon

20

25

Road?

Road?
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A.

The same time, through the 50's, yeah, mid

Q.

And what portion of Maple Canyon Road would

50's.

you use?
A.

Full length of it.

Q.

The full length being --

A.

Being from the Wallsberg road, Main Canyon

Road to the Ridge Road.
Q.

And when did you last use Maple Canyon Road?

A.

It's been quite sometime ago, yeah. I don't

know date wise. I'm going to say 20 years.
Q.

Some where around the 80's?

A.

Uh-huh, yeah.

Q.

And you started using it in the 50's?

A.

Yes.

Q.

From the 50's to the 80's how often per year

do you think you'd use Maple Canyon Road?
A.

Oh, that was really a favorite spot of ours

to go hunting. I would say we would use that two or
three times every hunt. We really enjoyed riding up
through there.
Q.

And you'd drive clear up and connect into the

Ridge Line Road?
A.

Yes, uh-huh.

Q.

During that time did you ever see a no
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1

trespassing sign?

2

A.

No.

3

Q.

Were you ever asked by anyone not to use the

5

A.

No.

6

Q.

Were there gates across this road?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Did you ever run into a gate that was locked

4

9
10

road?

across this road? Were the gates always closed on this
road?
A.

11

That again would depend on whether there was

12

stock in the area or not. Sometimes they're up sometimes

13

they're down.

19

Q.

Did you ever see or hear of anyone being

15

stopped from using Maple Canyon Road while, during the

16

time that you used it?

17

A.

Yeah -- Not during the time I used it, no.

18

Q.

You've since heard that people are stopped?

19

A.

Since that time, yeah, it's stopped. You

20

can't use it.

21

Q.

Going back to Ridge Line Road. How far have

22

you traveled down from Ridge Line Road to the Big Glade

23

area?

24
25

A.

Well, the full length of it I guess you would

say. Going north on that thing it gets pretty near
196

impossible to what we use to call the -- Oh, what did
we call that? Anyway it gets over there where it's
pretty near impossible along the north end of it there.
Q.

Is that on Mr. Okelberry's property? Is that

on fish and game property? Where
A.

That's on fish and game property.

Q.

Fish and game property?

A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

And you've traveled down to that point?

A.

Oh, yes, yeah.

Q.

During the between the 50's and 80's did

A.

Yes.

Q.

-- travel the entire length?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you think you'd do that each year?

A.

No, we wouldn't run that every year, but

you

some, you know, periodically we'd run over there.

Q.

In the time that you used the Ridge Line Road

and would go across did you are get stopped anywhere
along the Ridge Line Road?
A.

No.

Q.

Did you ever see no trespassing signs

anywhere along the Ridge Line Road?
A.

No.
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1

2

Q

Did you ever run into locked gates anywhere

.

along the Ridge Line Road?

3

A.

No.

4

Q.

How did you use the road? What -- Did you

5
6
7

walk them?
A.

We had four-wheel drive pickups that we would

drive on, you know, pickup.

8

Q.

And that's what you have always used?

9

A.

Yeah.

10

Q.

Did you ever use anything besides a

11

12
13
14
15
16
17

four-wheel drive?
A.

That was about all, yeah. That was our main

way of going.
Q.

Even in the 50's when you was younger did you

use four-wheel drives?
A.

No, they didn't have them then, at least we

didn't have them. We wasn't quite that rich then.

18

Q.

How did you use the roads then?

19

A.

We had old cars, old trucks, sort of things

20
21
22

we put together. Whatever we could get in and go on.
MR. SWEAT: I have no further questions at

this time, your Honor.

23

THE COURT: Mr. Petersen, cross?

24

MR. PETERSEN: Thank you, your Honor.

25

CROSS-EXAMINATION
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BY MR. PETERSEN:

Q.

Mr. Wall, I gather you're a hunter?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you like to

A.

I've been out a few times.

Q.

Do you like to hunt every year?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And do you hunt other areas besides this

property designated on Exhibit 2? Do you ever go
anywhere else to hunt?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Where else would you hunt?

A.

We hunt Strawberry Valley and other parts of

the Wallsberg area and up in the Strawberry Valley.
Q.

And this would be from the 1950's, would it

A.

Yes, uh-huh.

Q.

So when you're talking about a hunting

not?

season, the hunting season lasts what, 2 to 3 weeks?
A.

Uh-huh, yes.

Q.

So 2 to 3 weeks you're hunting not only in

this area designated, set fourth in Exhibit 2, but you're
hunting other areas as well?
A.

That would depend on the particular year, you

know.
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Q.

Sure.

A.

You wouldn't hunt that whole area I described

all in one year. You may kind of concentrate here and
here, you know. And you wouldn't -- You couldn't cover
that whole thing in one hunting season.
Q.

No, that would be too much, wouldn't it?

A.

Yes, yeah.

Q.

So would there be years that you would

concentrate on the, it was Exhibit 2, and other areas
where you would concentrate in other areas?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

Like Strawberry?

A.

Basically, yeah, yeah.

Q.

So if it was a year that you were not

concentrating on this Exhibit 2, where that's designated,
you wouldn't be up there that often, would you?
A.

You may go up there, you may not. I mean,

you know, it's -- It depended on where you want to go
that particular hunt, day.
Q.

But you would -- You would hunt these other

areas. You would hunt where ever you thought it was the
best hunting?
A.

Of course, yes, sir.

Q.

And you've got about 2 or 3 weeks to do it?

A.

Yes, sir.
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1
2

Q.

Now, this Circle Springs Road, you indicated

the last time that you went there was 10 years ago?

3

A.

Oh, did I say 10 or 20?

4

Q.

It could be been

5

A.

It's been quite sometime ago, yeah.

6

Q.

So as far as the Circle Springs Road, and I'm

7

indicating this, I think it's marked in green.

8

A.

Yes, yes.

9

Q.

It could be up to 20 years ago since you've

10

hunting that ground?

11

A.

It's been quite a while since I've hunted in

12

there, yes. I would say since Mr. Okelberry closed the

13

gates.

14

Q.

And it could be as long as 20 years ago?

15

A.

I could not say a specific time, sir.

16

Q.

I think your testimony on direct examination

17

was 10 years ago. And then

18

A.

Okay.

Okay.

19

Q.

-- you indicated it could be even longer

20

than that then?

21

A.

It's possible.

22

Q.

Let me show you what's been marked as

23

Defendant's Exhibit No. 6 and ask you if you can identify

24

that?

25

A.

No, sir, I can't.
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1
2

Q.

It doesn't look familiar as far as going on

to the Circle Spring area?

3

A.

Not really, huh'uh.

4

Q.

I'll show you what's been marked as

5

Defendant's Exhibit No. 7 and ask you if you can identify

6

that?

7

A.

No, sir.

8

Q.

Does that look like any gates that would lead

9
10

onto the Circle Springs area?
A.

Well, it could be, yes.

I mean, all the

11

gates up there, they're just a wire gate, you know. Back

12

then that's what they were, just a wire gate.

13

Q.

Sure. Let me show you what's been marked as

14

Defendant's Exhibit No. 8. There's a no trespassing

15

sign. Did you ever see, at any time see that no

16

trespassing sign there?

17
18
19
20
21
22
23

A.

And there again, I can't really definitely

say I've seen that, no, sir, that I recall.
Q.

Is it possibly it could of been there and you

just wouldn't notice it?
A.

Well, if it was there I'd notice it, of

course, keep out, yeah.
Q.

You indicated that your memory is not as good

24

as it use to be. Would that be true? And I think you

25

indicated on direct examination that you would not go
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1

there every year in Circle Springs to hunt that area?

2

A.

Not every year, no.

3

Q.

There were gates though leading into the

4

Circle Springs?

5

A.

Yes, sir.

6

Q.

Did you ever go in there using those gates

7

when you had to open the gates and close them again?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

And your memory goes back to the 1950's, does

11

A.

Yes, uh-huh.

12

Q.

So going back to the 1950's, there were gates

10

13

it not?

in that area then?

14

A.

Yes, uh-huh.

15

Q.

You indicated that the Circle Springs Road

16

ends at the Forest Service line?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

Doesn't go beyond that?

19

A.

No.

20

Q.

And that there is a wire gate there?

21

A.

As I recall there was. Like I say, I

22

couldn't definitely say, but as I recall there was a gate

23

there to get through, uh-huh.

24
25

Q.

You said when ever there was a gate you would

honor it. You would not -- You'd open the gate, drive
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through and then close the gate?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

At the end of that Circle Springs Road did

you ever see a sign that looked like this? I'm showing
you what's marked as Defendant's Exhibit No. 12.
A.

Well, I seen signs like that, but I cannot

particularly say where that sign was at, that particular
one.
Q.

We're looking at a sign that says road closed

to motorized vehicles. You said you've seen that sign.
Have you seen it in this area where the Okelberry
property is, signs like that?
A.

No.

Q.

You've seen it elsewhere then?

A.

I've seen it other places, yes.

Q.

But not in this area?

A.

I can't recall seeing it in this Circle Road,

no, sir.
Q.

Now, on this Ridge Line Road, you said you

started using that in the mid 50's?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And once again, this would be something that

you would hunt, not every year, but periodically you
would hunt in that area?
A.

Yes, uh-huh.
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1

Q.

So we couldn't -- You wouldn't -- It

2

wouldn't be accurate to say that you used that road every

3

year to hunt?

4

A.

Not every year, no, but a whole bunch.

5

Q.

You indicated that last year you used that

6

road and there were gates in place?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

And so you didn't really go down that road at

9

all then last year?
A.

10
11

From the Main Canyon Road to the fence, to

the gate. I did use it, yes.

12

Q.

From Main Canyon in -- And that's an area

13

where you're traversing over Forest Service property, is

14

it not?

15

A.

Correct, yes.

16

Q.

Now, as far as the Thorton Hallow Road and

17

the Parker Canyon Road, you indicated that you really

18

never gone to the bottom of those roads?

19

A.

I haven't, no.

20

Q.

So you're not claiming that you've used those

21
22

roads over any period of time?
A.

Just the upper end of them roads. From the

23

Ridge Line Road off into that area, you know, never went

24

clear down in there, no.

25

Q.

Never been to the bottom of those roads?
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1

A.

No, sir.

2

Q.

You indicated that Thorton Hallow Road is in

3

the White Pole area?

4

A.

Yes, it is.

5

Q.

And you indicated that both the Thorton

6

Hallow and the Parker Canyon kind of merge or they're in

7

the same

8

A.

As I recall, yeah.

9

Q.

Actually there's quite a distance, is there

10

not, between the Thorton Hallow Road and the Parker

11

Canyon Road?

12

A.

You know, I don't --

13

Q.

You wouldn't know.

14

A.

I don't know.

15

Q.

Do you recall signing an affidavit that's on

16

file with the Court, which affidavit is dated the 23rd of

17

January, 2003?

18

A.

Okay.

19

Q.

Do you recall signing an affidavit?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

You stated, "I have personally used the

22

following roads as indicated; Parker Canyon Road from

23

1950 to the present". That would not be accurate,

24

because you never went to the bottom of Parker Canyon

25

Road, did you?
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A.

1
2

Well, from what I understand that Parker

Canyon Road comes in and hooks into the Ridge Line Road.

3

Q.

Okay. But -

4

A.

As long -- You know, if I'm not mistaken.

5

Q.

It does do that. But you never went to the

6

bottom of Parker Canyon Road.

7

A.

No, but I did use the upper end of the road.

8

Q.

Okay. But this is not accurate when you said

9
10

Parker Canyon Road from 1950 to present. It should say
the upper part of Parker Canyon Road then.

11

A.

Well, okay.

12

Q.

Same with Thorton Hallow Road, you stated

13

under oath that you used the Thorton Hallow Road from

14

1950 to present.

15

A.

Uh-huh.

16

Q.

That would only be the upper part of Thorton

17

Hallow Road, would it not?

18

A.

Yeah, yeah, you're right.

19

Q.

And that wouldn't be on a yearly basis, that

20

would be just on the years that you were hunting in that

21

area?

22

A.

Correct.

23

Q.

Now, the Maple Canyon Road, could you

24
25

describe that road?
A.

Well, that road takes off from the Main
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1

Canyon Road, that is main road through Wallsberg, goes up

2

through Maple Canyon, what we always called Maple Creek,

3

same thing, Maple Canyon, and it would connect into the

4

Ridge Line Road. And it was just a road that went up

5

that canyon and give you access to the country.

6

Q.

Now, in this of these exhibits, some of these

7

maps, that's indicated as a trail, would that be

8

accurate?

9

A.

Well, I guess that would be depend on whether

10

you considered it a trail or a road. But we would always

11

take it, like the pickups or an old beat up car, whatever

12

we had at that time and we would go through.

13

Q.

It's a pretty rocky road, isn't it?

14

A.

Oh, yes, it was. It was kind of a rough

15

road, yeah.

16

Q.

And pretty steep, was it not?

17

A.

It wasn't too bad for steep, no, but it was

18
19
20
21
22

pretty rough. You are climbing all the way up it.
Q.

It would be impossible to travel that road in

an ordinary passenger car, would it not?
A.

It would if I was driving it, it was my car.

Yes, it would.

23

Q.

You wouldn't drive a car up it?

24

A.

No.

25

Q.

You wouldn't go up in anything other than a
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four-wheel drive vehicle, would you?
A.

Yeah, pickup, you know, something that

-_

Correct, yeah.
Q.

Do you know if you could travel that road

A.

Personally I don't know, but from what I

today?

understand it it's grown in and rocks and that's fell
down into (INAUDIBLE) things where it's practically
impossible, impassable.
Q.

It's almost impassable then?

A.

That's what I understand.

Q.

And there have been periods of time since the

1950's when it has been impassable, has it not?
A.

Not really, no.

Q.

Are you aware of any time since the 1950's

when it was washed out?
A.

No, sir, I can't say that I have, no.

Q.

Your use of that road would be on these

occasions when you'd go up there and hunt, isn't it, this
use of the Maple Canyon Road, when you'd go up there and
hunt in the fall of the year?
A.

Yes. Of course, we would go in there other

times also, you know, just to get out in the woods, take
the family out picnicking. And you know, it was a nice,
pretty, green canyon to get up into and enjoy.
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Q.

Isn't it true there was a gate down in the

Wallsberg side?
A.

Yes.

Q.

There was a gate there?

A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

Would you open the gate and go through it?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Close the gate?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And isn't it a fact that there's a gate up on

the Ridge Line Road?
A.

There was a gate on the Ridge Line Road, but

not on the Maple Creek Road. The Maple Creek Road, as I
recall, it never had a gate on the upper end of it.
Q.

So the gate that you're referring to is not

on the Maple Canyon Road side, it's some where else on
the Ridge Line Road side?
A.

Correct, uh-huh, unless it's been put there,

you know, since Mr. Okelberry owned it.
Q.

Now, on this Ridge Line Road, you indicated

that it's almost impossible to travel the full length of
that. That would be correct, would it not?
A.

On the Ridge Line Road?

Q.

On the Ridge Line Road.

A.

I don't think I said that, sir.
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1
2

Q.

north end, almost impossible.
A.

3
4

My notes indicate that the full length, the

That's clear over to the north end where the

road just kind of fades out and no more road.

5

Q.

Just about goes out. Let me show you a

6

picture, if I may. This is Defendant's Exhibit No. 9 and

7

ask you if can identify that?

8
9

A.

Oh, I would say that's the road coming up out

of White Pole.

10

Q.

On the Ridge Line

11

A.

It sure looks like it. On the Ridge Line

12

Road, uh-huh. You know, it's hard to tell looking at

13

something like that.

14

Q.

Sure.

15

A.

But that's what I would say that was.

16

Q.

That's almost in one of those areas when you

17

described it's impossible or impassable?

18

A.

MR. PETERSEN: Can I confer with my client

19
20

That is low range and four-wheel drive.

for just a minute?

21

THE COURT: You may.

22

MR. PETERSEN: I think that's all, your

23
24
25

Honor.
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Sweat?
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
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BY MR. SWEAT:
Q.

Mr. Wall, when Mr. Petersen was asking you

questions he was asking a lot about whether you would
hunt every area every year.
A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

And you indicated that you wouldn't

necessarily hunt every -A.
Q.

Correct.
road every year. Did you ever use these

roads for other than hunting?
A.

Yeah, we would go in them -- Like I told

him earlier we'd use these just to get out in the woods,
you know, just to get out and travel, enjoy it.
Q.

Is there ever a chance that one year that you

maybe didn't hunt and use Maple Canyon Road, that you
would of just taken a ride up it?
A.

Very definitely.

Q.

Is there ever a chance that once when you

didn't use Main or Ridge Line Road to hunt you would of
just taken a drive on it?
A.

Yes, yes. We would gather wood up in that

area in the fall, firewood.
Q.

Now, you indicated that you have a hard time

remembering exact dates; is that correct?
A.

That's correct, yeah, back that far.
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1
2
3

Q.

You kind of remember the 50's. Why do you

remember the 50's?
A.

Oh, I was married in the 50's.

That's when I

4

turned 18. And I was a big guy, you know, tough. I

5

could get around. Had wheels of mine own and everything,

6

you know. And that's just kind of when everything

7

started happening.

8

Q.

Stands out a little more?

9

A.

Yeah.

10

Q.

You're a little less definite on when you

11
12
13
14
15
16

quit using these roads; is that correct?
A.

Well, I still use them as much as I can until

I run into a no trespassing sign.
Q.

Is there any doubt in your mind that you used

the roads as indicated between the 50's and the 80's?
A.

No doubt whatsoever.

17

MR. SWEAT: That's all I have, your Honor.

18

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Petersen?

19

MR. PETERSEN: Yes, sir.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION

20
21

BY MR. PETERSEN:

22

Q.

23

Mr. Wall, you indicated you used these roads

to gather, go gather firewood?

24

A.

Yes, uh-huh.

25

Q.

Okay. Now, you -- You said you used the
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Maple Canyon Road?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Tough road to travel up?

A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

Rugged road?

A.

Well, it -- No worse than any other roads.

I mean, you get out in the mountains all the roads are
rough, bumpy, rocky roads.
Q.

Sure. Where are you going to gather firewood

on the Maple Canyon Road?
A.

On the Maple Canyon Road?

Q.

Yes.

A.

You don't. You get up onto the, up onto the

Ridge Line Road.
Q.

Tell me where

A.

And get into a patch of pines up there, see,

and cut wood.
Q.

Well, where's that going to be?

A.

Go either direction from where Maple Canyon

hooks into it. Or you can come up what they call the
other -- Oh, what's that rough son of a gun? There's
another one that goes up on there.
Q.

You're not going to gather wood off the Maple

Canyon Road, that's private property.
A.

No, no, there's really not -- Not off the
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1

Maple Canyon. But even if you did gather it up off the

2

Maple Canyon, you know, it's no biggy.
You're up here on mountain ridge, on the

3

Q.

4

Ridge Line Road.

5

A.

Uh-huh, that's where we would get wood is

6

along the Ridge Line Road. See, it goes through patches

7

of pines. And it was pretty good wood gathering.
Where are you going to gather wood on the

8

Q.

9

Ridge Line Road?

10

A.

You want me to show you there?

11

Q.

Yeah. Are you going to be on the West

12
13

Daniels' property?
A.

Let's see. Now, where are we here? Maple

14

Canyon, Maple Canyon. Okay. Now, here is the Ridge

15

Line. You could gather wood through this area. There

16

are lots of big patches of pine here.

17

Q.

You're indicating the private property of Mr.

18

Okelberry and the West Daniels Land Association; is that

19

correct?

20
21

A.

Who owned the grounds that time particular I

could not say.

22

Q.

You said you were up there gathering wood --

23

A.

Uh-huh.

24

Q.

-- on private property. Did you gain

25

permission to do that?
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A.

No, sir.

Q.

How many years has it been since you went up

there to gather wood?
A.

Oh, 70, late 70's.

Q.

Haven't gathered wood since the late 70's?

A.

Yeah. The reason I say that -- See, I

bought me a truck, a four-wheel drive truck, in '75. And
that's what I would gather wood in, you know. It let me
get up there and get wood.
Q.

Okay. You said that you went up in the 50's.

Can you give us a date when you went up in the 50's?
A.

No, sir, I can't.

Q.

Was it more than once?

A.

Yeah. You know, hunting and -

Q.

No, no, to gather wood.

A.

No, I didn't gather wood then.

Q.

Didn't gather wood in the 50's?

A.

No, no.

Q.

How about the 60's?

A.

No, no.

Q.

And the last time you went up was the 70's?

A.

Yeah, through the 70's. Yeah, early to mid

70's, uh-huh.
Q.

So there's about a 3 or 4 or 5 year period

when you were gathering wood?
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A.

Yes, approximately.

Q.

All right.
MR. PETERSEN: That's all.
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Sweat?
MR. SWEAT: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: You may step down.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
THE COURT: Okay. Now, we'll take an

afternoon recess. We'll be in recess until 5 minutes to
3:00.
(A brief recess was taken.)
THE COURT: Mr. Sweat, you may call your next

witness.
MR. SWEAT: The Plaintiff would call Roy

Daniel, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SWEAT: Or Daniels.
THE COURT: Daniels?
MR. SWEAT: I think so.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Daniels, come forward

and have a seat here and we'll get started.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we have to object
to this witness on several grounds. One is Mr. Daniels

has been conferring, contrary to the directions of the
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1

Court this morning, with the witnesses. We observed Mr.

2

Besendorfer or Mr. Wall talking with Mr. Daniels,

3

reviewing testimony, reviewing dates, and contrary to the

4

instructions of the Court, reviewing he's testimony with

5

him.

6

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Daniels, have you

7

talked with any of the witnesses that have already

8

testified?

9

THE WITNESSS: Yes.

10

THE COURT: Okay. What did you talk about?

11

THE WITNESS: They talked about -- I didn't

12

-- I made very few comments. They asked me about some

13

fences. I told them where I believed them to be. They

14

made comments about their length of time they (INAUDIBLE)

15

and that's about the size of it. They never talked about

16

their testimony.
THE COURT: Didn't you get my instruction to

17
18

you, you weren't to confer with one another after you

19

testified?

20
21
22
23

THE WITNESS: Well, I was sitting there. I

should of excused myself.
THE COURT: I'm not going to hear your

testimony. Next witness.

24

THE WITNESS: I'm excused?

25

THE COURT: Yeah, you're excused.
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1

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

2

THE COURT: Mr. Wall, Mr. Besendorfer, you're

3

not to talk with any witnesses that are here to testify.

4

MR. PETERSEN: We understand that one of the

5

witnesses that they designated, your Honor, was sitting

6

in the courtroom for a period of time, but I guess we'll

7

cover him when we get to it.

8

MR. SWEAT: Who's that?

9

UNIDENTIFIED: Pedro, Paris and Pedro.
UNIDENTIFIED: Oh, he's not going to testify.

10
11

He's not on our list.

12

MR. SWEAT: He's in here right now.

13

UNIDENTIFIED: He's not on our list.

14

MR. PETERSEN: Well, what's he in here for?

15

Get him out of here.

16

THE COURT: Next witness.

17

MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, I've got them

18

staggering in. Let me check and see who's here and who's

19

not here.
UNIDENTIFIED: Dick Baum is suppose to be

20
21

here at 3:30, but Jake is here now if you want to go with

22

Jake.
MR. SWEAT: Okay. We call Jake Thompson,

23
24
25

your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Thompson, come forward
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and have a seat here in the witness stand.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we'd make the same

motion in respect to Mr. Thompson that we made in respect
to Mr. Daniels. He was in the hall conferring with Mr.
Besendorfer, Mr. Wall. They were discussing testimony.
THE COURT: Mr. Thompson, after Mr.

Besendorfer and Mr. Wall had testified did you talk with
them?
THE WITNESS: Yeah, but I didn't talk about

what, his ground. We was talking about that up by the
oil rig.
THE COURT: So did you review with them what

they testified concerning?
THE WITNESS: No, not really.
THE COURT: Did you talk about some other

grounds (INAUDIBLE) location?
THE WITNESS: Yeah, we were talking about

where the forest fence was, where it come through there
by the oil rig, where they drilled that oil rig up there.
THE COURT: That's on the north end?
THE WITNESS:

(INAUDIBLE). Yeah, north end

of the bridge.
THE COURT: Any further inquiries, Mr.
Petersen?
MR. PETERSEN: Well, your Honor, I think that
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1

Mr. Thompson was there during the full course of the

2

conversation with Mr. Daniels. They were sitting

3

together. They were observing. They were listening to

4

the same conversation. One of them with Mr. Daniels

5

would of been

6

THE COURT: Well, I asked you if you want to

7

inquire further. Right now I have not found anything

8

that would disqualify him.
MR. PETERSEN: Sure. Mr. Thompson, you were

9
10

sitting out in the hall, were you not?

11

THE WITNESS: Yes.

12

MR. PETERSEN: And you were on the, sitting

13

on a seat and Mr. Daniels was sitting next to you, was he

14

not?

15

THE WITNESS: Yes.

16

MR. PETERSEN: And you carried on a

17

conversation with Mr. Besendorfer and Mr. Wall?

18

THE WITNESS: Yes.

19

MR. PETERSEN: And how long did that

20

conversation go on?

21

THE WITNESS: Oh, maybe five minutes.

22

MR. PETERSEN: So pretty much the length of

23

the last break that we had in court?

24

THE WITNESS: Yeah.

25

MR. PETERSEN: So if that was five, ten
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1

minutes, whatever it is, that's what you talked about?

2

THE WITNESS: Yeah.

3

MR. PETERSEN: Was there ever a time when you

4

were, when Mr. Daniels was talking alone to Mr.

5

Besendorfer and Mr. Wall?

6

THE WITNESS: Alone?

7

MR. PETERSEN: Alone.

8

THE WITNESS: I think we was all involved in

9

the conversation.
MR. PETERSEN: And that conversation involved

10
11

more than just the oil well in that area.
THE WITNESS: No, Mr. Wall wanted to know

12
13

where the fence line come through there where that road

14

went back to that, that oil rig site, he wanted to know

15

if that road went on down. And I said no, it goes into

16

Parker. And he wanted to know where the forest fence

17

was. And we all commented where we thought it was

18

(INAUDIBLE).

19
20

MR. PETERSEN: Where's the forest fence that

you're talking about?

21

THE WITNESS: I'm not sure. I thought it was

22

the one that came up over the Wallsberg side down through

23

the pines and come right close to that oil rig there.

24

But I'm not sure if that's here or the one above it.

25

MR. PETERSEN: You heard the admonition from
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1

the Court this morning, did you not, not to confer with

2

one another concerning your testimony?

3
4

THE WITNESS: Well, I didn't think we was

talking about testimony.

5

MR. PETERSEN: You thought it was okay?

6

THE WITNESS: Maybe I'm wrong, but I didn't

7
8
9
10

think it was testimony.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, I submit it's the

same conversation that Mr. Daniels and Mr.
THE COURT: Well, I disqualified Mr. Daniels,

11

but I haven't heard anything yet that would disqualify

12

Mr. Thompson. Mr. Daniels talked about, indicated that

13

they talked about how long they'd been hunting and those

14

type of things. And that's the reason I disqualified Mr.

15

Daniels, but it's not what Mr. Thompson is listing. I'm

16

not going to disqualify him.

17
18
19
20
21
22

MR. PETERSEN: Were you privy to any of those

conversations about hunting and so fourth?
THE WITNESS: Well, I think everybody's

talked about being able to hunt that area.
MR. PETERSEN: I mean out in the hall, did

you talk about hunting?

23

THE WITNESS: It was mentioned.

24

MR. PETERSEN: And did you discuss with them

25

your hunting on that property?
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1

THE WITNESS: Probably. I've hunted there

2

for so many years. Me and Clay use to run into a lot of

3

these guys up there.

4
5

MR. PETERSEN: Did Mr. Besendorfer and Mr.

Wall talk about their hunting?

6

THE WITNESS: I don't know.

7

MR. PETERSEN: But you talked about your

8

hunting?
THE WITNESS: I just said I don't know the

9
10

dates that I started, you know, the actual date, the year

11

that I started. I know about approximately.

12

MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we'd ask then that

13

if he's not going to be excused then he cannot talk about

14

any dates or any hunting on that property, your Honor.

15

That's
THE COURT: Well, he -- We'll get onto it

16
17

and see if you want to make any objection to him. Go

18

ahead, Mr. Sweat.
MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, before we start,

19
20

based on that information, if we were to ask the Court to

21

listen to Mr. Daniels, but not discuss anything regarding

22

hunting.

23

THE COURT: I -- You know

Mr. Sweat,

24

you have an obligation making sure your witnesses don't

25

confer with each other. This is, you know -- Part of
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this penalty is that they discussed, they met together at
all. And I don't know -- To a certain extent I don't
know how much they've tainted each others testimony. But
I'm not going to permit Mr. Daniels to testify as partial
sanction for you not making sure your witnesses didn't
confer with one another.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. SWEAT:

Q.

Mr. Thompson, would you please state your

full name and address for the record?
A.

Gerald Thompson, 1165 East 100 North

Wallsberg, Utah.
Q.

And what is your birth date?

A.

November the 16th, 1937.

Q.

How long have you lived in Wallsberg?

A.

Since 1966.
THE COURT: Were you sworn in earlier, Mr.

Thompson?
THE WITNESS: Yes.

Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) Okay. Are you familiar with

the area east and a little bit north of Wallsberg?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Why are you familiar with that area?

A.

I spend a lot of time on that area, from

Wallsberg right over through the, by the hills, through
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1

the flats and up on top, clear up as far as three forks.

2

Q.

Do you own any property in that area?

3

A.

No.

4

Q.

Have you ever leased any property in that

6

A.

No.

7

Q.

I'd like to draw your attention to what has

5

area?

8

been marked as Exhibit No. 2. Can you take a moment and

9

review this exhibit?
THE COURT: You can go -- You can step down

10
11

and look at it if you want, Mr. Thompson. Look at that,

12

Mr. Thompson -- The Court's got to take a phone call.

13

It's an emergency call. So we'll be in a short recess.
(A brief recess was taken.)

14
15

THE COURT: Okay.

16

MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, before I get started,

17

Mr. Petersen has brought to my attention that there is

18

one of the roads here that hasn't been highlighted. We'd

19

ask the Court's permission, I believe it was highlighted

20

in the complaint as part of the Ridge Line Road, to be

21

able to highlight that at the next break, just in a red

22

marker?
THE COURT: Do you acknowledge that, Mr.

23
24
25

Petersen?
MR. PETERSEN: Yeah, that -- I think that's
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correct, your Honor.

I think it's on there.

THE COURT: Okay. You may do so.
MR. SWEAT: Thank you, your Honor.
DIRECT EXAMINATION CONT.

Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) Mr. Thompson, how long have

you lived in Wallsberg?
A.

49 years, 48 or 49 years.

It was '56 when I

moved there. So
Q.

I think we went over this. And you're

familiar with the area to the east and a little bit north
of Wallsberg?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And you just reviewed this map that covers

that area; is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you recognize the roads there shown on

that map?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Are you aware of a road called the Circle

Springs Road?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Where does that road go?

A.

Well, it goes off the Ridge Line and goes

around by Circle Springs and right back onto the Ridge
Line Road, through Bear Wallow.
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1

Q.

On the Circle Spring Road, would you look at

2

(INAUDIBLE) road to indicate this Circle Spring Road on

3

the map?

4

A.

Yeah.

5

Q.

Is that your understanding of it here, this

6

green road?
A.

7

I guess. I've only been down on there one

8

different time, but that many years ago, but I know the

9

road borders the gate there where you go in there and

10

goes right back on Ridge Line Road.
Q.

You say you used this Circle Spring Road one

A.

Yeah, I've been out on that road several

15

Q.

Several times or one time?

16

A.

Several times. I've been caught in muddy

11
12

time?

13
14

times.

17

country up there during deer hunting. We couldn't get up

18

through them pines, because people was stuck. So we went

19

around there and we'd come out there at the Big Glade.

20

Q.

On Circle Springs or are you

21

A.

No, it ain't Circle Springs.

It's the road

22

that borders the gate to go into Circle Springs. I could

23

show you. I could go down there and show you.

--

24

Q.

Please.

25

A.

(INAUDIBLE) this is the road here, right
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(INAUDIBLE) the gate to Circle is right here and that
road comes right back to Ridge Line Road.
Q.

Okay. This road where it shows in green,

it's going down this way, have you ever used that road?
A.

I've been on it, but it's been a lot of years

ago. I never did spend my time on it.
Q.

What do you call that road, the green road?

A.

Circle Springs I guess, or just Circle.

Q.

You indicate that you have driven on that

A.

I haven't driven down in there, no.

Q.

How did you

A.

I've driven on the road that borders it and

road?

goes back to the Ridge Line.
Q.

How long --

A.

I walked down in there one year hunting, bow

hunting.
Q.

Did you walk down the road?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Do you remember what year that was?

A.

It's been so many years ago I couldn't tell

Q.

Do you recall seeing any no trespassing signs

you.

when you walked town there?
A.

Not then no, sir.
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1

Q.

Do you recall any locked gate?

2

A.

No.

3

Q.

Are aware of a road called Ridge Line Road?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

Could you show us on the map what you

6
7
8

understand to be Ridge Line Road?
A.

This road here in red, and it goes way down

and it goes over to the gun club.

9

Q.

Have you ever used the Ridge Line Road?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

When do you think you first used the Ridge

12
13

Line Road?
A.

Oh, it's probably in mid 50's is when I used

14,

it the first time. I've been down as far as Hearts

15

Gravel, but I never went from there on over until after

16

they built that -- When did they build that fish and

17

game road up on there?

18

Q.

You indicate as far as Hearts Gravel. To get

19

to Hearts Gravel do you have to leave the Okelberry

20

property?

21

A.

Yeah.

22

Q.

Do you have to leave

23

A.

Probably go through it a time or two. I

24
25

can't see it.
Q.

Do you have to leave the West Daniels'
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property?
A.

No. You might go

You might leave it

right down towards where you drop off the hill. I'm not
sure. There's so many fences through there that I don't
know.
Q.

Do you remember when you first used that

property?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Why did you use it?

A.

I was just up there deer hunting.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, I would move to

exclude any testimony about his deer hunting. This is
one of the areas that he discussed with the witnesses in
the hall.
THE COURT: Overruled.
Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) When did you last use the

Ridge Line Road?
A.

Well, the last time I used the Ridge Line

Road is when Ray put the guy to stop everybody from going
down in there during the deer hunt.
Q.

What year was that, do you remember?

A.

Well, it's -- My boy is 32 now and he

started hunting up there when he was 16. So it would
probably be -- He'd have to be some where between 16
and probably 20 years old the last time he used it. But
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1

they stopped me at that gate there where you come through

2

the pines there by Thorton Hallow.

3

Q.

And asked you not to use the road?

4

A.

They told me I had to pay $50 to hunt down in

5

there. And I said I'm not hunting on your property.

6

Q.

7

the road?

8

A.

9

Well, they had a bunch right there by the

gate. I can remember that. They had some red paint on

10

the gate.

11

Q.

12

Were there any signs saying no trespassing on

Was there any locks on the gate or were the

gates open?
I have no idea. The gate was open when we

13

A.

19

come through it.

15

Q.

Before that time, from the first time you

16

hunted to that time, did you ever see any no trespassing

17

signs on that road?

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

Were you ever stopped from hunting?

20

A.

That's the only time I was ever stopped on

Q

Did you ever use the roads other than just to

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

What did you use it for?

21

i t.

22
23

hunt?
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A.

Just to take the family for a picnic or

something and go up over there.
Q.

And you'd use the Ridge Line Road?

A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

Was you ever stopped from using it on one of

those trips?
A.

No.

Q.

Did you ever encounter a locked gate?

A.

No.

Q.

Were there gates?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What kind of gates were they?

A.

They was wire gates, post and wires, you

know. We'd set them back up when we'd go through them.

Q.

Were they up all time?

A.

Well, not all the time. I went through there

when the gates have been down, but I always tried to make
a point to -- If I had put a gate down I put it back up
and I went through.
Q.

So between the 50's, when you indicated you

first started, and up to 20 years ago, how often per year
do you think you would used that road, Ridge Line Road
now?
A.

Oh, I'd use it several times during the hunt.

And I'd always go at least once or twice with the family
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1

up there just for ride, just to get, you know -- In the

2

evenings or go up for a picnic.

3

Q.

Do you think there

4

A.

Sometimes we'd go farther down than we did

5

the time before, you know.

Q.

6
7

didn't use the Ridge Line Road?

8
9
10

A.

Not up till the time they stopped me there.

And that's -- After that I quit going up there cause it
wasn't worth the hassle, fightin everybody.

11
12

Do you think there was ever a year that you

Q.

When you used it did you ever see others use

it the same as you?

13

A.

Oh, yeah.

14

Q.

Were they people that owned the road or had

15

property on the road?
A.

16

No, I've passed a lot of hunters up in there

17

and a lot of people from town was up in there riding

18

around. You certainly always run into somebody,

19

specially during the hunt.
Q.

20
21

Did you ever ask permission to use the Ridge

Line Road?

22

A.

No.

23

Q.

Are you aware of a road called Thorton Hallow

A.

Yes.

24
25

Road?
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1

2

Q.

Can you point out on the map where that road

A.

Right in here. Now, when I first started

is?

3
4

going up in there, I can't remember a road in there the

5

first time I went in there.

6
7

When do you first remember a road being in

A.

Well, as far as the year and date I don't

there?

8
9

Q.

know. I just -- When we went there last we went there

10

with spots. I didn't know that I -- I can't remember

11

the road the first time we went.
Q.

Do you remember the last time you went in

14

A.

Probably --

15

Q.

You can go ahead and sit back down.

16

A.

Probably just before they put their, blocked

12
13

there?

17

the road there off of us. I stayed right away from there

18

after he started blocking that road.

19

Q.

About how -- You say you don't remember the

20

first time you went in there. Did you go in there during

21

the 70's?

22

A.

Yeah, it'd be --

23

Q.

Did you go in this during the 60's?

24

A.

Well, I might have. I didn't spend much time

25

up around there. There are too much pine trees and I
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1

don't like pines.

2

Q.

Did you ever see a locked or a gate on that

4

A.

Yeah.

5

Q.

Was it locked?

6

A.

No, not then.

7

Q.

Did you ever see a no trespassing sign on

3

8

road?

that road?

9

A.

No.

10

Q.

Did you ever see anyone else using that road?

11

A.

Yeah.

12

Q.

Do you know a road called Parker Canyon Road?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

Can you point that out to us?

15

A.

Right in here. It goes this way. It goes

16

east to (INAUDIBLE) north east.

17

Q.

And have you ever driven on that road?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

You can go ahead and sit. Do you remember

20
21

the first time you went on that road?
A.

No, not really.

It was -- It was after I'd

22

hunted there for a while, cause I didn't know there was

23

even a road down there for a long time.

24
25

Q.

Do you remember when the last time was you

went on that road?
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1

A.

Yeah.

2

Q.

When was that?

3

A.

Oh, it could of been 10, 12 years ago. I was

4

on horse back when I went down it then though, last time.

5
6

Q.

Was there any signs on the road saying you

couldn't use the road?

7

A.

I didn't see any where I come through. I

8

took the trail there at the oil rig. It goes through.

9

And I think it goes clear over to about Three Forks.

10

When I crossed that road I turned and went down toward to

11

where it ends out on the ridge there and come back.

12
13

Q.

So did you come up the Ridge Line Road to get

to the Parker Canyon Road? Is that what you
A.

14

No, I come around Hearts Gravel and where the

15

oil ridge was, went through the gate there, the hole in

16

the fence or whatever it was and hit that trail. Then

17

there's a trail that goes over and down through Thorton

18

and on over to about Three Forks. I guess it goes that

19

fax. That's as farther as I've been on it. But I just

20

-- But for a horse back ride that -

21

Q.

Have you ever been clear down to the, where

22

it goes into the Forest Service at the end of Parker

23

Canyon?

24
25

A.

I've been to the end of that road. So if

I've -- If the forest is this side of it I've crossed
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it
Q.

Do you remember a gate there?

A.

Seems like I can remember a gate there, but

I'm not sure.
Q.

It seems like it's down towards the end.

Other than hunting did you ever use Parker

Canyon Road?
A.

I

Yeah, that's what I was telling you here.

was just out for a horseback ride when I went down in
there
Q.

Other than that one time did you ever use it?

A.

-- the last time. I hunted down there once

Q.

Other than that one time you rode the horse

before.

and hunting did you ever use Parker Canyon Road?
A.

No.

Q.

Are you aware of a road called Maple Canyon

A.

Yes.

Q.

Have you ever used that road?

A.

Yes.

Q.

When did you first use that road?

A.

It'd be right around the time I first moved

Road?

there in Wallsberg. I went up it several times. And It
got so rough that it was hard to get up and down.
Q.

When was it you first moved to Wallsberg?
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A.

'56.

Q.

When did it get so rough that you quit using

A.

Oh, probably in the 60's, early 60's.

it?

I

don't know.
Q.

From when you first used it in the 50's to

the 60's did you use it how often per year?
A.

Maybe once. I -- Well, mostly once, but I

may have went down it a second time. I don't know.
Q.

When you used Maple Canyon Road did you use

-- What portion of the road did you use?
A.

Just from where you'd go into Wallsberg there

on up to where it turns back down to Ridge Line Road
north.
Q.

When you used that road did you ever see

gates across the road?
A.

Yeah, there's a gate at the bottom.

(INAUDIBLE) the oil at Wallsberg there was a gate we use
to go through it.
Q.

Is that gate locked?

A.

No, not then.

Q.

During the time that you just testified you

used it was the gate ever locked?
A.

No.

Q.

Did you ever see other people use that road?
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1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

Did you ever see any no trespassing signs on

3
4

that road?
A.

MR. SWEAT: That's all the questions I have

5
6

No.

at this time, your Honor.

7

THE COURT: Mr. Petersen, cross?

8

MR. PETERSEN: Thank you, your Honor.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

9
10

BY MR. PETERSEN:

11

Q.

12

Now, Mr. Thompson, I understand you moved up

in that area in 1956?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

You moved to Wallsberg in 1956? Prior to

15
16

1956 you were never in that area?
A.

I was in there one time in 1955. Only I

17

didn't go down the Ridge Road. I just hunted with my

18

father and stepbrother. And we come from Daniels to the

19

Big Glade.

20

Q.

And that's about as far as you went?

21

A.

Yeah.

22

Q.

So you didn't go on Ridge Line Road or any of

23

these other roads?

24

A.

Not until after I moved there.

25

Q.

Okay. Now, the Circle Springs Road, my
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1

understanding is you only used that one time?

2

A.

I walked down into Circle Springs one time,

4

Q.

Okay. You never drove down there in a car?

5

A.

No.

6

Q.

Is the reason you walked down there is

3

7

yes.

because the road was so rough?
A.

8

No, I was bow hunting. I parked a car out on

9

the road that goes around back on the Ridge Line Road.

10

They call it Bear Wallow Road or use to. I don't know

11

what they call it now or what the name really is.
Q.

12
13

What year was it you went down that Circle

Springs Road?
A.

14

I can't tell you the date on that.

I can't

15

remember. I wasn't interested in dates and stuff then.

16

I was out hunting and I -

17

Q.

It wouldn't of been in 1955 then?

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

Was it in 1956 when you moved there?

20

A.

It was after that.

21

Q.

Would it of been in the 60's?

22

A.

No, it would be in the later part of the

Q.

Then the Ridge Line Road, you started using

23
24
25

50's.

that in the mid 50's you said.
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A.

Yeah.

Q.

It wouldn't of been in '55 then, cause you

weren't living up there?
A.

I don't think I went clear through on the

Ridge Line Road. I went down into, oh, probably to
Hearts Gravel.
Q.

What I'm asking is

A.

Well, I didn't go that far -- Excuse me.

I'd go down into them pines just about where that forest
fence took off and then walked down from there.
Q.

When would of been the first year you would

of used Ridge Line Road?
A.

'56 or '57.

Q.

Now this Hearts

A.

(INAUDIBLE) that far, I didn't go clear

through on it now.
Q.

But that's the first time you'd ever gone on

Ridge Line Road was '56, '57?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

You said you went as far as the Hearts Gravel

A.

Well, was just above there.

Road?
I was just

saying I went just up out of White Pole in them pine till
I hit the fence, then I walked down off there on foot.
Q.

This first time you used it in '56, '57 were
292

you walking or were you driving?
A.

I drove down to the pines then I walked. I

didn't go on down. I turned around and drove back when I
got to (INAUDIBLE).
Q.

Okay. You drove to the pines. Where were

the pines at?
A.

I'll try to show you here as much as I can.

At White Pole there's (INAUDIBLE) bridge that comes up
here (INAUDIBLE) come off this plat and down on top.
There's a lot of pine trees along here. And then right
over here someplace there's a fence and went down to
where by that oil rig plat and the road from Hearts
Gravel use to come around to there. I always went down
through them pines there.
Q.

Okay. So as I understand then you drove that

once in '56 or '57; would that be correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, did you ever drive it again in the 50's?

A.

I would imagine. Yeah, I definitely drove it

again, cause I hunted there every year and we'd always
drive up on there.
Q.

Do you have a recollection of driving up and

down that road more than once in the 1950's?
A.

Oh, yeah, I'm sure I was up there several

times during the 1950's.
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Q.

Several times in

A.

I hunted deer every year up there.

Q.

Several times in the 50's?

A.

Yes.

I don't know

I didn't even know

the road went on down to Ridge Line at that time in my
life. I drove there to hunt and I was able -- The
first time I drove clear off is after they built that
fish and game road up in there. It was after then that I
drove clear off to the gun club.
Q.

Now, when you came off of the Forest Service

property onto the Ridge Line Road was there a gate there?
A.

There was a lot of gates between the Big

Glade and down to White Pole. And the only gate I seen
after that was the fence I was telling you about that I
walked down had a gate on it, there on top.
Q.

If you recall, as you went on this Ridge Line

Road, if there was a gate when you went up in '56, '57?
A.

Yes, there was several gates on the east end

Q.

Was the gate opened or closed when you went?

A.

Well, sometimes it was open, sometimes it was

Q.

It just depends then?

A.

Yeah, we have open gates all the way through

there.

closed.

there.
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Q.

I'll show you what's been -- Let me show

you what's been marked as Exhibit 6 and can ask you if
you can identify that?
A.

That looks like -- I'm not sure. That

looks like Circle Springs Road or else the road that
comes -- After you cross over into Thorton Hallow, you
go up just a little rise and there was a gate right
there. And then the road back here to Circle Spring.
Now, it could be that gate or it could be Circle Springs
gate. I don't know.

It looks familiar to me, but I'm

really not sure which gate it is.
Q.

There's a keep out sign on it. Do you

remember seeing that sign?
A.

Let's see it again.

I think there's a sign

there now that says keep out if that's the, going down in
the
Q.

No, I'm asking you when you went there the

first time A.

No, I didn't see no trespassing signs at all.

Q.

Let me show you what's been marked Exhibit,

Defendant's Exhibit No. 9 and ask you if you can identify
that?
A.

Yeah, that's the ledges going up over from

White Pole to the top of the ridge there, where I was
just talking about.
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Q.

Would you describe that as a steep, rocky

A.

Yes, it is.

Q.

Difficult to get over?

A.

Well, yeah, you got to take your time.

Q.

Now, when you went deer hunting did you hunt

road?

other areas besides this area here? Did you go in other
areas?
A.

Well, from probably ahead of Maple Creek

where that canyon comes up, probably from there, Cummings
is back north and west. That's about as far as we went,
up towards Cummings Canyons.
Q.

So when you say north and west is it, is that

across the Main Canyon Road there, some where up in that
area?
A.

It's -- No, it's up on the Ridge Road, but

it's right at the head of Maple Creek. The road comes in
below there from Maple Creek, but there's a draw that
comes down Maple Creek and cross right there. That's why
I say the head of Maple Creek.

Q.

So you'd hunt there where -- Are there any

other areas in Wasatch County or anywhere else you'd
hunt?
A.

Oh, yeah, I hunted on the south side of

Wallsberg over in the oaks and up the little valley. But
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when I went up there it was pretty basically from
Cummings back north and west, Cummings.
Q.

So you're hunting over the years has not been

confined to this area. There would be other areas you
would hunt?
A.

Well, it was mostly this area until I got

stopped.
Q.

There were occasions you would go into other

areas though?
A.

When I -- After I was stopped going down

there then I moved to other areas.
Q.

Now, this Ridge Line Road, how would you

describe that? Is it rocky?
A.

Well, I'll tell you the first time I went in

there I took a -- Not the first time I went in there,
but I took a car in there one time, a 1955 Ford. And I
parked just below them ledges right there.
Q.

Well, my question was

A.

So that says something about the road, it's

passable.
Q.

Was it rocky?

A.

No, it's not too rocky till you -- There

rocks here and there, but it ain't solid rock. There's a
lot of mud there when it gets wet. And there's holes,
mud holes, you know, that gathers.
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1

Q.

That's pretty hard on your car, wasn't it?

2

A.

Well, it could of been, but I made it all

3

right. I was going hunting and I drove right to it.

4

Q.

Did you have to move any trees out of the

6

A.

No.

7

Q.

Any time you went up there did you ever move

5

8

way?

any trees?

9

A.

No trees, no.

10

Q.

Did you ever take that Ford vehicle up there

11

again on that road?

12

A.

No.

13

Q.

Why not?

14

A.

I had a truck by then. I didn't need it.

15

I'd take the truck up.

16

Q.

Too rough?

17

A.

Yeah, it was a rough road, but it wasn't that

18

bad. I made it in there and out. The guy that was with

19

me had a 1954 Chev and he made it in and out. So

20
21
22

Q.

Do you think the roads have improved over the

years? Is it a better road last time
A.

No, I don't think they've improved. I think

23

the four-wheelers get in there with the mud and stuff and

24

dig ruts and stuff. I don't know. I don't think they've

25

improved any. I think they was better back then
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1

(INAUDIBLE).

2

Q.

So they're worse now than they were then?

3

A.

Well, the last time I was on them there was a

4

few more ruts in them.

5
6

Q.

been over ten years ago then?

7
8

Well, the last time you went up there it's

A.

It's been a while since I went up there. I

don't know the exact date. It was during the hunt.

9

Q.

10

up there?

11

A.

Yeah, run into a lot of people I knew.

12

Q.

Give me a time in the 1950's when you ran

13

Now, you said that you would run into people

into people up there?

14

A.

During the deer hunt.

15

Q.

1956, '57?

16

A.

From '56 on through. I'd always

17

Q.

Where? What -- When in 1956?

18

A.

During the deer hunt.

19

Q.

Where?

20

A.

Down in White Pole, through that area.

21

Q.

Who?

22

A.

Well, I run into some Edwards that use to

23

hunt there from Charleston. I run into Russel Wall. He

24

use to bring his family up there to hunt. I run into

25

them.
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1
2

5
6
7

You have a clear recollection of that in

A.

Yeah, I knew the guy personally. I talked to

Q.

What brings it to mind it was 1956 you

1956?

3
4

Q

him.

remember that?
A.

Well, maybe it was -- I told you '56 or '57

8

the first time. But they hunted there every year just

9

like we did.

10
11

Q.

Okay. So the first time you went up in that

area was 1956 or 1957?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

You signed an affidavit that's been filed

14

with this Court, did you not?

15

A.

I guess, I don't know.

16

Q.

In this affidavit you stated that you used

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

those roads beginning in 1955.
A.

Well, I told you that I come in as far as the

Big Glade in 1955.
Q.

You said you used the Ridge Line Road from

1955 to 1966. That would be incorrect, wouldn't it?
A.

Well, I don't know if it is or not.

I can't

remember that far back really.
Q.

Your testimony on direct and now

cross-examination is the first time you went in there was
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1956 and maybe 1957?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

So this affidavit -

A.

That's the first time I hunted in there.

Q.

Okay. Well, this affidavit is in error, is

A.

I couldn't tell you cause I can't remember

it not?

that far back, really I can't. I can't give you no
specific years or dates. I moved there in '56 and I've
hunted there every since.
Q.

Okay. When you said in your affidavit that

you began in 1955, my question is that is an error, is it
not?
A.

Well, I think maybe the understanding there

is I moved to Wallsberg in 1955 for a short period of
time. Then I moved back out. I went over there and
stayed with my in-laws for a while because the mine was
shutting down and stuff. Then I went back to Park City.
Then after they shut down I come back and moved there and
got a job at Geneva Steel. I worked there for 30 years.
Q.

And when you say that your recollection is

not too good; that's correct, is it not?
A.

It is.

I

I -- As far as giving the

dates. But I know from '56 on I hunted there every year
till I was run out that day.
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1
2
3

Q.

But you also said you hunted other years,

other areas.
A.

I did, after they, after they stopped me from

4

going in there. I'm not going to fight with people to go

5

in there and hunt. I go out for recreation and have a

6

good time.

7
8

Q.

Okay. The Thorton Hallow Road, you said when

you went on that the first time there wasn't a road.

9

A. I didn't know if there's a road. I couldn't

10

remember seeing a road in there. We walked down through

11

some pines and that.

12

Q.

So your recollection is the first time you

13

went into Thorton Hallow you can't remember if there's a

14

road or not?

15

A.

That's right.

16

Q.

You didn't drive in then?

17

A.

No.

18

Q.

And the first time you went in there was the

19
20
21

70's and not the 60's or the 50's?
A.

Well, I guess. Like I say, I'm kind of

just --

22

Q.

Well, I'm just comparing the testimony --

23

A.

-- trying to put it all together here, but

24

I'd imagine that's about when I started -- I drove down

25

in there with Dee Sabey one time. That's the first time
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a new road was in there. But I walked down in there,
just to the head of it, before then.
Q.

Well, then your affidavit when you said you

went into Thorton Hallow Road started in 1955; that's
incorrect, is it not?
A.

Yes, I guess so.

I can't remember going down

in there in '55. I really -- The first year I hunted
in there was in 1955, but I didn't spend that much time
in there. So it with have to be '56 are after.
Q.

Parker Canyon Road, you said you can't

remember the first time you went into that road?
A.

No, I can't.

Q.

So in your affidavit when you said you

started in 1955 that affidavit would incorrect too,
would it not?
A.

No, not entirely, cause I went to White Pole

in them first years and that road -- I'd been on a road
that went over to a ridge right there. I'd only go maybe
less then a quater of a mile. Then we'd go up over a
ridge and back down by the White Pole pond.
Q.

Mr. Thompson, on direct-examination your

testimony was you can't remember the first time you went
on Parker Canyon Road?
A.

I can't.

Q.

Okay. But in your affidavit 253

A.
there.

I don't know when the road was even built in

I couldn't tell you.
Q.

Okay. But in your affidavit you said your

first time you went in was 1955?
A.

Well, that's the first time I went in that

Q.

You realize you're under oath?

A.

Yeah, but I can't remember telling you that.

Q.

You said that you think there was a gate

area.

there when the first time you went in?
A.

Down towards the end of it, probably where

the forest comes through, if that's where it comes
through. It seems like I could remember a gate.
Q.

Okay. The Maple Canyon Road, you said it was

very rough?
A.

Well, it got pretty rough.

Q.

Hard to get up and down?

A.

Well, I thought it was too hard to go that

way when there's better ways.
Q.

And that was in the 60's?

A.

Well, you're -- You're loading the bullets.

Q.

Well, I'm just --

A.

It had be between 1956 and when they started

keeping people from in there. And I cannot remember the
exact dates or years.
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1

Q.

You can't remember exact dates or years?

2

A.

No, that's been a long time ago.

3

Q.

And that's true for all these roads. You

4

can't remember exact dates or years?

5
6
7

So that's a

A.

Probably, but I've been on them.

Q.

Now, you said that you used the Maple Canyon

fact.

8

Road once. Would this be something you remember or you

9

don't remember?

10

A.

Maple Canyon?

11

Q.

Uh-huh.

12

A.

I used that more than once. I just told you

13
19

I used it more than once.
Q.

Mr. Thompson, we can review your testimony,

15

it's all on tape. My notes indicate that you started to

16

use that once in 1960?
MR. SWEAT: My recollection is he used Circle

17
18

Springs once.
THE COURT: Well, he's -- Mr. Petersen,

19
20

just ask him direct questions. Don't -- Cause the

21.

Court will recall what was said and what wasn't said.
MR. PETERSEN: Thank you, your Honor.

22
23
29
25

Q.

(BY MR. PETERSEN) You said there was a gate

at the bottom of Maple Canyon Road.
A.

There was, just after you leave the oil in
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Wallsberg.
Q.

It wasn't locked, but there was a gate there?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And that's in the 1960's?

A.

Yeah.
MR. PETERSEN: Can confer with my client,

your Honor?
THE COURT: You may.
MR. PETERSEN: Thank you. That's all I have,

your Honor.
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Sweat?
MR. SWEAT: Just briefly, your Honor.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. SWEAT:
Q.

Mr. Thompson, you've indicated that you have

driven this Ridge Line Road from this end clear down to
the gun club?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

What did you drive it in?

A.

Jeep.

Q.

Have you only done that once?

A.

No

Well, clear through, yeah, once. Got

a little steep going off the end there by the country
club. But I've been up that first ridge from Hearts
Gravel in my pickup many times, but I didn't go through
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1

it all.

2
3

Q.

this area; is that correct?
A.

4
5

You've indicated Hearts Gravel is down off of

This is the fish and game road (INAUDIBLE)

Hearts Gravel here.

6

Q.

So you say you've driven

7

A.

From right here you go this way up on the

8

ridge. There's -- It's a pretty good road up in there.

9

And then this part drops off (INAUDIBLE).

10
11

Q.

times have you driven the entire length of that?
MR. PETERSEN: What was that again? I missed

12
13

So from right here to right here how many

that.
MR. SWEAT: From where Ridge Line Road enters

14
15

into Okelberry property where it leaves the West Daniels

16

property.

17

Q.

18

you've driven the length of that road?
A.

19
20

(BY MR. SWEAT) How many times do you think

Well, it'd have to be, I'll bet you five

times a year at least, or maybe more.

21

Q.

And when

22

A.

Plus you're counting the deer hunt and the

23

trips I made up in the summer.

24
25

Q.

And when was the last time you went on that

road?
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1
2
3
4

A.

summer. I only went up there to the
Q.

A.

6

probably.

7

Q.

When was last time you drove the entire

Well, that would be in the later 60's or 70's

And when did you first drive the entire

length of that road from

9
10

-_

length of that road?

5

8

Last time I went on that road was last

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Sweat, he's testified

he's only driven the whole length of the road once.

11

MR. SWEAT: I'm -- I'm meaning --

12

THE COURT: I think you confused him. Why

13

don't you ask him again when the last time he drove the

14

area from where it leaves West Daniels' property to where

15

it leaves Mr. Okelberry's property.

16

Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) From where it starts here to

17

where it leaves here when was the first time you drove

18

that road?

19

A.

The first time I drove it?

20

Q.

The entire length of that road, yeah.

21

A.

It would be the later 60's early 70's when we

22

went the full length, clear to the gun club.

23
24
25

THE COURT: Again, Mr. Sweat, you're

confusing him.
Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) Okay. Do you see where the
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road starts on Mr. Okelberry's property.
A.

Yep.

Q.

Do you see where it comes off of West

Daniels' property, right here?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

Right now I'm calling this, from here to

A.

Oh --

Q.

-- the length of the road.

A.

Okay.

Q.

When was the last time you drove that much of

here

the road?
A.

I guess when they stopped me there that time.

That was the last day I went down in there.
Q.

When was the first time you drove that length

of the road?
A.

In my own outfit I would say it was 1957 or

Q.

In between those two times you've already

'58.

testified that you drove that length of the road, am I
right, five or six times or am I mis-characterizing it?
A.

Oh, when I -- When I went up there deer

hunting we'd make it -- I'd go in and out of there just
about every day of the hunt. We figure at least five
times.
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1
2

Q

During those times did you ever see a locked

A.

No, not till they stopped me that day. It

gate?

3
4

wasn't locked then. The gate was open then. They had it

5

all painted up to stop me.

6

MR. SWEAT: That's all I have, your Honor.

7

THE COURT: Mr. Petersen?

8

MR. PETERSEN: Thank you.

9

RECROSS EXAMINATION

10

BY MR. PETERSEN:

11

Q.

12

Mr. Thompson, you said that you have driven

five times a year on the Ridge Line Road?

13

A.

Yeah, at least.

14

Q.

In your affidavit, which is dated the 23rd of

15

January, 2003, you stated, "Ridge Line Road from 1955 to

16

1996". We've covered the 1955 issue.

17

Ridge Line Road typically occurred several times per

18

year". Several, how do you interpret several?

19

A.

"My use of the

Well, like I just got through saying, I went

20

in and out of there often to hunt ,deer. I didn't -- I

21

camped up there the first few days and then I'd go back

22

to work. And I'd drive back in every time I got a chance

23

to hunt more.

24
25

Q.

Do you interpret several to mean five times a

year?
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1

A.

Well, approximately. It varied some.

2

Q.

It would be some years you wouldn't even go

3

up, wouldn't there?
A.

4

No, I went up every year till I was kept out

5

of there. And when I started hunting it till they locked

6

the gate, I hunted there every year.

7

Q.

Now, there was one time that you drove all

8

the way from the Glade to the gun club over the Ridge

9

Line Road?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

Only one?

12

A.

Well -- Huh?

13

Q.

Only once?

14

A.

Yeah, it's a pretty steep going off the gun

15

club there. So if we hadn't been in the Jeep I wouldn't

16

of been there then.

17

Q.

Did you run into any locked gates?

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

Let me show you what's been marked as

20

Defendant's Exhibit 11 and ask you if you can identify

21

that?

22

A.

Yeah, that's the gate there on Hearts Gravel,

23

I think, where you start up over where the fish and game

24

road comes in.

25

Q.

Is that a gate on Hearts Gravel or is that a
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gate on Ridge Line Road?
A.

I don't know.

I can't -- That looks like

the one they use to have at Hearts Gravel, but I couldn't
say for sure, it's been too many years.
Q.

When you traveled -

A.

You can't see enough of it anyway.

Q.

When you traveled on that road did you see

any signs that's indicated on Defendant's Exhibit 5?
A.

No, not back then I didn't.

I've never been

down it since. So I don't know about after.
Q.

You never saw a sign that said road closed to

motorized vehicles?
A.

No, I've seen them since, but not back then.

Q.

Now, you said the last time you drove that is

when they stopped you and wanted $50 to hunt?
A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

Can you give us any idea when that was?

A.

Well, I tried to tell you once.

It's when my

boy was hunting with me. So he was old enough to hunt.
Maybe some where -- He'd have to be between 16 and 20,
some where through there. I don't know. Somebody -- A
big tall guy stopped me there driving a four-wheeler. He
told me if I went down there it would cost $50. And I
said I'm not hunting on your place.

Q.

So that could be 10 years ago, 15 years ago?
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1

A.

Oh, it was -- It's probably been over 10

2

years ago or been 10 or so.

3

around there.

4

I don't know. Some where

Now, as I understand, Mr. Thompson, when you

Q.

5

traveled on Ridge Line Road you did indicate there were

6

gates there?

7

A.

Yes, sir.

8

Q.

If they were up you would drive through and

9
10

put them backup again?
A.

Uh-huh.

11

MR. PETERSEN: That's all.

12

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Sweat?

13

MR. SWEAT: No, your Honor.

14

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. You can step

15
16
17
18

down. Next witness.
MR. SWEAT: The Plaintiff would call Ed

Sabey, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Sabey, come forward to

19

the witness stand up here. You were sworn this morning;

20

is that correct, Mr. Sabey.

21

THE WITNESS: I haven't been.

22

THE COURT: You haven't been sworn?

23

THE WITNESS: No.

24

THE COURT: Okay. Raise your right hand and

25

take an oath.
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CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the

testimony you shall give in the matter now before this
Court shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
about the truth, so help you God?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Have a seat. Okay. Mr. Sweat,

you may proceed.
MR. SWEAT: Thank you, your Honor.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. SWEAT:

Q.

Mr. Sabey, would you please state your full

name for the record?
A.

James Ed Sabey.

Q.

And what is your address?

A.

3273 South 3400 West, Heber City.

Q.

And what is your birth date?

A.

July 22nd 1945.

Q.

How long have you lived in Wasatch County?

A.

All my life.

Q.

Are you familiar with the area east and a

little bit north of the City of Wallsberg?
A.

I am.

Q.

Why are you familiar with that area?

A.

I just spend a lot of time up there.

Q.

Do you own or have you ever owned any
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1

property up in that area?

2

A.

No.

3

Q.

Have you ever leased any property in that

5

A.

No.

6

Q.

Have you ever used any of the roads that are

7

up in that area?

8

A.

Yes, I have.

9

Q.

I'd like you to take a look at what's been

4

area?

10

marked as Exhibit No. 2. If you'd like you can walk down

11

here and take a look at it. Do you recognize the area

12

depicted in that map?

13

A.

Yes, I do.

14

Q.

On that map there's a road labeled the Circle

15

Springs Road, have you ever driven on that road?

16

A.

I have.

17

Q.

When did you first use that road?

18

A.

I don't know, probably in the 60's when I

19

first started.

20

Q.

Why did you use that road?

21

A.

Just grew up there hunting.

22

Q.

When you used that road what portion of the

23
24
25

road would you have used?
A.

The whole thing, from the Big Glade probably

out to Circle Springs and back, you know.
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Q.

The Circle Springs is that located on the

A.

It is.

Q.

And is there a gate between the forest and

forest?

Mr. Okelberry's property at the Circle Springs side?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What kind is that?

A.

Just wire gate.

Q.

When was the last time you used that road?

A.

A week or so ago with you guys.

Q.

Prior to that ride when was the last time you

used that road?
A.

I'm not sure. It's been sometime, cause

every since the Okelberrys have trespassed it or locked
the gates and asked people, I've never

I've

respected their rights and I've never been up there on
them till that day with you guys.
Q.

You indicated that you used the road in the

60's; is that correct?
A.

I have.

Q.

Did you use it ever in the 70's?

A.

I did.

Q.

Did you ever use it in the 80's?

A.

I'm sure I did. I don't know when they -

I don't know when Ray and them stopped or started locking
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1

the gates or trespassing them. That's when I quit, when

2

ever that was.

3
4

Q.

Do you have any sort of estimate of when that

A.

I can guess maybe 15 years ago, but I'm just

was?

5

I've used it -- I've used it

6

-- That's just a guess.

7

since, since then, but I've never driven a vehicle on it.

8

Almost -- I have kind of an annual thing. I go up

9

there the weekend of Thanksgiving and I usually go up

10

either Thorton Hallow or, and I ride down the ridge and

11

come home, on horse, but as far as driving a vehicle I

12

haven't. I've done that for many years.
Q.

13

During the time between the 60's and 15 years

14

ago did you use that road very much, the Circle Springs

15

Road?

16

A.

You don't go up there a lot, but you do go up
I didn't

17

occasionally, maybe twice a year, three times.

18

go out on Circle as much as I did the other roads.

19
20
21

Q.

During that time did you ever see a no

trespassing sign?
A.

There was -- I don't know when they put

22

that tire up on the tree, but it's been sometime. But I

23

did see that. But it hasn't been

24

Q.

Is that when you quit going?

25

A.

No, I went even after that out on Circle. I
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1

mean, I've driven out there. I never, after that tire

2

was there. The gate wasn't -- There was never a locked

3

gate. I just assumed it was a trespass or a driveway.

4

Q.

You assumed it was a

5

A.

A driveway to the forest.

6

Q.

But you didn't go on the property, is that

7

what you're

8

A.

Just drove the road.

9

Q.

You say you have seen -- Other than last

10

week have you ever seen a locked gate up there?

11

A.

No, I haven't.

12

Q.

Have you ever seen others use the Circle

13

Springs Road?

14

A.

A lot of people.

15

Q.

So a couple times a year you're up there you

16

typically see someone else using that?

17

A.

Yeah.

18

Q.

Would they would be the Okelberrys?

19

A.

I've seen those people up there occasionally.

20

Q.

Have you seen other people other than the

21

Okelberrys?

22

A.

I have.

23

Q.

Do you know what they were using the road

A.

Mostly hunting.

24
25

for?
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1
2

Q.

Are you aware of a road called Ridge Line

Road? Have you ever used the Ridge Line Road?

3

A.

I have.

4

Q.

What portions of the Ridge Line Road have you

A.

Whole thing, from Big Hallow onto the Big

Q.

You've driven the entire length from the Big

5

used?

6
7
8
9

Glade.

Glade down to Big Hallow?

10

A.

I have.

11

Q.

When did you first make that type of a drive?

12

A.

Oh, probably in the 60's. I don't know when

13

the fish and game purchased that ground and put that road

14

up through there, but that's, that's when I first did.

15

Q.

Why did you use that road that time?

16

A.

The first time?

17

Q.

First time.

18

A.

Just to go. Just to see what was there.

19

Q.

Did you see any no trespassing signs anywhere

20

along that road?

21

A.

No.

22

Q.

Did you encounter any gates?

23

A.

Yeah, there's gates.

24

Q.

What kind of gates were they?

25

A.

Just wire.
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Q.

Do you recall specifically where the gates

were on that first drive?
A.

Yeah, there was one there at the -- After

you get up on top there was one between the fish and game
and the Cattle Association. And then there's also one as
you come out of White Pole there between the Okelberrys
and Cattle Association, and also there ahead of Maple
Creek and Cummings, there's a fence and a gate there.
Q.

When was the last time you used this road?

A.

Before with you guys?

Q.

Yep.

A.

When they stopped people from going in.

Q.

And you don't remember when that date was?

A.

No. Like I say probably 15 years ago or when

ever that was.
Q.

Between the first time you used it and when

you stopped using it maybe 15 years ago about how often
per year would you use Ridge Line Road?
A.

I don't know, several times. Several times a

month probably.
Q.

What would you typically use it for?

A.

Just in the summer -- I like to go up

there. I like that country. I like to go up there. I
like to ride. I like to ride the -- Just go up and
look around. And then I hunt. I've hunted deer up there
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all my life and elk.
Q.

Did you ever encounter a locked gate between

those two when you first and last went?
A.

I've never seen a locked gate up there.

Q.

Were there gates along there?

A.

Yeah, there were gates.

Q.

Were they always up?

A.

No, they weren't always up, but usually.

Q.

And have you ever observed other people using

this road?
A.

I have.

Q.

Do you know why they were using the road?

A.

I'm assuming the same reason I was there,

hunting or just there.
Q.

From when you first started using the road

until you last used the road were you ever asked not to
use this road?
A.

No.

Q.

Did you ever ask anyone's permission to use

this road?
A.

No.

Q.

Did you ever think you needed to ask anyone's

permission to use this road?
A.

No, I didn't.

Q.

Are you aware of a road called Thorton Hallow
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Road?
A.

I am.

Q.

Have you ever driven along that road?

A.

I have.

Q.

When did you first use that road?

A.

The same time.

Q.

What was the reason you used it?

A.

For hunting or just to be there.

Q.

What portion of Thorton Hallow Road as

depicted on Exhibit 2 did you use?
A.

From the Ridge Line Road down to, just below

the forest fence.
Q.

When did you last use Thorton Hallow Road?

A.

Same time probably, 15 years.

Q.

Typically how often per year would you use,

during that time period would you use Thorton Hallow
Road?
A.

Probably the same, once or twice a month

maybe in the summer, seldomly in the winter.
Q.

Did you ever see people, other people using

that road?
A.

I have.

Q.

What would you see them using the road for?

A.

Same thing.

Q.

When you say the same thing could you be a
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1

little more specific?

2

A.

Hunting or just up there, just camping.

3

Q.

Where would people camp at?

4

A.

Usually down just barely on the forest there,

5

back to the south after you go through the cattle guard

6

usually is where most people, if they did, they'd stay

7

there.

8
9

Q.

Would you typically see people there each

year camping?

10

A.

I would.

11

Q.

When you saw these people camping did they

12

have vehicles or did they walk in?

13

A.

14

trailers.

15

Q.

16

Oh, no, they had vehicles and camps and

Is there any other way to access that area

accept through the Thorton Hallow Road with a vehicle?

17

A.

No.

18

Q.

Did you ever ask permission to use Thorton

19

Hallow Road?

20

A.

I haven't.

21

Q.

Was there ever gates across Thorton Hallow

23

A.

Oh, yeah, wire gate.

24

Q.

Were they ever locked?

25

A.

No.

22

Road?
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Q

Are you aware of a road called Parker Canyon

A.

I am.

Q.

And have you ever used that road?

A.

I have.

Q.

When did you first use Parker Canyon Road?

A.

Probably the same time.

Q.

And what was the reason for using that road?

A.

Just hunting or just to be there, just for a

Q.

When would you of last used Parker Canyon

A.

Last November.

Q.

What did you use it for then?

A.

Just -- I was headed home. I rode my horse

Road?

ride.

Road?

up Parker Canyon Thanksgiving weekend, and I rode up over
the top and home.
Q.

Was there any no trespassing signs at that

A.

I seen a CMU signs down there, but I never

time?

seen a no trespassing sign.
Q.

But you came in from the end of the road, is

that what you're indicating?
A.

I come in from the highway.

Q.

Prior to that horse ride when was the last
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1

time you used Parker Canyon Road? When was the last time

2

you used it with a vehicle?
A.

3

About the same -- When ever they put that

4

fence between the Cattle Association and Forest Service,

5

when ever that was. I come up over -- I come up over

6

Big Hallow, or up Hearts Gravel and from down on there

7

when they'd fence that fence that year.

8

probably been five or six or so years ago.

I think it's

9

Q.

That was the last time you used that?

10

A.

Yep.

11

Q.

Was there any locked gates at that time?

12

A.

No.

13

Q.

Was there any no trespassing signs at that

15

A.

I didn't see any.

16

Q.

Can you indicate to the Court where you came

14

time?

17

up and how you accessed Parker Canyon Road on that time

18

on the map.

19

A.

How I came?

20

Q.

Yeah.

21

A.

(INAUDIBLE) up here. I came from the

22
23
24
25

highway, up this canyon here and I rode back this way.
Q.

No, I asked you when you last used Parker

Canyon with a vehicle.
A.

When ever that was that the fish and game or
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the state put that fence in.
Q.

That's the last time you used it?

A.

Yep, unless with you guys was the last time.

Q.

Do you recall how long that was?

A.

When they fenced that?

Q.

Parker Canyon.

A.

Or when I was with you guys?

Q.

No, no, when they fenced it.

A.

I'm guessing six years or five or six years

ago or so. I'm not sure about that.
Q.

And how would you -- When you last

Before with me, when you last drove a vehicle down Parker
Canyon, how did you access Parker Canyon Road?
A.

I come up from Hearts Gravel and up over the

top, the Big Hallow way, from (INAUDIBLE).
THE COURT: The other direction.
MR. SWEAT: The other direction.
THE WITNESS: From the north.
MR. SWEAT: I'm trying to get him to show it

on the map. You know where it is.
THE COURT: I have (INAUDIBLE).
THE WITNESS: I don't see that -- I don't

see the road that goes down Hearts Gravel there. I see
the one that goes down Big Hallow.
Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) Yeah, it's not highlighted.
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A.

Up over the -- Up over the drop.

Q.

How often do you use Parker Canyon Road? You

say that -A.

Pardon?

Q.

How often do you use Parker Canyon Road?

A.

Oh, just regular -- I mean not

I

wasn't up there every day. I mean, we'd go up once or
twice a month maybe or -- A lot in the fall.
Q.

Could you give us a time frame of when you

would go up?
MR. SWEAT: I've confused myself, your Honor.
Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) Could you tell us when you

started using Parker Canyon Road to when you last used
Parker Canyon Road.
A.

Well, that's probably in the 60's or maybe

even a little before that when we was up there hunting
deer until, you know -- I mean, I -- As far as
accessing it, like I say, I went up there when they put
that fence down on there. I rode down over there and
seen that fence and then I come back and that's the last
time I've been up there with a vehicle. That's been
five, six years ago.
Q.

So it would be fair to say in the mid 90's

was the last time you used it?
A.

It would.
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Q.

Some where from either side, take or give a

A.

It would.

Q.

And the first time you used it was in the

few?

60's? Between that time how often per year do you think
you would use Parker Canyon Road?
A.

Once or twice a month and several times in

the fall when we were hunting more or less.
Q.

During that period of time did you ever see a

no trespassing sign?
A.

I never did.

Q.

Did you ever see a locked gate?

A.

No.

Q.

Were there gates in existence?

A.

There was.

Q.

Were they always up?

A.

No, usually, but not always.

Q.

What type of gates were they?

A.

Just wire.

Q.

And during that time period when you used the

road did you see other people using the road?
A.

I did.

Q.

What would they be using the road for?

A.

Hunting and just -- Usually hunting. Most

the time when I was up there that's what most people are
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doing up there. Cattle Association sometimes up there
and they access it.
Q.

Are you aware of a road called Maple Canyon

A.

I am.

Q.

Can you see where it's designated on the map?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Is that you're understanding of what's Maple

Road?

Canyon Road?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you have another name for it that you use?

A.

Maple Creek.

Q.

Have you ever used that road?

A.

Yes.

Q.

When was the first time you have used Maple

Canyon Road?
A.

In the early 50's. And part of that road on

the Ridge Line I did in the early 50's too. My brother
was herding sheep up there and I went up there with him
when I was six, and that would be in '51. That's just
from White Pole to Maple Creek was the only stretch I
ever rode on that that early.
Q.

When was the first time you went up there

that you wasn't up there working to somebody?
A.

I don't know. I mean, just up on my own when
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we was in high school would be in the 60's.
Q.

Did you ever see any no trespassing signs?

A.

No.

Q.

Did you ever see any locked gates?

A.

No.

Q.

Were there gates on Maple Canyon Road?

A.

Oh, yeah.

Q.

Where were the gates located?

A.

Down at the bottom.

Q.

What type of gate was it?

A.

It was just wire.

Q.

When was the last time you drove the entire

length of Maple Canyon Road?
A.

It's been a while. I think it washed out

about in, about '80, early 80's. And I drove it once
after that. And that was the last time I went down.
It's probably like in '85 I went down it, but it was a
-- I think Ray had probably took the Cat up there, but
it was rough, really rough when I come down it.
Q.

Between when you first started using the road

and when you last drove the entire length, about how many
times per year do you think you'd use this road?
A.

Once or twice or three times, not a lot.

Q.

Did you ever see other people using this road

when you were using it?
280

A.

I did.

Q.

Were they the Okelberrys?

A.

No.

Q.

Did you know some of the people you saw using

A.

I did.

Q.

Do you know why they were using it?

A.

Mostly hunting.

Q.

During the time that you've indicated that

it?

you used the road was there people using the road all
throughout that time?
A.

There was.

Q.

Were you ever denied access to this road?

A.

No.

Q.

Were you ever asked not to use this road?

A.

No.

Q.

Did you ever see anybody else be asked not to

use this road?
A.

Not to my knowledge, until the last few

years.
MR. SWEAT: That's all the questions I have

at this time, your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Petersen, cross?
MR. PETERSEN: Thank you.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
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BY MR. PETERSEN:

Q.

Mr. Sabey, what is your occupation?

A.

I work for the engineering department at

Wasatch County.
Q.

Are you we are here as a representative of

Wasatch County or on your own?
A.

I'm just here on my own.

Q.

You had occasion, did you not, to drive

vehicles up there twice
A.

-

-

I did.
recently? And in driving those vehicles

Q.

you did that as an employee of Wasatch County?
A.

I did, yes.

Q.

Once you went up to show the attorneys drive

up there, did you not?
A.

I did.

Q.

And the other time we went up and the judge

and attorney was in another vehicle?
A.

Yes.

Q.

So on those two occasions you were

representing Wasatch County?
A.

I was.

Q.

And you work in what department?

A.

The engineering.

Q.

Has Wasatch County ever done any work, at any
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time, to your knowledge, on any of those roads?
A.

Not to my knowledge, no.

Q.

And Wasatch County, if the Court declared

those to be public roads, would never do any work up
there either, would they?
A.

I don't think so.

Q.

So they have no intention of improving the

roads or anything like that?
A.

No, I don't think so.

Q.

Now, when we call them roads in some respects

it's sort of a misnomer, is it not?
A.

I don't understand. Why?

Q.

Well, sometimes they're no more than trials?

A.

I mean, they're access and you drive a

vehicle on them.
Q.

Well, let's talk about the Circle Springs

Road. We went down the Circle Springs Road, didn't we?
A.

We didn't go all the way to the end, no.

Q.

It got very rough, didn't it?

A.

It is.

Q.

Very narrow?

A.

It is.

Q.

Scraping vehicles on the sides with the limbs

and trees and leaves and what have you?
A.

It does.
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1
2

Q.

what, seven or eight feet at the most?

3
4
5
6

Yeah. Circle Springs couldn't be wider than

A.

Maybe, at places. With limbs hanging out,

Q.

That's the way it was when we went up a few

maybe.

weeks ago, was it not?

7

A.

It was.

8

Q.

And that's the way it was when you started

9
10

going up in the 60s?
A.

I think the roads were better the more they

11

were driven from what they are when I was up there with

12

you guys.

13

Q.

14
15
16
17

So you think the roads have deteriorated over

the years?
A.

I think just the lack of people being on them

has caused vegetation and stuff to grow.
Q.

Well, we're talking about the Circle Springs

18

Road. You say you started going up there in the 60's.

19

Was it a better road in the 60's than it is today?

20

A.

I never did notice vegetation scratching my

21

truck ever in the 60's. Maybe I wasn't as particular,

22

but I never did notice it ever -- I never did ever

23

notice it scratching my pickup.

24
25

Q.

Did you ever, when you went on Circle

Springs, have to remove any trees out of the road?
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Any time you drive in the mountains you have

1

A.

2

to remove trees.

3

Q.

4

Okay. And if you don't remove the trees then

how do you get down the road?

5

A.

Well, I usually remove them.

I

I don't

6

don't like we did, drive out through people's property

7

and around out through the forest like we did when we

8

were up there.
Q.

9

Okay. There were some trees that had to be

10

removed when we went up prior to the judge going up,

11

wasn't that true?

12

A.

That's true.

13

Q.

So we cut some -- You cut some?

14

A.

Did.

15

Q.

Or Shane Ford or somebody cut them?

16

A.

Somebody did, yes.

17

Q.

Somebody cut. And then when we went up with

18

the judge there were more trees that were cut up?
A.

19

I'm not sure there was more.

I don't know,

20

but there may have been. I don't know if there was any

21

more from when -- There was trees we had driven around

22

the time before that weren't cut out that we cut out

23

later.

24
25

Q.

That's typical any time that you would use

these roads up there. I'm talking about all the roads,
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1

not just Circle Springs?

2

A.

Pretty much, yes.

3

Q.

It would be safe to say that Circle Springs,

4

that road is a rough, rocky road, is it not?

5

A.

It is.

6

Q.

And it would be safe to say that to traverse

7

that you would have to have a four-wheel drive vehicle?

8

A.

No.

9

Q.

You think you could do it without a

10

four-wheel drive?

11

A.

I've been up there many times.

12

Q.

Well, when we -- When you went up the last

13

two weeks, twice you had that vehicle in four-wheel drive

14

on many occasions, did you not?

15

A.

I'm not sure -- The only time I put mine in

16

four-wheel drive is when we went through those, between

17

those trees off the road. The only reason I did that is

18

so I wouldn't slide the county vehicle into a tree, but

19

if them trees were out of the road you would never had to

20

have a four-wheel drive.

21

Q.

On Circle Springs Road?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

You wouldn't need a four-wheel drive to get

24
25

down there?
A.

No, I've driven there many times without 286

1

I've driven a -- I use to drive a '79 Datsun.

2

Q.

No, I'm talking about right now.

3

A.

I don't think you'd have to right now if

4
5
6

those trees were out of the road.
Q.

By trees you mean the ones that need to be

cut out?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

You would agree then that it's a rough, rocky

9

road seven to eight feet wide?

10

A.

I would. I would

11

Q.

And you would agree that it does scratch up

12
13
14
15
16

your car, vehicle, whatever, as you go down it?
A.

Probably. I don't know whether it scratches

it or not, but there's limbs out in the road.
Q.

You would agree that to get onto Circle

Springs Road you have to go through a gate?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

And you've seen that gate locked on occasion,

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

have you not?
A.

I have never seen that gate locked until I

was up there with you that day.
Q.

Let me show you what's been marked as

Defendant's Exhibit 6 and ask you if you can identify it?
A.

That's the gate, accept it's got a metal gate

on there now.
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Q.

All right. Let me show you what's marked as

Defendant's 8. Is that the metal gate?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

Is that about the way it looked to you when

you started going up in the 60's as set forth in Exhibit
6?
A.

Accept there was never a no trespassing sign

Q.

Okay. You're saying that that keep out and

there.

that no trespassing sign wasn't there.
A.

It wasn't.

Q

But there was this wire gate?

.

A.

There was.

Q.

And you would always respect that, would you

A.

I would. I mean -- Like I said before I

not?

had driven that road, but I never, I never went off from
it. I went down to Circle Springs. And if we were
hunting down there that's where I hunted.
Q.

I ask you to look at Defendant's Exhibit 7.

Is that -- Would that be a representation of the way it
looked in 19, in the 60's when you started going up?
A.

I don't think so.

Q.

You don't think that would be a fair

representation?
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A.

No, I never seen a lock or cable on that.

Q.

Okay. Disregard the lock and the cable.

Then would that be
A.

Yeah, pretty much, maybe, without any kind of

a lock on it.
Q.

Now, you said you went up in the 50's, but at

that time you were with your brother, you were up there
with permission. You were -- Your brother was herding
sheep or something.
A.

He was. Like I said, I did.

I went up there

with him. And we come up to White Pole and then up the
ridge and down Maple Creek when I was up there with him.
Q.

Now, you've hunted in that Circle Springs

area, have you?
A

I have. I don't hunt that a lot.

Q

But you do hunt it occasionally?

A.

I have.

Q.

If you were to hunt the Circle Springs area

wouldn't it be more convenient to come off the Main
Canyon Road than to go up in that area rather than drive
around?
A.

It depends on why you're hunting it

Q.

You're hunting deer.

A.

If you're walking or riding a horse it

probably -- I mean, you could ride a horse probably up
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from the highway, up the main canyon no trouble, but if I
was walking I'd want to drive out there.
Q.

My question was isn't it more convenient to

use the Main Canyon Road to hunt that area than it is to
drive around?
A.

Not if you're hunting right on Circle

Springs, around the head there it's not.

I mean, it

wouldn't be for me.
Q.

There are trails, are there not, coming up

the Main Canyon Road?
A.

There is.

Q.

Have you ever been on those trails?

A.

I have.

Q.

Have you ever hunted that way?

A.

No, I haven't.

Q.

The Ridge Line Road, wouldn't it be safe to

say that's a narrow road as well?
A.

It is.

Q.

It's a rocky road?

A.

It is in places.

Q.

There are places where in the last two weeks

they had to remove poles, trees across the road?
A.

Yes.

Q.

True? Removing these trees, that happens

about any time of the year, does it not?
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A.

It does.

Q.

Not just in the fall or the summer or the

spring. I mean, you could be up there and have to face
those trees?
A.

It's true.

Q.

If the Court were to open that up and

somebody comes by and sees a tree and they don't have a
saw how are they going to get down the road?
A.

Probably the same way you did. Either they

drag it out with a pickup or drive around it.
Q.

You can drive around it and trespass on the

property? You have to answer audibly.
A

Probably so.

Q.

Okay. So to the average person that doesn't

have a saw or an ax or something, they're just going to
drive out on somebody's property?
A.

Or over it, yeah. Or over the tree.

Q.

Most of those trees are big enough that it's

going to block the road. You're not going to be able to
drive over it, isn't that true?
A.

Well, some of them probably, yes.

Q.

Now, once again, when you'd go on the Ridge

Line Road this was gates, were there not?
A.

There was.

Q.

There was a gate coming off of the Forest
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1

Service property onto the Okelberry property?

2

A.

There was.

3

Q.

And there were other gates as you come off

4

this Ridge Line Road, isn't there?

5

A.

There was.

6

Q.

Gates separating the Okelberry property from

7

the West Daniels property.

8

A.

There was.

9

Q.

And likewise, West Daniels from Okelberry?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

And when you would traverse up there many

12

times those gates were up, were they not?

13

A.

They were.

14

Q.

And when they were up you would drive through

15
16

and then put them back up?
A.

I would, unless it was late in the fall when

17

they never put them up. Once the sheep and cattle is

18

gone they were hardly ever put up, ever, in the spring or

19

till spring when they come back.

20

Q.

That was until 15 years ago then?

21

A.

Pardon?

22

Q.

This was -- You said you haven't been up

23
24
25

there in the last 15 years (INAUDIBLE).
A.

I haven't. Well, I don't know if it was 15

years. I don't know when Ray and them started to
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Q.

Well, that was an approximation, was it not?

A.

Yes, it was.

Q.

15 years ago. So you really wouldn't know

much about what's gone on up there in the last 15 years?
A.

I never -- Until you guys that's the first

time I've been back.
Q.

The Thorton Hallow Road, isn't it true that

if a person wanted to hunt that road that there is a
road, a right of way, whatever, across the Forest Service
property, you get on the Okelberry property it would go
directly over to Thorton?
A.

Down along the fence?

Q.

Yeah, just parallel to the fence.

A.

There never was until they started locking

the gates and then they started driving four-wheelers
down along there. Which is a trespass across the Forest
Service in my estimation.
Q.

But there is a -- You can see a road or

whatever you want to call it from the
A.

But that's what I'm saying.

Q.

Off the Main Canyon Road here right over to

Thorton Hallow?
A.

But that's what I'm saying, it's cause people

just, cause that's the only access they've had to get in
there, they've went that way and trespassed across the
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1
2

Forest Service, which is illegal.
Q.

Okay. But there were other trails, was there

3

not, coming on this Glade down into Thorton and all the

4

way down to Parker?

5

A.

There is.

6

Q.

And some of those the Forest Service had

7

blocked off with piling up dirt, have they not?

8

A.

From Thorton Hallow to Parker?

9

Q.

No, I'm talking about here in the Glade.

10

They had trails that would go down from the Glade to

11

Thorton to Parker.

12

A.

There's still a trail that goes across there.

13

Q.

Sure. Do you know if they blocked those off?

14

A.

No. I mean, as far as vehicle traffic you

15

can't drive them, but you can drive, you can ride horse.

16

Q.

Can you take a four-wheeler?

17

A.

I -- I wouldn't. I've ridden horse along

18
19
20

there many time though.
Q.

Do you know if the Forest Service has blocked

any of those trails off with dirt?
I think they have. Yes, there's piles of

21

A.

22

dirt down there.

23

Q.

If this

24

A.

I guess, assuming that's who did it.

25

Q.

This road, whatever you want to call it, from
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1

this Glade over to Thorton Hallow, that has not been

2

blocked off, has it?

3

A.

No.

4

Q.

And people are using that, are they not?

5

A.

You mean along the Forest Service fence?

6

Q.

Right.

7

A.

I'm assuming there is. You can see tracks

8

there. I've never seen anyone on it.

9
10

Q.

Now, you say that you have seen people using

the Thorton Hallow Road?

11

A.

I have.

12

Q.

Can you give me dates, times and places in

13

the 60's when you did, saw that?
A.

14

Mostly always in the fall when I've seen

15

people up there. There's not a lot of people go up there

16

in the summer. There is some. From the time they start

17

archery hunting till deer hunts over and then you don't

18

see a lot of people.

19

Q.

20

the fall?

21

A.

There's a few that goes up there, but not a

Q.

But not a lot. Now, when you were hunting up

22
23

So generally you won't see many people till

lot.

24

there were you hunting in any other areas in Wasatch

25

County or any where else?
295

A.

Was I?

Q.

Yeah.

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Where else would you hunt?

A.

Usually -- Before all this -- Where you

had the designated area to hunt, I would hunt up in the
south side of Wallsberg and also the north side of
Daniels Canyon.
Q.

Would you hunt those areas as much as you

would this property in question?
A.

No, I never did.

Q.

But you did hunt in those areas?

A.

I did.

Q.

The hunting season is what, two to three

A.

They're less now.

Q.

Back in the 60's and the 70's.

A.

Yeah, probably ten days most the time.

Q.

Ten days.

A.

Two weeks, yeah.

Q.

The time that you were hunting up and using

weeks?

So you're

this area would be ten days, approximately. And your
time would be split somewhat between this property in
question and these other areas that you would hunt?
A.

No, that's not true, cause I use to
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mean, you're talking one hunt. I mean, back earlier you
could hunt, you could boy hunt, you could hunt elk, you
could hunt deer with a rifle.
Q.

Well, I'm talking about

A.

I mean, you're looking at probably a two

month period you could hunt.
I'm talking about you.

Q.

Okay.

A.

That's what I'm saying.

Q.

You had a deer hunting license?

A.

That's true.

Q.

And that would go how long?

A.

You could hunt with an archery. You could

kill -- You could hunt with a

If you didn't kill a

deer with an archery tag you could hunt with a rifle.
Q

.

A.

How long have you had an archery tag?
All my life. That's -- Usually in the 60's

when I was on Circle Springs that's what we was doing is
archery hunting out there.
Q.

Did you have a archery tag last year?

A.

I did.

Q.

Did you hunt other areas that you just told

us about?
A.

Last year?

Q.

Yes.

A.

Yes, I didn't go out there.
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Q.
2

But in the 60's and 70's you went into this

other areas to hunt, did you not?

3

A.

I did.

4

Q.

You weren't exclusively in this area?

5

A.

No.

6

Q.

You can't give us a specific date, time, when

7
8

you saw people on this Thorton Hallow Road?
A.

I mean, any time from when I was up there

9

till -- In fact, I seen people up there after Ray had

10

start locking the gates down, down in Thorton Hallow or

11

in Parker Hallow. How they had gotten there I'm not

12

sure, but I had seen people down in there. I had come up

13

from the highway and there was, and there was some people

14

down in there hunting then.

15

Q.

Now, there is a gate, is there not, going

16

down into Thorton Hallow Road off of the Okelberry

17

property?

18

A.

There is.

19

Q.

There's another

20

A.

Well, where do you talk -- Off of --

21

There's not one off of Okelberry's into Thorton Hallow.

22

There's one on the Cattle Association.

23
24
25

Q.

I'm talking about -- Well, the Cattle

Association isn't even around Thorton Hallow, is it?
A.

Parker Hallow? Where you talking now?
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Q.

I'm talking about Thorton Hallow.

A.

Okay. There is a gate there, yes.

Q.

In fact, Thorton Hallow is not around West

Daniels?
A.

No, not too far, but it is a ways.

Q.

There is a gate between Thorton Hallow and

the Forest Service?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you ever recall seeing a sign on the

Forest Service property which says no motorized vehicles?
A.

Not to my knowledge I have never.

Q.

Do you know if motorized vehicles are allowed

on the Forest Service property?
A.

I don't think they are.

Q.

And that would be ATV's or anything then?

A.

Yes, that's what I'm -- That's what I said

when you said that roads down there, I said they were
probably trespassing. That's why I said that.
Q.

So people are down there camping, they're not

to have motorized vehicles?
A.

Well, this has just been in the last few

years that they've done this. It hasn't been 15 years
ago. When I was up there all the time you could, you
could and did, people did take four-wheelers and
everything as far as you could. And they went pretty
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1

near down where the trail cuts across from that one

2

you're talking about lower.

3
4

Q.

Now, did you ever see people camping in this

Forest Service area off the Thorton Hallow Road?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

You saw them with four-wheelers?

7

A.

I seen them with pickups.

8

Q.

And you realize that that's an area that's

9
10

not for motorized vehicles?
A.

Well, it was then. That what I'm saying,

11

it's only been the last few years that they've, have not

12

let motorized vehicles up there. I don't know when that

13

was, but it hasn't been -- 15 years ago you could

14

access almost anywhere you could go on a four-wheeler.

15
16
17

Q.

You don't recall ever seeing any signs up

there that says no motorized vehicles?
A.

The first sign I seen up there that said no

18

motorized vehicles was when I came up from -- Where?

19

Across the Cattle Association where they put that new

20

fence in there at Robinson Reservoir. And they struck

21

some, them plastic signs up right in the middle of the

22

road there that said no motorized vehicles. And there'd

23

been four-wheelers driven over them. And that's after

24

Ray and them started locking it up. And I'm assuming

25

that some -- I mean, there had been nobody on the road
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1

accept for who'd come down the top. That's the first

2

signs I had ever seen no motorized vehicles up there.

3

That's probably been maybe five or six years ago.

4
5

Q.

The camping that you see up there is mostly

in the Glade, is it not?

6

A.

Right now?

7

Q.

Yes.

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

And the camping you've seen over the year has

10

been in the Glade?

11

A.

During the summer, yes.

12

Q.

Now, Parker Canyon Road, you said you rode a

13

horse up there last November?

14

A.

I did.

15

Q.

It you come up from Highway 40?

16

A.

I did.

17

Q.

Wouldn't that be a better way to hunt that

18

area would be to come up from Highway 40 than it would be

19

to drive around on Parker Canyon?

20

A.

Not really. If you've ever been up that

21

trail, by the time you get from Parker Canyon, the road,

22

the highway up to the where you and I was that day,

23

unless you're in darn good shape you've had your hunt

24

right to there.

25

Q.

Wouldn't it be true to describe Parker Canyon
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1

and this Thorton Hallow as narrow?

2

A.

The road?

3

Q.

Yes.

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

No more than seven or eight feet.

6

A.

It depends on where you measure. Yes, I mean

7

there's trees that come out into it in spots. It's the

8

same width. The road that goes down Thorton is probably

9

wider. Most -- Like I said about the others, I think

10

the roads, the more they were traveled the wider they

11

were.

12
13

Q.

Wouldn't it be true that they're rocky roads,

Thorton Hallow and Parker Canyon?

14

A.

They are.

15

Q.

Wouldn't it be true that they're steep in

17

A.

They are.

18

Q.

Wouldn't it be true as you're going down

16

places?

19

there you're going to scrape on trees and bushes and

20

leaves and so fourth?

21

A.

It depends how careful you are I guess.

22

Q.

Once again on Parker Canyon is there a gate

23
24
25

to come off Ridge Line Road onto Parker Canyon?
A.

No, there's not one at the top.

There's one

at the Cattle Association.
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1

Q.

Where is that gate at?

2

A.

Where it comes off of Ray's onto the Cattle

3

Association, right at the head of Maple Creek, there

4

between Maple Creek and White Pole.

5

Q.

No, I'm over on Parker Canyon now.

6

A.

There's a gate

7

Q.

(INAUDIBLE) way down here?

8

A.

There's a gate down when you get right to the

9

bottom when you hit the forest fence.

10
11

Q.

Okay. So the bottom of Parker Canyon there

is a gate on the Forest Service?

12

A.

Yeah, there is.

13

Q.

You've never seen a sign in there that says

14

no motorized vehicles?

15

A.

I have never.

16

Q.

But as far as you know it's not open to

17

motorized vehicles?
A.

Well, no, I've never seen a sign there,

20

Q.

As you come up this Ridge Line

21

A.

There's two gates right there is what I was

18
19

never.

22

saying when I said they put a sign up there. When the

23

Forest Service fenced that fence there was a gate right

24

there at Parker Hallow that turns back to the south,

25

where we were that day and drove out there, I've never
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seen a sign on that road that says no motorized vehicles.
But down just I little further to the north
along that fence line there's that same road that goes
back to the Forest Service. And they put a gate there
right by a pond. And there was two of them plastic signs
that said no motorized vehicles. And there have been
people that have driven over there. And that was long
after it had been blocked off.
Q.

I understand there is a gate then between the

West Daniels property and the Forest Service property?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And as you come down Ridge Line Road to get

to Parker Canyon there are other gates?
A.

Yes.

Q.

There's a gate from the Okelberry property to

the West Daniels property?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And there are several gates as they

crisscross over that?
A.

There is.

Q.

And when you would traverse down that road

and those gates were up you would go through and then put
them backup again?
A.

I would, unless it was in the fall or winter

after everything was gone or before they're there in the
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1

spring.

2
3

Q.

snows quite a bit up there, does it not?
A.

4
5

Probably from -- In a vehicle, probably

from, I'm guessing June till November.

6
7

Now, when can you use that road up there? It

Q.

So from June 1st to November 1st on an

average?

8

A.

Oh, maybe. Yeah, on an average probably.

9

Q.

Now, as far as your use on this Parker Canyon

10

Road, you couldn't give us dates and times when you've

11

used that over the years, can you?

12

A.

Just -- No. Just randomly?

13

Q.

Just randomly. The Maple Canyon Road, some

14

of these exhibits here designate that as a trail; would

15

that be correct?

16

A.

I haven't been up there for a while, but the

17

last time I was down it you could almost say it was a

18

trail?

19

Q.

A pretty bad road?

20

A.

It was.

21

Q.

When was the last time you were there?

22

A.

I'm guess in the middle 80's.

23

Q.

You indicated that it had been washed out?

24

A.

It had.

25

Q.

That's not an unusual occurrence on that
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1

road, is it?
A.

2

So

Well, that's the first time I've seen it.

3

you could -- I mean, you could drive it then, but it

4

wasn't the best road.

5

Q.

Have you driven that road more than once?

6

A.

Maple Creek?

7

Q.

Yeah.

8

A.

Maple Canyon?

9

Q.

Yeah.

10

A.

Yes. When I was in high school we use to go

11

up Maple Creek a lot. We use to fish up there.
Q

12
13

.

From the Wallsberg side up to the Ridge Line

Road?
A.

14

Well, we never -- I mean, we never went all

15

the way up every time. But we use to go up there and

16

fish up, creek up through there, up to them springs.

17

And --

18
19

Q

Well, isn't it safe it say that that is a

narrow, rough road?

20

A.

It is.

21

Q.

And isn't it enough -- Isn't it accurate to

22

say that most people would never want to drive a vehicle

23

up there for the damage that it could cause to a vehicle?

24
25

A.

It depends on what kind of vehicle you drive,

I guess. I mean, four-wheelers and stuff like that I
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think there would be a lot of people that drive it.
Q.

Oh, four-wheelers, but what about a four, a

pickup truck?
A.

I can't really say. I haven't been -- Like

I say, I haven't been up there for 20 years probably. So
I mean, I'm not -- I'm not saying there's not -- It
could be a super highway for all I know today.
Q.

It's been that long since you've been there?

A.

It's been 20 years probably.
MR. PETERSEN: Can I have just a moment with

my client?
THE COURT: You may.
MR. PETERSEN: Can I have these marked, your

Honor?
THE COURT:

Q.

(INAUDIBLE).

(BY MR. PETERSEN) Mr. Sabey, we've talked

about that road or trail or whatever you want to call it,
from the Glade over to Thorton Hallow.
A.

Okay.

Q.

I'm going to show what's been marked as

Exhibit 13 and 14 and ask you if you can identify those?
A.

I'm not sure about this one. I've never

_-

I don't know if I've ever seen this one, but the day Q.

And you're referring to Exhibit 13?

A.

The day I was up there Ray had his truck
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1

parked right down there the day I was with you guys,

2

right there along the fence?

3

Q.

We're looking at Exhibit 14.

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

Would that be a fair representation

6

A.

And that tree wasn't there the day we was up

-

-

7

there. They pulled that tree across there after we'd

8

left, that day we was there, cause they had that truck

9

and them guys was down there fixing fences the day we

10
11
12
13

were there.

Q.

Okay. Would that be a fair representation of

that area if you take the tree out?
A.

Until -- Until I was there with you guys

14

I've never seen that before like that, never. And I

15

think --

16

MR. PETERSEN: That's all I have, your Honor.

17

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Sweat?

18

MR. SWEAT: Just one thing, your Honor.

19
20
21

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. SWEAT:

Q.

Mr. Sabey, Mr. Petersen asked you about a

22

trail or a track that goes along into Thorton Hallow down

23

the side of the forest fence. Can you get a vehicle down

24

that road?

25

A.

I don't know. I've never -- I've never
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ridden a horse down that trail.

I couldn't tell you.

From what I seen from where we were that day I'd say no.
Q.

And just to clarify in my mind, Mr. Petersen

asked you about signs that said no motorized vehicles?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And is it my understanding that you indicated

that during the time that we had talked about it, when
you used those roads, there were no signs of that sort?
A.

No, I had never seen them.
MR. SWEAT: That's all I have, your Honor.
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Petersen?
MR. PETERSEN: No, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. You may step down.
THE WITNESS: Thank you. Good to see you.
THE COURT: Next witness, Mr. Sweat?
MR. SWEAT: The Plaintiff would call Dick

Baum, your Honor. Your Honor, this is the last witness
that I kind of scheduled from today.
THE COURT: Well, good, we're about through.
MR. SWEAT: I imagine I will have two,

possibly three tomorrow. I'd make a motion that I can
recall Don Wood and kind of get him to introduce some
exhibits that weren't done by another witness.
THE COURT: Uh-huh. Okay. Mr. Baum, were

you previously sworn? Did you take an oath?
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MR. SWEAT: He was not. He was not, your

Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Baum, come forward to

the witness stand right here, if you can get through the
mess. Raise your right hand and take an oath.
CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the

testimony you shall give in the matter now before this
Court shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
THE WITNESS: I do.
THE COURT: Have a seat.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. SWEAT:

Q.

Mr. Baum, would you please state your full

name for the record?
A.

Richard Morgan Baum.

Q.

And what is your address?

A.

185 North 200 West Midway, Utah.

Q.

And what is your birth date?

A.

December 4th of '43.

Q.

How long have you lived in Wasatch County?

A.

58 years.

Q.

Are you familiar with the area that's north

and northeast of the City of Wallsberg?
A.

Well, I'm familiar with that area, but it
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1

seems like the area that we're talking about is south,

2

southeast of Wallsberg.

3
4

Q.

been marked as Exhibit No. 2.
THE COURT: He can come down to the map.

5
6
7

Q.

10
11

(BY MR. SWEAT) Do you want to come down and

take a look at that?
THE COURT: Why don't you point out where

8
9

Have you ever -- Let me show you what has

Wallsberg is.
Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) This is Wallsberg. This is

Heber City up here.
(INAUDIBLE).

12

A.

Okay.

13

Q.

Can you see a depiction of the road that's

14

highlighted in red?

15

A.

Yep.

16

Q.

Are you familiar with that road?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

What do you call that road?

19

A.

Wallsberg Ridge.

20

Q.

You can return to your seat.
MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, may the record

21
22

reflect that he was referring to, what we have depicted

23

as Ridge Line Road.
THE COURT: It may so reflect.

24
25

Q

(BY MR. SWEAT) Mr. Baum, do you own any
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1

property in this area.

2

A.

No.

3

Q.

Have you ever leased any property in this

5

A.

Nope.

6

Q.

And that road that you called the Wallsberg

4

area?

7

Ridge that I've identified or called the Ridge Line Road,

8

have you ever used that road?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

What portions of that road have you used?

11

A.

All of it.

12

Q.

When do you first recall using that road?

13

A.

Probably when I first got a four-wheel drive

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

truck in about 1970 or so.
Q.

And where would you have went that, on that

first time you used that road?
A.

I -- It seemed like we went up to Daniels

Summit and then north from there.
Q.

And how far down the Ridge Line Road did you

use that time?
A.

I think I got to a little bit north of

22

Wallsberg Town and turned around and come back because it

23

was just a rugged road.

24
25

Q.

Since that time have you ever used that road,

other than that first time?
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1

A.

Yes.

2

Q

When was the last time you used that road?

3

A.

.

It's probably -- I didn't cover the entire

4

road depicted there, but the last time would have been

5

probably 1999, I think.

6
7

Q.

What portion of the road did you use at that

A.

I went -- Parked in Wallsberg and I ride

time?

8
9

mountain bike. And I road north of the cemetery and up

10

east onto the ridge, and then south to Strawberry Peak,

11

and then west from there and come out Little Hallow

12

Creek.
THE COURT: Why don't you have him show you

13
14
15
16
17

on the map.
Q.

(BY MR. SWEAT) Can you show me where that

-- Essentially show us where Strawberry Peak might be?
A.

Okay. There's this road right here. The

18

cemetery is right here. I rode up here, hit the road

19

here, rode up to

I don't know. It doesn't even show

20

Strawberry Peak.

It's (INAUDIBLE). Well -- Okay. And

21

then I went north. Okay. It's probably up this road

22

here. It was a big loop.

23

MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, may the record

24

reflect that he showed traversing the entire length of

25

Ridge Line Road across both West Daniels and the
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1

Okelberry property?

2

THE COURT: The record may so reflect.

3

MR. PETERSEN: Well, I don't think it's the

4

entirely Ridge Line Road.

5

THE COURT: Well, the entire Ridge Line Road

6

that we're concerned with. The only portion of the road

7

we're concerned with is the property that crosses West

8

Daniels and Mr. Okelberry's property.
MR. PETERSEN: That's true. But I just

9
10

wanted to make sure that (INAUDIBLE).

11
12

Q.

biking up that road?
A.

13
14

(BY MR. SWEAT) Mr. Baum, do you often go

Not often, but I do probably every other year

or every third year, something like that.
Q.

And when did you first go biking up that

17

A.

Probably about 20 years ago.

18

Q.

When you first went up do you recall seeing

15
16

19
20
21

road?

any no trespassing signs?
A.

I remember hitting closed gates, but I don't

remember any no trespassing signs.

22

Q.

Would the gates have been locked?

23

A.

They could of been. I remember there was

24

cows there. And on a bike we usually -- You know, if

25

some is fastened very securely we'll throw our bikes over
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the fence and climb over.
Q.

Have you ever traversed the road from the

south coming back towards Heber?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

And do you -- How do you do that?

A.

I've ridden that in a four-wheel vehicle, on

a motorcycle, on a mountain bike and on skis.
Q.

Typically between the first time you used

that road and the last time you used it, how many times
per year would you say you use that road?
A.

I would say once every other year, once every

third year, something like that.
Q.

And one year it maybe bicycle, one year it

maybe a truck and one year it maybe skis?
A.

Yep.

Q.

Do you ever recall seeing a no trespassing

signs anywhere along that road?
A.

You know, I think I've seen plywood painted

orange it seems like. I don't recall seeing any no
trespassing signs.
Q.

The orange plywood, where would that have

A.

It seemed like that was about halfway between

been?

Wallsberg and Big Glade. That's what my recollection is.
Q.

Can you point to that on the map by chance?
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A.

Well, it would have been in this area here,

cause this is, you know, where I get on it usually and
this is -- I either go down Main Canyon or come out
Daniels Summit. So that's about halfways right in here
some where.
Q.

Do you recall when you would of first seen an

orange painted board or anything?
A.

It doesn't seem like it was there. When I

first started using that road it was, it was in a truck.
And I don't remember seeing those there at that time.
That would of been in the 70's. And maybe in the 80's,
probably late 80's I want to say.
Q.

When you were using this road did you ever

observe others use this road?
A.

Yeah, the last time I rode it I passed

somebody in a truck coming the other way. There aren't
very many people, but I -- When I went up there, rode
my bike on it during the deer hunt one year and passed a
bunch of people.
Q.

Now, when you ski on this road are the gates

typically up?
A.

It seemed like the one at the, just on the

north end of Big Glade. The road forks and goes around a
mountain. The road goes around both sides of the
mountain and come back together on the north end. And
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then there's a gate just north of that. And it seemed
like that was closed. But that's the only one that seems
like it was closed.
Q.

As you've used this road over the years has

there ever been a time that you've felt like it's went
from being rather open to more closed?
A.

Well, yeah, just, you know, like I say, I use

to be able to ride my truck, drive a truck up there and
there were gates closed. But I didn't feel like I was
trespassing when I open the gate and go through and then
I close them. But then, like I say, when I'm -- A
little bit later down the road after I took up mountain
biking and I was up there on a mountain bike, it seemed
like I was seeing those plywood signs or painted posts or
something.
Q.

Have you ever seen other people using those

A.

Well, yeah, that time during the deer hunt

roads?

and the time recently, probably been in '99 or so I
passed someone going north, I was going south. Those
were the only times I can recollect seeing anybody.
MR. SWEAT: I have no further questions at

this time, your Horor.
THE COURT: Mr. Petersen, cross?
MR. PETERSEN: Thank you, your Honor.
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CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETERSEN:
Q.

Mr. Baum, when you're up there skiing, is

this cross country skis you're on?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

When you're up there cross country skiing how

deep is the snow?
A.

The elevation varies up there and the aspect

of the mountain varies, but it would be anywhere from
about -- It's hardly ever more than three feet deep.
Sometimes -- I think one time I actually hit mud on
some of the south facing slopes.
Q.

Could it get as deep as ten feet in some

areas up there?
A.

Not unless it's a (INAUDIBLE).

It doesn't

-- I ski up there all the time and it's hardly ever more
than three feet deep.
Q.

Well, your testimony, I believe, was that you

go up there on that, you call the Wallsberg Ridge, we've
been referring to it as the Ridge Line Road. You go up
there once a year or every other year or every third
year; is that correct?
A.

Yeah. I wouldn't say I go up there every

year though. I'd say that -- I don't go up there that
often.
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1

2

Q.

No, no, it wouldn't -- Excuse me. Every

other year or every third year?

3

A.

Yeah.

4

Q.

Okay. Now, when you go up there every other

5

year or every third year, is that when you're skiing or

6

is that when you're riding your ATV or is that when

7

you're in a truck?

8
9

A.

That includes all that. Sometimes it's even

on foot. Sometimes I'll hike up from Thorton Hallow and

10

go up to, I think it's Palmer Canyon, loop around and

11

come back down to Thorton.

12
13

Q.

You're up there more or less to do hiking and

things like that. You're not up there hunting then?

14

A.

No, I quit hunting about 20 years ago.

15

Q.

And you say that when you're up there every

16

other year or every third year you'll sometimes see

17

someone?

18

A.

Yep.

19

Q.

And that someone that you're seeing could -

20

You don't know if they're the property owners or if

21

they're up there with permission or what then?

22
23
24
25

A.

No, I didn't quiz them on what they were

Q.

You said you saw someone in '99 and you don't

doing.

know who that was.
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A.

1

Well, I know they were in a pickup truck and

2

there was two guys, but I -- I mean, it could have been

3

-- I mean, it wasn't a government truck or anything. It

4

was a private truck, but I don't know who it was.

5

Q. When you're up there on your ATV do you

6

sometimes come to rocky roads, narrow roads on that

7

mountain ridge?

8

A.

9

I'd say.

Yeah, specially north of Wallsberg,

but even the south portion, yeah.

10

Q.

Do you ever come to areas where it's blocked

11

off with trees?

12

A.

I don't recall ever doing that.

13

Q.

Never had to stop or go around a tree then?

14

A.

I don't remember doing that.

15

MR. PETERSEN: That's all I have, your Honor.

16

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Sweat?

17

MR. SWEAT: Just a couple questions, your

18

Honor.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION

19
20
21

BY MR. SWEAT:
Q.

Mr. Baum, the time that you've used that road

22

have you ever been asked by anyone not to use it or stay

23

off'of it?

24

A.

No.

25

Q.

Were you ever asked to leave?
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No.

A.

1
2

MR. SWEAT: That's all I have, your Honor.

3

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Petersen?

4

MR. PETERSEN: No, sir.

5

THE COURT: You may step down. Thank you.

6

Okay. You say, Mr. Sweat, you have probably three more

7

witnesses?
MR. SWEAT: That's what I anticipate, your

8
9
10
11
12

Honor.
THE COURT: And you're prepared after to call

your witnesses?
MR. PETERSEN: Yes, we are, your Honor.

In fact,

13

We're prepared to start at 12:00 tomorrow.

14

we've got some witnesses subpoenaed at 9:00, but I think

15

we can put them off till 12:00.

16
17

THE COURT: Okay. We'll be in recess until

9:00 a.m. then.

18

MR. PETERSEN: Thank you.

19

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.

20

(Where upon Court recessed for the day.)

21
22
23
24
25
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June 29, 2004

9:07 a.m.
P R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT: Good morning. Mr. Sweat, we'll
go to the case of Wasatch County verses Okelberry,
continuation of the trial. You may call your next
witness.
MR. SWEAT: Thank you, your Honor. Before we
do that I would like to make a record. I'd talked with
Mr. Petersen that I might have some direct type
examinations for his client, Mr. Okelberry and possibly
Brian. And I think he's willing to make a record that I
could ask those on cross-examination rather than calling
them twice
MR. PETERSEN: We have no objection to that,
your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. That's fine.
MR. SWEAT: And our Plaintiff would call
Brandon Richins.
THE COURT: Was he sworn yesterday?
MR. SWEAT: He was not, your Honor. These
were ones I didn't even have show up yesterday, some of
them anyway.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Richins, come forward
and come up here to the witness stand. Okay. Raise your
5
right hand and take an oath before you sit down.
CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the
testimony you shall give in the matter now before this
Court will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth, so help you God.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: You may have a seat. Okay. Mr.
Sweat, you may proceed.
MR. SWEAT: Thank you, your Honor.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. SWEAT:
Q.
Mr. Richins, will you please state your full
name and address for the Court?
A.
Brandon T Richins. 501 West Main Canyon Road
Wallsberg, Utah.
Q.
What's your birth date?
A.
December 19th, 1973.
Q.
And you've lived in Wasatch County for how
long?
A.
Oh, my whole life.
Q.
Okay. Are you familiar with the area east
and a little bit north of the town of Wallsberg?
A.
Yes.
Q.
I'd like to direct your attention to what has
been marked as Exhibit No. 2, which is a map. If you
6
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like you can come down and take a look and see if you
recognize the area depicted in this map.
A.
(INAUDIBLE).
Q.
You can return to your seat. Specifically
referring to the mountainous area north and east of
Wallsberg, do you own any property up in that area?
A.
I don't.
Q.
Have you leased any property up in that area?
A.
No.
Q.
Have you used any of the roads that are in
that area?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Are you aware of a road called Circle Spring
Road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Can you see it depicted on my map?
A.
Yeah, it's the green road there.
Q.
The green road?
MR. SWEAT: I would ask the record reflect
that he has -THE COURT: Why don't you have him point it
out so we know specifically which one (INAUDIBLE). The
record may reflect he's identified what on the map is the
Circle Springs Road.
MR. SWEAT: Thank you, your Honor.
7
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) Have you ever used that road?
A.
I have.
Q.
What portions have you used of that road?
A.
I've went all the way down.
Q.
What do you mean all the way down? Where
does that end up?
A.
I just went down as far as I could over in
the springs and open area.
Q.
When did you first use that road?
A.
I can't recall on that one.
Q.
Do you have an idea when it might have been?
A.
Well, childhood memories I can't exactly
remember, but -Q.
When's the first time you actually recall
using that road?
A.
Sometime in my teenage years after I had my
driver's license I went down there.
Q.
Why did you go down that road?
A.
Just for a ride.
Q.
At that time did you go all the way to the
end of the road?
A.
I think so.
Q.
When did you last use this road?
A.
Oh, I actually went down the road before the
property line last year to help my father lift some wood,
8
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but that was just partially, not very far.
Q.
When was the last time you went clear down
the road?
A.
Oh, it's been a few years ago.
Q.
Do you recall about when?
A.
I can't.
Q.
Between the time you first went down the road
and when you last went down the road, did you use road
very often?
A.
No.
Q.
Why did you quit going down the road?
A.
Other interest, maybe with the signs, didn't
know whether I was going to get in trouble or not.
Q.
What signs are those?
A.
No trespassing.
Q.
When do you first remember seeing a sign?
A.
To the best of my knowledge I'd say 15, 16
years ago.
Q.
And once you saw the sign you quit going
down?
A.
No. I've been down that one since with the
understanding that there was public land on the far sides
and the road was just access.
Q.
Have you ever encountered a locked gate on
that road?
9
A.
I don't recall.
Q.
Have you ever been asked by anyone not to use
that road?
A.
No.
Q.
Are you aware of a road called the Ridge Line
Road?
A.
I am.
Q.
Could you point that road out to us on the
map?
A.
It's directly across the top.
MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, may the record
reflect that he's pointed what we've designated as the
Ridge Line Road.
THE COURT: It may so reflect.
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) Have you ever used this road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
When do you first recall using this road?
A.
Like before when I was young I have vague
memories of using it, but since I became a licensed
driver I've used it quite frequently.
Q.
Do you recall when the first time you used
the road would have been?
A.
I would of had my license in the summer of
'90 and I'd taken a couple vehicles between '90 and '94.
I don't recall how many times I've taken, but I know I've
10
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taken at least two vehicles that I rode over the top.
Q.
Just one time each?
A.
I'm not sure how many times each, but like,
for sure at least once each.
Q.
Do you recall when that was?
A.
My first vehicle would have been '90, I owned
that '90 to '92. I took that one. And I purchased a '93
truck in '93 and I used it. And I went on a mission and
left in '94. So it would have been '93, '94 area.
Q.
When first used the road did you ever
encounter a locked gate?
A.
When I first used the road, no. There were
signs and at times there may have been gates up, but they
were not locked.
Q.
Did you ever encounter anyone up there
patrolling the area?
A.
When I was young, before I had my driver's
license, we went hunting with my grandfather and there
was people patrolling the area.
Q.
And did they stop you from using the roads?
A.
They tried to stop us from using the road.
Asked us not to come in and we informed them that we were
just passing through to get to some public land. And
they watched us to make sure that we passed through. And
then we got to where we wanted to go and hunted on public
11
land.
Q.
Do you recall when the last time you used
this road?
A.
The last time I used that road I, for sure,
was in, that I can recall I know I used it in 2000, the
summer of 2000 and we used it frequently four-wheeling.
Q.
You used it frequently that year?
A.
I did.
Q.
Was there no trespassing signs in place at
that time?
A.
There was.
Q.
Was there locked gates at that time?
A.
No.
Q.
Did anybody ever try to keep you off the road
in 19 or 2000?
A.
No.
Q.
Were there gates up in 2000?
A.
I can't remember for sure if they were up or
not cause there was times when there were gates up and
times when they weren't, but they were not locked.
Q.
What did you use the road for in 2000?
A.
Just to access public lands for just riding
ATV.
Q.
Where would you go on the road when you used
it?
12
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A.
All the way across from the Big Glade till
you can get to the other side and come down the state
land there.
Q.
And what type of vehicle did you use then?
A.
An ATV.
Q.
When did you stop using the Ridge Line Road?
A.
It seems to the best of my knowledge that
when we went and attempted in 2001 there were locked
gates and have been since.
Q.
Was that the first time you encountered
locked gates?
A.
Yes.
Q.
You indicated that prior to locked gates you
had seen signs; is that correct?
A.
Yes.
Q.
What was your belief in using the road prior
to the locked gates?
MR. PETERSEN: Now, what are we -- At what
point are we talking about here?
THE COURT: He's talking -- He's asking
what his understanding as to the use of the roads prior
to the locked gates in 2001.
MR. PETERSEN: My question was where were
those locked gates that he's referring to?
THE COURT: Why don't you ask him that
13
question.
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) Where were the locked gates
that you saw in 2001?
A.
Along the Ridge Line at the property line.
Q.
Could you point on the map where the locked,
where you encountered the locked gate that kept you from
using it?
A.
I think it would be hard to know exactly on a
map, but as you leave the Big Glade and come down along
here, it seems like probably just before you get to the
Maple Canyon Road there would be a gate, and then another
one down further, but I can't -- Some where down in
there.
Q.
My previous question was that prior to you
running into the locked gates, but after you had seen the
no trespassing signs you indicated you still used the
road; is that correct?
A.
Right.
Q.
And what was your belief or understanding of
why you would still use the road?
A.
My understanding is that I was legally
authorized to use the road to access public land as long
as I didn't disturbed the property but I just passed
through.
Q.
When you were using the road in 2000 did you
14
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ever see others using the road?
A.
On occasion I would see someone, pass
someone.
Q.
Did you know who they were?
A.
Yeah, usually.
Q.
Were they -- Were they any of the
Okelberrys or any of the people that worked for them?
A.
I don't recall on that road. I'd seen them
around, but I don't remember, but I don't believe I've
ran into them on that road. Mostly just towns people
doing what I was doing.
Q.
Have you ever used a road called Thorton
Hallow Road?
A.
I have.
Q.
Would you point to that road on the map?
MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, may the record
reflect that the Defendant or that the witness has
pointed out what Plaintiff has designated as Thorton
Hallow Road.
THE COURT: The record may so reflect.
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) When did you first use that
road?
A.
It would have been when I was young, with my
family. And I haven't used that one a whole lot since.
Q.
Did you -- When was the last time you used
15
that road?
A.
I can't recall.
Q.
You indicated you only used it with your
family. Did you ever use it by yourself at all?
A.
You know what, I probably may have, riding
around, but I can't say because I don't recall.
Q.
Did you ever use Parker Canyon Road?
A.
I have.
Q.
Can you point that road out to us on the map?
Do you recall when you first used that road?
A.
The first time -- Like I said, all my life
we -- So it would of been a childhood memory the first
time. The most recent time would of been '99, 2000.
Q.
And what would you of used the road for in
'99 or 2000?
A.
Joy riding.
Q.
At that time did you run into any locked
gates on that road?
A.
No.
Q.
Did you run into any no trespassing signs.
A.
I don't remember. I (INAUDIBLE) from that
road.
Q.
Why did you stop using that road?
A.
Just because you can't get through the gate
to get over to it from the easier side.
16
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Q.
Would you of used that road in 2000?
A.
Yes.
Q.
In 1999?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Typically during the years you used that road
how many times per year would you think you used that
road?
A.
Not as often as the Ridge Line, maybe once a
year.
Q.
Are you familiar with a road called Maple
Canyon Road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Can you point that road out to us? Have you
ever used that road?
A.
I have.
Q.
What portions of that road have you used?
A.
The whole road.
Q.
Why did you first use that road?
A.
Just another way to ride up there.
Q.
When you say ride up there -A.
Well, there's times where maybe our family
may have been camped somewhere up there on the Big Glade,
and let's try this road or let's go this way this time.
Q.
When was the last time you remember using the
Maple Canyon Road?
17
A.
It seems two years ago, two, three years ago.
Q.
What did you use it for on that trip?
A.
We was riding four-wheelers.
Q.
And was the gate locked on that time, that
day?
A.
It was up top, but we came up from the
Wallsberg side. And it had been locked for a long time,
but during this time for some reason it was unlocked. So
we knew that there was, that there was litigation on
whether those roads should be open. And we thought well,
maybe they're open now. And so we rode up and
encountered a locked gate at the top.
Q.
When was the last time you -- Did you ever
use that road that you didn't encounter a locked gate
other than -A.
It was years ago.
Q.
Do you recall about when?
A.
Probably 15, 16 years ago.
Q.
Do you ever remember seeing a no trespassing
sign on Maple Canyon Road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
When did you first see a no trespassing sign?
A.
Probably 15, 16 years ago to the best of my
knowledge.
Q.
And did you ever use the road other than the
18
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one time that the gate had been locked and was open, did
you ever use the road after you saw a no trespassing
sign?
A.
No, because there was a locked gate.
Q.
So the lock came about the same time as the
no trespassing sign?
A.
If my memory serves correctly.
Q.
Was the only reason you used these roads was
for riding your ATV and for camping with your family?
A.
Riding, camping and hunting.
Q.
Of the roads we've discussed what roads would
you of used for hunting?
A.
Ridge Line by far the most.
Q.
How often do you think you hunted up there?
A.
Oh, every year essentially.
Q.
Do you think you used that road every year?
A.
I would say so, since I had a license to
drive.
Q.
When did you -- How long ago did you get a
license to drive?
A.
It would of been -- I was 16, I'm 30 now,
so it would have to be '90. I think I said '89 or '90.
Q.
Other than the two places you've indicated
you've encountered locked gates have you ever encountered
any other locked gates on the roads that we've discussed?
19
A.
No.
MR. SWEAT: I have no further questions at
this time.
THE COURT: Mr. Petersen, cross?
MR. PETERSEN: Thank you, your Honor.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETERSEN:
Q.
Mr. Richins, it would be safe to say, would
it not, that in respect to the Circle Spring Road you
used that very little?
A.
Yeah.
Q.
You said the last time you used it you went
down to get wood, but you didn't go all the way to the
bottom?
A.
No, we never went to the property line.
Q.
When you got the wood were you on Forest
Service property or were you on private property?
A.
Forest Service.
Q.
And do you know if you need permission to go
down there and gather wood?
A.
On forest?
Q.
Yes.
A.
They had a wood permit.
Q.
Are you sure you went -- Was there a fence
there and a gate -20
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A.
No.
Q.
-- separating the Forest Service from the
private property?
A.
No. We didn't go that far, just off the,
before we got to the fence.
Q.
You didn't go all the way to the fence?
A.
No.
Q.
Well, if you didn't go all the way to the
fence then you would of been on private property, would
you not? Cause if the fence separates the private
property from the Forest Service property -A.
No, it would be the Forest Service just where
the road leaves near the Big Glade.
THE COURT: There's a portion of the, that
road that's on the Forest Service side.
THE WITNESS: Right.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) When you gathered the wood
you were not on it?
A.
Yeah, we was -Q.
On private property?
A.
No.
Q.
So the last time you didn't even go down this
Spring Road then?
A.
No, no.
Q.
Well, we can pretty well discount the Circle
21
Spring Road, can we not?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Cause you haven't traveled it that much?
A.
Not very often.
Q.
And we can pretty much discount the Thorton
Hallow Road too, could we not? Cause you said you'd been
on that very little.
A.
Very little.
Q.
So we're really talking about the Ridge Line,
Road Parker Canyon and -A.
Right.
Q.
-- and Maple Canyon Road?
A.
Right.
Q.
Now, you say that you've gone all the way
from the Big Glade all the way over to the gun club; is
that true?
A.
Well, before you -- There's a point once
you get across the top where you can turn and come down
into Wallsberg. And that would be where I went.
Q.
So you didn't -A.
Didn't go all the way to the gun club. I
have, but -Q.
You didn't go all the way to the gun club?
A.
I have in the past, but very seldom. Mostly
-- Before you there's a gate there that's protecting the
22

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

road, so turn down and come into Wallsberg.
Q.
Well, when you said you took two vehicles
over the top, and this was between '90 and '94, were you
talking about going all the way to the gun club or were
you talking about turning off and going down to
Wallsberg?
A.
Turning off and going to Wallsberg.
Q.
That's a pretty rough road, is it not, going
up there?
A.
The -- I guess it would be the north-east
end that it is fairly rocky.
Q.
Is it very steep?
A.
Yeah.
Q.
Let me show you what's been marked as
Defendant's Exhibit No. 9 and ask you if you can identify
that?
A.
Yes.
Q.
What is that?
A.
That's the north-east end of the road.
Q.
Is that on the Okelberry property?
A.
I don't believe that portion is.
Q.
Okay. Is it designated as the Ridge Line
Road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
That's pretty steep, is it not?
23
A.
Yeah.
Q.
And that's an accurate representation of it?
A.
Yeah.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we'd offer Exhibit
9.
THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. SWEAT: No objection.
THE COURT: It's received.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 9
was received into evidence.)
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Certainly wouldn't take
anything but an ATV or a four-wheel drive type vehicle up
there, would you?
A.
I haven't taken anything but a four-wheel
drive.
Q.
You wouldn't drive your own passenger car up
there, would you?
A.
No.
Q.
Let me show you what's been marked as Exhibit
6 and ask you if you can identify that?
A.
Yes.
Q.
What is that?
A.
That's one of the grates on the Ridge Line
Road, I believe.
Q.
Do you know where it's at?
24
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A.
I'm not sure exactly which one it is from the
picture.
Q.
Now, when you come through this gate has it
been up or has it been down?
A.
I've encountered both.
Q.
So there's been occasions when the gate has
been up, you'd go through, you'd open the gate?
A.
Right, open the gate, drive through and close
the gate.
Q.
Did you always close the gate if it was up?
A.
Yes.
Q.
So you acknowledge that there was a gate
there?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And I think you indicated there were other
gates along the Ridge Line Road?
A.
I think there was two.
Q.
And there were occasions when those gates
were closed, was there not?
A.
Yeah.
Q.
And if they were closed you would close them
after you went through?
A.
Right.
Q.
Well, there occasions when you went down the
road then, it was covered with trees?
25
A.
Sometimes there'd be a new fallen tree that
you would have to drive around.
Q.
What would you do when you came to a new
fallen tree?
A.
Try to move it out of the way and if I
couldn't I would just go around as close as possible.
Q.
And to go around you'd have to leave the
roadway, wouldn't you?
A.
Somewhat.
Q.
By doing that you'd be going out onto private
property?
A.
Well, I guess so, but it was usually warn
where other people have -Q.
Would it be safe to describe the Ridge Line
Road as narrow?
A.
In places.
Q.
Would it be safe to describe it as rocky?
A.
On the north-east end, otherwise not too bad.
Q.
Would it be safe to say that if it had rained
it would become impassable?
A.
Well, it depends on what you're driving I
guess.
Q.
It can get pretty muddy up there, can it not?
A.
It can.
Q.
Now, as I understand, the last time you said
26
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you went up there was in 2000 and you were on
four-wheelers?
A.
Right.
Q.
So the last time you used the Ridge Line Road
was four-wheelers in 2000?
A.
Yeah, me and my wife on a four-wheeler.
Q.
And did you go all the way over and then down
to Wallsberg?
A.
Correct.
Q.
So in -- On that occasion you were not
accessing any public ground, any public property?
A.
Well, we was camped on the one side, towards
the south end. And then we rode to the, through to get
to the state side.
Q.
Well, but this occasion you told us about
where you went up and then down to Wallsberg?
A.
Right.
Q.
You weren't camping on that occasion?
A.
Well, no, we were camping, but we went home
on that road to get home.
Q.
So in that since you weren't accessing any
public property?
A.
Well, home I guess.
Q.
Do you -- Any Forest Service property I
should say?
27
A.
I believe there would be some on the
north-east side.
Q.
Do you know if there's any -A.
We didn't stop and camp, no.
Q.
Do you know if there's any restriction using
ATV's or any motorized vehicles on Forest Service
property?
A.
In some areas there are, but I don't recall
being restricted there.
Q.
Anywhere there?
A.
Not on that road.
Q.
Well you -A.
And we've encountered forest people.
Q.
Oh, okay. Let me show you what's been marked
as Exhibit No. 4. Clearly it's been marked Exhibit No.
4. That's a picture. Have you ever seen a sign like
that on Forest Service property?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Where have you seen signs like that?
A.
Usually off of a main road where people have
tried to ride and destroy the ground, they'll put them
there is where I've seen them.
Q.
Did you ever see any signs like that off of
Circle Spring Road?
A.
It's been, like I say, a while since I've
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been down there. So I don't know.
Q.
Thorton Hallow Road?
A.
I don't know.
Q.
Parker Canyon Road?
A.
I don't remember seeing one there, no.
Q.
But you do remember seeing in that general
area up there on Forest Service property?
A.
Yeah, usually several areas where people are
taken off the main road trying to create their own,
you'll see them put something like that.
Q.
You have seen signs that say, "area closed"?
A.
Right.
Q.
Now, you indicated that you have come across
locked gates on the Ridge Line Road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
When the gates are locked then you turn
around and you don't go any further then?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Have you ever attempted to blow those locks
off with a rifle or gun?
A.
No.
Q.
Do you know of anybody that ever has?
A.
No.
Q.
Have you ever seen any signs on Forest
Service property that say, "no motorized vehicles"?
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A.
Yeah.
Q.
And that's not an uncommon sign to see, is
it?
A.
No.
Q.
If it says, "no motorized vehicles" would
that restrict you from driving your ATV's on there?
A.
Yeah.
Q.
Would it restrict you from driving your
trucks and so fourth?
A.
Yeah.
Q.
With signs like that why would you want to
access the Forest Service property?
A.
Hiking, or horse back riding or people could
do that.
Q.
Have you ever ridden a horse up there?
A.
I haven't.
Q.
This Parker Canyon Road you indicated you
traveled that before?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Was there a fence and a gate separating the
private property from the Forest Service property?
A.
It seems like there was a fence, but I really
cannot recall. I haven't used that road that much like I
have the Ridge Line.
Q.
You haven't used Parker Canyon?
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A.
I have a couple times in recent years, but
not like the Ridge Line one.
Q.
So Parker Canyon you haven't used very much,
much like Thorton Hallow, you haven't used that -A.
Well, I've used it more than Thorton Hallow,
but maybe once a year just to run -Q.
But you don't recall if there's a fence and a
wire gate separating the private property from the Forest
Service property?
A.
I can't recall. It seems like there's a
fence, but I can't recall a gate.
Q.
If you don't recall a gate how did you get
onto the Forest Service property?
A.
Just drove through.
Q.
Drove through the fence?
A.
Well, I don't remember if I had to open a
gate or not. I may have. I just can't remember.
Q.
Your recollection just isn't that good?
A.
No.
Q.
And that would apply, would it not, as to how
many times you've been on the Parker Canyon Road, your
recollection would not be that good?
A.
Right.
Q.
Now the Maple Canyon Road. You said that
you've traveled that and the last time was -- Was it
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two or three years ago?
A.
Right.
Q.
You rode an ATV?
A.
Right.
Q.
You came up from the Wallsberg side?
A.
Right.
Q.
Let me show you as what's been marked as
Defendant's Exhibit 15 and ask you if you can identify
that?
A.
That looks like coming from the Wallsberg
side, up further on the oiled road, Main Canyon Road.
That's not the way I accessed it though.
Q.
You didn't access it that way?
A.
No, there's oil rig road, the old oil rig
road. You can go partially up that and then there's a
road that takes you over and connects to the Maple Creek
Road and goes up. And that's the ones that was.
Q.
So there's another access you say? Could you
come down here and describe -- This gate here is right
down here on the main canyon road, is it not?
A.
Yes, I believe so.
Q.
And that one says no trespassing and posted?
A.
Right.
Q.
You didn't go through this one then. This
was -- Was it locked up?
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A.
I didn't even go that way. So I wouldn't
know if it was there or not.
Q.
Okay. Well and demonstrate how you got on
that Maple Canyon Road.
A.
If this is that road -- This is Main Canyon
Road I assume right here?
Q.
Yes.
A.
There's another road -- What road is this?
Some where there's a road here where the old oil rig road
was. You can drive over here. And then there's another
road that takes you over and connects here some where and
goes on that road?
Q.
So you were accessing over private property
and then, here, and then on the Okelberry property to get
on the Maple Canyon Road?
A.
Right.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, I move to strike
his testimony as to the use of that Maple Canyon Road
because there, he's accessing it over roads that county
is not asking to be open to the public.
THE COURT: Well, but he did use it. That's
-- I overrule your -MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we would offer
Exhibit 15 as the gate that's on the maple, on the main
canyon road.
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THE COURT: Well, he doesn't -- Any
objection, Mr. Sweat?
MR. SWEAT: No objection, your Honor.
THE COURT: It's received.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 15
was received into evidence.)
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Now, when you drove that
Maple Canyon Road two or three years ago you're on an
ATV?
A.
Right.
Q.
If you weren't on that ATV you couldn't of
gone up that road, could you?
A.
Probably not.
Q.
In order to access that Maple Canyon Road
you'd have to have an ATV?
A.
I would think so or a very old truck.
Q.
You indicated that however you access that
road at that time there was a no trespassing sign?
A.
I believe so.
Q.
But -- And there was actually a gate
crossing the road, but the gate happened to be open?
A.
Right.
Q.
So even though it said no trespassing you
went right through it then?
A.
Right.
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Q.
Well, wouldn't it be safe to say, Mr.
Richins, that your use of those roads up there really
would only constitute the Ridge Line Road?
A.
Mostly, yeah.
Q.
And there have been occasions when you
couldn't access that because the gates were locked?
A.
Right, in recent years.
Q.
You couldn't access it because there were
trees across the roads and so fourth?
A.
I've always been able to move them or
whatever, in most cases. Four-wheeler, you need a fairly
narrow area.
Q.
Or drive around them?
A.
Yeah, but on a four-wheeler I could usually
clear enough I could get through.
MR. PETERSEN: That's all.
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Sweat?
MR. SWEAT: Just briefly, your Honor. May I
approach the witness, your Honor?
THE COURT: You may.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. SWEAT:
Q.
Mr. Richins, you indicated that you hadn't
used Thorton Hallow Road very much?
A.
Right.
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Q.
Could can you give us an estimate of during
your entire lifetime how many times, how many times you
would of used that would constitution not very much?
A.
A couple times.
Q.
Your entire life you've been down there a
couple times?
A.
That I recall vaguely.
Q.
Two times?
A.
Yeah.
Q.
Parker Canyon Road, how many times during
your life do you think you've used that road?
A.
I would guess four or five.
MR. PETERSEN: I missed that. What was that
now?
THE COURT: Four or five.
MR. PETERSEN: Okay.
THE WITNESS: I use these roads much more
frequently as I've got older until the locked gates.
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) But even on Parker Canyon,
your entire life you've only used it five times?
A.
Like I say, I really don't know cause I was
most my life so far I've been young, so -- About two or
three times since '99, 2000.
Q.
Mr. Petersen showed you this picture with
areal photos.
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A.

Right.
MR. PETERSEN: What number was that?
THE COURT: Exhibit -- It's marked as

Exhibit 16.
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) You don't know where that is;
is that correct?
A.
I can't know because there's signs like that
all over the place that look just like that.
Q.
Typically when you see a sign like that does
it mean leave the area?
A.
No, it just means stay on the road and don't
drive off through the boonies.
Q.
Does it mean that any area, any road in the
area is closed?
A.
It doesn't, unless it's stuck right in the
middle of the road, which I haven't seen on that one.
Q.
I'm showing you what's been admitted as
Exhibit 15.
A.
Okay.
Q.
You indicated that that is the bottom, when I
mean the bottom I mean the west end of main canyon;
right?
A.
Right, just close to the oil road there.
Q.
Is that how it's always looked?
A.
No.
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Q.
All those signs have always been there?
A.
I don't think so.
Q.
Do you recall when it didn't look like this
here?
A.
When I was younger.
Q.
What was different?
A.
Probably 15, 16 years ago would be my best
guess.
Q.
What would of been different 15 or 16 years
ago?
A.
Either the gates were open or else you could
open them and go through and close them.
Q.
As long as you can remember has there been
signs like these (INAUDIBLE)?
A.
In the last 15, 16 years for sure, but I
don't think previous to that.
Q.
Do you remember a time that there weren't any
signs there?
A.
Maybe when I was young.
Q.
The last time you when were camping, you
returned home?
A.
Right.
Q.
You had been camping on forest property; is
that correct?
A.
Right.
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Q.
And you were now leaving and returning home?
A.
Right.
Q.
So you weren't accessing forest property.
It's fair to say you were de-accessing forest property?
A.
De-accessing forest property.
Q.
Maple Canyon Road, how many times would you
say you've used that road in your lifetime?
A.
Half dozen times, to travel the whole length
of it.
Q.
What to you do if don't travel the whole
length of it?
A.
Well, years ago when I was younger when the
oil rig road was finished you could go over there and
kind of go around there. It was always open when I was
young.
Q.
You say it was always open, does that mean
these gates here were always open?
A.
That wasn't where we'd access usually from,
but you could get through there at one time.
Q.
The place you did access from, you're calling
it oil rig road?
A.
Uh-huh.
Q.
Were there no trespassing signs there?
A.
Earlier on I don't think so, until 15, 16
years ago would be my best guess, about when all the
39
other ones started to go up.
MR. SWEAT: That's all I have, your Honor.
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Petersen?
MR. PETERSEN: Just briefly, your Honor.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETERSEN:
Q.
Mr. Richins, to access this Maple Canyon Road
you go up what you call the oil well road?
A.
Right.
Q.
That road has been closed, has it not?
A.
It has since, yeah. But when they did close
it and buried it in the bottom part was still travelable.
Q.
But you cannot -- To go on that road now
you'd be trespassing, would you not?
A.
Unless you're going all the way to the top I
would think.
Q.
If you come off that oil well road to access
Maple Canyon as you did, you're going to have to cross
over the Okelberry property, are you not?
A.
Right.
Q.
And to do that you'll have to be trespassing,
won't you?
A.
If -- My understanding was if you're using
it for access then it's okay if the gates are open.
Q.
Well, there's no roads over there that are
40
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open to the public, are there?
A.
The roads -- Not that I know. I don't
know. It's kind of like the rig road, you use it to get
to the forest or whatever.
Q.
The point is though the manner in which you
accessed Maple Canyon Road the last time you went up you
went over private property?
A.
Right.
Q.
And you indicated that when you did that it
was on an ATV?
A.
Right.
Q.
You couldn't really drive a four-wheel drive
vehicle a four-wheel drive vehicle up Maple Canyon Road
now?
A.
Huh'uh, probably not.
MR. PETERSEN: That's all.
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Sweat?
MR. SWEAT: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: You may step down. Thank you,
sir. Okay. Your next witness.
MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, at this time we would
recall Don Wood.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Wood, if you would
return to the witness stand. The Court reminds you
you're still under oath.
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DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. SWEAT:
Q.
Mr. Wood, we asked you some questions
yesterday or I did about your experience and training.
Is that all still true?
A.
Yes, sir.
MR. PETERSEN: What number is that?
MR. SWEAT: You know, I have it marked as 6,
but I think that's wrong. Is it still 6?
CLERK: (INAUDIBLE).
THE COURT: It's the next one, No. 17.
MR. SWEAT: I just cross out and write 17 on
it.
THE COURT: You may, uh-huh.
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) Mr. Wood, I'm showing you
what has been marked as Exhibit No. 17. Do you recognize
it?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Can you tell us what it is?
A.
It's an international forest map.
Q.
Can you tell who published it?
A.
It was published by the Forest Service.
Q.
And do you see the date that it was
published?
A.
1975 is on the map.
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MR. SWEAT: Move to admit, your Honor.
MR. PETERSEN: We have no objection.
THE COURT: It's received.
(Defendant's Exhibit No 17
was received into evidence.)
MR. SWEAT: Thank you.
BY MR. SWEAT:
Q.
As you look at that map can you see the area
that is subject of this matter?
A.
Yes, sir, I can.
Q.
And can you see any of the roads that are the
subject of this matter?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Do you see any designation on any of those
roads that is -A.
Well, on the Circle Spring Road there is a
road service number.
Q.
What's that number?
A.
My understanding of the Forest Service is
rather than put road names on all of their roads, which
would be too complicated, they assign the road a number.
And that road is a unique identifier for that road on the
forest. In this case the map shows Circle Spring Road
having No. 129.
Q.
Does the legend indicate anything about the
43
number down or about the type of marking on it?
MR. PETERSEN: Well, your Honor, I think the
exhibit speaks for itself. And this is an employee of
the county not an employee of the Forest Service.
THE COURT: Well, it's been received. So he
can describe what he's observing. That's all that he's
doing?
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) Can you describe what the -A.
According to the legend the symbol that's
associated with Circle Spring Road shows it as a forest
road.
Q.
In your work as a GIS analyst or (INAUDIBLE)
do you often work with Forest Service maps?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Do you have any understanding of what it
means when the Forest Service designates a number for a
road?
A.
As I explained -MR. PETERSEN: That one I would object to,
your Honor, he's trying to -THE COURT: Yeah, I don't know if you've laid
sufficient foundation. He doesn't know if he's -Unless you're going to lay some foundation as to how he
might know what the Forest Service uses it for -Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) When you work with these do
44
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you work with -- When you work with maps have you ever
worked with Forest Service personnel?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Have you ever discussed with them the
meanings and the, what they use to make their maps?
A.
You mean the means of the numbers on the
maps?
Q.
The meanings of symbols on their maps and why
they would or wouldn't put a symbol on a map?
A.
Yes, sir, we have worked with them.
Q.
In your working with members of the Forest
Service have you ever received an understanding of what
it means for them to number a road?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
And what is that understanding that you have?
A.
The understanding is that -MR. PETERSEN: Well, your Honor, that's based
on hearsay. Your Honor, it's what the Forest Service
personnel is telling him. If there's something on the
map that's admitted so be it, but for him to interpret it
and to base it upon what information he's getting from
Forest Service personnel, your Honor, we object to that.
THE COURT: Overruled. I mean, it's his
business. He's a map markers.
THE WITNESS: Our -45
THE COURT: Excuse me, go ahead.
THE WITNESS: Our understanding is that those
are the unique identifiers used by the Forest Service to
identify the roads in their road inventory.
MR. SWEAT: Am I now at 18?
CLERK: (INAUDIBLE).
MR. PETERSEN: May I see that other exhibit?
THE COURT: You may proceed, Mr. Sweat.
MR. SWEAT: Thank you, your Honor.
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) Mr. Wood, I am now showing
you what has been marked as Exhibit -- What did I mark
it as?
A.
18.
MR. SWEAT: Is that correct?
CLERK: Yes.
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) Would you take a minute and
review that? Can you tell us what it is?
A.
It is a forest, international forest map.
Q.
And does it purport to show who it was
published by?
A.
It is published by the Forest Service.
Q.
And what is the date on that map?
A.
The date on this map -- It has compiled
1989. I believe this is the same map you can purchase
today, however. Is there another date on this that -46
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MR. SWEAT: We would submit, your Honor.
MR. PETERSEN: We have no objection.
THE COURT: It's received.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 18
was received into evidence.)
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) Mr. Wood, if you went out to
the Forest Service today to purchase a map for this area
would this be the map you would purchase?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Looking at the map, does it again include
areas that are the subject of this matter?
A.
Yes, sir, it does.
Q.
Again, does it include the roads that are the
subject of this matter?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Are there any designations on the map
regarding these road, regarding the roads?
A.
Yes. On the map it appears that there is a
designation for the Circle Springs Road, the Parker
Canyon Road and then, or the Ridge Line (INAUDIBLE) and
then the Thorton Hallow.
Q.
Is it the same designation for Circle Springs
as before?
A.
Same number? I would have to look at the
previous exhibit.
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THE COURT: The previous one was No. 129.
THE WITNESS: It's 129 on this map.
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) And you said there was
another designation?
A.
There is a designation it appears for Ridge
Line Road and the road that connects to Parker Canyon.
Q.
What's that designation?
A.
It is 044.
Q.
And where does that -- From looking at the
map what portion -- Would you get up and shows us on
the Exhibit No. 2 what portion is designated as 044 of
the roads?
A.
If it appears on their map the designation
includes this Parker Canyon Road we identified here and
then the Ridge Line roads that connects it back to the
Forest Service.
Q.
And is it your understanding that the
designation for the roads on this map is the same as the
prior map?
A.
Yes. The legend on this map says that they
are -- It actually says, "Forest Service maintained,
but not for passenger vehicles".
Q.
Would you read that again, please?
A.
Sure. In this particular symbol, which is
the numbers in the vertical box, it says, "national
48
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Forest Service under route markers, not maintained for
passenger cars".
MR. SWEAT: That's all the questions I have
at this time, your Honor.
THE COURT: Cross, Mr. Petersen?
MR. PETERSEN: Thank you, your Honor.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETERSEN:
Q.
Mr. Wood, in regards to Plaintiff's Exhibit,
I think it's Exhibit 17. In regards to that -- In
regards to Exhibit 17 is it not true that the designation
for Maple Canyon is that of a trail?
A.
For part of the canyon, yes, sir.
Q.
And the designation for Parker Canyon is
Primitive Road?
A.
That's correct, sir.
Q.
The designation for Circle Springs is
Primitive Road?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
The designation for Thorton is trail?
A.
On the Forest Service property, yes, sir.
Q.
And the Ridge Line Road is designated
Primitive Road?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
You indicated that this is not, these
49
so-called roads are not maintained by, for passenger
service?
A.
As for the current road map it says not
maintained for passenger cars.
Q.
So they don't want any passenger cars down
there, would that be true?
A.
Well, the Forest Service is saying it's not
maintained for passenger cars.
Q.
Does that mean that they want to restrict
passenger cars?
A.
I would assume they're warning people not to
go down it because passenger cars may get stuck or not be
able to traverse the road.
Q.
Do you know if there are any signs down there
that restrict, on any of those roads, motorized vehicles?
A.
I can't speak to any signs that are on those
roads.
Q.
Have you ever been down to the bottom of
those roads as it goes on to Forest Service property?
A.
I have, on Thorton and Parker Canyon.
Q.
Did you see any signs?
A.
Parker Canyon I recall there was a sign that
says you were at the trail head that came up Parker
Canyon. I don't remember -Q.
I'm going to show you -- I'm going to show
50
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you a sign, a picture that's marked as Defendant's
Exhibit 19 and ask you if you've ever seen that sign in
Parker Canyon?
A.
This is Parker Canyon or Thorton Hallow?
Q.
Parker.
A.
I don't recall seeing this.
MR. SWEAT: I'm going to object to him
testifying to what canyon it is. I think he needs to ask
the witness what canyon it is.
THE COURT: He knows -- It hasn't been
admitted, so we don't know what foundation it is.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Do you know -- Did you
ever see a sign like that when you went down Parker
Canyon?
A.
It's possible. I don't recall this specific
sign.
Q.
Were there similar signs like that on any
other Forest Service property?
A.
I have seen signs like that on Forest Service
property, yes, sir.
Q.
Mr. Wood, I'm going to show you what's been
marked as Defendant's Exhibit 16 and ask if you've ever
seen signs like that on Forest Service property?
A.
Yes, sir, I've seen signs like this on Forest
Service property.
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Q.
Have you seen it on any of the Forest Service
property that these so-called roads lead to?
A.
Nothing that I can say for sure.
Q.
You testified that the Forest Service will
not maintain these roads and -A.
Excuse me?
Q.
Forest Service will not maintain the roads.
MR. SWEAT: I object. I think that
mis-characterizes his testimony. He said it's not
maintained for passenger car.
THE COURT: He's always -- What he's done
is he's read from a legend of Exhibit No. 18 indicating
that it's not maintained for passenger car use.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Would that be your
experience?
A.
Repeat the question once again. I'm sorry.
Q.
The legend says it's not maintained for
passenger service by the Forest Service.
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
My question was is that what you -- Is that
-- Based -- Not just the legend, but based on your
experience would that be true?
A.
I would say it's true.
Q.
So even though the legend says that, based on
your experience, they don't go up and maintain those
52
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roads?
A.
Well I -- The road is not for passenger
travel, for passenger cars.
MR. PETERSEN: Okay. That's all.
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Scott? Or Mr.
Sweat? I'm sorry.
MR. PETERSEN: Oh, I had -THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. PETERSEN: Can I follow-up on that?
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Getting back, Mr. Wood, to
Plaintiff's Exhibit 18.
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Is it not true that the -- On that one the
Ridge Line Road is designated unapproved road?
A.
That is correct.
Q.
And Maple Canyon is designated unapproved
road?
A.
That is correct, sir.
Q.
Circle is designated unapproved road?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Thorton Hallow is designated trail?
A.
On the Forest Service portion, yes, sir.
Q.
And the Parker Canyon is designated trail?
A.
Once again, on the Forest Service portion,
yes, sir.
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MR. PETERSEN: Okay. That's all.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. SWEAT:
Q.
Mr. Wood, I believe you already testified
that on Exhibit 18 that designates what we have
designated as part of the Ridge Line Road from where it
enters the Okelberry property from the south-east, down
that road onto what we've designated as Parker Canyon
Road, down to the forest, designates that as a road; is
that right?
A.
That is correct, sir.
Q.
And after it gets to the Forest Service does
it have a designation for what's left?
A.
There is -- There is a small (INAUDIBLE)
that extends onto the Forest Service then it changes to
trail.
Q.
Is there a number designated on it or is it
just a type of -A.
For the trail connect Parker there is a
number assigned to the trail, but it is the same number,
044, that appears is on the Ridge Line.
Q.
Is it a different type of designation for
both Thorton and for the -A.
Thorton is just a trail, a trail owned by
Forest Service property.
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Q.
You say on Forest Service property, is that
where it leaves the Okelberry property and enters the
forest (INAUDIBLE)?
A.
That is correct.
Q.
And what does it show prior to or on the
Okelberry property?
A.
It shows it as a road.
Q.
It shows it as a road. Mr. Petersen showed
you this, what has been marked as Exhibit 19.
MR. SWEAT: Has that been submitted?
THE COURT: No, it hasn't.
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) Have you seen signs like that
before?
A.
On the Forest Service, yes, sir.
Q.
And if you were to come upon a sign like that
how would you interpret that sign?
A.
That the roads in this area is closed.
Q.
Would you interpret it that the road that you
came to on to get there is closed?
A.
No, just from that portion, from that sign
further on down the road is closed.
Q.
Is there anything on those maps that, in your
mind, prohibits passenger cars on the roads?
A.
As far as the maps is -MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, that's an
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interpretation for the Court to make, not his knowledge
of looking at the map.
THE COURT: The map speaks for itself.
MR. SWEAT: No more questions, your Honor.
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Petersen?
MR. PETERSEN: Just briefly.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETERSEN:
Q.
Mr. Wood, Exhibit 17 is a U.S. Forest Service
map dated 1975; is that correct?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
And Exhibit 18 is a US Forest Service map
dated 18 or 1989?
A.
It shows in the bottom from the date it
complied in 1989, yes, sir.
Q.
They've changed some designations from one
map to another -A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
-- is that correct? But we concluded that
the Forest Service doesn't do any maintenance. They
don't do any road work up there, do they?
MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, I object. I don't
think that's -THE COURT: It's not what -- That's not
where we're at, Mr. Petersen. We don't know that he's
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-- He doesn't know. All he can do is just read from
what it says on the map.
MR. PETERSEN: Well, that's what I'm getting
at.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Do you have any idea why
they would change designation in this 14 year period of
time?
A.
I have no -- I have no knowledge as to why
they changed the designations.
Q.
The county hasn't gone up there and done any
work, have they?
A.
Not to my knowledge.
Q.
Okay. There are other roads, so-called roads
designated on these maps, are there not? They're not
open to the public? Would that be true?
A.
There are many roads shown on the maps. As
far as which ones are open to the public I -Q.
So the mere fact that they designate
something on the maps as a road doesn't necessarily mean
it's a public road?
A.
That is correct.
MR. PETERSEN: That's all.
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Sweat? Any
other questions for Mr. Wood?
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
57
BY MR. SWEAT:
Q.
On Exhibit No. 18 there are roads that have
no number designation; is that correct?
A.
Yes, sir, there are.
Q.
And on a Forest Service map would that mean
anything to you?
A.
If there was no number designation on the
road it means it's a loss, that the Forest Service has no
say or control on that road whatsoever or does any
maintenance on that road.
MR. SWEAT: That's all I have, your Honor.
MR. PETERSEN: I have nothing further, your
Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. You may step down. Thank
you. Next witness.
MR. SWEAT: The Plaintiff would call Benny
Gardner, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Gardner, if you'd come
forward and go to the witness stand.
THE WITNESS: Up there?
THE COURT: Yes, up here. Have you taken a
witness oath?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. You may have a seat then.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
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BY MR. SWEAT:
Q.
Mr. Gardner, would you please state your full
name and address for the for the record?
A.
Speak a little louder, please.
Q.
Would you please state your full name and
address for the record?
A.
Benny Gardner, 3649 South 3600 West
Charleston, Utah.
Q.
What is your birth date?
A.
April 7, '39.
Q.
How long have you lived in Wasatch County?
A.
How long what?
Q.
Have you lived in Wasatch County?
A.
I lived in Wasatch County, let's see, 65
years.
Q.
Are you familiar with the area east and a
little bit north of the town of Wallsberg?
A.
Yes.
Q.
I would like to direct your attention to
what's been marked as Exhibit 2. Would you come and take
a look at this? It's a map, is it not?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Are you familiar with the area depicted in
the map?
A.
Which area do you want me to -59
Q.
Here's Wallsberg.
A.
Wallsberg there. This area here (INAUDIBLE).
Q.
Okay. You can return to your seat. Have you
owned any property up in that area?
A.
No.
Q.
Have you ever leased any property up in that
area?
A.
No.
Q.
I have ever worked for anyone that owned
property up in that area or leased property?
A.
Yeah, I worked a couple times for Verg and
Jim Thompson.
Q.
Where did they own property at or where do
they own property at?
A.
Well, I helped Verg herd sheep out on
Toadstool, just west of Circle. And I helped him down on
White Pole.
Q.
When would that have been?
A.
That was in '55 or '56.
Q.
How many times did you help him?
A.
Just once.
Q.
Other than that have you ever worked for
anyone up there?
A.
No.
Q.
Are you aware of a road called Circle Springs
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Road?
A.
Q.

Pardon?
Are you aware of a road called Circle Springs

Road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Could you point it out to us on the map?
A.
This is Maple Creek. This must be Big Glade
right in here, huh?
MR. PETERSEN: May the record show that he's
miss -- He's not correctly designating where the Big
Glade is and designated private property of Mr.
Okelberry.
THE COURT: It may. I can't see.
THE WITNESS: This line road goes out this
way. So Big Glade would be right here. I would say this
one here is the one that goes out to Circle.
MR. PETERSEN: May the record show that he's
pointing at Ridge Line Road going north away from Circle
Springs Road.
THE COURT: Okay.
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) Would you take your seat, Mr.
Gardner? Could you tell us where your understanding is
that Ridge Line Road goes without looking at the map?
A.
Ridge Line Road that I understand -Q.
I'm sorry. Let's go back to Circle Springs
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Road?
A.
Circle Springs? You come onto Big Glade and
hit the ridge right, Ridge Line Road right up there where
you can drop down on Big Glade and you come off Big Glade
just a little ways, turn left, left and go out west.
Q.
So you turn west out of Big Glade?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And then where does that road go?
A.
Pardon?
Q.
Where does that road go?
A.
That goes out to Circle Springs and
Toadstool.
Q.
Have you ever been on that road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
When did you first use that road?
A.
First time I used that road was probably in
'65, '66.
Q.
What did you use that road for?
A.
Well, me and my brother went out there to
Circle Springs and built a tree house there. He's a bow
hunter.
Q.
Circle Springs, is that located on Mr.
Okelberry's property or the Forest Service?
A.
Not now it's not, that's on the forest.
Q.
You said it was about '64 that you went out
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and built a, you call it a tree house?
A.
Yes.
MR. PETERSEN: Was it '64 or '65?
MR. SWEAT: '64, '65.
THE WITNESS: In that area.
MR. SWEAT: In that area.
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) When you went out there at
that time do you remember any gates that you had to cross
through?
A.
Yes, there was a gate just as you go into Mr.
Okelberry's place. And then there's a gate just before
you go out of his place into the forest.
Q.
When you went there in '64 or '65, on that
first trip, do you recall seeing no trespassing signs?
A.
There was no trespassing signs.
Q.
There was or there was not?
A.
Was not.
Q.
I asked that badly, I'm sorry. Were there
any locked gates?
A.
No.
Q.
Were there gates?
A.
There were gates.
Q.
Do you recall if they were up?
A.
Pardon?
Q.
Do you recall if the gates were open or
63
closed?
A.
At that time I think they were open.
Q.
What kind of gates were they?
A.
They was just barbwire gates strung from one
post to another.
Q.
When was the last time you traveled on the
Circle Spring Road?
A.
Last time I traveled on that was October
24th, 1999.
Q.
Why did you travel that road that day?
A.
Me and my two boys went out there hunting.
Q.
On that day did you see any no trespassing
signs?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Did you see any locked gates?
A.
The morning we went to go out there the gate
was locked. We turned around and went back down to
Willow Springs and went hunting.
Q.
When was the last time you actually went
through Mr. Okelberry's property to Circle Springs on
that road?
A.
That same day. We come back that afternoon.
Somebody must of called the sheriff and went up there and
cut the locks.
MR. PETERSEN: Objection to what he's
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supposing.
THE COURT: It's stricken.
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) When you went back later what
was the case at that point?
A.
We went back later in the afternoon and the
gate was open.
Q.
When you traveled on that day where did you
go to?
A.
Through Okelberry's property. You mean, is
that what you're talking about?
Q.
Yeah. When you went back and the gate was
open how far down the road did you go?
A.
We went to Circle Springs.
Q.
When was the first time that you went up
there on Circle Springs and saw a locked gate?
A.
That was the first day I'd seen it locked.
Q.
That was the very first time?
A.
First time I'd seen.
Q.
When did you first see a no trespassing sign
up there?
A.
I can't remember just what day or what year
it was. It was right after Mr. Okelberry sold his
hunting rights to the United Sportsmen and no trespassing
sign, no nothing.
Q.
Was it United Sportsmen's no trespassing
65
signs?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Between the time you first used that road in
'64 and when you last used it in '99, did you use that
road very much?
A.
We went up there several times, yes.
Q.
Several times between those years or -A.
Between those years.
MR. PETERSEN: Shoot, I missed that. What
years are we talking about?
MR. SWEAT: Between '64 and '99.
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) Did you use that road every
year?
A.
I wouldn't say we used it every year, but I
used it, we used it several times.
Q.
When you say several can you give a, give us
an indication of what that means?
A.
Pardon?
Q.
When you say several can you give us an
indication of what that means?
A.
Mostly when we went hunting.
Q.
Did anyone ever try to, other than when you
saw the lock in '99 did anyone ever try to keep you from
using that road?
A.
No.
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Q.
Did anyone ever kick you off the road?
A.
No.
Q.
During the several times you used that road
did you ever encounter anyone else using the road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Do you know what they were using the road
for?
A.
Hunting.
Q.
Up until '99 were you ever aware of anyone
being stopped for using that road?
A.
Pardon?
Q.
Up until 1999 when you encountered the locks
were you aware of anyone being stopped from using that
road?
A.
No.
Q.
Are you aware of a road known as Ridge Line
Road?
A.
Known as what?
Q.
The Ridge Line Road.
A.
Yes.
Q.
Have you ever traveled on that road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Could you tell us, basically describe where
the Ridge Line Road goes or comes -A.
Ridge Line Road starts like I say, you drop
67
off from, into Big Glade and go clean over and you go
clean over and come out at the gun club if you want.
Q.
Have you ever traveled the entire length of
the Ridge Line Road to the gun club?
A.
Yes, I have.
Q.
When did you first do that? I realize you
probably can't give the exact time and day, but
approximately when did you first do that?
A.
Now, am I suppose to answer that at one time
or just kind of broke up?
Q.
Have you ever taken a trip where you started
the beginning and went clear to the gun club, started at
Big Glade?
MR. PETERSEN: I think the question was when
was the first time you used the Ridge Line Road.
THE COURT: No, the question was when was the
first time he used the whole length of the road.
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) Do you understand the
question?
A.
Yeah, I'm trying to think. I don't think I
ever used it all but one time. I think the closest I
went is down into what we call Hearts Gravel, from Big
Glade down to Hearts Gravel.
Q.
And have you went to the Big Glade to Hearts
Gravel at one time?
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A.
Yes.
Q.
When did you first do that?
A.
Probably mid 80's.
Q.
How many times have you made that ride from
Big Glade to Hearts Gravel?
A.
I don't know for sure, probably seven or
eight times.
Q.
When was the last time you made that trip
from the Big Glade to the Hearts Gravel?
A.
I would say probably the early 90's.
Q.
Between the first time you went in the 80's
when you went in the 90's did you ever encounter no
trespassing signs?
A.
The only time I ever encountered trespassing
signs is right after Okelberry sold his hunting rights to
the United Sportsmen.
Q.
Is that the same time you saw them on Circle
Spring Road?
A.
Yeah.
Q.
How many times a year do you think you would
use Ridge Line Road?
A.
Well, from, like I said, from Big Glade over
to White Pole probably seven or eight times a year.
Q.
Have you ever used a road called Thorton
Hallow Road?
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A.
Yes.
Q.
When do you recall first using that road?
A.
First used that probably in the mid 80's.
Q.
What did you use that road for?
A.
Hunting.
Q.
Where were you hunting?
A.
Down on the forest. We'd go through -- It
was Mr. Okelberry's property down onto the forest, down,
accept for that lower pond.
Q.
At that time did the road go through the
forest land?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Was there a gate there?
A.
There was a gate as you went into Okelberry's
property and a gate as you went out of Okelberry's into
the forest.
Q.
First time you used it were those gates
locked?
A.
No.
Q.
When you used it in '64 -THE COURT: He said mid 80's.
MR. SWEAT: Oh, mid 80's, I apologize.
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) When you used it in the mid
80's did anyone try to keep you off the road?
A.
No.
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Q.
When was the last time you used the Thorton
Hallow Road?
A.
That was in '94.
Q.
And what did you use it for on that day?
A.
Hunting.
Q.
Was there any no trespassing signs in place
at that time?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Were there any locked gates at that time?
A.
No.
Q.
Where was the no trespassing signs at that
time?
A.
They was as you just entered Mr. Okelberry's
property, all the way down through there he had them on
the trees.
Q.
All the way along the road he had them on
trees?
A.
All the way along the road there was trees
that had no trespassing on them.
Q.
So even after you went through into his
property there was no trespassing signs?
A.
No, after you went through his property there
was no trespassing signs.
Q.
I'm sorry I maybe misunderstanding. While
the road goes through his property you say all along
71
there were no trespassing signs?
A.
On the trees he had no trespassing, on the
trees going through his property?
Q.
What did you understand that to mean?
A.
I understood that I couldn't get out of that
truck and get on the property and go hunting on his
property.
Q.
During the time you first used Thorton Hallow
and you last used it did you use it any time in between?
A.
Say that again.
Q.
How many times a year did you use Thorton
Hallow.
A.
Oh, probably six or seven.
Q.
What would you use it for?
A.
Hunting.
Q.
Between the 80's and the 90's were you ever
stopped from using the road?
A.
No.
Q.
Did you ever see other people use the road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Do you know what they were using the road
for?
A.
Hunting.
Q.
Did you ever -A.
And camping.
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Q.
Where did they camp at?
A.
They'd camp down on the forest, after you get
off Mr. Okelberry's property they'd camp down right there
by the bottom pond.
Q.
Did you see them using vehicles to camp or
did they -A.
Yes.
Q.
Is there any other way that you know of
getting to that spot of the Forest Service other than
through Thorton Hallow Road?
A.
If you wanted to ride a horse or walk up the
trail you could.
Q.
Is there anyway to get a vehicle down there?
A.
Not unless it was a four-wheeler. And last
time I was down there I don't think you could get a
four-wheeler (INAUDIBLE).
Q.
As far as an automobile or a four-wheel drive
truck would you have to use the road?
A.
The last time -- The only time I went clean
through there you couldn't.
Q.
When you say clean through there do you mean
Thorton Hallow Road or you mean down the side of the
fence?
A.
From -- If you -- The road -- The trail
of the road come back into Thorton Hallow at the bottom
73
if you come in that way.
Q.
Oh, I understand now. Up from highway 40?
A.
Well, no, you couldn't come up from highway
40. You'd have to go down and around and come up through
Parker and use that trail. Come back in that way. You
could walk-in that way or ride a horse. I think they did
bull doze a trail through there, but I think you could
just go all the way with a four-wheeler if you wanted.
The last time I remember going down through there.
Q.
Have you ever used Parker Canyon Road?
A.
Parker Canyon Road is the one you turn off
the White Pole Road and you go through White Pole and
come back towards Comington, Station and Thorton, right?
Q.
I'm asking you about Parker Canyon.
A.
Yeah, that's the one -- I used that.
Q.
When did you first use that road?
A.
That was in '66 when we went down there with
my brother to build a tree house. I think they called it
Robinson Pond.
Q.
How did you access -- How did you use that
road?
A.
We had pickups.
Q.
And on that day did you see no trespassing
signs?
A.
No.
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MR. PETERSEN: What day are we talking about?
THE COURT: Back in '66.
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) When was the last time you
used Parker Canyon Road?
A.
I'd say it was '94.
Q.
What did you use it for on that day?
A.
We was hunting.
Q.
And in '94 did you see any no trespassing
signs on that road?
A.
All the way through Okelberry's property.
You get on the forest you never see no trespassing signs.
Q.
Did you see any on West Daniels land?
A.
If that was on West Daniels land I never seen
any there.
Q.
Now, in '94 when you saw the signs when you
used Parker Canyon again was there signs throughout Mr.
Okelberry's property, is that what you testified?
A.
Let me read what I said. I think there might
have been some no trespassing on the Daniel's, cattle
permit, cause I'm sure you wasn't able to hunt through
there.
Q.
Between '66 when you first used it and '94
when you last used it, did you frequently or infrequently
use Parker Canyon Road?
A.
Pardon?
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Q.
During the time you first used it and you've
last used it, how often did you use that road?
A.
Parker Road?
Q.
Yeah.
A.
Oh, maybe four or five times a year.
Q.
And what would you use it for?
A.
Hunting.
Q.
And in between those two times when you'd use
it four or five times a year were you ever stopped from
using the road?
A.
No.
Q.
Were you ever -- Did you ever encounter a
locked gate on the road between '94 and '66?
A.
No.
Q.
During that time when you would use the road
did you ever see other people using the road?
A.
Yea.
Q.
What were they using the road for?
A.
Probably hunting or recreation. I don't
know, I never asked them.
Q.
Are you familiar with the road known as Maple
Canyon Road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Can you tell us where that road begins and
ends?
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A.
That road takes off down Maple Creek just
after you come, Ridge Line Road through Mr. Okelberry's
place and then it goes on down into Maple Creek off the
Ridge Line Road before you get over into Comings, what
they call top of Comings, where we use to camp and
Thompson's on down.
Q.
It starts on the Ridge Line Road, you said.
Where does it end?
A.
Maple Creek.
Q.
Where's that?
A.
Maple Creek Road ends out on the highway by
John Young's, the Main Canyon Road they call it.
Q.
Have you ever used Maple Canyon Road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
When did you first use Maple Canyon Road?
A.
It was probably in the late 60's early 70's.
Q.
And why would you of used the road?
A.
Well, we use to camp up on Comings.
(INAUDIBLE) Comings. And we'd that every once in a while
to go up, if it wasn't too wet. If it was wet or snow or
something you couldn't use it, it was too rough a road.
You got to go the other way.
Q.
When was the last time you used Maple Canyon
Road?
A.
Probably the mid 80's.
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Q.
When you used it in the 80's did you see any
no trespassing signs?
A.
No.
Q.
Prior to that time in the 80's did you ever
see any no trespassing signs?
A.
No.
Q.
Did you ever encounter any locked gates
between when you first used it in the 80's?
A.
Not locked, no. It was shut, but not locked.
Q.
Between when you first used Maple Canyon Road
and when you last used it in the 80's how often would you
use that road?
A.
Oh, maybe two or three times a year.
Q.
And what would you typically use the road
for?
A.
We'd use it for hunting.
Q.
What type -- How would you use it?
A.
In a pickup.
Q.
During that time did you ever observe other
people using the road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Did you know who they were?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Were they people that -- Were they the
Okelberrys or people that worked for the Okelberrys?
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A.
No.
Q.
Who would they have been?
A.
They was my brothers and cousins that follow
me. They follow me one of the two.
Q.
Were they ever asked not to use the road?
A.
Not that I'm wear of.
Q.
Did you ever see or hear of them getting
kicked off the road during that time?
A.
No.
MR. PETERSEN: Objection if it that's based
on some hearsay or something, your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, he's responded. Overruled.
MR. SWEAT: That's the only questions I have
at this time, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Cross, Mr. Petersen?
MR. PETERSEN: Yes.
THE WITNESS: Can I have a drink of water?
THE COURT: You bet. It's free.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETERSEN:
Q.
Mr. Gardner, you couldn't identify the Circle
Spring Road on the map, could you?
A.
No, it's not a very good map.
Q.
It's not a very good map?
A.
Not for me to look at.
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Q.
I see. But you had a difficult time
identifying these other roads too, would you not?
A.
Probably on a map, yes. I'm not very good
reading maps.
Q.
Okay. So we really can't rely on any
exhibits, we have to rely on your memory, would that be
true? Yes or no?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Now, in regards to the Circle Spring Road you
indicated that the first time you went there was in '64,
'65, would that be true?
A.
'64, '65, is that what you said?
Q.
That's what you testified to. I'm just
asking you if that's accurate?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Okay. And you indicated the last time you
used it was October 24th, 1999?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Do you remember signing an affidavit that's
on file with the Court?
A.
Pardon?
Q.
Do you remember signing an affidavit?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Do you remember in your affidavit that you
said that you used the Circle Spring Road from 1960 to
80
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2001?
A.
I might have said that. I don't remember
what I wrote in that affidavit.
Q.
Which is accurate your affidavit or your
testimony in court today?
A.
Well, I'd say my testimony is.
Q.
So we can say that the affidavit that you
signed under oath is not accurate?
A.
I don't remember signing that under oath.
Q.
Well, let me show you a copy of it. The
original would be on file with the Court. It seems to be
dated the 29th day of January, 2003. And I ask you if
that's your signature?
A.
Yes.
MR. PETERSEN: I think the Court can take
notice that the affidavit is on file.
THE COURT: It is.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) You said in October 24th,
1999 that you went there and the gate was locked, so you
went, you turned around?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And then came back in the afternoon and the
gate was unlocked?
A.
Right.
Q.
Isn't it true that on that day that you
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received permission to use the Circle Springs Road from
Mr. Brian Okelberry?
A.
No, I didn't. It was open and when ever the
gate, roads open I was told you can use that road to go
to the forest. We checked on that when he first owned
it.
Q.
Did you ever talk to Mr. Brian Okelberry
about using the roads?
A.
No, I didn't.
Q.
Do you know him?
A.
Yes, I know him.
Q.
Can you identify him in Court today?
A.
Yes, I can.
Q.
And at no time did he ever give you
permission to use the roads?
A.
No.
Q.
Did you ever talk to him about using the
roads?
A.
No.
Q.
Never?
A.
Not that -Q.
Now, in 1999 the sign -- You said there was
a sign that says no trespassing?
A.
Right.
Q.
But you interpret that mean you can still use
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the road, just don't get off the roads?
A.
Right. As long as we didn't get off and go
hunting on his property we was told we could use that
road to go through to the forest. Not by Mr. Okelberry,
but -Q.
The signs that you saw there in '99 said no
trespassing, did it not?
A.
Yes.
Q.
It said keep out?
A.
I think it did.
Q.
Do you know what kind of gate was there when
you went through in '99?
A.
Well, when we pulled up there that morning
and it was locked, if I remember right it was dark, but I
think it was, I think it had net wire on the bottom and
two or three barbs on the top.
Q.
It was locked at that time?
A.
It was locked.
Q.
Have you ever had occasion to destroy any
locks on any gates up there?
A.
No, I haven't.
Q.
You've never taken a rifle and blown off the
locks?
A.
No, that's stupid.
Q.
It would be a fact that your use of that
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Circle Springs Road is rather limited, isn't it?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Now, the Ridge Line Road, there's always been
a gate from the Forest Service property onto the Ridge
Line Road, has there not?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And has that gate always been open when
you've gone through there or been occasions when it's
been closed?
A.
The one that hooks to the forest and Mr.
Okelberry's, is that the one you're talking about.
Q.
Yes.
A.
It's never -- It's -- What was the
question again?
Q.
The question is there's been a gate between
the Forest Service property and Mr. Okelberry's
property -A.
Yes.
Q.
-- coming off the Glade?
A.
Right.
Q.
And there have been occasions when you have
seen that gate closed, isn't that true?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Now, this road that we're talking about, the
Ridge Line Road, is that the same gate that gets you into
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the Circle Springs Road?
A.
No.
Q.
So their two separate gates then?
A.
Right.
Q.
And are there gates on both entrances?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And when that gate is closed would you open
it and just go through or would you turn around and go
back?
A.
We would open it and go through.
Q.
Would you close the gate again?
A.
Yes, we would.
Q.
Now, you say that you went on an occasion up
that Ridge Line Road and over to Heart and then down to
Hearts Gravel Road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Now, the Hearts Gravel Road is closed, is it
not?
A.
The Hearts Gravel Road as far as I know it's
closed since I was on it.
Q.
Is it your understanding that's open to the
public?
A.
Hearts Gravel Road, yes.
Q.
You indicated that the last time you used the
Ridge Line Road was in the early 90's, would that be
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true?
A.
Yes.
Q.
In your affidavit you said you used the Ridge
Line -- Well, when was -- When was the first time you
started using the Ridge Line Road?
A.
I would say it was in mid 70's.
Q.
Okay. So you first started using the Ridge
Line Road in the mid 70's. In your affidavit you said
you used the Ridge Line Road from 1962 to 2001. Now, the
affidavit would be an error, would it not?
A.
Well, I've used that road all the way through
that year, yeah. No, I think I should be right.
Q.
Well, Mr. Gardner, what are we to believe
your affidavit or what your testifying to today?
A.
Well, when I wrote that affidavit I wasn't
very, I guess, thinking as straight as I am now. So I
think (INAUDIBLE).
Q.
So we're to disregard the affidavit and rely
on your testimony today?
A.
Yes.
Q.
I gather the times you went up there was
mostly in the fall of the year, would that be true?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Did you ever encounter trees across the road?
A.
Broke down ones, yes.
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Q.
What would you do when you come down, come to
a tree that had blown over the road?
A.
Well most -- Most of the time we -- Well,
let me restate that. I don't recall but maybe one or two
that we encountered across the road that was -- If we
had something to saw it in two we'd saw it in two and go
through.
Q.
You do recall there were trees covering the
Ridge Line Road?
A.
There have been, yes.
Q.
One are two times, and you carried saws and
then you'd saw through that?
A.
We use to go up there and get fire wood in
the 80's. And it if there was a tree down we'd saw to it
and go through.
Q.
Well, what if you didn't have a saw?
A.
Well, we couldn't, didn't have nothing to
moved it with we wouldn't go through.
Q.
So on -- These one or two times that you
testified to when there was trees across the road, was
there one occasion you had a saw and another occasion
when you didn't have a saw?
A.
I really can't remember. Most the times I
didn't have a saw. If we had a chain we'd hook up to it
and pull it out of the road or break the end off and pull
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it around. A couple of us would get out and pull it
around where we could pass.
Q.
Well, now, I'm not sure I'm following you.
You said there was or was not occasion when you had a saw
and you sawed it out?
A.
I said if we had a saw.
Q.
Do you remember?
A.
I remember one occasion we had sawed one and
that was before we hit the Big Glade. That wasn't on the
Ridge.
Q.
Well, I'm talking about the Ridge Line Road.
You indicated there has been one or two occasions when
there's been trees across the road on Ridge Line Road,
but you can't remember what you did when you got to the
trees then, with that be safe to say?
A.
The couple times that I remember that the
trees was along the Ridge Line Road it was on fish and
game property. It was after you come up out of the White
Pole and over the rocky going down into what we call
Hearts Gravel. There was a couple there and I recall we
had a saw and we sawed it in two. Once we didn't we
pulled it around and made room that way.
Q.
Do you ever recall seeing any trees on the
Okelberry property that was covering the roads?
A.
No.
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Q.
Never?
A.
No.
Q.
Now, the Thorton Hallow Road you said that
you first began using that road in the mid 80s, would
that be correct?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And the purpose for going there was for
hunting?
A.
Yes, we'd go down there and go in the forest
to hunt.
Q.
Is there any other purpose for using that
road?
A.
Pardon?
Q.
Was there any other purpose for using that
road?
A.
We use to go down there and set at that lower
pond and watch for deer or elk come in and see what come
in.
Q.
Any other purpose?
A.
No.
Q.
Then you said the last time you used it was
in 1994?
A.
Yes.
Q.
In your affidavit you said that you used the
Thorton Hallow Road from 1965 to 2001. Is this another
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occasion when we should disregard your affidavit and rely
on your testimony?
A.
Well, I understand I probably, probably
thinking about the times now that I went down in them
roads when I was driving. Then when I wrote the
affidavit I was probably with other people then.
Q.
Well, now, you testified under oath just a
few minutes ago the first time you used it was the mid
80's, the last time you used it was '94. Now, are you
going to say that's not accurate?
A.
No, that's accurate.
Q.
Okay. So then we just, we need to disregard
the affidavit?
A.
Yeah, disregard it.
Q.
As I understand, you said that there was a
gate from the Thorton Hallow private property onto the
Forest Service property?
A.
From -- Yes, there's a gate that separates
the forest and Okelberry's.
Q.
The gate is always -- Has there always been
a gate there when you've gone out?
A.
Yes.
Q.
I wasn't sure that I followed you on the
signs. Was there ever a time when you saw no trespassing
signs there?
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A.
Yes, there was signs all the way on the trees
going down through his property till you hit the forest.
And I never seen any after you got across his property
into the forest.
Q.
The forest -- Do you interpret the no
trespassing signs to mean you're okay on the road, but
just don't get off the road?
A.
Can't get off and hunt, yes. Can't get off
and get wood or anything like that and anything.
Q.
You don't recall seeing any signs down on the
Forest Service property, no trespassing, anything of that
nature?
A.
No.
Q.
Do you recall any signs on the Forest Service
property restricting motorized vehicles?
A.
I have. I've seen them signs.
Q.
What did the signs say?
A.
It said restriction -- No traveling on
these roads. And the signs that I've seen up there they
usually bull dozed the road up and put the sign right
where they bull dozed the property or the -Q.
Well, the point is, Mr. Gardner, you have
seen on the Thorton Hallow Road on the Forest Service
side that says no motorized vehicles?
A.
I don't recall that on the forest side, no.
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Q.
Okay. Well, then as I understand you do
recall seeing signs on the Forest Service property that
says no motorized vehicles; is that correct?
A.
I have seen it on the forest, yes, but not on
that particular place.
Q.
But you don't recall ever seeing it on the
Thorton Hallow area?
A.
No.
Q.
You indicated that you can't come up from
Highway 40 into that Thorton Hallow area?
A.
In a motor -- In a truck or a
four-wheeler -Q.
Right, but no, you can come up and hunt in
that area, can't you?
A.
You can walk up from Daniels Road if you
want. You can walk up Thorton Hallow Canyon -Q.
Sure.
A.
-- and ride a horse up there.
Q.
Sure. And there are trails up in that area,
aren't there?
A.
Well, sure there is.
Q.
So if you want to hunt that Thorton Hallow
area you don't have to come down that road, you can come
up Highway 40?
A.
Right.
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Q.
Now, the Parker Canyon Road, you said the
Parker Canyon Road connects in some way to the Hallow,
Thorton Hallow Road?
A.
If you want to walk it or ride a horse.
Q.
Well, we're talking about roads though.
We're talking about the road you go on connects as the
Parker Canyon Road connect -MR. SWEAT: I'm going to object, your Honor.
I think that mis-characterizes his testimony. I think he
said there was a trail that connected the two canyons.
MR. PETERSEN: Well, that's what I'm trying
to find out.
THE COURT: That is what his testimony was.
THE WITNESS: There's no road.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) There's no road?
A.
There's trails for walking. You might get
over it with a four-wheeler. I don't know. I -Q.
You said the last time that you used the
Parker Canyon Road was '94?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Your affidavit you said the last time you
used the Parker Canyon Road was 2001. Once again should
we disregard the affidavit?
A.
Disregard it.
Q.
Disregard the affidavit and rely on your
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testimony in Court today?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Did you ever see any signs once you leave the
private property going on the Forest Service property
about no trespassing?
A.
Just on the private property side not on the
forest side.
Q.
Okay. So you did see a sign on the private
property that said no trespassing?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And once again, you interpret that to mean
it's okay to drive on the road, just don't get off of it?
A.
Right, don't get off and hunt.
Q.
Now, as you come off that Parker Canyon Road
and you go onto the Ridge Line Road, were there any gates
and fences in that area?
A.
There's a fence. And if you want to call it
a gate there was a gate there, just not a very good one.
Q.
The Maple Canyon Road, now have you ever
traveled that road from one end to the other?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And is it your testimony that you can travel
that in a four-wheel drive vehicle?
A.
We went up in a two-wheel drive vehicles.
Q.
A witness earlier this morning for the
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county, Mr. Brandon Richins, testified the only way you
can traverse that road is on an ATV. Would you agree
with that?
THE COURT: Why don't you -- Why don't you
lay some foundation as to when. I think the last time he
was there was in the 80's.
MR. PETERSEN: Okay.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Your first use of that
road you said was in the late 60's or early 70's?
A.
Yes.
Q.
In your affidavit you said it was 1968, but
it could have been as late as the 70's; is that correct?
A.
Could have been.
Q.
Now, the first time you went up that road
what were you traveling in?
A.
Pickup.
Q.
Four-wheel drive?
A.
No.
Q.
It wasn't a four-wheel drive?
A.
No.
Q.
Is it a good road?
A.
No, it's not a good road.
Q.
Rough road?
A.
It's a rough road.
Q.
So if there's testimony -- When was the
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last time you went on it?
A.
When the last time I went on it, it was
probably in the mid 80's.
Q.
And what was the condition of the road at
that time?
A.
It wasn't any better than the first time I
went up.
Q.
Pretty bad?
A.
It was in bad shape.
Q.
So you would not know what the condition of
the road was right now?
A.
No.
Q.
Do you know if that road ever washes out from
time to time?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Does that make it impassable when that
happens?
A.
If you want to take a chance of getting down
in the ruts. I have and we've had to work our butts off
getting out. (INAUDIBLE).
Q.
Well, then it's been about 20 years since
you've traveled that road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
So you would not know what the current
condition of it is now?
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A.
Not now.
Q.
And even when you traveled it the last time
in the mid 80's it was a pretty rough road?
A.
It was rough.
Q.
Isn't that -A.
That's why we quit traveling it.
Q.
Isn't that the way we characterize all these
roads, they were rough roads?
A.
Most generally, in places they are.
Q.
Steep?
A.
Well, in some places they are.
Q.
Rocky?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And sometimes trees would fall over on the
roads?
A.
Sometimes.
MR. PETERSEN: That's all.
THE COURT: Mr. Sweat, anything else?
MR. SWEAT: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. You may step down.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
THE COURT: We'll take our morning recess.
We'll be in recess until, oh, quarter after.
(lunch recess was taken.)
THE COURT: Okay. We return to the case of
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Wasatch County verses Okelberry. Mr. Sweat, you can call
your next witness.
MR. SWEAT: The Plaintiff would call Mark
Butters, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Butters, come forward
and appear on the witness stand. Have you taken an oath
previously?
MR. SWEAT: He has not, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Raise your right hand and
take an oath.
CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the
testimony you shall give in the matter now before this
Court shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Have a seat. You may proceed.
MR. SWEAT: Thank you, your Honor.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. SWEAT:
Q.
Will you please state your full name and
address for the record?
A.
It's Mark Brigg Butters. 2105 East Main
Canyon Road, Wallsberg.
Q.
How long have you lived in Wallsberg?
A.
I've lived there 42 years.
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Q.
Are you familiar with the area east and a
little bit north of Wallsberg, the mountains up in that
area?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Why are you familiar with that area?
A.
We use to -- I use to hunt there. Most all
my life I've hunted until the CWMU started.
Q.
Have you ever owned any property up in that
area?
A.
No, I haven't.
Q.
Have you ever leased any property up in that
area?
A.
No.
Q.
Have you ever worked for anybody that's owned
or leased property up in that area?
A.
No, I haven't.
Q.
I want to show you what's been marked as
Exhibit No. 2. If you want to just step down and look I
guess. It's a map and see if you can recognize the area
and point out where is Wallsberg on the map?
A.
(INAUDIBLE).
Q.
That's Wallsberg?
A.
(INAUDIBLE).
Q.
Okay. Do you recognize -- (INAUDIBLE) what
this road would be here?
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A.
(INAUDIBLE) Ridge Line Road and this is the
mountains east of my house that we use to hunt in all the
time.
Q.
Okay. Do you recognize what would be Maple
Canyon Road on there? Where does it go?
A.
It comes off Ridge Line Road and comes down
and comes up (INAUDIBLE).
Q.
Do you recognize Circle Springs Road on
there?
A.
(INAUDIBLE).
Q.
Do you recognize Thorton Hallow Road?
A.
(INAUDIBLE).
Q.
Do you recognize Parker Canyon Road?
A.
(INAUDIBLE).
MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, can the record
reflect that he did identify the roads as we have
designated them on Exhibit 2?
THE COURT: It may so reflect.
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) Mr. Butters, have you ever
used the Circle Springs Road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Why have you used that road?
A.
We've used it for access for hunting. We've
used it for access for hauling fire wood.
MR. PETERSEN: Excuse me, could we have the
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witness speak a little louder.
THE COURT: Can you speak up some?
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. We've used it as
access to haul fire wood off of Circle Springs. And
we've used it for access to hunt the forest. And also as
well to hunt Okelberry's property when we was, when it
was legal for the public to hunt it.
Q.
When did you first use this road?
A.
Probably when I was five years old with my
father and my grandfather.
Q.
When did you last use this road?
A.
It would have been about '92.
Q.
During the first time you used it and the
last time you used it did you ever see any locked gates
across the road?
A.
No.
Q.
Did you ever see no trespassing signs?
A.
I have seen partial trespassing signs about
'92. And at that time we was also to buy trespass
permits to hunt on Okelberry's property before they
started their CWMU.
Q.
During the time that you first saw no
trespassing signs and the time you first used it, how
often would you use the road?
A.
We probably access the road to get over onto
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Circle Springs probably at least 20 times a summer.
Q.
Why would you do that?
A.
To haul fire wood and also to, a lot of times
just go for a ride and look for deer and elk over around
Circle Springs.
Q.
When were you born?
A.
'59.
Q.
You indicated you first used the road when
you were about six years old?
A.
Yes.
Q.
What year would that be?
A.
'65.
Q.
Did you ever observe other people use the
Circle Springs Road during that time?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Were -- Do you know what they were using
the road for?
A.
A lot of people from Wallsberg would access
it over there to haul fire wood.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, I think he can
testify to what he did, but he's assuming other people
did something.
THE COURT: Well, unless he observed -MR. PETERSEN: He saw what he observed.
THE COURT: Unless he observed it.
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Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) What did you observe people
using it for?
A.
Hunting, hauling fire wood, just out for a
ride in the mountains.
Q.
Are you aware of a road called the Ridge Line
Road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Let me backup one more time. Before you
first bought the trespass permit to hunt on Mr.
Okelberry's property -A.
Yes.
Q.
-- did you ever seek permission to use
Circle Spring Road?
A.
No, I never have.
Q.
Now, bring your attention to Ridge Line Road,
are a you wear of that road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Have you ever used that road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
When do you think you first used that road?
A.
Probably when I was eight years old.
Q.
And why would you of used that road?
A.
To go hunting with my father, to haul fire
wood with my father.
Q.
When did you last use the road?
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A.
About '96.
Q.
What did you use the road for on that
occasion?
A.
We -- We had permission from Mr. Huvard to
go in there and haul fire wood out of Maple Canyon.
Q.
Other than that time you had permission when
was the last time you used that road?
A.
Pardon me?
Q.
Before you used it in '96 with permission
when would be the last time have been you used that road?
A.
'95.
Q.
Did you get permission on that date?
A.
No, I didn't.
Q.
Was there any locked gates along that road on
that date?
A.
No, there wasn't.
Q.
Was there no trespassing signs in place?
A.
Not that I remember.
Q.
Between 1967 when you first used it and 1995
when you last used it without asking permission, how
often would you use that road?
MR. PETERSEN: Which one are we talking
about?
MR. SWEAT: Ridge Line.
THE WITNESS: At least 20 times a summer.
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Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) Typically what was your use
for that road?
A.
To haul fire wood, to access the forest, to
go scouting for deer and a lot of times just to go for a
ride in the mountains.
Q.
Are you aware a road called Thorton Hallow
Road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Have you ever used that road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
When did you first use Thorton Hallow Road?
A.
Probably about '67.
Q.
When did you last use Thorton Hallow Road?
A.
About '94.
Q.
What did you typically use that road for?
A.
To access the forest property, to hunt and
also to haul fire wood.
Q.
Did you ever -- During between '67 and '94
did you ever seek permission from Mr. Okelberry to use
that road?
A.
We did seek permission. It was through Mr.
Huvard to haul fire wood.
Q.
Was that in -- When was that?
A.
That would of been '94.
Q.
How many times did you seek permission to get
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fire wood?
A.
One time.
Q.
Prior to that time in '94 did you ever seek
permission to use Thorton Hallow Road?
A.
No.
Q.
Prior to '94 did you ever see locked gates on
Thorton Hallow Road?
A.
No.
Q.
Did you ever see no trespassing signs?
A.
I have seen partial trespassing signs.
Q.
In your mind did they tell you not to use the
road?
A.
No. To not -- Not to get off the road onto
their property.
Q.
Have you ever used a road called Parker
Canyon Road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
When did you first use that road?
A.
Probably would have been in '72.
Q.
When did you last use that road?
A.
About '92.
Q.
During that time how often would you use that
road?
A.
Around 50 times.
Q.
What did you use that road for?
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A.
To locate deer for deer hunting and to access
across and over to the forest, the fish and game ground
to come down behind Wallsberg town.
Q.
I can't remember if I asked you or not, you
indicated 50 times, was that 50 times between '72 and '92
or was that 50 times per year or what was the -A.
It would of probably been 50 times in
between.
Q.
Were you ever topped from using that road?
A.
No.
Q.
Did you ever see no trespassing signs on that
road?
A.
No, not until it was about '92.
Q.
Have you ever used a road called Maple Canyon
Road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
When did you first use that road?
A.
'65.
Q.
Where there any signs or any markers
indicating to keep out at that time?
A.
No.
Q.
Where there any locked gates at that time?
A.
No.
Q.
When did you last use Maple Canyon Road?
A.
About '86.
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Q.
Was there a sign, any signs up at that time?
A.
No.
Q.
Was there any locked gates at that time?
A.
No.
Q.
Did anyone try to keep you off the road at
that time?
A.
No.
Q.
And how often between when you first used it
and when you last used it would you use the road say in a
given year?
A.
Probably about 75 times a year.
Q.
What would you use it for?
A.
The wintertime we'd use it for snowmobiling,
to access the forest for the top of the mountain. And
the summertime to use, just to ride up the canyon to,
just for a pleasure ride.
Q.
Did anybody ever try to keep you from using
that road between those times?
A.
No.
Q.
Did anybody ever ask you not to use those
roads during that time?
A.
No.
Q.
You've indicated that you kind of recall when
no trespassing signs were put up, is that -A.
Yes.
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Q.
Were they -- You indicated that you said
there was partial no trespass be signs?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Was there ever a time that it was completely
signed for no trespassing?
A.
When they started their CWMU.
Q.
Do you remember, have a date do you recall
that would be?
A.
It would of been about '94.
Q.
You indicated you purchased a trespass
permit; is that correct?
A.
Yes.
Q.
What was that permit for?
A.
To haul fire wood off of Okelberry's property
up by the head of Maple Canyon.
Q.
At that time did you ever use the roads -Strike that. Prior to purchasing the trespass permit was
there ever a time that there were signs up that you used
the road, used any of the roads that we've discussed?
A.
Yes.
Q.
When would that have been?
A.
'91, '92.
Q.
And why would you use the roads at that time?
A.
To access the forest by Parker Canyon and
Thorton Hallow.
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Q.
Did you believe you were trespassing to use
the roads?
A.
No. As long as we stayed on the road I felt
that, and we didn't get their property to deface their
property in anyway, I felt that it was okay.
MR. SWEAT: That's all the question I have at
this time, your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Petersen, cross?
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETERSEN:
Q.
Do you have relatives in Wallsberg?
A.
Yes.
Q.
The Youngs?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Do you know if they sought permission from
the Okelberrys to go on their property?
A.
I'm not positive.
Q.
Do you know of anybody, besides yourself,
that got permission to go on their property?
A.
My brothers got permission. When I went on
the property we, my brothers obtained permission. I do
know Thompsons, Jack Thompson and some of the Youngs,
Glen Young, Dee Young obtained trespass permits to go on
their property to hunt deer.
Q.
It wasn't uncommon then for people to go to
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the Okelberry's and obtain permission to go on the
property and use the roads then, was it?
A.
No.
MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, I object to get some
foundation as to what time.
THE COURT: What time are we talking about?
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) What time period was this?
A.
'91 to '93 approximately.
Q.
Did it go into the 80's? Are you aware of
any permission that was given in the 1980's?
A.
I'm not aware of any.
Q.
The 70's?
A.
No.
Q.
So what you're talking about is a two year
time period there, '91, '92, '93, something like that?
A.
Yeah, about three years there.
Q.
And would that just apply to you or just to
the people that you know of that got permission?
A.
That applied to whoever wanted to hunt on
Okelberry's property.
Q.
Now, for those years did you -- You say you
got a trespass permit to get wood. Did you get a permit
to hunt deer?
A.
I did in '92. I got a trespass permit from
Mr. Okelberry to -111
Q.
To hunt.
A.
-- to hunt deer on their property during
that year.
Q.
And what year did you get the permit to haul
wood?
A.
I think it was '94.
Q.
So you considered at that time it was
necessary for you to get permission to go on the
property?
A.
True.
Q.
And you felt like that if you didn't get
permission you would not be allowed to go on the
property?
A.
Right.
Q.
The Circle Springs Road, you say you used
that 20 times a summer?
A.
At least.
Q.
And what months would you go up there?
A.
It would be from probably the middle of May
through October.
Q.
You really couldn't access that property
until June, could you, because of the weather? There
would be snow up there, wouldn't there?
A.
It depended on the summer or on the spring.
Q.
Sure, it depended on the year. That's about
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five months. Were you -- Is it your testimony you're
going up there once a week on Circle Springs?
A.
Before -- Before I was married, yes. We
would -- We would go up there almost every weekend
during the summertime.
Q.
And when were you married?
A.
In '92.
Q.
And after that you stopped going up there
that often?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Once a week you'd go up, you'd go down Circle
Springs Road. Would you describe the road?
A.
It's very bumpy.
Q.
Okay. It's a rough, rocky road, would that
be true?
A.
Certain parts of it are very rough.
Q.
And were rocks in it?
A.
In the middle of the road, yes.
Q.
Did you ever go down the road when trees had
fallen over the road?
A.
I have been down the road when there has been
trees that had been, already been cut out the road, but
they had fallen across.
Q.
We're talking about Circle Springs. You
never had to remove any trees, but you saw where trees
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had been removed?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Do you know who did that removal?
A.
I don't.
Q.
How -- How wide is Circle Springs?
A.
Circle Springs itself?
Q.
No, the road.
A.
Oh, the road? Probably about 20 feet.
Q.
Well, aren't there places on that road where
you'd scratch your car on the limbs and the trees and the
bushes?
A.
There is now.
Q.
Well, wasn't there back in those days?
A.
The brush hadn't quite gotten out that far
yet.
Q.
Well, you haven't been on that road for
almost ten years, have you?
A.
I haven't been on it for quite a while.
Q.
Well, when you traveled that road, isn't it
true that you would scrape your vehicle on the limbs and
trees and so fourth in certain places on Circle Springs?
A.
I don't recollect where it was growing in
that much at that time to get into it with your vehicles.
Q.
Isn't it true that to travel certain portions
of that road you need a four-wheel drive vehicle?
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A.
No.
Q.
You could drive the whole road without a
four-wheel drive?
A.
In a two-wheel drive truck, yes.
Q.
Could you drive that road if it rained
recently?
A.
In a two-wheel drive truck, no.
Q.
In a four-wheel drive?
A.
Yes.
Q.
If you had rain on that road you could travel
that road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Why did you buy permits to use that road if
you felt like it was open to the public?
MR. SWEAT: I'm going to object. I think
that mischaracterizes his testimony.
THE COURT: It does mischaracterize his
testimony. He bought permits to hunt on the property.
He bought permits to cut wood on the property, not to use
the roads. That's his testimony. You might pursue it
further.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Well, did you use those
roads during that period of time without buying that
trespass permit?
A.
Well, which time?
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Q.
When you bought these permits.
A.
We used the roads to access forest property.
Q.
But it was buying the permits that allowed
you to use the roads, wasn't it?
A.
Buying the permits to allow us to be able to
hunt or use Okelberry's property.
Q.
Right. But without the permits you couldn't
of used the roads, isn't that true?
A.
No. I -Q.
That's not your understanding?
A.
No.
Q.
Or do you have an understanding on that?
A.
I understood that it was a public access.
You could get through there as long as you didn't get off
on their property and do what you wasn't suppose to on
their property.
Q.
Now, the last time you used the Ridge Line
Road was in '96?
A.
About that, yeah.
Q.
And you gained permission from a Mr. Huvard?
A.
Yes.
Q.
At that time did you see any no trespassing
signs?
A.
Yes.
Q.
There are places on the Ridge Line Road when
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you used that in '96, very narrow, is that true?
A.
Yes.
Q.
There were places where you would scrape your
vehicle with the trees and shrubbery, would you not?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And it can be very steep in places, can it
not?
A.
There is a couple spots that it's fairly
steep.
Q.
Where are those spots?
A.
That would be after you leave Okelberry's
property and drop, start dropping down into the fish and
game and the Cattlemen Association property into Parker
Canyon.
Q.
Isn't it very steep on the Okelberry property
as well?
A.
The Ridge Line Road is not real steep.
Q.
Let me show you what's been marked as
Defendant's Exhibit No. 9 and ask you if you can identify
that?
A.
This would be -- This -- To me this looks
like this would be after you drop off of, off the ridge
out of their property and start up the other side of the
mountain where you turn to go down into Parker Canyon to
come over the top of the mountain to the fish and game
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property and Dougway.
Q.
Would you identify that as being part of the
Ridge Line Road?
A.
Yeah.
Q.
That's pretty steep, is it not?
A.
It's awful rocky, but -Q.
Have you ever driven over it?
A.
Yes.
Q.
20 times a summer?
A.
At least, yes.
Q.
20 times a summer you would jump over this
area that's shown on Exhibit No. 9?
A.
We'd go to the Ridge Line Road.
Q.
20 times over the Ridge Line Road, but not
over this area depicted in Exhibit No. 9?
A.
That part there, it would be between 15 and
20 times a summer.
Q.
Were you going over an ATV or a four-wheel
drive vehicle?
A.
ATV's.
Q.
So you wouldn't tackle that, what's depicted
as Exhibit No. 9, in anything other than an ATV then?
A.
I have been across it a few times in a
four-wheel drive truck, but -Q.
Have you been all the way over to the gun
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club?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Did you encounter any gates?
A.
On the Ridge Line Road? Yes.
Q.
Yes. Were they locked?
A.
They was not locked.
Q.
Do you know if they were locked at all during
the year?
A.
I don't know.
Q.
Have you been over there in the last year?
A.
No, I haven't.
Q.
As you come onto the Okelberry property from
Forest Service property there's a fence, is there not?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And there's a gate there, is there not?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And there's two accesses onto the Okelberry
property. And there's fences and gates on both accesses?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And when you've on occasions come on that
property those gates have been up, isn't that true?
A.
They -- They've always been closed. And
we've always closed them after we've went through them.
Q.
Okay. So this 20 times a summer when you'd
go up there the gates were always closed, you'd go
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through them and you'd close them again?
A.
Yes.
Q.
There are other gates, are there not, as you
leave the Okelberry property and go onto the West
Daniels' property, there's a gate there, is there not?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And that was the same, that gate would be
closed and you'd go through it, open it, and then go
through it, and then come back and close it?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And as you go further up the Ridge Line Road
there are other gates going on and off the Okelberry
property, would that not be true?
A.
On the Ridge Line Road it says, no. I know
of four gates.
Q.
Four gates -- Is that four gates beyond
when we're down here in the Glade?
A.
That would be between the Glade and the -Q.
Okay. So there were four gates between the
Glade -A.
And Parker Canyon.
Q.
-- and Parker Canyon?
A.
Yeah.
Q.
That doesn't include this gate, this area
going over to Circle Springs?
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A.
Yes.
Q.
That would be a fifth gate then?
A.
Well, that -- That would -- That would
include going into Circle Springs.
Q.
Now, when you would access these areas you
say you went into to gather wood did you have permits
from the Forest Service to gather wood?
A.
When they started selling permits, yes.
Before they started selling permits, when it was just
open to the public, no.
Q.
When you go into the Forest Service there was
a gate there. You'd have to open the gate and go onto
Forest Service ground?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And you close the gate again?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Did you ever see any signs that restricted
motorized vehicles on Forest Service property?
A.
Not that I recall, no.
Q.
Would you drive your whatever, your ATV or
four-wheel drive on that Forest Service property without
any consideration to where you were going?
A.
No. We would stay on the roads. We wouldn't
get off the roads.
Q.
You don't recall ever seeing a sign that says
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no motorized vehicles though?
A.
No, I don't.
Q.
So as far as you're concerned once you got on
the Forest Service property as long as you stayed on the
road you could drive any kind of vehicle you wanted?
A.
Yes.
Q.
This Thorton Hallow Road, that's a narrow
road, is it not?
A.
Yes, it is.
Q.
Did you ever encounter any trees across the
road on that one?
A.
Not that I had to remove myself, no.
Q.
Did you see where trees had been removed?
A.
Yes.
Q.
You were up this 20 times a summer, but you
never had to remove any trees?
A.
No, I didn't.
Q.
When you were up there did you ever meet the
Okelberrys?
A.
I've passed them a few times. I've passed
their sheep herders, but I haven't really stopped and
talked to them.
Q.
Well, they're -- They have cattle and they
have sheep up in that area, are you aware of that?
A.
Yes.
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Q.
Is that one reason why you closed the gates?
A.
Yes.
Q.
You said that, in the Thorton Hallow there
was some partial trespassing signs?
A.
In -- They had partial trespassing signs.
Q.
What to you mean by partial?
A.
Just it wasn't clear -- It wasn't clear
around their fence line or that. It was just -- They
did have a few signs. They would have a sign by the
gate. And this was in, that I remember, about '91 when
they started selling their trespass permits for people to
go in there hunting.
Q.
Before that you saw trespassing, no
trespassing signs?
A.
Not before '91.
Q.
Well, did that trespass, no trespassing -How did you interpret that?
A.
I -- I interpreted that it was, that you
was not to be able, not suppose to get on their property.
Q.
So if the sign says no trespassing that means
you can still travel on the roads?
A.
I felt good about traveling across the road
to access the forest property.
Q.
Maple Canyon, the last time you went down
that road was in 1986?
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A.
Yeah.
Q.
Were you on an ATV?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Would you ever travel that road in anything
but an ATV?
A.
No.
Q.
That's about the only way you can travel that
road, isn't it?
A.
That or by horse.
Q.
It's pretty rough.
A.
Yeah, it is.
Q.
Are you aware of any locked gates?
A.
No.
Q.
Isn't there a gate coming off the Main Canyon
Road.
A.
Not that I recall. I know there's one in
Maple Creek.
Q.
Where -- Where it begins on Main Canyon
Road, you don't recall seeing a gate there.
MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, I'd just ask Mr.
Petersen to clarify as to when.
MR. PETERSEN: Right now, presently.
THE COURT: (INAUDIBLE).
THE WITNESS: I haven't seen a gate right off
Main Canyon Road, no.
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Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Have you see any gates?
A.
There is a gate where they unload their sheep
in their corral in the bottom of the Maple Canyon.
Q.
How far off of Main Canyon is that gate?
A.
Off the Main Canyon Road? Probably half a
mile or more.
Q.
Does it have no trespassing signs on it?
A.
Right now I don't know. I haven't been
there.
Q.
It's in Wallsberg, is it not?
A.
Yeah.
Q.
But you haven't had occasion to look at it?
A.
Well, I -- There's other people that live
below there. And I don't -- I don't go across their
land to go up there.
Q.
Now, this Maple Canyon, the only way you
would traverse that one is on an ATV?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And you'd say that would be 75 times a year?
A.
We would -- We would snowmobile in the
wintertime a lot. We would leave our house, my
grandfather's house, which is just right there close to
Maple Canyon. And we would take our snowmobiles, go up
Maple Canyon and then go over onto the Strawberry peeks
over onto the forest.
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Q.
Did you ever cross off the roads?
A.
I haven't left the road, yes.
Q.
You never cross off the roads onto the
Okelberry property when you're snowmobiling?
A.
What do you mean by cross off?
Q.
Well, leave the roads?
A.
We did in the winter while snowmobiling
(INAUDIBLE).
Q.
So you wouldn't confine yourself to the roads
when everything was covered with snow, would you?
A.
We would -- We wouldn't go up through the
trees, no.
Q.
So you take the -- On this Maple Canyon
Road you wouldn't necessarily follow what was the road,
you'd take whatever way you wanted to get up the road,
get to the top, would that be true?
A.
No, no, there's only one way to the top and
that's the road going up the bottom of Maple Canyon.
Q.
So it's your testimony that you never got off
of that road when you're snowmobiling?
A.
Not while going up the canyon, no.
Q.
Never crossed over onto private property?
A.
No.
MR. PETERSEN: That's all.
THE COURT: Mr. Sweat, anything?
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MR. SWEAT: No further questions, your Honor.
THE COURT: You may step down. Thank you.
Okay. Mr. Sweat, we're going to take our noon recess at
this time. We'll start taking testimony again at 1:15.
How many more witnesses do you have?
MR. SWEAT: That was my last witness, your
Honor.
THE COURT: He's your last witness?
MR. SWEAT: The Plaintiff would rest.
MR. PETERSEN: They rest, your Honor? We
move to dismiss on the grounds they haven't proved a
prima fascia case. We'll submit without arguing.
THE COURT: Denied.
MR. PETERSEN: We'll be prepared to begin at
1:15, your Honor.
THE COURT: 1:15. Okay. How many witnesses
do you anticipate?
MR. PETERSEN: I anticipate the rest of today
and the best part of tomorrow.
THE COURT: Okay. I just wanted to know to
plan on it. Okay. Thank you.
MR. PETERSEN: Thank you.
MR. SWEAT: Thank you, your Honor.
(lunch recess was taken.)
THE COURT: We'll return to Wasatch County
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verses Okelberry and others. The Plaintiff has rested.
Mr. Petersen, you may call your first witness.
MR. PETERSEN: Thank you. We'll call Jeff
Jefferson.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Jefferson, come
forward to the witness stand. Okay. Raise your right
hand and take an oath.
CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the
testimony you shall give in the matter now before this
Court shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Have a seat.
MR. PETERSEN: Can we have the witness just
step down and look at Exhibit 2?
THE COURT: You may.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETERSEN:
Q.
Mr. Jefferson, this has been marked and
received as Exhibit No. 2. Does this aerial look
familiar to you?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Are you familiar with the roads that are
designated on there?
A.
Correct.
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Q.
Okay. You can take the witness stand. Would
you state your name, please?
A.
Jeffery Curtis Jefferson.
Q.
And your address?
A.
251 East 300 North Santaquin, Utah.
Q.
And what is your occupation?
A.
Driver.
Q.
And who do you work for?
A.
At this time I'm working for Tina Rock.
Q.
And what is your date of birth?
A.
8th month, 4th day, '63.
Q.
Now, did you ever have occasion to work for
Ray Okelberry and his sons?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Did you ever have occasion to work in this
area that's the map that's set fourth in Exhibit 2?
A.
Correct.
Q.
When did you go to work up there?
A.
I started helping the Okelberrys in '77.
Q.
And did you work continuously every summer
for them?
A.
That's correct.
Q.
Up until last -- Did you work last summer?
A.
Last summer up to August, August the 13th.
Q.
During this period of time did you ever
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reside in Wallsberg?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And when did you live in Wallsberg?
A.
From about '77 to '87.
Q.
And when did you first go on the property?
A.
In '77 when I was going up the road towards
Peatree that's when I met Mr. Okelberry.
Q.
When did you start to work on the property?
A.
That day.
Q.
What sort of work did you do?
A.
Docked and fixed things.
Q.
Did you herd cattle?
A.
Yes.
Q.
During the course of every summer, being up
there, would you traverse most of these roads?
A.
Correct, I'd travel that territory pretty
seldom, very often.
Q.
Did you ever have occasion to work on the
West Daniels' property?
A.
That's correct.
Q.
Did you herd cattle there?
A.
Yes, and I managed it.
Q.
You managed it?
A.
The West Daniels Cattle Association.
Q.
When you left West Daniels did you take the
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cattle out of the Forest Service property?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Now, do -- Based upon your experience,
going back to 1977, are you familiar with the area where,
that's called Ridge Line Road?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
And the Circle Springs Road?
A.
Correct.
Q.
It would be -- Is there a gate from the
forest, a fence and gate from the Forest Service property
onto Mr. Okelberry's property?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
And both spots?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Let me show you what's been marked as
Defendant's Exhibit No. 6 and I ask you if you can
identify that?
A.
This is at the gate going into Circle.
Q.
Is that a fair representation as to what it
looked like when you began working there?
A.
That's correct, even the old tire on the tree
is still there.
Q.
I'm showing you what's been marked as
Defendant's Exhibit No. 7 and ask you if you can identify
that?
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A.
This is a lock on a gate.
Q.
Is that the same gate?
A.
Uh-huh, yeah, yes, at that time.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we'd offer Exhibit
6 and 7.
THE COURT: Any objection.
MR. SWEAT: Can I see them first, your Honor?
No objection.
THE COURT: They're received.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 6 & 7
was received into evidence.)
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Mr. Jefferson, looking at
Defendant's Exhibit No. 6 it shows a, is that a tire in
the tree?
A.
That's correct.
Q.
What does it say?
A.
It says keep out.
Q.
It also shows, does it not, some other signs,
looking just down from that tire in the tree there's a
red one.
A.
It's no trespassing.
Q.
Do you know when that was put up then?
A.
It was about in '92 is when that one was put
up.
Q.
There's another sign in yellow over on
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the

--

A.
That's the same time.
Q.
And what does that sign say?
A.
No trespassing.
Q.
Then there's a red one up here on the post?
A.
That's a government thing saying that the
public should not go beyond this point because they're
doing activity underneath there, the government trappers.
I even had to check with the government trappers before I
went pass that point.
THE COURT: Mr. Sweat?
MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, I'm going to object
to that, unless he's got some foundation as to what it
is. I haven't -- I didn't see the red sign. Are you
sure that's not just wood with paint on it?
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Counsel wants to know is
that actually a sign or was it just wood with paint?
A.
No, that's a sign that Mike Tammus, the
government trapper put up. When I was managing that I
always had to check with him before I went beyond that
point when he put up them signs.
Q.
What would the signs say?
A.
They'd be doing some kind of activity to
control.
Q.
Looking at Defendant's Exhibit No. 7, there
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appears to be a chain and a gate and a lock. Has that
always had a lock on it?
A.
Yes, that fence has.
Q.
I'm going to show you what's been marked as
Defendant's Exhibit No. 8 and ask you if you can identify
that?
A.
Yes, that's the up to date going into Circle.
Q.
That's what it looks like now?
A.
Yes, and then the tire is still in the tree.
Q.
The wire gate has been replaced by an iron
gate; is that correct?
A.
That's correct, because every week -- You
could put up the gate and the next day it would be ripped
out.
Q.
Is that a fair representation of the way it
looks today?
A.
Yes.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we'd offer Exhibit
8.
THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. SWEAT: No objection.
THE COURT: It's received.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 8
was received into evidence.)
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Now, Mr. Jefferson, as you
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would go up this Ridge Line Road were there other gates?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And where would those other gates be?
A.
The gates are always on the boundary fence.
The fence digs, the (INAUDIBLE) digs through the boundary
fence. So every time you hit a boundary fence there'd be
a gate there.
Q.
What was the purpose of having the gates?
A.
Control the public and animals. If the
animals got out on the forest then they got citation.
Q.
So it was necessary to keep the gates closed?
A.
Yes, cause the animal -- Yeah, cause the
public would tear them out or leave them open.
Q.
Now, were there any signs on those other
gates such as the one we just saw?
A.
That's correct. They all -- All entrances
was marked.
Q.
And what were they marked?
A.
No trespassing or keep out.
Q.
When would you begin working up there? What
time of year would this be?
A.
Early May and end of April I'd start going up
there if the snow had left and start standing fence.
Q.
And on the high country how -- On an
average when could you get up there?
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A.
Well, like it depend on the year, how deep
the snow was. North slopes you couldn't get up there
until mid June on a normal year. I'd say mid May, mid
May, soonest.
Q.
You're familiar with a road called Circle
Springs Road?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
You first went on that road in 1977?
A.
Yeah, I road a horse across there.
Q.
And you were up there last summer I suppose;
is that correct?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Is there any different -- Has that road
changed at all in that period of time?
A.
No, sir, it's never been maintained.
Q.
If you were to traverse that road in 1977
would it be basically the same condition as it is now?
A.
Yes, it is.
Q.
Would you describe that road?
A.
It's narrow in some spots, very rocky, washes
out. It's a poor road. There's been accidents on that
road.
Q.
What kind of accidents has there been?
A.
People going down there that ain't suppose to
be down there and sliding off.
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Q.
Can you traverse that road with an ordinary
pickup truck without four-wheel drive?
A.
I like my pickup. I wouldn't, no.
Q.
You're familiar with a road known, designated
as Ridge Line Road?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Would you describe that road?
A.
It's muddy, muddy, rutty, steep and narrow.
Q.
I'm going to show you what's been marked as
Defendant's Exhibit No. 9 and ask you if you can identify
that?
A.
Yeah, that's what they assume, they call a
road.
Q.
Where is that?
A.
That's just north -- That's on the private
of the West Daniels. It's right above the Parker Road,
just right there.
Q.
Is that a fair representation of the way it
looked in 1977?
A.
Yes, it's always looked that way.
Q.
Is it a fair representation the way it looks
today?
A.
It's pretty much the same, rocky and
terrible.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we'd offer Exhibit
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No. 9.
MR. SWEAT: No objection.
THE COURT: It's received.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 9
was received into evidence.)
THE COURT: I think we already received it
once.
THE CLERK: I've received that.
THE COURT: Yeah, we've received it once I
think.
MR. PETERSEN: Oh, have we?
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Are you familiar with the
road known as the Parker Canyon?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Would you describe that road?
A.
When you start going down off the higher road
it's steep and narrow, and it's slick and rocky and
rutty.
Q.
Is it a road where there are rocks on it?
A.
Yes, there's rocks on it. And it's mud, it's
slick, it's like clay in some areas.
Q.
On all these roads if it rains up there does
that -- Does that have any effects on the roads?
A.
It does.
Q.
Is it easy to get stuck if it rains?
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A.
Oh, yeah. I've been stuck up there many
times and had to walk out.
Q.
You're familiar with the Thorton Hallow Road?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Would you describe that?
A.
Thorton Hallow Road is narrow, rocky. You'll
knock your mirrors off if you go down on the wrong time
of year.
Q.
By that there's how much growth close to the
road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Is that the way it was when you first went up
there in the 70's?
A.
Yes, it's pretty -- It's kept the same.
Q.
Now, are you familiar with a road known as
the Maple Canyon Road?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Would you describe that one?
A.
Gees, I don't know how to -- I don't even
call it a road. It's washed out. It's rocky. I'd call
it a path before I'd call it a road.
Q.
Could you drive that road with a four-wheel
drive vehicle?
A.
No.
Q.
Could you drive any of these roads without a
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four-wheel drive vehicle?
A.
No, sir.
Q.
You need four-wheel drive?
A.
I'd -- I'd (INAUDIBLE).
Q.
Could you get on that Maple Creek -- Could
you traverse that on a ATV?
A.
It depends -- It depends on how well you
like your ATV. I'd say no if it was mine.
Q.
Now, did you ever see people up there? Ever
run across any people on occasion?
A.
Every once in a while I'd run across people.
Q.
And when -- When was that?
A.
Around the hunts. It would be around the
hunts. I'd run into a few people.
Q.
And when you were up there in May, June,
July, August, did you see people up there site seeing,
gathering wood or anything like that?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
And did you see more people though during the
deer hunt?
A.
Yes, uh-huh.
Q.
And when you'd see these people what would
you do?
A.
Well, I was -- I worked for the Okelberrys.
So they had a policy that you approach them, you know,
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and be kind and everything. And ask them if they had
permission to be on that. If they didn't you ask them to
leave. And that's -- The majority of people didn't
have permission.
Q.
Did that happen very often where you'd seek,
have to remove -A.
Not too bad. That there wasn't very many
people up there.
Q.
Do you know a gentlemen by the name of
Butters, Mark Butters?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Did you ever remove him from -A.
I asked him about twice to leave.
Q.
And did he leave?
A.
He went that way, so I assume he did.
Q.
In your opinion are those roads being used
continuously by the public?
A.
No.
Q.
Now, is it possible to access the Forest
Service property by not using those roads?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
On Highway 40 can you access Parker Canyon?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Can you access Thorton Hallow?
A.
Yes, sir, there's trails.
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Q.
There are trails that go up?
A.
Yeah, they're marked on the freeway.
Q.
Right off the road you can see them?
A.
Oh, yeah, big signs, Forest Service signs.
Q.
And likewise, can you access that Circle
Springs area from off of Main Canyon?
A.
Yes, sir, right there at Willow Springs
there's a trail that goes up through the Hallow.
Q.
Do you know, on occasion, if people have used
those trails and have accessed that area in that manner?
A.
Yes, sir, I see people all the time when I'm
riding through there, hiking up through there.
MR. PETERSEN: Thank you.
THE COURT: Mr. Sweat, cross?
MR. SWEAT: Can I get the exhibits, your
Honor?
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. SWEAT:
Q.
Now, is it Jefferson; is that right?
A.
Jefferson, yes, sir.
Q.
Mr. Jefferson, how old were you when you
first started working for Mr. Okelberry?
A.
Well, I'm assuming I was 14, if I remember
right.
Q.
And you've worked for him every year until
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last year?
A.
Yes, sir, uh-huh, right up to last year.
Q.
Any years you didn't work for him?
A.
No, sir, I always helped him.
Q.
Full-time job?
A.
When I was younger not full-time, you know,
just cause I was young, going to school. But as I grew
up it was full-time.
Q.
When did it become a full-time job?
A.
I can't remember right off bat, but it's been
quite a while.
Q.
When you was younger you worked full-time
during the summer or part-time during the summer?
A.
Full-time.
Q.
Did dock all year round?
A.
No, you do it in the spring.
Q.
What else did you do him?
A.
Fence, put up the fences.
Q.
At 14?
A.
Uh-huh.
Q.
Who did you work with?
A.
Who did I work with? There was his boy,
Eric, and Shanna. There's a few of us.
Q.
And was all the time your summers spent in
what's depicted in the yellow on the map here?
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A.
No, I did it on the Forest Service. I put up
fences on the Forest Service and stuff like that.
Q.
Does Mr. Okelberry own property in any other
parts of the state that you're aware of?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Did you ever go and work on any of those?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Is it fair to say you spent as much time
working in other areas as this area?
A.
No, I did it more cause I lived there.
Q.
Did Mr. Okelberry ever have you work when he
was not on the property?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
You'd go up by yourself and fix things?
A.
Not by myself. He always wanted us, you
know, a couple people together so in case somebody got
hurt.
Q.
So it was typically if there was a member of
the Okelberry family working with you?
A.
No, it wouldn't be that. Maybe it was my
brother or someone, but he didn't want us up there alone.
Q.
And that started in 1977?
A.
Yeah, uh-huh.
Q.
I'm showing you what's been admitted as
Exhibit 6.
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A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Uh-huh.
Did you take that picture?
Yes, sir.
When did you take it?
I took that picture three, three years ago or

Q.
A.

What does the red sign say?
Which sign? The one that the government puts

so.
up?
Q.
Yeah.
A.
It's just pretty much telling us to -- I
can't quote it. So pretty much they're doing activity
to, for control, like coyotes and stuff like that. And
it just tells not to go beyond that point because there
might be something setup that they don't want no harm to
come along to anybody. So I always checked with Mike
Tammus when he put them up to know that I wouldn't be in
the wrong area.
Q.
Did you put the tire up that's on the tree?
A.
No, sir.
Q.
Do you recall it being up in '77?
A.
I remember as long as I can remember.
MR. SWEAT: Did you move that picture off the
wall?
MR. PETERSEN: Which one?
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MR. SWEAT: Did you use that one?
MR. PETERSEN: Yeah.
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) I'm showing you what's been
marked as Exhibit 7?
A.
Yes.
Q.
(INAUDIBLE) indicate that picture is?
A.
That is at Circle gate.
Q.
And did you put that cable on at that time?
A.
No, sir.
Q.
Has that cable always been there?
A.
It's been pretty much there.
Q.
Same cable?
A.
(INAUDIBLE) they had to put this cable on -There was a chain that they tore off there and they put
that cable to replace the chain.
Q.
So when did the cable go on?
A.
Oh, I'd say -- Gees, it's been on long as I
can remember.
Q.
Do you remember the chain?
A.
I remember the chain. It's been like, quite
a few years.
Q.
Did you take that picture?
A.
I'm not sure.
Q.
Do you know when that picture was taken?
A.
No.
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Q.
You also testified that where Ridge Line Road
crosses into Mr. Okelberry's property there's a gate
there?
A.
That's correct.
Q.
Is that correct?
A.
Yes, sir, and a cattle guard.
Q.
Is there a cattle guard there too?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
What's the cattle guard to for?
A.
In case people -- They had problems there
that guys kept ripping the gate out. And they think it
was an extra caution not to let the live stock onto the
forest, stay out of trouble.
Q.
Do you know who put the cattle guard there?
A.
No, sir.
Q.
Has it been there as long as you've ever seen
it?
A.
I can -- It's been there a long time.
Q.
Isn't it true that many times the gate is
open and the cattle guard is not blocked by a gate?
A.
It's very seldom. It's only open if like,
somebody in the public has been across it and left it. I
don't catch that gate open very often.
Q.
When you were 14 how did you get around up
there?
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A.
On horse.
Q.
Are you able to cover the entire area
contained to these roads in a single day?
A.
Yes, sir, I use to wear a pair of shoes off
of a horse in two weeks.
Q.
You indicated there's been accidents on
Circle Springs Road; is that correct?
A.
Yeah, just one that I know.
Q.
Just one?
A.
Yeah. A person went down there. They ripped
the gate out and tried to go past that one spot and slid
off into the canyon.
Q.
Did you see them rip the gate out?
A.
I did not see them rip it out, but they
admitted it.
Q.
Do you know who that was?
A.
Uh-huh.
Q.
Who was that?
A.
Huh.
Q.
Who was it?
A.
It was -- What's -- I try to think of his
name -- Lives down there -- I know where he lives. I
can try and think of his name. Lives by the Round Belly
Road. Carlsons, Carlson kid.
Q.
You indicated that any time you saw people on
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the property you'd ask them to leave; is that correct?
A.
That's correct.
Q.
Is that any time you saw people driving on
the roads?
A.
Well, I'd ask if they, they had permission to
be on there, cause I was informed that it wasn't a public
access, you know, for people to be on there. So if they
didn't have permission I would ask them to leave.
Q.
When you saw on there, do you mean on the
roads or on the property?
A.
Well, most of the time when people came on
there they wouldn't stay on the road.
Q.
So people you talked to were people that were
off the road on property, is that what you're saying?
A.
No -- Yeah, I'd run into people like that
and on the road. And I'd ask them if they're suppose to
be on there.
Q.
Would you chase them down with your horse -A.
No.
Q.
-- or how would you talk to them?
A.
Just as I was coming up the road I'd run into
them. Try to do it nice, polite.
Q.
So in a given month how many days would you
think you were up on the property?
A.
A lot. I'd cross it -- I know the -149
Gees, I'd cross it all the time riding up.
Q.
Riding up where?
A.
I'd be riding to Thorton, check cows, put
salt out, or over to Station, over to Parker.
Q.
Is that when you were working for West
Daniels' land, managing the land?
A.
Uh-huh. And I worked for Ray Okelberry
though. Ray Okelberry is the one that I was under. Then
I'd put fence up and stuff. So quite a few. I can
actually say numbers, quite a bit. I about lived on that
mountain in the summertime?
Q.
From when to when?
A.
Just as soon as school was out. And then on
weekends before school got out when the fences need to
start going up, to late fall to put the fences down.
Q.
Who else worked up there at the Okelberry's?
A.
There was Eric and there was Dave. Dave
Okelberry and Eric and Shanna and -- I could -- If I
stopped and thought I could rattle off quite a few names.
Q.
You indicated the entire time you worked up
there you ran into Mark Butters twice?
A.
More than that, and Stacy Butters.
Q.
What years would that have been?
A.
2002, 2003, about every year. I tried to be
-- Cause they -- Their grandma sort of lived right
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below Maple Creek. So I tried to be descent with them.
Q.
Every year from about 2000 you'd have to ask
them to leave?
A.
More, sooner than that.
Q.
Have you ever driven a vehicle down Maple
Canyon Road?
A.
No.
Q.
Have you ever driven a four-wheeler down
Maple Canyon Road?
A.
No.
Q.
Have you ever driven a vehicle up over this
area here?
A.
Nope.
Q.
Never once?
A.
I wouldn't try.
Q.
Have you ever driven a four-wheeler up over
here?
A.
Nope.
MR. SWEAT: That's all the questions I have
at this time, your Honor.
THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Petersen?
MR. PETERSEN: Nothing further, your Honor.
THE COURT: You may step down.
MR. PETERSEN: May we excuse this witness,
your Honor?
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THE COURT: You may.
THE WITNESS: I can leave?
THE COURT: You can go.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
MR. PETERSEN: Call Mel Price.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Price, come forward
and come up here to the witness stand. Okay. Raise your
right hand and take an oath.
CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the
testimony you shall give in the matter now before this
Court shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
THE WITNESS: I do.
THE COURT: Okay. You may proceed.
MR. TENNEY: Thank you.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. TENNEY:
Q.
Could you go ahead and state your name for
the record?
A.
Melvin Price.
Q.
Melvin Price. And where do you live, Mr.
Price?
A.
I live in Heber City.
Q.
Could you give your address for the Court?
A.
1449 South Industrial Parkway.
152

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q.
And how long have you lived there?
A.
At that address about 24 years.
Q.
Okay. And what's currently your occupation?
A.
I'm an electrician.
Q.
Mr. Price, we're wondering if you could tell
us whether you're familiar with the property that's been
marked in yellow on this map here marked as Exhibit 2?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And how is it that you've come to be familiar
with that property?
A.
I've used that property to hunt and recreate
on for several years.
Q.
When was the first time that you recall
accessing that property?
A.
Oh, I hunted there with my uncles when I was,
before I was of age to hunt, probably about 13. So maybe
'75, '74.
Q.
So it's -- And have you accessed that
property continuously or frequently during that time?
A.
Yes.
Q.
So it would be safe to say then that you've
regularly been on that property for the past 30 years or
so?
A.
Yes.
Q.
I'm wondering if you can step down off the
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stand for a moment, just to make sure that we're
oriented, and identify for the Court whether you're
familiar with the road that's been marked here in red as
the Ridge Line Road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And you're familiar with this road here in
this pink magenta color?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And this road here, this blue one, Thorton
Hallow?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And again with this Circle Springs Road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
I'm wondering if we could just walk through
-- Go ahead and have a seat. If we could walk through
your experiences with each of these roads just to
establish your familiarity with them. Regarding Ridge
Line Road, how often or when was the first time you
recall accessing that road?
A.
Probably '72 or '3, '4, maybe some where in
there.
Q.
And when was the last time that you recall
accessing that road?
A.
About a month ago.
Q.
A month ago. And then during the ensuing 30
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years between the first and last time how often do you
think you've accessed that road?
A.
Every year.
Q.
Every year since then. And during those
years would it be once a year twice a year?
A.
Probably, if I didn't have a hunting tag
maybe twice or three times a year.
Q.
Uh-huh. And if -A.
Well, I do a lot more than that, 10 or 20.
Q.
10 or 20. In your experiences with this road
during what months of the year is this road passable by
motorized vehicle?
A.
I'd say between the middle of May till
October.
Q.
Middle of May. And then during the other
months is it passable at all or is it passable
infrequently?
A.
I've snowmobiled on that property in the
wintertime.
Q.
Uh-huh.
A.
So it's passable on a snowmobile or an T ATV.
Q.
But then from your experiences from mid
October through the middle of May is it accessible at all
with a four-wheel drive vehicle, truck?
A.
No, I wouldn't say so.
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Q.
And during the passable months, during the
summer season and the late spring, what are the
conditions generally of Ridge Line Road?
A.
Well until the -- Until the spring snow
runoff you can't get through a lot of the dark timber,
the snow stays deep in there till the middle of May or
so.
Q.
Middle May or so. And then from May through
middle of October is it, it is a passable road according
to your -A.
Yes.
Q.
-- your knowledge. What sorts of
conditions, if you described that road as a driving
surface how would you describe it?
A.
It's rough. It's rough and rocky and if it's
rained at all it's muddy.
Q.
Is it steep?
A.
In areas, uh-huh.
Q.
According to your knowledge of this road how
wide is this road?
A.
Almost -- For the most part it's maybe 6 or
8 feet wide. It will scratch your truck in a lot of
areas.
Q.
And have the conditions, specifically has the
width of this road changed in anyway during the 30 years
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that you've been familiar with it?
A.
Not a bunch -Q.
Not a bunch.
A.
-- I wouldn't say.
Q.
So then according to your memory, even back
during the 70's and 80's, it was still about 6 feet wide,
7 feet wide?
A.
Yeah.
Q.
Okay. In terms of how passable exactly this
road is would it be, would a person be able to access
this road with a passenger car, typical?
A.
No.
Q.
Would a person be able to access this road
under, even during the summer season with a none
four-wheel drive car?
A.
I don't think so.
Q.
So then according to your understanding a
person would have to have a four-wheel drive vehicle to
access it?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And then you talked about when it rains.
When it rains would a person have difficulty, even with a
four-wheel drive truck, traveling along the Ridge Line
Road?
A.
There's some areas that get pretty slick and
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muddy.
Q.
Okay. To the best of your knowledge, are
there any gates cutting off access to the Ridge Line
Road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Could you step down and identify on the map
where those gates are?
THE COURT: Counsel? Just -- Just to make
this comment. I've heard this story now probably 15, 20
times. I don't, you know -- I don't think there's any
(INAUDIBLE), take any exception as to where the gates are
or the condition of these roads, are we?
MR. PETERSEN: Well, I don't know. Your
Honor, we don't want to be redundant, but if -THE COURT: Well, I mean, I've heard this
story, you know -- Every witness, I don't think as to
the condition of the roads, the width or where the gates
are located, I don't think there's been any dispute among
any of the witnesses, have there?
MR. PETERSEN: I don't think so. I think
everybody agrees there are gates there. You know, if
we're willing to assume that as a fact then we don't need
to dwell on it.
THE COURT: You know -MR. TENNEY: According to my understanding
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there has been some dispute as to the conditions. You've
heard some witnesses say they can get up there with cars.
We've had certain witnesses say they can get up there.
That these roads are passable with none four-wheel drive
vehicles. Yet we've had testimony from other witnesses
that have said these roads are impassable by anything but
an ATV.
THE COURT: It depends on which road and
which area.
MR. TENNEY: True.
THE COURT: And the Court drove the roads.
So the Court has personal knowledge as to what the
conditions of the roads are, at least today. So -MR. TENNEY: (INAUDIBLE).
THE COURT: I just make that comment. I
mean, you can make whatever record you want. I don't
think there's any dispute as to where gates are located
or the, or the condition of the roads. There might be
some dispute as to, with respect to what type of vehicle
can be used to go up the roads.
MR. TENNEY: Okay.
THE COURT: But proceed.
Q.
(BY MR. TENNEY) Can you identify, according
to your knowledge, where those gates are?
A.
The gate on top, if I read the map right, is
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just on the property line right here. And then I'm not
sure where the gate on the bottom is on this property
line. This ones -- Actually it had to be this one.
Q.
All right. If you can return to your seat.
We'll go ahead skip ahead through a few of those
questions. According to your memory have those gates
been locked?
A.
Yes.
Q.
How far back have they been locked?
A.
In time?
Q.
In time.
A.
I guess I always thought they were locked. I
can't remember. I don't remember back, maybe 20 years or
something.
Q.
So just to make sure we're on the same page.
So according to your understanding, for the past 20 years
those gates, that control access to Ridge Line Road, have
been locked?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Okay. Have there been signs, no trespassing
signs posting along the roads?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And how far back have those signs been
posted?
A.
I think they've always been there.
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Q.
So at least for the past 20 years?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Okay. Let's move onto Circle Springs Road.
Are you familiar with Circle Springs Road?
A.
Not as familiar. I haven't been on Circle
Springs Road for several years.
Q.
Okay. Based upon the memory that you do have
of it, in general terms, is it passable by none
four-wheel drive vehicle?
A.
No.
Q.
Were there gates controlling access to Circle
Springs Road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And were those gates locked?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And were there signs posted at the entrances
to the Circle Springs Road indicating there's no
trespassing?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Okay. Moving onto Parker Canyon Road. Is
Parker Canyon Road, according to the best of your
knowledge, passable by a none four-wheel drive vehicle?
A.
No.
Q.
And were there -- Are there gates
controlling access to Parker Canyon Road?
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A.
I don't think there's a gate on that
particular road, but there's gates before it on both
sides.
Q.
And those gates, have they ever been locked
in your experience?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And has there been signs there that have
indicated there's no trespassing?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Okay. Moving onto Maple Canyon Road. Does
Maple Canyon Road passable by a none four-wheel drive
vehicle?
A.
The last time I tried to go down that road it
was washed out.
Q.
Washed out. And before it was washed out was
it passable at all?
A.
I don't think by a none four-wheel drive
vehicle. You could get a four-wheel drive in.
Q.
And then was there a gate at the entrance to
Maple Canyon Road?
A.
I don't recall one.
Q.
Okay. Thorton Hallow, is it passable by a
none four-wheel drive vehicle?
A.
No.
Q.
It's not. Regarding the property in general,
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have you, in the past, asked permission from the
Okelberrys or anybody that manages the property to enter
the roads?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And who have you asked property -- Who have
you asked permission from?
A.
Ray Okelberry.
Q.
Have you asked permission from other persons
or just Ray Okelberry?
A.
I think I asked (INAUDIBLE) one year.
Q.
And how often have you asked permission?
A.
Every year.
Q.
Every year that you've used these roads.
Have you asked permission to use the property in general
or have you asked specifically for permission to use the
roads?
A.
Well, both, access to the property and to
camp and hunt on the property.
Q.
Okay. Are you familiar with this document
that's been identified as Plaintiff's Exhibit 20?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Could you tell us what this is?
A.
"I, Ray Okelberry, give Mel Price" -Q.
I'm sorry, before we go there, can you just
tell us in general what this is?
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A.
This gives me permission to use his property
to hunt bear and permission to access it.
Q.
And did you personally obtain this from Mr.
Okelberry?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And when did you do that?
A.
Last year, last May.
Q.
Okay. Could you read it for the Court?
THE COURT: Are you offering it?
MR. TENNEY: Oh, I'm sorry. We'd like to
offer it as -THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, I'm not going to
object to it as a permission slip, but I am going to
object to how the, another statement in there saying how
long it's been happening. I think Mr. Okelberry is here.
I think he can testify to that if we need to.
MR. TENNEY: That's fine. So I'd like to
offer this -THE COURT: It's received.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 20
was received into evidence.)
MR. TENNEY: -- as Exhibit 20.
Q.
(BY MR. TENNEY) Could you read for us that
permission slip?
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A.
"I, Ray Okelberry, give Mel Price permission
to set bear bait on my private land. And he also has a
right to access all of my private roads on my private
land".
Q.
Thank you. Are you familiar with this
document, which is similarly marked as Exhibit 21?
A.
Yes.
MR. TENNEY: I'd like to offer that as
Defendant's Exhibit 21.
MR. SWEAT: Same objection, your Honor. My
objection isn't to the document as a permission slip,
just to the statement in it.
THE COURT: Okay. It's received.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 21
was received into evidence.)
Q.
(BY MR. TENNEY) Would you tell the Court
what exactly this document is?
A.
It gives permission to use the property to
hunt turkeys.
Q.
And you received it when?
A.
This year, April 20th.
Q.
(INAUDIBLE). So is it fair to say, according
to your understanding, that you have specifically asked
for permission to use the Okelberry's roads when ever you
use them?
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A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Have you traveled the Okelberry property and
the Okelberry roads with other persons?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And who have those persons been?
A.
My uncles, my nephew.
Q.
And to the best of your knowledge have those
persons also asked for and received permission to use the
roads?
A.
Yes.
Q.
They have. According to your understanding
of the Okelberry property over the past 30 years have
these roads been public or private?
A.
Private roads.
Q.
Have they always been private roads or has
there ever been a time when the public had free access to
them according to your understanding?
A.
I've always understood that it was private
property, private roads.
Q.
So you've always understood then that a
person needed permission to use those roads?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Okay. Have you seen other persons using
those roads while you've been using them?
A.
I have.
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Q.
How often have you seen other persons using
these roads?
A.
This spring during the turkey hunt we seen a
couple guys on four-wheelers.
Q.
Would you say that you frequently see other
persons on these roads while you're using them?
A.
No, that's the only ones I can recall.
Q.
So in your experience has there been any sort
of substantial traffic on these roads?
A.
No.
Q.
You've not seen large numbers of people on
these roads?
A.
No.
Q.
Have you seen campers parked along the
various roads along the Okelberry property?
A.
No.
MR. TENNEY: We have no further questions.
THE COURT: Any cross, Mr. Sweat?
MR. SWEAT: Thank you, your Honor.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. SWEAT:
Q.
Mr. Price, do you pay the Okelberrys anything
for your permission to use the road?
A.
No.
Q.
Is it kind of just a gift to you to use the
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road or to use their property?
A.
Yeah, I consider them as personal friends.
Q.
How did you meet the Okelberrys?
A.
My dad ran a service station when I was
growing up and he always done business with us.
Q.
Have you received a letter like that from the
Okelberrys every year?
A.
I have.
Q.
Since 1975?
A.
No. Before it became a private hunting unit
it was always a verbal agreement between the Okelberrys
and I. After it became a private hunting unit and he
leased the property for hunting rights to other people
then I had written permission so that I had some proof
with me if his operator happened to stop us.
Q.
When would that have been that you first had
a written, first written permission slip?
A.
Oh, I'm just going off memory, maybe early
80's.
MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, (INAUDIBLE).
THE COURT: You may.
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) I'm showing you what's been
marked as Exhibit 7?
A.
Okay.
Q.
Can you see what that is?
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A.
A locked gate.
Q.
Do you have a key to that lock?
A.
I don't have one right now, no.
Q.
Can you see what is marked as Exhibit 6?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Do you see the tire in the tree?
A.
Yes.
Q.
When do you remember that tire first existing
in that tree?
A.
There again just going off memory, maybe
80's, early 80's.
Q.
So your memory wasn't always there?
A.
No, but the tire was always there. The
property has always been marked with paint marks on the
trees.
Q.
Well, was it there in the early 80's or was
it there before the early 80's?
A.
The tire?
Q.
Yeah.
A.
I think the tire was probably there in the
early 80's.
Q.
You've indicated that there's two gates along
Ridge Line Road that you're aware of. How are they
locked?
A.
Just with a chain and a lock.
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Q.
Do you have a key to those locks?
A.
I don't have right now. I have had keys to
them. Or there's been a key hidden.
Q.
Have you been up there this year?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Did you access the property this year?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Was it a keyed lock this year?
A.
The only gate I went through is the lower
gate and it was not locked. The time I was hunting was
early in the spring and they hadn't, didn't have their
cattle up and the gates, their fences weren't up yet.
Q.
Fences weren't up and the gates wasn't
locked?
A.
No, he lays the fences down in the
wintertime.
Q.
Has there ever been any other times that
you've been up there since '74, '75 now that the gates
weren't locked?
A.
I think I've, you know -- Sometimes the
gates aren't locked in the spring because they leave them
down if the wintertime. To my recollection during the
summertime after they get the cattle in there they lock
the gates. And I've been there when the gates have been
pulled down.
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Q.
You see anyone pull the gates down?
A.
I have not. I always report it to the
Okelberrys when I see it.
Q.
Do you enjoy using the property up there?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Do you think you will a be able to use the
property in the future?
A.
Well, I hope so. I keep the gates locked
when they're suppose to be and take good care of the
property, making sure it's clean so it will ensure future
use.
MR. SWEAT: That's all the questions I have,
your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Petersen, anything else? I
mean -- Sorry.
MR. TENNEY: No, nothing further.
MR. PETERSEN: May we excuse this witness?
THE COURT: You may. You're excused.
MR. PETERSEN: Thank you, very much. We'll
call Lee Okelberry.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Okelberry, come up
here to the witness stand.
MR. PETERSEN: Before he does that, your
Honor, could we just show him Exhibit 2?
THE COURT: Yes. Why don't you stand right
171
in front of this map right there -THE WITNESS: Okay.
THE COURT: -- and have a look at it.
MR. PETERSEN: (INAUDIBLE) look at this?
THE WITNESS: Okay. I think it looks
familiar, that yellow one anyway.
MR. PETERSEN: Okay. You can take the
witness chair.
THE COURT: Before you step down raise your
right hand and take an oath from the clerk.
CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the
testimony you shall give in the matter now before this
Court shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
THE WITNESS: Well, I do.
THE COURT: Have a seat.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETERSEN:
Q.
Mr. Okelberry, would you state your name,
please?
A.
Lee Okelberry.
Q.
And what is your address?
A.
Goshin, Utah. The telephone is Box 132 on
the post office. And the telephone -- Do you need
that?
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Q.
No, we don't need the telephone.
A.
Okay.
Q.
What is your occupation?
A.
I guess you'd call it farmin and ranchin.
It's kind of an all trader. Everything that comes with
that work.
Q.
Okay. How old are you?
A.
77 plus.
Q.
And are you a brother to Ray Okelberry?
A.
Yes, I am.
Q.
Did you and your brother, Ray, and your
father purchase this property that's indicated in yellow?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And was that a purchase in 1957 that you
made?
A.
That was.
Q.
So that would of made you how old at the
time?
A.
Well, I have to do some adding and thinking
about it.
Q.
Around 26 years?
A.
I'd imagine. I was full of business and
young.
Q.
Okay. Now, do you have a recollection of
what this property looked like, the roads looked like in
173
1957 when you purchased the property?
A.
I do.
Q.
Mr. Okelberry, was there a fence along the
property that you purchased on the east side and the
Forest Service property?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Were there gates on what is known as the
Ridge Line Road and Circle Springs Road?
A.
Yes, they all had gates on them.
Q.
Was there a fence on the south side of the
property that you purchased?
A.
Yes, it went down through there just about to
the bottom.
Q.
And was there a gate on that Circle Springs
Road?
A.
I think -- I think there was over in that
corner, in that top corner.
Q.
Were there fences, other fences on that
property you purchased over on the north end and so
fourth?
A.
Well that -- That property goes straight
there for a couple three sections. And then it makes
that left hand turn for about a mile. And it jogs
through there in a couple places. But every time I went
into the forest or into that private property there was a
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gate on each end of the private property.
Q.
So every time your property went onto other
private property, which is now West Daniels, it would -A.
Yeah.
Q.
-- you'd have a (INAUDIBLE)?
A.
But it was mostly along one of them triangles
where that road went through that property.
Q.
Are you familiar with what is known at the
Ridge Line Road?
A.
Yes, I am.
Q.
Now, what was the condition of that road in
1957? Would it be safe to call it a road?
A.
Well, I don't think you could take a car up
through there. You could take one of them little trucks
through there, but whether you get back out of there
without tearing out the front end or the transmission or
the rear end or something with big rocks. It wasn't very
good shape.
Q.
Was it rocky?
A.
I'll say. Lots of rocks.
Q.
Was it very steep in places?
A.
Yes, there's some steep.
Q.
When you went up there in 1957 do you know if
there was any trees covering that road?
A.
There's trees along it -- When there's
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trees -- There's always trees when you go up in the
spring. And there's always trees the first part of the
summer. You have to have a saw and a good ax and cut
them trees out to get down, up and down them roads.
Q.
Was that a frequent occurrence?
A.
Yes, that was every year.
Q.
Was it just in the spring when you'd have to
cut trees out?
A.
No, no, you get a windstorm and you might get
10 or 15 trees crossing that length of it down through
there. Pine Trees or Aspens.
Q.
Now, when you were there in 1957 did you ever
see anybody besides you and your family traversing that
road in anyway?
A.
I -- I met the fence crews in there from
the other side, from the Cattle Association. They was
there and come there and have dinner with us.
Q.
Okay. But they were there putting up
fencing?
A.
They were putting fences up their share and
we was putting our fences up too. We was taking care of
the stock.
Q.
Did you ever see anybody just driving on that
road?
A.
It wasn't very good to drive on just to be a
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driving. Sometimes they'd go, traverse it on down
through there to Boomer and the end of our yellow
property. They'd go down through there to get on down
into there. That road didn't go on down across the red
at that time. They built that road after that.
Q.
You mean the road that continued onto the
north?
A.
Yes, that went on down and out towards Heber.
That was built after.
Q.
That road wasn't even there then?
A.
No.
Q.
Now, are you familiar with what is known as
the Thorton Hallow Road?
A.
I'll say.
Q.
When you purchased that property what was the
condition of that road?
A.
Well, if you'd throw the rocks out you might
get down there and get back out, but this was, had to be
repaired.
Q.
Was it more than a trail?
A.
Well, it was a little better than a trail,
but just two-wheel tracks.
Q.
Now, did you have occasion when you were the
owner of, part owner of that property to ever grade
Thorton Hallow?
177
A.
To what?
Q.
To grade it?
A.
I sure did.
Q.
Well, what did you do?
A.
Well, I had -- The first time I went in
there I went with a little T9 International Caterpillar.
And that's all we had at that time. And we did a lot of
work with that. It was up there when that fire went
through there. We had a fire up there. And that little
Caterpillar was there then. And I helped fight that fire
with that little Caterpillar.
Q.
Was that the purpose why you graded that road
was to fight the fire?
A.
No, not the purpose. The purpose is so we
could get in there and take care of the fences. We had
to -- We had to join -- We joined the Forest Service
and places we had to maintain that fence with the Forest
Service and on the private, certain parts of the private
we had to maintain it our self.
Q.
Now, other than you and your family do you
know if anyone else ever used that Circle Springs Road up
there?
A.
I think that -THE COURT: You're talking about Thorton
Hallow.
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THE WITNESS: Thorton Hallow or -THE COURT: You haven't moved onto Circle
Springs yet.
MR. PETERSEN: Oh, pardon me. Okay.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) We're on Thorton Hallow?
Yeah, we're still on Thorton Hallow.
All right. Excuse me (INAUDIBLE) Thorton
hallow. Okay. That's the one you graded?
A.
Yep, I've graded that and made a reservoir
down in there.
Q.
Okay?
A.
And I put a cattle guard on that fence down
there also.
Q.
And you've described the condition of that
road when you purchased the property?
A.
Well, that's the one I just told you it's
kind of hard to get down through there with a truck. And
then you can only go just a little ways below the forest
fence. It didn't go on down there only just a hundred
yards or two below that forest fence and there was no
road.
Q.
Well, before you graded that is it possible
to go down that area with a truck?
A.
Well, it seemed like we had more troubles,
cause we didn't have all them four-wheel drive trucks
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then. Now you can go about any place, but then you had
to be pretty careful where you went.
Q.
Now, did you ever see members of the public
people that didn't have business up there using that
Thorton Hallow Road?
A.
Not then.
Q.
Back in the 50's?
A.
No.
Q.
Well, let's go to the Circle Springs Road.
Are you familiar with that road?
A.
I am.
Q.
Did that exist in 1957 when you purchased the
property?
A.
I think there was a gate through the line
down through there to that spring. I think you could get
down through there and probably should of had a saddle
horse to make the route.
Q.
Did you grade that road?
A.
I graded part of it.
Q.
Is that that TD9 you told us about?
A.
Yes.
Q.
What was the purpose in grading that road?
A.
So we could get down in there. We salted the
sheep. We packed salt with the trucks and put out salt
troughs, made salt troughs?
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Q.
A.
Q.
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Q.
I think you testified that there was a fence
and a gate at the end of that?
A.
There was.
Q.
Was there a gate and a fence at the end of
the Thorton Hallow?
A.
Yes, that was -- That fence on that yellow
line joins the Forest Service there was a constant
continuous fence.
Q.
Now, when you purchased that property did you
ever see anyone other than your family or people that had
business up this using that Circle Springs Road?
A.
People that maintained the fence and the
cowboys that took care of the cows on the other side,
they used it. And they'd stop and we'd talk things over
and see how things were going.
Q.
Okay. Are you familiar with a road known as
the Maple Canyon Road?
A.
I sure am.
Q.
What was that situation in 1957?
A.
A guy prior to us had took a little
Caterpillar up through there and partly graded it out.
But it's steep and rocky and rock slides and it's -There's nothing -- You've got to have gravel and dirt
to cover over them big rocks to get over them. And it
wasn't used very much. And then I -- So I took that D9
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Cat up there, D9 Cat, just a small Cat the first time,
I've been up over that road three times with a
Caterpillar.
The second time I took a 9 (INAUDIBLE) Cat, a
bigger cat and graded it out. And then the third time I
took my D6 Caterpillar up there and graded it out. But
it's so steep. And then you got them -- There's water
that come down there in the spring and wash the road out.
And then rocks fall down in there, the ledges, and then
rock slides. And they covered up the road. It's
constant battle to keep that road open.
Q.
Well, after you did that grading there could
you use that as a -A.
Yeah, I did follow-up through there the first
year or two. And then the next spring you might go up
there and you couldn't get up it. The trees -- It
would be full of trees and rocks. And you'd have to get
out and saw the trees off and throw the rocks out.
Q.
When you purchased that property in 1957 is
that anything -- Did you see any people, any other
people other than those who had business using -A.
I don't think they even knew that road was
there in 1957.
Q.
Now, are you familiar with the Parker Canyon
Road
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A.
That's just down north of our property there.
And that's about as far as I went into that, down that
canyon within the caterpillar. I know that they took a
D8 Caterpillar in there and made two or three big
reservoirs right down in there below that corner of that
yellow, our property. So there was a Caterpillar down
there. And I don't know whether that was Daniels Canyon
Cattle or who -Q.
Somebody went down there and made a pond, did
they?
A.
Yeah, they made some big reservoirs down
there. In the spring there'd be quite a bit of runoff.
And they build these reservoir to hold enough water for
all summer.
Q.
Now, is that, that Parker Canyon, is that one
that you personally did any work on like you did in -A.
No, I didn't. I went down to it. I went
down to our line where we went through that yellow, to
the north. And you're going to that -- That's where
that construction is around that corner down in there.
Q.
Now, when you purchased the property in 19,
in the 1950's, 1957 did you see anybody that didn't have
business using that Parker Canyon Road?
A.
Well, if we did we'd like them to stop a
little bit cause that's the first company we'd seen for
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all spring long. There wasn't too much use if any on it.
I don't remember seeing any, anybody hunting in the fall
or anybody traversing it in the spring that at any time
have business in there.
Q.
Would that be applicable for the 1950's?
A.
I'd say it was.
Q.
Okay. Now, we go into the 1960. Were those
-- were any of those roads being used in the 1960's that
you're aware of by anybody that didn't have business
there?
A.
I couldn't tell you but as the years went by
there was a little more traffic on them roads.
Q.
What time a year would that be?
A.
Well, I had got in there the first of June
and couldn't, couldn't go down for, sweat and snowbanks
or one thing another on them. So it would be accurate
first of June and it was before and then in the fall and
I'd say by the middle of, the first of November they
would be covered up with snow and they wasn't used then.
Q.
So they weren't even passable from November
to May or so?
A.
That's right, there was no use on them at
all.
Q.
Now, in those summer months and in the fall,
if you saw anybody that was there that didn't have
184
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business would you ask them to leave?
A.
I don't recall ever asking anybody, though at
that time to leave. If we seen somebody then we probably
make their acquaintance and find out what business they
had. But I don't remember even who would come other than
the boys that put the fence up or the cowboys that coming
to gather a few cows up.
Q.
They're basically the only people you
remember being up there?
A.
That's right, for quite a while in there.
Q.
Now, have you sold your interest in that
property to your brother, Ray?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And was that about 7 or 8 years ago?
A.
Yes.
Q.
To your knowledge, were those roads being
used by public other than those, people other than those
who had official business there?
A.
Well, let me backup just a little bit. Now,
that's -- Some of them people from Wallsberg would come
up there and camp on the top of that ridge in one or two
places. Two or three families is all I knew that would
come up in there at that time. And they finally got so
they was camping on the Forest Service rather than pull
over there through all them rocks on our place?
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Q.
On the Forest Service would that be what is
known as the Glade?
A.
Yep, the Glade.
Q.
That's where they camp?
A.
They'd camp on the edge of the Glade and on
the Forest Service there.
Q.
And -- But were they using these roads that
we've been talking about? Were they driving on those
roads? Are you aware of any of that?
A.
The last few years they was using those
roads. There was more people all the time. And that was
all on them. It got to the point that the gates would
disappear along that green strip where it joined the
forest. They just take pinchers and cut the wire and cut
the gate off. And we -- We'd gather our horses. We
had three or four herds of sheep and each heard had about
three horses. And by the time we got them put in we had
10, 15 horses over there.
Q.
Is it your memory that when people were
through using those roads it was after they cut through
the gate some way to get into it?
A.
Not after they was through using them, it was
when they was using them.
Q.
Yeah, it was when they was using them, yeah.
A.
Yes. We'd put them horses in there and the
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next thing we know we'd go up there and the gate would be
gone. And four or five times I had to track them horses
clear back over into Glide Creek and found them horses
going back into Strawberry Valley. And when I was
bringing the horses back I found the gate rolled up and
thrown in them big pine trees to the east of that
property. Three or four times I found them gates down in
them pine trees.
Q.
So that happened on more than one occasion?
A.
Yes, three times I think.
Q.
Okay. That's all, Mr. Okelberry.
THE COURT: Mr. Sweat, cross?
MR. SWEAT: Thank you, your Honor.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. SWEAT:
Q.
Mr. Okelberry, when you purchased the
property in 1957 were there no trespassing signs where
the roads would cross into your property?
A.
I don't think we needed no trespassing signs.
There was no, not that much trespass up there.
Q.
Did you put locks on the gates in 1957?
A.
No, sir. We put fasteners on them and we
wired them to a post. We never did lock anybody out of
there.
Q.
Did you use trucks to access that property in
187
57?
A.
I can't hear you.
Q.
I'm sorry. Did you use trucks to access the
property? Or how did you access the property?
A.
Well, we took the truck in there. It was
mostly two-wheel trucks standing at that time cause there
wasn't no four-wheel drive trucks.
Q.
Typically when did you take the sheep up onto
the property?
A.
Well, we'd -- In the spring we'd take them,
probably first part of June, the last part of May, right
in there above the property above the road there at, in
the mouth of the main canyon and over in there above
Taylors.
Q.
Where did you bring them through?
A.
We'd take them there on that -- Can I step
down?
THE COURT: You bet. Go ahead.
MR. SWEAT: I'll hold it up for him, Judge.
THE WITNESS: We'd let out one band right
here. And we'd let out another band up into here and
then go up through, or up into here. We had two bands.
One band to take this north half and the other band to
take this. And this road went across the flat. I
maintained that road quite a few times.
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Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) Where typically would you put
your camps at when you had your sheep up there?
A.
There wasn't too many camping places up
there.
Q.
No, I say your sheep camp or your herder, did
he ever camp up there?
A.
Well, that's what I'm talking about.
Q.
Okay.
A.
You had to find -- We had -- We had a
little place right in here. We camped right in here.
There's a little spring right there. And then there was
-- Over in this area right here and down this road and
about along in here we had the camp right here. The rest
of this country is so rocky that you couldn't utilize it
with a vehicle. You couldn't pull -- You'd pull the
front end right out from underneath the camp.
Q.
You've indicated the property at the end of
Circle Springs Road, there was a gate here?
A.
Yeah, there was a gate there.
Q.
When did you take the sheep out in the fall?
A.
We took them out by the 1st of July. We took
them out of that private property and put them up into,
over in Mud Creek and Brian's Fork area and up in the
west part of the Duchesne and scattered three or four
herds of sheep around on the Forest Service. And they
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come back, about the 1st of October they was back in
there. You had to be off in the forest by the 1st of
October.
Q.
Okay. Your welcome to sit down. If you're
more comfortable standing I don't want to -- When would
you typically take the sheep out in the fall?
A.
1st of October -- No, there -- We'd stay
there -- After the 1st of November, October -- The
last of October if you got a foot of snow you had to
leave. When ever you got a snow storm, a big snow storm,
you had to leave cause you couldn't get around up there.
And that would go into the 1st of November -- The first
week in November you had to be out that's the rule, or
earlier if you had trouble.
Q.
So you tried to get out before the snow fell?
A.
Well, we'd stay there until the snow fell and
then we'd move on through down the lower country and get
out of there as quick as we could.
Q.
Did you ever see people gathering wood on
your ground?
A.
I sure did.
Q.
Did you ever ask them to get off?
A.
I sure did.
Q.
When would that have been?
A.
I can let you have a little description, up
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to the top of that -- That road -- There was a big
Aspen about 90 feet long and tall and was dead and it
died. And it was never had no limbs on it at the top,
just one little bunch of limbs up on the top of it. And
I had Roy Daniels with me. And we was looking for a
place to put the cattle guard.
And we come up around the turn and there was
a woman and a man and two or three kids. And I stopped.
And they cut this great big tree down. I pulled up there
with this Roy Daniels. He was the ranger with the Forest
Service. And he can verify this. And he -- I pulled
right, you know, from here to you from this woman.
And I said, "What are you folks doing up
here?" She said, "Well, you old fool, can't you tell
this tree is dead and it needs to be cut out of here".
And I said, "Hey, do you know who you're talking to".
She said, "Oh, are you Mr. Okelberry?" She said, "You
know I've been trying to catch up to you all spring long
so I could cut these dead trees". And I said, "You get
this family gathered up right now and get them in that
trough, and put your saw back in that truck, and get out
of here right now".
And that's the only ones I've run out of
there. And I went on down the road for about a mile,
mile and a half with Roy Daniels. And we selected a
191
place to put the cattle guard and put a flag by it. And
come back and so help me God, they had come back and cut
that tree up in logs and took it and they was gone. And
we saw them down there about 30 minutes to an hour. Now,
that was the neighbors we had there.
Q.
Was that the only -- You say that was the
only ones you ever kicked out?
A.
No, I was a little rough with some of them.
Some of them people ask, out of Wallsberg, would ask if
they couldn't come up and get some of the dead pines.
And I did give -- There's some Youngs that helped us
take care of the sheep. And I did give them Young
people, families, permission to go cut some of them dead
trees that was down on the roads.
Q.
You had more trouble with people cutting wood
on your property other than that one family?
A.
Well, after a while they cut them any place.
They just take right out through where ever they could
drive and cut the dead trees. It's quite a bit of Aspen
that would die.
Q.
And did you kick those people off too?
A.
Well, if you don't see them you don't kick
them out.
Q.
You indicated that you and Roy Daniels, who
was the forest ranger, is that what you indicated?
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A.
You bet.
Q.
You were placing the cattle guard; is that
correct?
A.
I built -- I took one up there and put it
in. And I can show you right there at Thorton Hallow,
right down on the fence. Put your pencil on the Thorton
Hallow Road, where it goes through the -- Where it goes
through the forest fence I put a cattle guard there. I
brought it up myself from Goshin and put it in there?
Q.
Now, there's a cattle guard right here too;
is that right?
A.
That's right, and I put it in too.
Q.
Did Mr. Daniels help you select that site
also?
A.
No, that -- That went onto the Cattle
Association. The greens where he was associated and the
Daniels Canyon Cattle was orange.
Q.
Now, I'm speaking where Ridge Line Road
crosses out from the forest into your property up here.
Did you put that cattle guard in too?
A.
I'm not sure if I put that one in or not. I
had three cattle guards and I've been trying to think
where I put them. But I know I put the one down there
for the, where it goes into that orange. And I put that
one on Thorton Hallow. Is that one on the forest -- Is
193
that on the forest line right there? Maybe the forest
put that one in right there.
Q.
They could of put that one in?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Did you always keep a gate locked across that
cattle guard, was it the head of Ridge Line Road there?
A.
No.
Q.
Was there times that there was just the
cattle guard and no gate?
A.
When we put that cattle guard there that
would take care of it. You couldn't keep a gate up when
I put that cattle guard there. That's why that cattle
guard was put in there.
Q.
But you think it may have been the forest
that put that one in?
A.
Well, right on the main line, the forest,
they had the business of maintaining that line right
there.
Q.
Did you ever catch people hunting on your
ground?
A.
I've caught a few. Mostly them people that
would help me I'd give them permission, one or two of
them.
Q.
Did you ever kick any of them off for hunting
on your ground?
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A.
You got to be pretty careful. You might get
the hell beat out of you.
Q.
It's happened before, hasn't it?
A.
Well, I was careful. So -Q.
When you owned this property did any sheep
herds ever trail up through Circle Hallow?
A.
Circle -- That use to be the -- There use
to be sheep that trailed from over across the Glade and
down that circle line and go through a gate and come out
down in there in that private property, them trail herds.
And there was two or three trail herds when we first got
up and used that to get up, go up in the spring or come
out in the fall.
Q.
How did they get their camps down that way?
Would they follow right down?
A.
They couldn't follow. They had to take the
camps down around.
Q.
Where would be down around?
A.
They had to take it back over to Daniels
Canyon and come down the highway and up through, and on
up through the town and into the bottom down in there
where that highway comes up into there. And they'd meet
down in there at the bottom of Circle.
Q.
You indicated that gates would just
disappear; is that correct?
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A.
That's right.
Q.
Did you ever lock gates?
A.
I never locked them gates.
Q.
Are you aware of the Forest Service ever
provided any maintenance on any of these roads?
A.
Well, the one time -MR. PETERSEN: Which one were you pointing
at?
MR. SWEAT: I'll ask him which one.
THE COURT: I think it was a general question
on any of the roads.
THE WITNESS: That -- That main line from
that one corner down to the orange, that joined the
Forest Service. And at that time when we got it the
Forest Service took that line, had that -- That was
their responsibility to put that line up. And we had a
guy by the name of Dick Whyship, was the assistant
supervisor down at the Provo office.
He called us in and he said -- And he
pounded his fist down on the table like that, bounced the
papers around and he said, "As of this minute, right now
that fence belongs to you". And I said, "How we gonna
herd the cows out? Who's going to maintain it?" And he
said, "If you want it maintained you're going to maintain
it. And you're going to herd your sheep, keep your sheep
196
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off of us. And they can herd -- They can keep their
cows off of you or you'll have to herd them off". So we
automatically took control of the fence.
Q.
With respect to any of the roads that go from
the forest to the forest, did the forest provide any
maintenance at all on any of those roads?
A.
I don't get any if they did.
Q.
After you had your sheep out in the fall
would you go backup and do much in the property?
A.
No, I don't think once we left the top we
ever did get backup on the top.
Q.
During the summertime when you would have
sheep or something up there, were you up there every day?
A.
No, I wasn't there every day, but I was there
once a week or something like that. The gates would be
down and you'd have a herd of cows on you once you left
with the sheep.
Q.
Was it your, pretty much a common occurrence
that the gates would be down when you got back?
A.
No, at first when we put them gates in there
we had pretty good respect for them gates. It's just
when you had some wild hunters. Mostly the hunters was
doing it. It wasn't the live stock people that was
taking them gates.
Q.
So mostly people would respect the gates,
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open and close them?
A.
Yes.
Q.
But every so often they'd just tear them
right off?
A.
You bet. They just cut them off, roll them
up and take them. That's how come we put them cattle
guards in.
Q.
When you were up there did you ever see any
people camping on the forest in Thorton Hallow or Parker
Canyon?
A.
Up the top of Thorton Hallow there was some
Taylors, they were some people that would help us and
they camped in there. There would only be one or two
camps in there, that's all there was.
Q.
Was there any on Parker Canyon?
A.
I don't know what stopped down in Parker
Canyon cause I didn't get down in Parker Canyon. That
was on the Cattle Association.
Q.
When did you last get up to this area?
A.
When did I what?
Q.
When were you last going up to the area a
lot, to the property?
A.
Oh, about six years ago, I guess.
Q.
When you was up there six years ago did you
see a lot of no trespassing signs on the roads?
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A.
I seen no trespassing signs on the road. At
that time I believe Ray was in the process of leasing
that to a hunters group. And when they leased it I don't
know whether they locked them gates or not. But I went
there one time and where the gate went through the
forest, and there was well, three or four guards or five
or six guards, security guards there. And they was -They had signs that there was no hunting on private
property there. And I remember they had a bunch of
people sign, down in the post office of the town, against
coming up and tearing the fences down or to come up and
tear the fences down.
I happened to be there talking to them
security guards. And them guys come up, and just four or
five of them pretty rowdy. I think I knew one of them
pretty well. They took their rifle and shot the signs
up. And somebody crawled up with the, up on the truck
and pulled the signs down. And they said if you put them
signs up again we're going to kill you or we'll shoot
somebody. And that night we never had no security guards
left. They all went home. Now, that was the public
people that done that. I remember that very accurate and
vividly.
Q.
When was that?
A.
I couldn't tell you when it was, but it was
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about the time that we was starting to lease that out,
that property for a hunting unit.
Q.
Was that about the time that no trespassing
signs were placed up around the property?
A.
I couldn't tell you when they was placed up
there. I was -- I was phased out of that business.
And I don't know when Ray started putting them no
trespassing signs up there.
Q.
When did you phase out?
A.
Oh, I've been phased out of there seven, six
or seven years ago.
Q.
I'm showing you a picture that's been marked
Exhibit No. 6. Do you recognize that area?
A.
Probably would if I could study it. It's
probably where I put a cattle guard. When was it taken?
Q.
I'm not sure when it was taken. It's been
represented with that (INAUDIBLE) Circle Spring. Does
that look familiar to you?
A.
I haven't been down there for ten years. So
I don't know what that's, that on that Circle Springs
Road is.
Q.
Do you see the tire on the tree?
A.
Yeah.
Q.
Do you remember seeing that tire?
A.
No, I think that's been put there since I was
200
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there.
Q.
Since about when? Oh, after since you've
left it's been put there, is that what you're saying?
I'm showing you what's been marked as Exhibit 7. Do you
see the gate with the cable and the lock on it?
A.
Uh-huh.
Q.
Did you put that there?
A.
No, sir, I did not.
Q.
Do you remember that being there?
A.
I never had to go through it. I don't
remember seeing that there. That's been put there after
I left.
MR. SWEAT: I think that's all the questions
I have, your Honor.
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Petersen?
MR. PETERSEN: Yes, just briefly.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETERSEN:
Q.
Mr. Okelberry, you indicated you gave
permission to some people to go on your property, would
that be correct?
A.
Just maybe a half a dozen people is all.
Q.
Uh-huh.
A.
In the fall they'd help us gather the sheep
off of the mountain and help us come around and move the
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camps. And that was welcome help. And we do them a
little favor if they wanted to hunt. There was one or
two that pulled a camp over there ahead of Thorton
Hallow.
Q.
Well, was some of the people that you gave
permission was people by the name of Youngs?
A.
Yes.
Q.
People by the name of Thompsons?
A.
Youngs helped us with them sheep. There was
a couple of them.
Q.
Uh-huh.
A.
They helped us gather the sheep, move them.
And if they needed some wood I give them permission to
cut a little wood or they'd come up in there and help me
move some camps.
Q.
Okay. Did you give permission to people by
the name of Thompson to come up on your property and use
those roads?
A.
Thompsons?
Q.
Thompsons. Does that sound familiar?
A.
I think so.
Q.
How about Taylors, do you remember giving
permission -A.
Taylors is the bottom end of that north road
that comes up in there. And they helped my dad quite a
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bit of the time in there. They was with him. And he was
getting a little older all the time. And he -Q.
Did you give permission to people by the name
of Taylors to use your roads and come on the property?
A.
I don't think we ever discussed using the
roads.
Q.
Was it permission to come onto your property
then?
A.
They use to go up through the bottom and ride
a horse up through there. That's how they got there.
They went up through that rough road that you couldn't
grade or do anything with it, up Maple. But I don't
think they ever did take a vehicle up in that road.
Q.
No, my question was do you -- You have on
occasion give permission to people to come onto your
property?
A.
I have, yes.
Q.
And I asked if some of those people were by
the name of Taylor?
A.
Yes, I know the Taylors.
Q.
Okay. And you did give them permission, did
you?
A.
I did.
Q.
All right. That's all.
A.
And I think my dad give them some permission.
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Q.
Okay. Thank you.
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Sweat?
MR. SWEAT: There is, your Honor. I lost my
train of thought.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. SWEAT:
Q.
Mr. Okelberry, you just indicated that you
gave permission to use the, your ground not the roads; is
that correct?
A.
Well, you can call it a road or a trail or
whatever you want to call it. I guess it's been called
both things.
Q.
Was it your understanding -A.
If it wasn't graded it was a trail. If it
was graded it was partly a road. So -Q.
Was it your understanding that those trails
or roads or whatever that led to the forest land was open
for use by the public to get to the forest?
A.
There was no consideration for the use of the
public or nothing else with the Forest Service. Anybody
that had any business in there could get through the road
without any trouble at all.
Q.
And you didn't require them to ask
permission?
A.
Not the Forest Service. You don't tell them
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what to do.
Q.
How about hunters or campers that were trying
to get to the Forest Service?
A.
Hunters can be quite a thorn in the side. I
remember it very vividly. I told you that he shot the
signs down. I was standing right there and the security
guards was there. And that's how -- That's how
considerate they was of us and the property. They was
showing the security guards they was still going to go
through there. And I'll -Q.
And you indicate -A.
I think we stood up for the public quite a
bit. If there was any that needed to go through there in
any way, shape or form they could ask or they could go
through there. We never turned nobody down that had any
business down in there.
MR. SWEAT: That's all I have, your Honor.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETERSEN:
Q.
Do you recall, Mr. Okelberry, when this
happened, this confrontation you testified to, that shot
the signs, when people shot -A.
I can't hear you.
Q.
When people shot things up, do you recall
when that was?
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A.
I don't know for sure. We was having some
hard times with the sheep and was quite hard to make ends
meet. And I remember talking to the Taylors and half a
dozen people from the town down there. And I says, "Now,
we are having some bad times here. And we're going to
lease this hunting rights to somebody". And I went right
to them people from Wallsberg and ask them if they was
interested in it. And there wasn't a one that was going
to pay for any leasing to run up in there. And that's
about the time that this took place. And we, we leased
it to this hunting club or people. Ray might could tell
you what the score was there.
Q.
You don't remember -- Do you remember the
year that happened?
A.
No, I don't, but it wasn't too far back, I do
know that.
Q.
All right. Thank you.
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Sweat?
MR. SWEAT: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: You may step down. Thank you.
Let's take our afternoon recess at this time. We'll be
in recess until 3:10.
(A brief recess was taken.)
THE COURT:

We'll return to the case of
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Wasatch County verses Okelberry. Mr. Petersen, you may
call your next witness.
MR. PETERSEN: We'll call Mr. Glen Shepherd.
THE COURT: Okay. Okay. Mr. Shepherd, come
forward to the witness stand right up here. Okay. Raise
your right hand and take an oath from the clerk. Stand
up, please.
CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the
testimony you shall give in the matter now before this
Court shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: You may be seated. Okay. Mr.
Tenney, you may proceed.
MR. TENNEY: Thank you.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. TENNEY:
Q.
Could you please state your name for the
Court?
A.
Glen Shepherd.
Q.
Glen Shepherd. And where do you currently
live?
A.
In Wallsberg.
Q.
And can you give your address?
A.
It's 2377 East Main Canyon Road.
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Q.
Thank you. Mr. Shepherd, where were you
born?
A.
In Provo.
Q.
And your current occupation?
A.
A carpenter.
Q.
Carpenter. Are you familiar with Ray
Okelberry's property?
A.
Yes.
Q.
How is it you're familiar with this property?
A.
My grandpa's had a ranch up there and I've
stayed up there for years.
Q.
Years. And then do you currently live near
his property?
A.
Yeah, I'm right adjacent his property.
Q.
Okay. Could you come down and identify on
this map that's been marked Exhibit 2, where exactly your
house is?
A.
It might be helpful maybe if -- Maple Creek
right here. I'm right at the bottom of the Main Canyon
Road, right where Maple Creek comes out.
Q.
Thank you. You can return to your seat. So
then your property, is it directly adjacent or is there
anything in between your property?
A.
Our family's property adjacents the whole
back of Okelberry's there.
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Q.
Okay. And how long have you lived in that
property?
A.
14 years.
Q.
And then how long has that property been in
your family?
A.
A hundred years.
Q.
A hundred years. In the course of your
residency at that house and in the course of your
family's ownership of that property, have you become
familiar with the various roads that travel through Ray
Okelberry's property?
A.
Yes. I've walked them probably the last 30,
35 years.
Q.
And just a rough estimate, how many times do
you think you've been over these roads in the past 35
years?
A.
Oh, thousands of times.
Q.
Thousands. Every year you go on there how
often?
A.
Yeah. 30 or 40 times every year.
Q.
Okay. Let's just walk briefly through the
various roads, just to discuss your knowledge of how they
are as roads. The Maple Canyon Road, would it be fair to
say that's the road you're most familiar with?
A.
Yeah.
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Q.
Is that road passable by none four-wheel
drive vehicle?
A.
No.
Q.
Has it ever been passable by none four-wheel
drive vehicle?
A.
No.
Q.
Oh. Are there signs posted at the entrances
of Maple Canyon Road indicating that it's private
property?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Have they always been there?
A.
They've been there for years that I remember.
Q.
And is there ever -- Do you ever have any
problems with those signs?
A.
Yeah, they disappear all the time.
Q.
And what do you think causes that
disappearance?
A.
It's vandalism.
Q.
Vandalism. How long has that been going on
with those signs?
A.
Forever, since I can remember.
Q.
Is there a gate that you keep at the entrance
to the Maple Canyon Road from your property?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Is it currently locked?
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A.
Yes.
Q.
And has it been locked in the past?
A.
Yes.
Q.
How long in the past has it been locked?
A.
Well, I remember it locked probably the last
seven years.
Q.
Last seven years. And before that was it
ever locked?
A.
I'm not sure of that.
Q.
Not sure. Was it closed during the time that
it wasn't locked?
A.
It's always been closed.
Q.
And then even during that time when it wasn't
necessarily locked there was still signs there while it
was closed saying that it was -A.
Yes.
Q.
-- private property? Let's move onto the
other roads. Ridge Line Road, is it passable by none
four-wheel drive vehicle?
A.
No.
Q.
And are there signs on it?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Circle Springs Road, is it passable by none
four-wheel drive vehicle?
A.
No.
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Q.
And are there signs there?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Parker Canyon Road is it passable by a none
four-wheel drive vehicle?
A.
No.
Q.
And are there signs there?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Thorton Hallow Road, is it passable at all by
a none four-wheel drive vehicle?
A.
No.
Q.
And are there signs there?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Regarding your use of this property, do you
-- You said that you're the adjacent landowner, but
you've also said that you go onto these roads. Do you
have the Okelberry's permission to go on these roads?
A.
Yes, I've had the Okelberry's permission for
years.
Q.
For years. How do you go about getting their
permission?
A.
Just contact them. They're always going
through Wallsberg. So I can see them all the time.
Q.
Yeah. Are they pretty free with giving
permission?
A.
Yes, that's probably some of the problem.
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They give permission and then it's got to where everybody
wants to use it for free.
Q.
Would it be fair to say you're familiar with
the town of Wallsberg, the people in Wallsberg?
A.
Yes.
Q.
To the best of your knowledge do people in
Wallsberg regard these as private roads or public roads?
A.
I think they'd be private roads.
Q.
Do you know of other people from the town who
travel on these roads?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Do these people, to the best of your
knowledge, ask for permission?
A.
Yes.
Q.
They do. So your understanding then is the,
is the general public perception that these are, in fact,
private roads?
A.
Yeah, they are private roads.
Q.
Okay. Now, when you've been on these roads
in the past have you observed other persons using these
roads?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Would -- How often do you see other people?
A.
Very seldom using, other than hunting season,
trying to get through them.
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Q.
Like I said, just rough estimation, during
hunting season how many people would you say?
A.
Oh, you might see, during the hunting season,
probably two cars maybe, three cars through the season.
Q.
Through the whole season?
A.
That I see.
Q.
And then is there evidence that there are a
lot of other people that you just don't see?
A.
Yes, there's travel through there. You can
see it.
Q.
Now, during the none hunting season, in your
experience have there been other persons on these roads?
A.
Very seldom are they used. I'm sure once in
a while, but very seldom.
Q.
Have you ever seen people camping on these
roads during none hunting season?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Has it been often?
A.
No.
Q.
Have you ever seen people taking picnics,
picnicking drives during the none hunting season?
A.
No.
Q.
Do you ever see people just out site seeing
during the none hunting season?
A.
No.
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Q.
No. So would then would it be fair to say
that during the none hunting season there just really
isn't a lot of traffic on these roads?
A.
There's not.
Q.
There's not. Now, you said that you've been
living there and involved with this property for 30 years
or so. In the past, in the 1960's, 70's and 80's was
there traffic on these roads during those time periods?
A.
Very seldom traffic was ever through there.
You could walk them every day for weeks and never see
anybody on them.
Q.
Okay. During the 1960's -- Let's just walk
through the decades. During the 1960's do you recall
seeing people out picnicking, joy riding, traveling
through these roads?
A.
There's very seldom ever see anybody in
there.
Q.
And then during the 1970's did you ever see
people picnicking, driving, just traveling through.
A.
No.
Q.
And during the 1980's?
A.
No.
Q.
Was this a time when the traffic on these
roads seem to have increased?
A.
Yeah, probably the last ten years.
215
Q.
And then has there been any sort of response
that you've been able to identify from the Okelberrys and
the other property owners to this increase in traffic?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And what's that response been?
A.
Just more vandalism, people trying to use
their property.
Q.
Has there been any sort of increase in terms
of the upkeep of the gates or signs or anything like
that?
A.
Yes, a lot.
Q.
What's happened during that time?
A.
Tear the gates out and the fences down.
Q.
And then how do the Okelberrys responded as
there's been this increase?
A.
Try to put in better gates and more signs and
stuff.
Q.
And then, I guess the last question would be
have you ever kicked anybody off of your property?
A.
Off of mine?
Q.
Or off of the roads leading from your
property into the Okelberry's property?
A.
Really not any Okelberry's, but off of ours I
have.
Q.
Yeah. Have you ever observed people trying
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to get from your property onto the Okelberry's roads?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And then have you had any encounters with
those people?
A.
A few times.
Q.
And can you describe those encounters?
A.
People hunting that shouldn't be hunting on
their property. I've tried to run them off. They'll
just ride right past ya.
Q.
Uh-huh.
MR. TENNEY: Okay. I have no further
questions at this time.
THE COURT: Mr. Sweat -MR. PETERSEN: Can we have just a moment?
There was that one picture in mind. Can we approach and
see if we've got this picture?
THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. TENNEY: Oh, right. All right. Before
we conclude, has this already been admitted?
THE COURT: What number is it?
MR. TENNEY: This is No. 15.
CLERK: Yeah.
Q.
(BY MR. TENNEY) Are you familiar with this
picture right here?
A.
Yes.
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Q.
Could you describe this to the Court what
this is?
A.
This is about 300 yards above my house.
Q.
So then on the map this would be -A.
This is right there at the entrance of Maple
Creek Canyon.
Q.
Is this gate -- Is this gate typically
locked?
A.
Yeah, it's been cut three or four times in
the last couple years.
Q.
And how long has this gate been at the
entrance at the Maple Canyon Road?
A.
It's been there probably 20 years I'd
imagine.
Q.
20 years. And then before that gate was put
in was there any sort of wire gate or anything?
A.
There was always a wire gate.
Q.
So for the last 20 years there's been this
metal gate and then before that there was a wire gate?
A.
Yeah, and there's a double set, just like
that right in front of my house. We just keep them
closed part time.
Q.
So has there ever been a time in your
involvement with that entrance to the Maple Canyon Road
that there's not been a gate of some sort leading off the
218

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

road?
A.
There's always been a gate because we've had
live stock and Okelberrys has always had live stock
(INAUDIBLE).
Q.
And then as far back as you remember have
these gates been open or have they been closed?
A.
They've been closed.
Q.
And have there been efforts taken by the
property owners to make sure they're closed during that
time?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Is the purpose of closing those gates and
your involvement with these gates, has the purpose been
just to keep out live stock or keep live stock in or have
there been other purposes as well?
A.
Yeah, it's private property is what I figure.
Q.
And so then would it be fair to say that the
purpose of these gates is also to keep people out not
just live stock?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Okay. Thank you.
THE COURT: Mr. Sweat?
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. SWEAT:
Q.
Mr. Shepherd, you say you've been up on these
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roads thousands of times?
A.
Thousands of times.
Q.
Do you still go up on these roads?
A.
Yes, I do.
Q.
Do you still have permission to go up on
there?
A.
Yes, I still do.
Q.
Do you get written letters from Mr. Okelberry
giving you permission to go up on there?
A.
Yes, I do.
Q.
What do you use these roads for?
A.
Oh, gaining access to other places there.
Just riding.
Q.
What other places are that?
A.
I ride to the other side of the mountain
right there.
Q.
Did you ever go down to Thorton Hallow?
A.
Yeah, I've been to Thorton Hallow, but I've
also been the Main Canyon way too.
Q.
Ever been to Parker Canyon?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Is that what you use the roads for is to get
there sometimes?
A.
Yes, but I ride up Daniels all the time too.
Q.
How about Circle Springs, do you ever ride
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out to Circle Springs?
A.
Yes.
Q.
You indicated that -- Is this the gate
that's -A.
That's above -Q.
-- on your property?
A.
Yeah, that's right above my house. I can see
it from my house.
Q.
You indicated those signs have been on those
gates for about seven years; is that correct?
A.
They've been there -- Them gates have been
there -- My house -- I built my house 14 years ago
and they were there -- I'm sure them gates have been
there probably at least 20 years.
Q.
I believe you just testified that the signs
have been there seven years?
A.
The signs have been there for years on the
gates. The gates has been there for at least 20 years,
them gates right there.
Q.
Do you like being able to go up on these
roads?
A.
Yeah, but if I lose my permission I'll go -The Forest Service, I'm right there too. I mean, if Ray
sells and somebody else owns it I'll have to use some
other means if I don't get permission.
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Q.
Mr. Shepherd, did you attend a meeting in
Wallsberg?
A.
Yes.
Q.
A couple years ago?
A.
Yes, I did.
Q.
Was that meeting brought about to talk to
people who were, believed those roads should remain open?
A.
Yes.
Q.
At that time when you went did you believe
those roads should remain open?
A.
Well, I probably did at that time.
Q.
You actually filled out a form, didn't you -A.
I haven't done my research enough on it.
Q.
But at the time that's what you believed,
huh?
A.
I believed at the time, but from what I've
seen I wouldn't believe it now.
Q.
Were you the only one that was at that
meeting?
A.
No, there was quite a few people at that
meeting.
Q.
And were -- Was the general consensus that
they'd all used those roads just like you?
MR. TENNEY: Objection, your Honor. I'm not
sure that he's competent to testify about the general
222
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consensus of the meeting.
MR. SWEAT: He was there, your Honor.
THE COURT: He said he was there. Overruled.
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) Was that the general
consensus that everybody used these roads?
A.
I believe so, but I think everybody had
permission.
Q.
You think you were the only one that's used
these roads, but everybody showed up?
A.
No, but I think everybody's had permission
too to use them. He's give everybody permission to get
fire wood in there and all sorts of -Q.
Do you think everybody's got a written permit
like you?
A.
I don't know if they have either a verbal or
written permit.
Q.
Is it nice to be able to travel these roads
and not have anybody else on the roads?
A.
Well, it's nice to be able to travel the
roads.
Q.
Kind of like your private preserve if no one
else is up there?
A.
Well, if I want to go to Thorton or that I
can be there just as quick going the forest route.
Q.
Have you ever seen people go through your
223
yard to get through to Maple Canyon?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Quite a bit?
A.
Not very -- Just very seldom.
MR. SWEAT: Can I have a moment, your
Honor -THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. SWEAT: -- to confer?
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) Mr. Shepherd, did you come
meet with me at the County Attorney's office -A.
Yes, I did.
Q.
-- a few months ago? And did you tell me
that -MR. PETERSEN: Objection, your Honor.
Counsel is not going to be a witness.
MR. SWEAT: I'm asking him what he told me.
MR. PETERSEN: Well, that makes him a
witness. Can't be a county -- Can't be a witness -THE COURT: Well, if it's to impeach -MR. PETERSEN: Well, he's going to impeach
him with what he supposedly told him then counsel will
have to be a witness.
THE COURT: Well, he hasn't asked a question.
He hasn't asked a question yet. Let's see if he
(INAUDIBLE). Overruled. But Mr. Sweat, if he doesn't
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answer the way you think he's going to answer then
there's no way you're going to be a witness.
MR. SWEAT: I understand that, your Honor.
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) Do you remember telling me
you wanted to build a barn across there in that, where
the road goes through?
A.
Yeah, but I'm going to put the road in.
MR. TENNEY: Could we get clarification which
road you're talking about, sir?
THE COURT: The road at his house.
THE WITNESS: At my house. I'll put it on
the other side of the bus garage.
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) Now, it's your testimony that
in the 30 or 35 years that you've been up there thousands
of times, you've very seldom seen anybody else on these
roads?
A.
I don't see very many people on them roads.
Q.
Did you ever see any of the people that
showed up at the meeting at Wallsberg?
A.
Oh, a few of them, yeah. They've had
permission too. Most of them are related to me.
Q.
Do you know they've had permission?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Have you seen their slips?
A.
No, but I'm -225
Q.
You're sure though, right?
A.
I mean, they -- They know Ray real well.
I'm sure they've had permission.
Q.
You're sure they have?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Have you heard Ray tell them they had
permission?
A.
No, but most of the people that are up there
have had permission from him.
Q.
Is your assumption anyway?
A.
Is my assumption.
Q.
Because you've had permission?
A.
Yes.
MR. SWEAT: No further questions, your Honor.
THE COURT: Anything else?
MR. TENNEY: Just a few more.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. TENNEY:
Q.
Counsel just asked you if you have used these
roads freely to go places like Parker Canyon and Circle
Springs. Have you ever gone up to these places, Parker
Canyon, Circle Springs, any of the places on the property
without having gotten permission first?
A.
No, I haven't.
Q.
You haven't. Counsel indicated that you
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attended this meeting three years ago and you said at the
time that you wanted these roads open; is that correct?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And you've now said that you don't want them
open. What's changed?
A.
They're private property, I figure. And I
don't have no grounds to open somebody else's property.
Q.
And so then in the past three years what,
what's changed your mind? Is it just you thought about
it?
A.
The vandalism and stuff on property.
Q.
Okay. Thank you.
MR. TENNEY: No further questions.
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Sweat?
MR. SWEAT: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: You may step down. Thank you.
Next witness?
MR. PETERSEN: We call Shane Ford.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Ford, come forward and
come up to the witness stand.
MR. PETERSEN: Before he takes the witness
stand, your Honor, could he just look at Exhibit 2
and -THE COURT: Yes. Before you -- While you
pass, stop there and look at that map and familiarize
227
yourself with it.
THE WITNESS: Okay.
THE COURT: Okay. Raise your right hand and
take an oath before you step -- Oh, sorry.
CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the
testimony you shall give in this matter now before this
Court shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
THE WITNESS: I do.
THE COURT: Have a seat.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETERSEN:
Q.
Would you state your name, please?
A.
Shane Ford.
Q.
And your address?
A.
PO Box 67 in Alberta, Utah, 84626 is my zip.
Q.
What is your occupation?
A.
I'm an outfitter.
Q.
And what does an outfitter do?
A.
I lease large blocks of private land, put
them into corporative agreements with the State of Utah.
Those agreements guarantee me the permits I use to sell
to run my business.
Q.
Is that called a corporative wildlife
management unit?
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A.
They are.
Q.
Is this area that we're looking at in Exhibit
2, is that part of this CWL, CWM?
A.
Yeah, the yellow and that pink shaded area
there is in the CWMU program presently.
Q.
We're talking about the Okelberry property
and the West Daniels property?
A.
Correct.
Q.
When you have that kind of a unit what does
that do? What can you do with that?
A.
Well, what it is -- It's a corporative
agreement that we enter into with the state and the
private landowners enter into with the state. There are
-- What it is is a -- It's a -- It's a mechanism to
generate guaranteed permits for the landowners use. In
the trade-off for those guaranteed permits there are
permits issued annually to public hunters to hunt that
land as well. So that's kind of the trade-off that goes
on there.
Q.
Now, did your family own any of these
property that's part of that unit?
A.
Yeah, they did.
Q.
As you drive around up there and carved in
the Aspen trees you'll see the name of Ford. Have you
noticed that?
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A.
Yeah.
Q.
Anybody's name that's Ford is likely to be a
relative?
A.
Yeah, there's, you know, to different
degrees, but I would guess that most of them are all a
relative of mine some where or another.
Q.
Now, did your great-grandfather own the
property at one time?
A.
He did.
Q.
And did that stay in the Ford family for a
period of time?
A.
To my recollection I think 1918 to around '36
is when they owned it.
Q.
Does your family, the Ford family, have
occasion to go back in that area for reunions?
A.
We do. We have a reunion there at the Big
Glade almost every year.
Q.
Could you point the Big Glade out again here
on this map?
A.
The Glade would sit just right, right where
this road forks there in section 31.
Q.
When is your first recollection of having a
family reunion there?
A.
Junior high school age. You know, mid
1980's, '84, '85, in that neighborhood.
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Q.
And when you would go there for a family
reunion it would be in the summer months?
A.
Correct, usually mid to late July.
Q.
Would you travel on this road called Ridge
Line Road and go down any of those roads, do you know?
A.
We did. We took one trip every year. As
part of that reunion we would go down -- My
great-grandfather's name was in that Quaky tree down
there just pass the Maple Creek turnoff in 1918. We like
to always go down as just a little family trip and go to
that tree. And then we turn around and go back out.
Q.
Have you had occasion to cut that out?
A.
I did. It's at my house now.
Q.
And that was carved in 1918?
A.
1918.
Q.
When you would go up there in these reunions
do you know if permission was ever sought to travel on
those roads?
A.
I didn't. My mother was always kind of in
charge with that. She was fairly good friends with Mr.
Okelberry's wife at the time. And she would always -I can remember quite often she would call and just tell
her we were having our reunion. Would it be okay if we
went down and did that? I remember always doing that.
Q.
As you would go onto the Okelberry property
231
would you go through gates?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And do you know if you went through any other
gates as you went down the Mountain Ridge Road?
A.
Through any other gates?
Q.
Yes.
A.
I guess I'm (INAUDIBLE).
Q.
As you travel on this property were there
other gates on the property?
A.
There's a few gates as you go across that
top, you know, just depending on where the sheep were,
depending on how they were using it at the time, they'd
be open or closed, depending on which pasture they were
in.
Q.
How often did you have these reunions?
A.
We have them annually. We have them at the
Glade quite regularly. Probably three years out of five
we'll have them at the Glade. The last one we had there
I believe was in 2002 I think was the last year that we
had one there. We're having one there this year.
Q.
You'll go back again this year?
A.
Uh-huh.
Q.
Do you know if when you hold those reunions
you always sought permission?
A.
To my knowledge we did. Like I said, that
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was kind of my mother's, that was one of the things she
handled it. And I know that she did, you know, did
always try to call them and tell them, ask them if we
could go on. Tell them the days, the day we were going
to go in and what we were doing.
Q.
Now, what was your -- You've been to
reunions there -- What was your next involvement with
this property?
A.
The next, you know -- My next work there or
the next things I did there I hired on with the state,
state government as a trapper in 1994. And I had
occasion to be on that place, you know, here and there
from 1994 up until I quit in 2002 I believe.
Q.
So about eight years?
A.
Yeah, in that neighborhood.
Q.
What does a trapper do?
A.
Just works on live stock problems with
coyotes, bear, mountain lion, just -It's -- That's
another corporative agreement between private landowners
and the state government that, you know, the state
government provides a service to those people that are
having live stock problems, you know, damage caused by
predators (INAUDIBLE).
Q.
In connection with that work did, was it
necessary for you to travel on what is known as the Ridge
233
Line Road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Thorton Hallow, Parker Canyon?
A.
Yeah, you know, we were around all of that,
you know, all of the country in question here.
Q.
Are those roads, when you started in 1994,
were they about the same now as they were at that time?
A.
Yeah, I don't know much change in them.
They're pretty similar.
Q.
I want to show you a picture here, if I may.
I'm showing you what's been marked as Defendant's No. 6,
Exhibit 6, and ask you if you can identify that?
A.
That's the Circle Springs gate or what we
call the Circle Springs gate where you go into Circle
Springs off of the public ground.
Q.
Now, you can see the -- Mr. Ford, you can
see depicted on there a tire. Can you see that tire?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
It says keep out on it.
A.
Uh-huh.
Q.
Do you know if that tire was there when you
were camping with your reunions and the (INAUDIBLE)?
A.
Those tires have been there a long time. You
know, as long as I can remember being around that place
there was the big tires in the trees. You know, that's
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some of the first signage I remember on that, you know
that property, seeing those big tires. And I do remember
us doing our reunion stuff, I always remember seeing
those big tires, spray painted tires?
Q.
It's also depicted on there, is it not, up
here, the sign right there. To you know what that says?
A.
I can't really tell just from the picture. I
mean, it looks like an old no trespassing sign.
Q.
Okay. Can you tell what that yellow one says
right there?
A.
The yellow one says no trespassing.
Q.
And then there's another red one. Do you
know what that red right there would be?
A.
I -- I can't really read it in the picture,
but I'd pretty sure it's a trap sign. Like the trappers,
if they're working that country if they have equipment
set on the property and a sign saying there's a trap or
something that they got set on that property, they're
required to post the entrances of the property with
signs. And that would be my guess as what it is, but
it's in that picture (INAUDIBLE)
Q.
And is that (INAUDIBLE) the property?
A.
Yeah, yeah, that's just you know a
prerequisite that the program puts on you. If you have
equipment you got to have it posted.
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Q.
I'll show you what's been marked as
Defendant's Exhibit 8 and ask you if you can identify
that?
A.
Yeah, I can identify it. That's the same
gate, Circle Springs.
Q.
Is that the metal gate to replace the one
that's shown on Exhibit 6?
A.
Yes, correct.
Q.
And does that show that tire in the tree?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Now, you've indicated that you worked as a
trapper from '94 to '02, did you ever -- Well, let me
ask. How often would you go into this area?
A.
You know, it was a real pretty site specific
situation. It wasn't -- The Wallsberg country wasn't
my specific district. I trapped districts that bordered
it. So I would go there kind of upon request. I would
be there traditionally from late spring through the
middle parts of the summer would be the times of year
that we would be there.
You could be there for a week at a time if,
you know, if he was to say you was having lion or bear
problems in there we would stay for a week at a time and
work on it. You know, it could be just a day here or
there. So every year was different. It would just
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depend on the land and how things went.
Q.
Did you ever run across anybody from the
public, any site seers, wood cutters and so fourth going
up?
A.
I never did when I was trapping. The people
I saw there were either employees of Mr. Okelberry, of
West Daniels people. There were people there, but they
were always people that had business there. You know,
the people that I saw there, which wasn't a whole lot of
people any ways, were people that had business there.
Q.
Now, you left the service of the state in
'02. What's your next involvement with the property? Is
that this hunting unit you told us about?
A.
Yeah, I leased the -- I leased the hunting
rights to it and began hunting it in 2002, I think, was
the first fall we hunted Wallsberg.
Q.
And how often do you get there now? Is it by
the fact you have a hunting unit?
A.
I'm there a lot now, probably a lot more now
than I was before. We spend -- We're there every week
in the summer months. You know, at least a day or two a
week in the summer months. And then from, you know, from
late August through middle of November we, either I'm
there or somebody that works for me is there pretty much
every day. We have a camp that we keep there and, you
237
know, we have people there pretty study.
Q.
Do you run across people from the general
public there now as go up there?
A.
You know, pretty limited scale. The first
year maybe more so than the last couple, but not -- You
know, every time you're hunting private land you're going
to have some trespassing issues, but not -- I wouldn't
say any more so than anywhere else, but yeah, there's -We definitely have to ask some people to leave. And that
happens every year.
Q.
That -- Those people that come and want to
hunt on this private property that you've got
(INAUDIBLE)?
A.
I assume that's what they're -- Yeah, I
mean, they're there. They're there in the hunting season
hunting, you know. They're there with rifles and those
are the people that we've had to ask to leave.
Q.
Now, on these pictures the one pictures shows
the metal gate. Is it locked during the hunting season?
A.
It is.
Q.
And are other gates locked up there during
the hunting season?
A.
Yes, they're locked.
Q.
In respect to the roads that are there, this
Ridge Line Road, would you describe that?
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A.
It's just awful rough, narrow, rocky road.
You know, it's just a pretty poor mountain road.
Q.
The Maple Creek Road, would you describe
that?
A.
Maple Creeks probably one of the roughest
ones up there. I don't think there's anyway to get a
vehicle down it. Well, I guess depending on how hard you
wanted to try. But it's more of a four-wheeler trail,
horse road. You know, you can ride horse up and down it.
You can ride a four-wheeler down it. It's real rocky.
You know, got some awful big rocks in it, pretty darn
rough road.
Q.
The Parker Canyon Road, how would you
describe that?
A.
Just the same, just narrow, rough, pretty
rough roads.
Q.
Thorton Hallow?
A.
The same thing. They're -- All those
roads, you know, are just what they are. They're not
much.
Q.
Circle Springs?
A.
Circle is a rough road.
Q.
Now, when you -- You take hunters up on the
property, I suppose?
A.
We do.
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Q.
And do you camp up there?
A.
We do.
Q.
When you're up there with your, with your
guide service and so forthwith, your hunter, are you
using those roads to hunt on?
A.
We use -- We do use the roads. We use them
with four-wheelers. Mostly we use very little vehicles
up there. Most of our hunting we'll use vehicles in the
camp. Park our vehicles at camp. And, you know, I'd say
90, 95 percent of your hunting is done either on horse
back or hiking or four-wheelers. You know, we don't use
vehicles on those roads very little just cause they're so
rough.
Q.
Is that the reason why you don't use them is
because they're so rough?
A.
Yeah, it's -- You can pretty much destroy a
truck in a fall if you want to.
Q.
In respect to people wanting to hunt on the
Forest Service area. If a person wanted to hunt the
Thorton Hallow and Parker Canyon is there other ways to
access that besides on these roads?
A.
Well, there is -- You can access from
Daniels. Now, there's trails up both canyons. You know,
you can you access it from Daniels Canyon. As far as
Thorton goes, you know, you can be to the Thorton Hallow
240
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Pond, I would guess, just as fast as walking from
Okelberry's gate as you can driving around it. You know,
I've never timed it, but it's not too far to get down
there. So there's other access into those places. It
would be mostly a foot.
Q.
You're saying that you could actually walk
from where the Okelberry gate is over to Thorton Hallow
and onto that gate?
A.
I can't imagine more than ten minutes going
down. It's not very far.
Q.
Can you see where ATV's have?
A.
They're twiddling on it now. I don't know
how farther they've got it. I kind of quit paying
attention over the last year or so. But they were -They're kind of carving their way down that fence. And I
don't know if they can get there or not now, but they
were working towards it.
Q.
Can you access that Circle Springs Road from
the Main Canyon Road?
A.
Yeah -- Well, you can't access the road,
but you can, you know, you can hike from Willow Springs
up to Circle pretty quick. I mean it's -- You can -I would bet I could hike from Willow Springs to Circle
faster than I could drive the Big Glade and around to
Circle Road and get down to it.
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Q.
Now, in your opinion are those roads, have
they been open to the public for continuous use?
A.
Not in my lifetime. No, not in my experience
up there.
Q.
Fine.
MR. PETERSEN: That's all.
THE COURT: Cross, Mr. Sweat?
MR. SWEAT: Thank you, your Honor.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. SWEAT:
Q.
Your experience up there, for all intense and
purposes, begins in about 1994; is that right?
A.
Well -Q.
Before that you testified you went up family
reunion?
A.
'84 -- '84, '85 is when, you know, when I can
remember going up there. Our families been going there
prior to that, but really, my memory of it's not -Q.
And that was maybe three out of every five
years?
A.
In that area.
Q.
And then you went up as a trapper in 1994; is
that right?
A.
Correct.
Q.
Currently you run the WC, CWMU; is that
242
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correct?
A.
I do.
Q.
Is that your livelihood?
A.
Well, it's part of it. I operate several.
Q.
Now, to put a CWMU together who is it you
have to contract with?
A.
Well, the private land -- I contract with
the private landowners and they in turn contract with the
division of Wild Life Resources or the State of Utah.
It's a -- You know, I make a contract to lease their
hunting rights and they in return contract with the state
to provide the a hunting right to the public and, you
know, and to enter that ground into the program.
Q.
And so what do you get out of putting that
together?
A.
Pardon me?
Q.
What do you get out of it?
A.
I get the permits -- I get the guaranteed
permits that are generated by that unit to sell.
Q.
So you sell the permits?
A.
I do.
Q.
What does the landowner get out of it?
A.
The landowner gets the land, the money that I
pay him to lease his hunting.
Q.
How many permits did you get to sell up there
243
last year?
A.
Six bull elk, I think we get 18 deer. I'm
not sure if we get 18 or 9. I think it got changed to 9.
I think we may have got 18 deer last year. Of that we
don't use hardly any. But I think I get 6 and 18. I'm
not exactly sure on the cows. 6 or 7 (INAUDIBLE) tags.
Q.
Does the property owner, do they get any tags
to sell?
A.
No, they do not.
Q.
They just get the lease from you?
A.
Right.
THE COURT: Before (INAUDIBLE) before you go,
just so the Court knows, how many permits does the state
get to sell?
THE WITNESS: Well, the state -- The public
-- It's not the state doesn't sell the permits, the
state offers permits to the public through a draw. They
receive, last year I think it was in neighborhood of 25
antler (INAUDIBLE) permits, they got one bull moose tag,
two buck deer and a bull elk.
THE COURT: (INAUDIBLE).
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) Is there a set price on what
you charge for those permits?
A.
Oh, you'd like to think there is, but -- It
will range anywhere from $7,500 to 9,000 depending on,
244
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you know, the year and the time and how that works.
Q.
Does it depend any on how well people have
done on the past -A.
Of course it does.
Q.
Kind of deer they got?
A.
Of course it does.
Q.
Kind of elk they got?
A.
Of course it does.
Q.
You indicated you can walk to Circle Springs
from the road in about ten minutes?
A.
No, not from Circle. I said ten minutes from
the road down to Thorton.
Q.
From the road to Thorton?
A.
Uh-huh.
Q.
How about someone that's 70 years old? How
long would it take them to walk down?
A.
That's all relative. I don't know. I can't
answer that. It depends on how good shape they're in.
It's all down hill.
Q.
Do you think if these roads are closed,
Circle, Thorton, Parker, do you think less hunters get
down there?
A.
You know, I would assume so, but that being
said there's -- The guys that -- If I can, I think
the guys that want it go down there now have a better
245
experience going down there. Cause, you know, the guys
that actually want to get down there will do the work to
get down there. And, you know, I've actually talked to
guys that are on their horses that think it's great,
because they can ride their horses down that fence line
and have a little less competition. But yeah, you know,
I would definitely say there's going to be less, less
people down there.
Q.
Do you like have less competition too?
A.
On the forest?
Q.
On your CWMU?
A.
I shouldn't have any competition on my CWMU.
A CWMU permit is only valid on a CWMU. So you know
there's -Q.
Are the wild life allowed to go back and
fourth across it?
A.
Sure.
Q.
So if there's less wild life got in some of
these areas neighboring areas there's more of a chance
that a big ones going to stay in your area?
A.
Well, you're targeting different wild life.
I'm targeting five to seven year old bulls. Where as
other hunters targeting spike elks. So we're not hunting
the same, not even hunting the same elk. As a general
rule there's lottery tags for Wasatch bulls that guys can
246
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go hunt there, which surely we're targeting the same elk
then, but that's in a real limited scale?
Q.
(INAUDIBLE) those bulls you leave a lot of
time for young bulls to grow up, don't you?
A.
Sure.
Q.
'94 as a trapper, did you use these roads?
A.
I did.
Q.
What did you use them with?
A.
Government vehicle and horse, both.
Q.
Did you ever drive clear to the fence in
Thorton Hallow?
A.
Not in a government truck.
Q.
Did you ever drive to Parker Canyon?
A.
Not clear to the fence. The farthest I ever
went in a government truck was down to White Pole.
Q.
Is it your testimony that it can't be done?
A.
Pardon me?
Q.
Is it your testimony it can't be done?
A.
No, it's not my testimony it can't be done.
Q.
Is your testimony that most people don't do
it?
A.
I would say that's accurate.
Q.
You indicate that where you're up there
you're seeing a lot people that are wanting to come and
hunt on the property; is that right?
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A.
I don't think I said a lot, but there are
some.
Q.
Did you ever meet anybody that ever expressed
where they wanted to go through the roads and express
their anger or their disgust or their -A.
Yeah, I've talked to -- Really only one
person that comes to mind that was quite hostile about
it.
Q.
Were there any that weren't hostile, but just
said, you know, we know we use to go down those roads all
the time and now you don't let us?
A.
Not that I had conversations with. The
people I had conversations with there had a few with guys
that maybe elk killed at Thorton or at Parker Canyon that
wanted to come through. Anybody that I've ever talked to
that was civil about it we let come through and go down
and get their elk. And that kind of stuff went on a
little bit. But didn't have a lot of conversations, you
know, just a few that were -- Like I say, one comes to
mind that was pretty hostile, but other than that -Q.
So you have the power of the pass to let
people go through if they want to go through while you
have the CWMU?
A.
Well, yes, I'm the operator of the unit.
Q.
Between '83 and '90 how many times do you
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think you went to this area?
A.
Oh, not a lot. Two times a year at the most.
Q.
When you went up as a trapper were you aware
if they were selling trespass permits to get onto Mr.
Okelberry's property?
A.
Yeah, I was. I mean, I was aware that there
was some, you know, some commercial hunting going on
there, like that type of stuff going on.
MR. SWEAT: May I have a second, your Honor?
THE COURT: You may.
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) When does your current
contract end with this CWMU?
A.
I have a ten year lease with Mr. Okelberry
right now, but there's, you know, there's some other
things involved with that. So -Q.
Okay.
MR. SWEAT: That's all I have, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Anything else, Mr.
Petersen?
MR. PETERSEN: No, I don't think so, your
Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Do you know, was there
another CWMU prior to yours?
THE WITNESS: There was.
THE COURT: Okay.
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THE WITNESS: There was.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: I believe it began in '94, '95
was the first year it was in, either '94 or '95.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. You may step
down.
MR. PETERSEN: We call Bruce Huvard.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Huvard, come forward.
Come up here to the witness stand.
MR. PETERSEN: Mr. Huvard -- Could we have
him look at this exhibit?
THE COURT: Okay. Come down here first and
look at this map and orient yourself.
MR. PETERSEN: Can you just look at this map
and see if (INAUDIBLE)?
THE WITNESS: It does.
ME. PETERSEN: (INAUDIBLE)?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. PETERSEN: Okay.
THE COURT: Come up here and raise your right
hand and take an oath.
CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the
testimony you shall give in the matter now before this
Court shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
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THE WITNESS: I do.
THE COURT: Have a seat.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETERSEN:
Q.
Would you state your name, please?
A.
Robert Bruce Huvard.
Q.
And what is your address?
A.
564 East 600 South Salem, Utah.
Q.
And what is your occupation?
A.
Retired and plus I run a hunting and guiding
business, owner, operator.
Q.
How old are you?
A.
61.
Q.
What does an outfitter do? A guy in the
outfitter, what kind of work is that?
A.
You take people -- You procure permits or
licenses for people and then guiding, then guide them on
hunting trips for deer, elk and other species.
Q.
Now, are you familiar with this Okelberry
property, generally the property that's designated on
Exhibit 2?
A.
I am.
Q.
When did you first become acquainted with
that property?
A.
In 1966.
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Q.
And for what purpose did you go there?
A.
I went there to ask permission to go hunting.
Q.
And who did you seek permission from?
A.
The Okelberrys.
Q.
And what were you going to hunt?
A.
Deer.
Q.
And was permission given to you to hunt the
property?
A.
It was.
Q.
When you went there in 1966 did you go
through any gates to get onto the property?
A.
I did.
Q.
Did you see any signs there in 1966?
A.
I did.
Q.
What were the signs?
A.
Keep out and private.
Q.
Did you have occasion to travel over the
roads?
A.
I did, what there was of them.
Q.
How would you describe the, in 1966 the
Mountain Ridge or the Ridge Line Road?
A.
Horse trail.
Q.
Not very good?
A.
Extremely bad.
Q.
Could you travel on that with a truck or a
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four-wheel drive type vehicle?
A.
In '66 -- I wouldn't have tried it at all.
I would of traveled on foot or with a horse.
Q.
In 1966 where did you do your hunting?
A.
Mainly on the Okelberry property.
Q.
Did you come down onto the Circle Springs
Road?
A.
Yes, I did.
Q.
What was the condition of that road?
A.
Extremely rough.
Q.
Did you go down the Mountain Ridge, or
maintain or the Ridge Line Road?
A.
I did.
Q.
How far down did you go in 1966?
A.
To where you could overlook Heber City area.
Overlook what's today is the, a gun club.
Q.
You didn't go all the way to the gun club,
you went through the (INAUDIBLE)?
A.
Yes.
Q.
What was that road like as you went down, as
left the Okelberry property and went down there?
A.
Extreme -- It was more a trail than it was
a road.
Q.
Was it difficult to get over?
A.
Yes, it was.
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Q.
Did you, in 1966, go down into the Parker
Canyon area to hunt?
A.
Yes.
Q.
What was the condition of that road?
A.
Horse trail.
Q.
And the Thorton Hallow Road, what was the
condition there?
A.
That was just about the same. It might have
been better at times, but it was pretty rough, Thorton
Hallow Road.
Q.
In 1966 did you have occasion to see any
other hunters up there?
A.
I did.
Q.
Do you know if they were there by permission
or not?
A.
There was two that were and there was one
gentlemen and his son that were not.
Q.
Did you have any conversation with them?
A.
I asked them what they were doing there.
Q.
Did you ask them to leave?
A.
I asked them that they -- I told them they
shouldn't be there on private property without
permission.
Q.
Now, did you go back on subsequent years?
A.
I did.
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Q.
A.

And what years did you go back?
I went back pretty near every year up to

1990.
Q.
So from 1966 to 1990 you hunted in that area?
A.
Yes, I did.
Q.
And during that period of time did you obtain
a hunting unit permit or was that after?
A.
It was after that period.
Q.
Okay. When you hunted from 1966 to 1990 did
you obtain permission from the Okelberrys?
A.
I did.
Q.
Did you do that every year?
A.
I didn't have to every year. I asked them if
I, you know -- Occasionally I'd -- One or two years
between.
Q.
Now, during that period of time did you go
through gates -A.
Yes, I did.
Q.
-- to get onto the Okelberry property?
A.
I did.
Q.
And were there subsequent gates as you went
up the mountain, the Ridge Line Road?
A.
There were.
Q.
Did those roads change in that period of
time? Did they become better roads or better trails or
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whatever?
A.
They did become better.
Q.
Very much so or did they stay about the same?
A.
At times they were a lot better when the
property owners took their equipment in there and did
work on them.
Q.
And did you observe that over a period of
time?
A.
Yes.
Q.
During this period of time from 1966 to 1990
do you know if other people obtained permission to use
those roads?
A.
They did.
Q.
Do you know if other people used those roads
that did not have permission?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Do you know if they were asked to leave?
A.
When I was personally hunting there I would
ask them to leave if they didn't have permission.
Q.
Were there very many people?
A.
No.
Q.
Did they constitute many -A.
No.
Q.
Now, you obtained a hunting unit. You called
that a CWMU.
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A.
I did.
Q.
When did you obtain that?
A.
In 1995.
Q.
And you had that hunting unit from 1995 till
what time?
A.
2001.
Q.
Mr. Ford just testified, I believe, he took
that unit over in 2002; would that be correct?
A.
That is correct.
Q.
During this period of time from 1995 to 2001,
would you go up there during times other than the hunting
season?
A.
Yes.
Q.
What would you do when you would go up there
during other times?
A.
Check the posting; go up and clear the roads
as needed to be cleared in the spring; replace locks that
had been blown off or cut off; fix any gates they pulled
down; different things like that.
Q.
Now, you say you would go up and check
posting. What do you mean by check posting?
A.
No trespassing signs that were posted on the
property and the perimeter of the property.
Q.
Now, you indicated that you saw signs like
that in 1966 when you began hunting up there?
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A.
Not the signs like I put up. But I did say,
saw signs that -- There were signs that said keep out
and private.
Q.
Then you said you would clear roads. In what
way would you clear roads?
A.
Chain saw.
Q.
These -- Because of trees that would fall
down?
A.
Yes, if I didn't do them they didn't get
done, unless Kelly brought the sheep in on the place.
And I was doing them for, courtesy for Ray because they
were his roads.
Q.
Was this a -- Is this a big problem up
there, clearing roads of those trees?
A.
It is.
Q.
Is it something that's just done once in the
spring of the year or do the trees fall down during the
summer and the fall?
A.
I took the lease -- I started leasing the
property in 1993. And depending on the type of storms we
had during the year, there'd be an average of two to five
times a year we'd have to, at least that many times, you
know, to clear trees and stuff off the roads to be able
to use those roads up there.
Q.
Would -- Would you carry in your vehicle a
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chain saw to help you do that?
A.
A chain saw or a hand saw, all the time.
Q.
You'd sometimes use a hand saw on those
trees?
A.
Oh, yeah.
Q.
You indicate that you would fix gates. In
what way would you fix gates?
A.
Replace them, dig new post holes and put
cement, steel posts back in or replace the regular green
steel post that they'd pull out, the fence, you know, the
wire and everything else.
Q.
Now, you indicated that you had this hunting
unit from '95 on, but you leased the property in '94; am
I correct in that?
A.
'93.
Q.
Excuse me, in '93. How did it go during this
period of time when you were up there in '93, '94?
A.
'93 and '94 -- '93 was not too bad once
people realized that we had the lease on it and without
paying they weren't allowed on the property.
Q.
Did you -- Was this before the hunting unit
that you were, that you were charging people to use that?
A.
Yes, yes, I was.
Q.
And did you have an arrangement with the
Okelberrys in some way that -259
A.
I had assigned -- We had assigned police on
the, for the hunting on the property.
Q.
And so you would charge so much per person to
come on there and to hunt?
A.
Yes, I would.
Q.
And if they weren't -- And if they didn't
pay were they not allowed to use the roads?
A.
I kept everybody off, period.
Q.
That was in -- Let me see if I got this
right. That was in '93?
A.
Actually in '94 -Q.
'94?
A.
-- I started that.
Q.
You started that in '94 and '95?
A.
5 and 6 and 7, I allowed nobody on that.
Q.
And how did it go for that period of time up
through '96?
A.
It wasn't too bad. I had a few trespassers,
a few, you know, the gates and stuff, locks shot off. I
had a, you know, some people confronted me. I told them
get off, like the day they come on the property. I
pretty -- It was no trespassing. No usage unless you
pay.
Q.
What would you charge to do that?
A.
What would I charge?
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Q.
A.

Yeah.
Anywhere from -- At first it was $200 per
person. Then when it became a CWMU I charged anywhere
from $1,200 for deer permit to $3500 or better for an elk
permit.
MR. PETERSEN: Excuse me, just one minute,
your Honor.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) In 1997 what happened
then, anything?
A.
It became more difficult to control access on
the property.
Q.
In what way did it become more difficult?
A.
I was threatened; called at home; I was
threatened on the property; I was actually shot at on the
property -- Shot at while I was on the property;
tearing gates down; and shooting locks off. Just really
tough.
Q.
And did you -- Were you up there full-time?
A.
No, I was not up there full-time, but I was
up there -- I had people hired to patrol it for me,
specially on weekends.
Q.
And would they keep people off the property
then?
A.
They definitely would.
Q.
Until '97 though you didn't have that sort of
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problem then?
A.
I had it locked up.
Q.
Now, in the spring of the year how soon could
you get into that property?
A.
June, sometime in June. Sometime -- Or
middle to late June.
Q.
And how late in the season could you be
there?
A.
Depending on whether conditions we could be
there till November, but, you know, first part of
November sometime. We usually got enough snow up there
that pretty well took care of any travel there on the
north face.
Q.
Are you aware that as far as accessing the
Forest Service property that it's possible to do that by
not using these roads?
A.
Definitely.
Q.
Do you know if hunters have ever done that
before?
A.
Definitely.
Q.
If they wanted to hunt the Parker Canyon and
the Thorton Hallow area where would they come from?
A.
If they were wanting to hunt Parker Canyon
they could come in from the bottom, down off of U.S. 40
down there. On Thorton Hallow you could go right up to
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the forest, to the exit of the private property and ride
down the fence line. On Circle Springs you could drive,
you could leave the Big Glade there -- I mean, it's
accessed right there from the Big Glade. And you could
drive up to the Okelberry fence line and ride around the
fence to access Circle Springs.
Q.
Okay.
A.
That's what I did before I asked permission
to gain hunting on Okelberry.
Q.
So you've actually done that then before you
had permission?
A.
Oh, yeah, uh-huh.
MR. PETERSEN: May I confer just one moment,
your Honor?
THE COURT: You may.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Mr. Huvard, when you were
in control up there and you were asking people to leave,
was it to leave because the hunting or to leave and not
use the roads?
A.
It was to leave and not use the roads.
That's private property.
Q.
Did you use those roads -- When you had
your hunting unit up there were you using those roads
much?
A.
I was.
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Q.
Did you use horses as well?
A.
I used horses to hunt.
Q.
Did you walk as well?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Did you have ATV's as well?
A.
I did.
MR. PETERSEN: Thank you.
THE COURT: Mr. Sweat, cross?
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. SWEAT:
Q.
Mr. Huvard, you indicated that when you had
the CWMU you weren't up there every day; is that correct?
A.
That's correct.
Q.
You also indicated that you never let anyone
use the roads, even if they were just going through; is
that correct?
A.
That's correct.
Q.
Is there a possibility that some of the
people you indicate were hired, that were up there every
day, may have let people use the roads to get through if
they were going on to the forest?
A.
There is a possibility, but I wasn't aware of
it. It wasn't authorized.
Q.
What changed in 1997 that suddenly it all
became real tense or however you put it?
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A.
And what became -- It was the attitude.
Q.
In 1997 things really got bad; right?
A.
It was the attitude of the public.
Q.
Isn't it true that's really the first year
you completely shut off the roads?
A.
It is not.
Q.
Is that about the time you first really
started patrolling the roads?
A.
It is not.
Q.
How did you meet the Okelberrys?
A.
How did I meet the Okelberrys?
Q.
Yeah.
A.
I met the Okelberrys by going on their
property and asking, driving, walking -- Actually I
walked from the fence line to a sheep camp and asked
permission. That's when I first met the Okelberrys.
Q.
What brought you up to this area? You say
you're from Salem, Utah. Did you ever live in Wallsberg?
A.
No.
Q.
Between the 60's and the 90's did you ever
hunt anywhere else in the state?
A.
I did.
Q.
You indicated between '66 and '90 when you
were just asking permission that you would kick people
off Okelberry property; is that correct?
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A.
That is true.
Q.
Did Mr. Okelberry ask you to do that?
A.
They wasn't -- Unless they had permission
they wasn't suppose to be on there, I was told that.
Q.
Were you asked to kick people off it?
A.
I was asked to ask them to leave, yes. I
don't kick anybody off, I ask them to leave.
Q.
How often were you up there in any given week
between '66 and '90?
A.
On any given week.
Q.
Did you come up every week during that time?
A.
During the hunting seasons, yes.
Q.
Even when you were hunting in other areas?
A.
No, not when I was hunting other areas. I
was not this during that time.
Q.
Do you currently hunt up in this area?
A.
I do not.
Q.
Do you currently run CWMU's at this time?
A.
I buy permits from CWMU operators, yes.
Q.
And then resell them or -A.
I guide them.
Q.
And you guide them? Since Mr. Ford has taken
over have you guided any up in this CWMU?
A.
No, I have not. I have not made those
arrangements with him.
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Q.
When you're up there between 1996 and 1990
were the gates locked at that time?
A.
Yes, some of them were.
Q.
Which gates were locked?
A.
The one where, from Circle Spring -- I
mean, excuse me. The way you access Thorton Hallow Road,
the one coming onto the main Okelberry property.
THE COURT: Why don't you go up and point?
THE WITNESS: I'll show you the gates that
were locked at that time.
THE COURT: Go down to the map and show.
THE WITNESS: This gate here was locked.
This gate here was locked.
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) Between '66 and '90 was there
always a gate at that point on Ridge Line Road where it
crosses into the Okelberry property?
A.
Yes, there was.
Q.
Was there a cattle guard there?
A.
I can't remember if there was or not for that
full period of time. I don't recollect whether there was
or not.
Q.
Is there one there now?
A.
Where, the Ridge Line Road?
Q.
Yes.
A.
No, it's further up.
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Q.
Where this road crosses from Ridge Line into
Okelberry property, you don't believe there's a cattle
guard there now?
A.
There's cattle guards -- One, two -- Yes,
there is. Yes, there is.
Q.
And was that -- Was there a gate over that
cattle guard all the time when you went up -A.
Yes, there was.
Q.
-- between '66 and '90? So any testimony to
the contrary would be wrong?
A.
I believe so. There was always a gate there.
If it wasn't up it was because of a cattle guard, it was
just pulled back.
Q.
You indicate that there's a, there was a keep
out sign between '66 and '90 every year up there?
A.
Yes, there was, keep out and private.
Q.
So any testimony to the contrary would just
be wrong?
A.
Evidently it would be. There's still some of
those signs there some where on the top, real old signs,
small signs.
Q.
Small signs or what kind of signs were they?
A.
They were small. Those type of signs that
they used in those days were small, probably four, three
inches or four inches by about eight inches or ten inches
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was the maximum size of those signs, like this.
Q.
And that's the types of signs you saw '66 to
'90?
A.
Yes.
MR. SWEAT: That's all the questions I have,
your Honor.
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Petersen?
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, I wonder if I
could reopen on direct for this witness.
THE COURT: What area do you want to cover?
MR. PETERSEN: I want to cover with your
Honor some pictures that he took of this area as you go
along this Ridge Line Road down in this area over here.
THE COURT: We're not concerned with that.
It's not part of this lawsuit.
MR. PETERSEN: It's not part of the lawsuit,
your Honor, but I think it goes to the credibility of
witnesses that said that they have traversed that area.
His testimony would be that it would be impossible
because the gates have been locked and the terrain and
what have you.
THE COURT: Well, but -- We're talking
about a 50 year period of time that people have testified
to. How in the world is it going to be helpful to this
Court, at some point in time in the last ten years, that
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there was a gate on one end of that property that was
locked when people have testified that, you know -- Or
sometime during that 50 year period of time they
traversed that road.
MR. PETERSEN: Well, if that was it, your
Honor, but I think the testimony was that of recent date
they've done that. But if it won't be helpful to the
Court then -THE COURT: Well, you can ask them. Go
ahead. I'm not going to stop you, but I don't -MR. PETERSEN: If it's not going to be
helpful to the Court, your Honor, we won't pursue that
area. I have nothing further of this witness.
MR. SWEAT: (INAUDIBLE).
THE COURT: Okay. You may step down. Thank
you.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we've moved along
rather quickly. We've finished the witnesses that we
intended to call this afternoon. But we do have a number
of witnesses for tomorrow, your Honor. We expected to
finish early afternoon tomorrow.
THE COURT: Okay. How many more witnesses do
you have?
MR. PETERSEN: We have -- We have six more
witnesses, your Honor, and this would include both
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Okelberrys.
THE COURT: And you don't think -- You
think that we could finish by early afternoon.
MR. PETERSEN: Oh, I think so. Well, I don't
know about early afternoon, but I expect we'll be done in
the afternoon sometime.
THE COURT: Okay. We'll reconvene at 9:00
a.m. then.
MR. PETERSEN: Thank you.
(Where upon Court recessed for the day.)
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WITNESS my hand at Midvale, Utah, the 19th day of
August, 2005.
Jennifer Hermansen France, RPR, CSR
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June 28, 2004

9:00 a.m.
P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT: Wasatch County verses E. Ray
Okelberry and others, defendants. Mr. Petersen, you may
call your next witness.
MR. PETERSEN: Thank you. We'll call Mr.
Wayne Robertson.
THE COURT: Is he out in the hall?
MR. PETERSEN: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Robertson, if you'd
come up here to the witness stand.
MR. PETERSEN: (INAUDIBLE) if you'd take a
look at this exhibit, please.
THE COURT: Come down and examine this
exhibit before you -MR. PETERSEN: (INAUDIBLE).
THE COURT: Okay. Come up and raise your
right hand and take an oath from the clerk.
CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the
testimony you shall give in the matter now before this
Court shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
THE WITNESS: I do.
THE COURT: Have a seat.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
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BY MR. PETERSEN:
Q.
Would you state your name, please?
A.
Wayne Robertson.
Q.
And, Mr. Robertson, what is your address?
A.
Goshen, Utah.
Q.
And your occupation?
A.
Truck and business.
Q.
How old are you?
A.
63.
Q.
What is your date of birth?
A.
8/4/40.
Q.
You had an opportunity, did you not, to look
at what's been designated as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2,
did you not?
A.
You'll have to speak up just a little bit.
I'm hard of hearing.
Q.
Okay. You had an opportunity, did you not,
to look at what's been designated as Exhibit No. 2?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Now, are you familiar with that property?
A.
Yes, I am.
Q.
And how is that?
A.
Well, my family owns it. We herded sheep on
there.
Q.
And which -- Which property did your family
5
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herd sheep on?
A.
Well, my dad and grandfather own Section 11.
That's what we call Boomer.
THE COURT: Why don't you point it out on the
map, Mr. Robertson?
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Point out generally where
that's at.
A.
It would be just this section right here, I
assume. This is the road -- Dad built the road from
White Pole down into Parker Canyon and on across here.
MR. PETERSEN: Okay. I think the record
should show that he's pointing to what we've been
commonly calling Parker Canyon Road.
THE COURT: Yes, and I assume the portion
you're, the section you're talking about is presently
owned by the West Daniels Land Company.
THE WITNESS: Okelberrys as far as I know.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) No, it's West Daniels.
A.
Oh, is it.
Q.
Yeah. Okay. You can take the witness chair
there. Now, did you have occasion to work up there as a
boy?
A.
Yes, I herded sheep up there.
Q.
Did your father own sheep?
A.
Yes.
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Q.
What is your first recollection? How old
were you?
A.
Well, I can never not remember going up
there.
Q.
Okay.
A.
Probably eight, seven, eight years old.
Q.
Now, when you first went up there to herd
sheep how did you get into that area?
A.
We had a pack in with pack outfit and leave
in a tent up there.
Q.
Did you come down the Ridge Line Road at all?
A.
No, not at that time.
Q.
You were packing in from what we'd call
Highway 40 then? Is that -A.
Yes.
Q.
Do you recall that your father built Parker
Canyon Road?
A.
He built a road from White Pole down to
Parker Hallow and on across Section 11.
Q.
Was there a road there before he built that?
A.
No.
Q.
And do you recall what year he did that?
A.
It sticks in my, best of my recollection as
1952.
Q.
And what did he do? How did you build it?
7
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What kind of equipment?
A.
Well, he hired a man with a dozer to come in
and build a road.
Q.
Caterpillar tractor type?
A.
Yeah.
Q.
Before he did that did that road -- There
was no road down Parker Canyon?
A.
No.
Q.
And what was the purpose in building that
road?
A.
So we could get a camp wagon down there, live
in a camp, didn't have to live in a tent.
Q.
It was a lot better to stay in a sheep camp,
was it?
A.
You bet.
Q.
Then after you built that road in 1952 did
you begin to use what we, what is known as Ridge Line
Road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Would you describe the condition of Ridge
Line Road?
A.
Do what?
Q.
Would you describe the condition of what was
known as -A.
Well, it was just a, more or less a two track
8
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road about as long as a pickup.
Q.
Was it -- Was it a rocky road?
A.
In places.
Q.
When you used that was the trees covering the
road a problem at all?
A.
Well, every spring -- We'd be the first
ones in there in the spring. And sometimes we'd spend
three days, four days cutting trees so we could get down
in there.
Q.
So before you could even use the road you'd
have to cut trees?
A.
Right.
Q.
Was that typical of every year?
A.
Some years was worse than others, but just
about every year there would be some trees across the
road.
Q.
Now, as you carry on along this Ridge Line
Road pass this road that your father made, the Parker
Canyon, was there a road going north?
A.
No, there was no road there then.
Q.
Did it even exist?
A.
No.
Q.
Did it exist after your father sold, up until
the time that your father sold the property?
A.
No, there was nothing ever changed there that
9
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I could ever remember until -- I think dad sold that in
'57.
Q.
Now, during the period of time that your, you
were using that Ridge Line Road, who would use the road?
A.
Just the live stock people.
Q.
Were there any gates on the road?
A.
I remember my mother complaining about the
gates. One time I was opening and closing the gates and
she was driving the pickup. She counted seven gates down
across the top of that mountain.
Q.
Was there a gate separating the Forest
Service property onto what is known as the Okelberry
property now as you -A.
Yes, I think that's what, where the first
gate was.
Q.
And you remember that there, from that point
down to this Parker Canyon Road there were seven gates?
A.
Yeah, seven total.
Q.
During this early 50's when were you up
there, to the best of your knowledge, was that road open
and used continuously by the public?
A.
I never seen anybody in there but live stock
people.
Q.
Do you know if there was a road that has now
been labeled Thorton Hallow Road?
10

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A.
I think there was a road there then, but I'm
not sure. I don't ever remember. We never used Thorton
Hallow. So I couldn't testify to that.
Q.
Would you know if there was a road known as
Circle Springs Road? Would you know if there was any
roads down in that area?
A.
No.
Q.
Do you know if there was a road called the
Maple Canyon Road?
A.
Come out of Wallsberg?
Q.
Yes.
A.
Yeah, there was.
Q.
There was -- There was that road coming out
that way? Do you know the condition of that road at all?
Did you ever travel it?
A.
Well, I just remember going in there with my
parents and it was pretty rough.
Q.
Do you know if any of those roads were ever
opened and used continuously by the public?
A.
I don't.
MR. PETERSEN: That's all.
THE COURT: Mr. Sweat, cross?
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. SWEAT:
Q.
Mr. Robertson, you indicated that your family
11
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sold the land in 1957; is that correct?
A.
To the best of my recollection, yes.
Q.
Did you go up there much after that?
A.
No.
Q.
You indicated that you believe your family
owns Section 11; is that correct?
A.
Yes. Should I point it out to you?
Q.
If you don't mind.
A.
It would be this section right here. Okay.
Dad built the road from White Pole down to Parker Hallow.
Then he built this road across here. Right here is what
they call Mud Spring.
Q.
Well, that shows it was Section 12?
A.
Well, it could of been 12 or 11. I don't
know.
Q.
You indicated, to the best of your knowledge,
that Parker Canyon Road was built in 19, or what has been
designated as Parker Canyon Road on this map, was built
in 1952; is that correct?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Could it have been as earlier as 1950?
A.
Pardon me?
Q.
Could it have been a year or two, either way,
earlier or later?
A.
It could of been a year or two, but to the
12
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best of my recollection it was 1952.
Q.
And after that you would bring your camp down
the Ridge Line Road?
A.
Yeah.
Q.
What type of vehicle would you use to pull
it?
A.
We usually -- Well, we had a ton and a half
-- He had a ton and a half Chev truck and he had a
four-wheel drive pickup.
Q.
When you'd bring your camp down that road is
that then how you would leave and access that property is
through that road? About how many times a summer would
you go up and down that road?
A.
Well, dad brought groceries up once a week.
Q.
Same day every week?
A.
No.
Q.
Typically once a week? When you say he
brought them up, did you ride with your dad or was you up
there watching -A.
I was up there herding the sheep.
Q.
So you weren't necessarily using the road
once a week, your dad may have been; is that correct?
How often did you use the road to get in and out?
A.
Usually just to get in there in the spring if
I had to pull a camp in or pull it back out.
13
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Q.
So maybe twice a year?
A.
Yeah.
Q.
And in those two times a year you don't
recall seeing a lot of people using that road, is that
what your testimony was?
A.
Very seldom anywhere.
Q.
Now, you indicated that you've also used
Maple Canyon Road?
A.
Maple Canyon?
Q.
Maple Canyon Road. You -- I believe that's
what your testimony was. Do you know where Maple Canyon
Road is?
A.
No. Is it the one that goes down to
Wallsberg?
Q.
I'm going to show you on this exhibit what's
designated as Maple Canyon Road.
A.
Well, we -Q.
Are you familiar with that road?
A.
We did use it to get back and forth to
Wallsberg.
Q.
How did you -A.
We never -- We never used that road very
often, only if he had business at Wallsberg. He always
went to the top of Daniels and down the highway.
Q.
And so your use of that road would have been
14
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starting in 1952, give or take a year, up until 1957 when
you sold the property; is that correct?
A.
You mean the road from White Pole down to
Parker.
Q.
I mean the Ridge Line Road, I'm sorry.
A.
Yeah.
Q.
And frankly the White Pole down to Parker,
the same use?
THE COURT: You have to answer out loud.
THE WITNESS: Pardon me?
THE COURT: I say you have to answer out
loud.
THE WITNESS: Oh, okay.
THE COURT: Was your answer yes to that
question?
THE WITNESS: Nodding the head ain't getting
it?
THE COURT: No, it's not. It's not
recording.
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) When you were up there in
1952 to 1957 did you ever see locks on any of those seven
gates?
A.
No.
Q.
Did you ever see no trespassing signs on any
of those gates?
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A.
Not that I recall.
Q.
Did you ever see people hunting on your
property in the fall?
A.
We was never in there in the fall.
Q.
When did you typically come on the property?
A.
We usually got in there the first part of
June and stayed till the middle of July.
Q.
So about a month and a half each year?
A.
Yeah.
MR. SWEAT: That's all I have, your Honor.
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Petersen?
MR. PETERSEN: Just briefly, yeah.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETERSEN:
Q.
You said that you had traveled on that Ridge
Line Road. Would you stay up there for the full month
and a half when you were herding sheep or would you come
out of there on occasion?
A.
Usually I stayed in there the full time. I'd
go in with the sheep and come out with them.
Q.
Now, when -- Would you trail your sheep out
the Ridge Line Road when you -A.
No, we would go down Parker Hallow when we
left.
Q.
And how would you trail your sheep in?
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A.
We usually come up Boomer.
Q.
So you -- And that would bring them in off
Highway 40, would it?
A.
Yeah.
Q.
Bring them in that way and take them out the
same way you brought them in?
A.
We'd unload down -- Usually truck them up
to, right there by where the old Acorn Inn use to be.
Unload there and then trail up Boomer Canyon. Well, just
kind of moved them up on the mountain. And then when
we'd come out we went down Parker Hallow to the highway.
And then up the highway to Strawberry.
Q.
And on those times that you were on this
Ridge Line Road would it be safe to describe it more as a
trail than a road?
A.
Well, it was a, just a two rut road. It
wasn't a -- If you passed another car or truck there
you usually have to pull off the side and let one of them
go.
Q.
Would that be a safe description for the
Maple Canyon Road as well?
A.
Maple Canyon? You'll have to -THE COURT: That's the road to Wallsberg.
THE WITNESS: Well, I couldn't testify to
that. I don't know.
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Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) You're not that familiar
with the Maple Canyon then?
A.
No.
Q.
Okay.
MR. PETERSEN: That's all.
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Sweat?
MR. SWEAT: Just one thing, your Honor.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. SWEAT:
Q.
Mr. Robertson, you indicated that you would
come in with the sheep and leave with the sheep?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Was there ever any years that instead of
coming down the Ridge Line Road, yourself, you followed
the sheep up in and followed the sheep back out, trailing
them?
A.
Well, I usually went in with the sheep and
came out with the sheep. I remember there were several
years that I did pull a camp out that way and pull it in.
Q.
So between '52 and '57 you used it. Some
years you pulled the camp, some years you took care of
the sheep?
A.
Right.
MR. SWEAT: That's all, your Honor.
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Petersen?
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REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETERSEN:
Q.
Mr. Robertson, did you ever use the road
known as the Main Canyon Road? Does that sound familiar
to you?
A.
Well, the Main Canyon Road, to my knowledge,
is the one that went down to Wallsberg.
Q.
Yeah. And is that the one you're talking
about when you say that you went to Wallsberg?
A.
Yeah. Dad went that way several times, I
remember, cause he had business in Wallsberg.
Q.
So when you went to Wallsberg it wasn't on
the, it wasn't on the Maple Canyon Road, it was on the
Main Canyon Road?
A.
Yeah.
Q.
All right. Thank you.
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Sweat?
MR. SWEAT: Just one last question.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. SWEAT:
Q.
Did you ever use the Maple Canyon Road?
A.
Myself?
Q.
Or to go to Wallsberg? Yeah.
A.
Myself?
Q.
Yes.
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A.
No.
Q.
Did you ever use Main Canyon Road to go to
Wallsberg?
A.
No.
Q.
So you really don't know what road your
father used?
A.
Other than I may have rode with my dad in and
out that way.
Q.
Okay. Do you recall if it was ever down
Maple Canyon?
A.
Oh, I don't remember.
Q.
Thank you.
THE COURT: Okay. You may step down. Thank
you.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
MR. PETERSEN: Excuse this witness, your
Honor?
THE COURT: You may be. You're excused.
MR. PETERSEN: Thank you very much. We'll
call Brian Okelberry.
THE COURT: Let's see. Were you sworn when
we start?
THE WITNESS: No, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. Raise your right hand and
take an oath.
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CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the
testimony you shall give in the matter now before this
Court shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Have a seat.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETERSEN:
Q.
Brian, would you state your name, please?
A.
Brian Okelberry.
Q.
And your address?
A.
Goshen, Utah.
Q.
You're one of the defendants in this action,
are you not?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And you're one of the owners of the property
in question, are you not?
A.
Yes.
Q.
What is your date of birth?
A.
January 1, 1962.
Q.
So that makes you how old?
A.
42.
Q.
You've had an opportunity, have you not, to
examine what is Exhibit 2?
A.
Just the same as my map.
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Q.
A.
Q.
what you've
A.

Well, come and take a look at it. Yes?
Is this one different than the other?
No, this is the same -- This is the same as
been (INAUDIBLE).
Okay.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we've had what's
been marked as Defendant's Exhibit 22, which is a map
prepared by Wasatch County. I think counsel would
stipulate the admission of this map.
MR. SWEAT: I would, your Honor.
THE COURT: It's received.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 22
was received into evidence.)
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) I'd like to refer to
Exhibit 22 and also to Exhibit 2, Mr. Okelberry, during
your testimony. Now, do you have a recollection of going
up onto this property at a young age?
A.
Yes, I traveled with my dad since I was
little.
Q.
How old were you when you started going up
there, do you know?
A.
Well, I would be in diapers, but I wouldn't
be able to remember all that. But -Q.
How old were you when you had your first
memory?
22
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

My memory goes to '69.
About '69 you can have a memory?
Uh-huh.
When did you start working up there, do you

know?
A.
I started herding sheep there in 1973, I was
11. And there was an Indian who drank two bottles of
rubbing alcohol. And my dad hauled him over to Heber
Hospital and I was left there at the bottom of Maple
Creek at that time.
Q.
In charge of the sheep? Are you familiar
with the roads?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Familiar with the Ridge Line Road and the
other roads that have been -A.
I never called it Ridge Line. What we call
Ridge Line Road was the fish and game road from Hearts
Gravel on down, we call it White Pole Road, Parker Road,
but I'm showing you what you're calling Ridge Line Road.
Q.
What -- During the course of this trial
what we've been using as -A.
Yes.
Q.
-- for terminology. So your -- Your
recollection goes back into the early 70's then -A.
Yes.
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Q.
-- approximately? Have those roads changed
much over the years?
A.
I don't think they've changed much, you know.
Sometimes we work on them and they're a little better and
sometimes they're a little worse. There's some that are
impassable now that were passable and -- They haven't
changed too much.
Q.
The Ridge Line Road, do you recall as you
entered the Ridge Line Road from Forest Service Road if
there were gates on those entrance?
A.
There's always been gates there in my time.
Q.
Now, what's been marked as Exhibit 22, it
shows two entrances, does it not? One on Circle Springs
and then one that goes on to Ridge Line Road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
To the best of your recollection have there
always been gates on those two entrances?
A.
Yes.
Q.
As you go up the Ridge Line Road are there
other gates?
A.
There's gates on -- There's four gates
inside the property as pasture gates. And then there's a
gate at each place that it goes on and off West Daniels.
Q.
To your recollection -A.
Four more.
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Q.
-- have there always been gates as they've
gone on and off of West Daniels?
A.
Yes. One's a cattle guard now.
Q.
To your recollection were there ever any
signs around those gates?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And where were there signs?
A.
Each gate, on the pasture gates inside, on
the boundary gates.
Q.
On the boundary gates there were signs?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And what would the signs say?
A.
Keep out.
Q.
What was the purpose of those signs, do you
know?
A.
Well, the purpose of the gates, the purpose
of the signs is to try to keep the sheep in tack.
Q.
Was it also to restrict vehicles from going
up and down the road?
A.
I've had the gates took down. It's just best
if they keep out.
Q.
Yeah, but was that one of the purpose of the
gates, to control vehicles from going up and down the
roads?
A.
Yes.
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Q.
Now, when you would go up there in the spring
of the year did you ever have to cut trees out?
A.
Yeah.
Q.
And was that a common occurrence every year?
A.
It's pretty common. There's places where
there's trees. Continuous, yes.
Q.
Would you have to cut trees on the Ridge Line
Road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Would you have to do that every year?
A.
If I was the, not the first one there I
would, it may be necessary. But I'd say every year I've
cut a tree up there, yes.
Q.
And the cutting of trees, is it just
restricted to the spring of the year when you go onto the
property initially, or does it happen during the course
of the year as well?
A.
A tree can fall any time. It's a forest
country.
Q.
And have you done that on occasion?
A.
Yes.
Q.
How would you describe the Ridge Line Road at
the present time?
A.
There's parts of the Ridge Line Road that's
impassable and there's parts that are pretty good.
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Q.
Where are the parts that are impassable?
A.
I can show you on the map.
Q.
Okay. Why don't you come over here on
Exhibit 2 and show us.
A.
This map is not the same as our other map.
You got this map in red on the other map.
Q.
Okay. Let's -MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, we've talked about
that. I have not yet had a chance to highlight that.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SWEAT: I don't have a red marker.
THE COURT: Get a red marker.
MR. PETERSEN: I wonder if we could show this
to the Court. Your Honor, the time and part that he's
talking about (INAUDIBLE).
THE WITNESS: Right there to right there. I
was (INAUDIBLE) since '73 right there. There's old pines
on it (INAUDIBLE).
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) How is it to travel on the
Ridge Line Road if it's been rained on or it's wet or
what have you?
A.
Well, up on top where it's not steep
(INAUDIBLE) that's -- And then there's some dips. We
haven't done work there's some holes (INAUDIBLE). What
was the question again?
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Q.
Okay. I'm just asking -- The question was
how is the road after it's been raining?
A.
It can be muddy.
Q.
Okay. Now, are you familiar with what is
called the Parker Canyon Road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
I want to (INAUDIBLE) an exhibit. It shows
the road going from Ridge Line Road down to Highway 40?
A.
That's what it shows.
Q.
And is that accurate?
A.
No.
Q.
Where as on Exhibit 2 it doesn't show that;
is that correct?
A.
Its got to go in there a little bit, further
than it does.
Q.
You're familiar with that road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
What's the condition of that road?
A.
I'm usually on my horse on that road. So I
drove down there two or three times. It's not very -I guess they describe it as a mountainous road. It's
just a rough, mountainous road.
Q.
When you go on that, in that area, do you
prefer to go on a horse rather than a vehicle?
A.
Well, I'm usually doing horse work. I hauled
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Bentonite when we made some ponds down there. I follow
Cat trails, which is closed now. The time I remember
driving down there with a pickup load of Bentonite.
Usually I'm going down there moving cows, but that's -Yes, I can be down there quicker on a horse than you can
in a truck.
Q.
So if you wanted to drive on that Parker
Canyon Road you'd be, it'd be quicker to take a horse
than it would be to take a vehicle?
A.
It would be for me. Right down that Thorton
fence and over there, I guarantee I can beat you.
Q.
Is that passable in anything but a four-wheel
drive vehicle?
A.
If you want to say continuous, no, but parts,
yes.
Q.
Now, on Parker Canyon is there ever a problem
with fallen trees?
A.
Yes, it's timber also.
Q.
Have you, on occasion, cut trees off of that
road?
A.
I don't think I've cut a tree for a while
(INAUDIBLE) White Pole pass down Parker Canyon.
Q.
Are you aware that other employees of yours
or other people have cut trees?
A.
Yes.
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Q.
Now, are you familiar with what is known as
the Thorton Hallow Road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Would you describe that one?
A.
Same, mountainous, short road. It's a pretty
short road. And it goes through some heavy thick quakers
right there at the top on part of it. And there's
usually some big trees down. Sometimes -- A lot of
times that road you can't go on. And then sometimes it's
been cut and you can. We've cut it. And then it makes a
turn and it's kind of -- It's not really the steepest
one. It comes down a little canyon. It's pretty good,
it's pretty rocky right there. It goes down to the
forest fence and stops.
Q.
Now, is it necessary to cut trees every year
on that road?
A.
I've never seen it when one of them big trees
didn't fall on that road, no. Yes, it's necessary to cut
trees on that road every year. (INAUDIBLE).
Q.
Can you travel on that road in anything less
than a four-wheel drive vehicle?
A.
If it's dry (INAUDIBLE) conditions again. If
it's just dry you can drive it in a two-wheel drive
pickup.
Q.
Are you familiar with what is known as a
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Circle Springs Road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And would you describe that road?
A.
That ones pretty rocky. Pretty rocky up the
road, but you can get down it.
Q.
Is that a road also that you have to remove
trees on?
A.
There's -- I've done quite a lot of sawing
on that road. I can -- I'm the one that goes down
there -- Yes, there's trees. I'm making my answering
too long, aren't I?
Q.
No, you're okay. Don't worry about that. Is
there a gate that separates your private property from
the Forest Service property on Circle Springs Road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Is that gate been there as long as you can
remember?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Likewise over on Parker Canyon and Thorton
Hallow, are there gates that separate your property and
the Forest Service property?
A.
Yes. There's a cattle guard at Thorton
Hallow, but there's gates.
Q.
Now, is it -- Are there trails -- You
know where the Big Glade is?
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A.
Yes, I know where the Big Glade is.
Q.
Are there trails from the Big Glade along the
Forest Service property that would take you back to
Thorton Hallow and Parker Canyon?
A.
Big Glade, the forest closed the road that
drives right down (INAUDIBLE), the head of cattle
(INAUDIBLE) it puts you right down, and the forest closed
the road. And then there's a Glades trail. It's about
like these others if you wanted to go saw it out. It
goes clear down to Parker, but they closed that off.
Now, the way I bring the cattle to come out of there is
up against the forest fence, the boundary fence, or else
that trail I'm talking about. And you can go right along
that boundary fence, yes.
Q.
Now, you say there's a boundary -- There's
a boundary -A.
That yellow and green right there.
Q.
Okay. Well, why don't you come down and show
us where that boundary road is, where you trail the
cattle. Glade -MR. PETERSEN: I hope the Court -- Can you
see that, Judge? Do you want to just kind of sit up so
the Judge can see it?
THE COURT: I know where Glade is at.
THE WITNESS: Glade, there's fence right here
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between the cows and the sheep. Go through that gate. I
go down along here and this is how I come to Thorton and
this is how I come here. I come along, come right along
here and I come through this gate right here to the Glade
(INAUDIBLE) right down the road like that to Strawberry.
So I come right along here all the time.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) So your trail -- Is this
-- Are these cattle you're moving along like this?
A.
Right here we come into Parker. There's one
cow trail that goes like this, goes through this forest
trail. And then Glade (INAUDIBLE). Just come along that
trail and come up to Cummings and hit the fence.
Cummings being right here. See that big canyon? Then
you come along like this.
Q.
So when you trail the cattle off of there
you're not going back onto Ridge Line Road using that?
A.
No, I don't.
Q.
You're -A.
I drove cattle along that Ridge Line Road
before with, a couple times (INAUDIBLE). This is sheep
country and this is cow country.
Q.
Now, if someone wanted to go from the Big
Glade here over into the Thorton Hallow area or the
Parker Canyon, if they want to hike or whatever, could
they take those trails that you've been telling us about?
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A.
I can get down that road right there without
breaking into a jog, Thorton Hallow in probably 13
minutes.
Q.
That's on one of those trails?
A.
Yeah.
Q.
That's fine. You can return. Now, are you
familiar with what is known as Maple Canyon?
A.
We call it -- I call it Maple Creek, but I
know where you're talking about.
Q.
Okay. And could you describe that road? Is
it passable by a car?
A.
There's nobody -- We're not driving -- My
(INAUDIBLE) not driving it and I don't think they're
sneaking in on it. They are on an ATV a little bit.
It's not passable by a vehicle though.
Q.
Since your recollection of the early 70's has
that road or do you know of anybody that's been using
that road? Has it been passable?
A.
Yeah, (INAUDIBLE) Cat down it in '78, washed
out in '83.
Q.
And is that a common occurrence, it will wash
out?
A.
Well, I've not drove it since 1982. So
whether it's washing out or not from '82 -- I mean,
that's the year it washed out is '83. They just took the
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Cat down in '78 to make it passable. In '77, that's when
we run the Cat down in '78.
Q.
Washing out is not an uncommon occurrence
there in that Maple Canyon Road then?
A.
No, even the one we travel down below has got
a big rut in it right now that we've spent a lot of money
on.
Q.
Now, are you aware of -- Have you ever,
over the years, given permission to people to use your
roads up there and to hunt on your property?
A.
Yes.
Q.
How often have you ever done that?
A.
Well, most people I meet up there and I know
I give permission, people that know me. Until here at
the last when they made it a hunting unit and during the
hunting season I've explained it as this, if you rent
your house out I can't let you stay in it any more, pard.
I can't tell you you can go on there during the hunting
season. And that's probably been since '94.
Q.
Now, have -- Do you recall people, names of
people that you've given permission to use the roads and
to hunt in that area?
A.
I recall some, but you have a document -- I
sold trespass permits too. And you have a exhibit with
them names on it.
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Q.
Okay.
A.
Be the best recollection with dates.
Q.
Do you have a -- Do you recall the
testimony of a gentlemen the other day who said that he
went up there and without permission?
A.
Yes, I do.
Q.
And do you recall ever giving permission to
he or children or someone in that family to hunt there?
A.
First time I met him. Like I say, if I know
them and they ask.
Q.
Mr. Okelberry, let me show you what's been
marked as Defendant's Exhibit's 23 and 24 and ask you if
you can identify those?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Does your handwriting appear on those?
A.
Both of them. Mostly this. This is me.
Q.
And when you say this, which one is that?
A.
24.
Q.
What is Exhibit 24?
A.
It's a paper I wrote 12/28/91. I give them
(INAUDIBLE). This the people that bought the trespass
permits.
Q.
And what did they pay for those trespass
permits?
A.
$50.
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Q.
What year was that?
A.
It would be been the season of '91.
Q.
So that -- Does that constitute a list of
names of people that paid you to go up there, use the
roads and use your property to hunt?
A.
Yes.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we'd offer Exhibit
24.
THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. SWEAT: No objection, your Honor.
THE COURT: It's received.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 24
was received into evidence.)
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Tell us what Exhibit 23
is.
A.
Exhibit 23 is a, it's dated here for 1992.
And the price went up here to a $100 for people that
bought this year and hadn't bought any previously, is
what this is sayin. And then this list of people over
here is people that had bought before. It's not my
writing. It's given to me by the Gardners. And I don't
know who wrote it.
Q.
Is your name -- We're talking about Exhibit
23.
A.
Yes.
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Q.
Does your handwriting appear -A.
Right here.
Q.
When you say right there, you're talking
about the right, upper right hand corner?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And do you know whose, whose handwriting the
rest of that is in?
A.
I know who gave me the paper. I don't know
who did the writing.
Q.
Who gave you the paper?
A.
Jane Gardner.
Q.
And what is that again now? Does that show a
list of -A.
It's a list of people that she sold permits
to.
Q.
Did you authorize her to do that?
A.
Yes.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor -THE WITNESS: You see there, that's times 50
and that's times (INAUDIBLE).
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we'd offer Exhibit
No. 23.
THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. SWEAT: No objection, your Honor.
THE COURT: It's received.
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(Defendant's Exhibit No. 23
was received into evidence.)
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Was it after those years
that hunting unit was formed and you went that direction
with the hunting unit?
A.
Yes. Well, they -- That was a hunting -Q.
Okay. That -A.
But it became a different hunting.
Q.
Are you familiar with an organization called
United Sportsman?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And were you ever associated with them in
anyway?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And for what purpose?
A.
They leased the ground to hunt on
exclusively.
Q.
Do you remember the period of time when that
happened?
A.
It's either '89 or '90. I should of found
out.
Q.
Did they post any signs up there?
A.
Yes, they posted that -- They posted
designated camping areas on the interior and they really
posted, metal signs. How -- Who they was. Pretty big
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sign.
Q.
I'm going back -A.
(INAUDIBLE).
Q.
Okay. Going back in your recollections into
the 1970. Did you ever see people using the Ridge Line
Road that were not up there on some sort of business or
had some reason to be up there?
A.
In 1970?
Q.
In the 1970's?
A.
No, when I was there in '73 camped at Bear
Wallow there was one person that come by there, Boyce
Young.
Q.
Was he there by permission do you know?
A.
I met him and we walked and he had my okay to
be there.
Q.
Other than that are you aware of any other
people that was up there in the 70's?
A.
I know there was other people, but I don't
-- I'm trying to think who I would of met there in the
70's. I seen him only when I was herding sheep there.
Q.
Okay. In the 1980's were any of these roads
being used by the public that you're aware of?
A.
Well, there was people that we know that use
them roads. It was all right with us if they used them
roads.
40
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Did you grant permission to people to use the

roads?
A.
I never refused permission to anyone to use
them roads that asked me that I knew up there. There's
only one guy that I caught killing elk on there and I
didn't know him. He wasn't suppose to be in there. And
I made him buy one of them trespass permits or -- And
he did it.
Q.
Did he -- In the 1990's, now we're in this
period of time when you had, you authorized people and
you would sell permits to go up there and so forth and
you had hunting units; is that correct?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Now, were there ever occasions when there
were people up there that you asked to leave?
A.
I don't think -- I can't think -- you
know, that -- I tried turning the hunting over to this
like, Shane and Bruce so I don't have to go up there and
fight with people. And plus I, you know, taken care of
the sheep and cattle. I -- I'm not the one that sits
at the gate and turn -- A lot of people keep testimony
that they were turned away. I would of frankly got them
to buy a permit and worked with them, you know. I don't
think of anybody I've kicked off.
Q.
How much time would you spend in an average
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year up there?
A.
Well, we're there in the spring. And like in
the 70's when I'm herding sheep I'm there every day.
Since then it's more of a weekly thing. And when we're
movin the cattle through there, we're moving the cattle
through there. I don't know how many. Sometimes it's a
lot and sometimes it's not very much. But I know that's
not the answer to your question.
Q.
Well, you'd go up in the spring of the year,
approximately when is that?
A.
Oh, it's -- It's the end of May, part of
May when we go up in there.
Q.
And you participate in that?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Were you there when you'd bring the cattle
back off the forest?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Would you be up there during the summer
months on your property in connection with your sheep
operation?
A.
In connection with trying to keep the cows
out of there.
Q.
But that would bring you up there between -A.
Yes.
Q.
-- the spring and the summer months?
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A.
You bet. I got to be there at least every
two weeks.
Q.
Now, the times that you're -- Based upon
your recollection and experience up there, do you have an
opinion whether those road have been open to the public
and have been used continually during these summer
months?
A.
Not -- Not -- In my time we haven't
opened them. We closed the gates and tried to put a
little control on it.
Q.
Okay. And some of those gates been locked
over periods of time?
A.
Yes.
MR. PETERSEN: That's all.
THE COURT: Mr. Sweat, cross?
MR. SWEAT: Thank you, your Honor.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. SWEAT:
Q.
I understand where you said you were born in
1962; is that right?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And you were up there in 1972 with -A.
I was there in '72. I started herding sheep
in '73.
Q.
And you'd be how old at that time?
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A.
11.
Q.
Herding it by yourself?
A.
I was by myself. There's a tree up there
that says I love you (INAUDIBLE). I was a lonely boy.
Q.
Mr. Okelberry asked you if you ever refused
people permission. You said you never refused. Did
people always asked permission to use the roads?
A.
People would come in there, can we be in
here? And like I said, pre to when it was a hunting unit
I'd give them permission to camp in there, and stay in
there, and cut wood in there, and build a fire in there
(INAUDIBLE) other place.
Q.
So really the permission they were asking for
was to use the property not the road?
A.
How do you get in and out without use the
road? They were asking to be on the grounds.
Q.
To be on your ground; is that correct?
A.
That's right. And -- That's right. There
was mostly -- There was a small group of people that
camped there.
Q.
Again that wasn't driving the road, that was
camping on your ground; is that correct?
A.
Well, they drove through there, but there are
certain roads they asked if they could use too, certain
ones that I didn't want them to too. I told them not to
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use certain roads too, like that Circle Springs Road.
They've made some new roads there that I didn't want. So
we definitely discussed roads.
Q.
Is the Circle Spring Road the new road?
A.
I could show you on the map.
Q.
No, the one designated as Circle Springs, is
that the new road?
A.
No, that's not the new road. That's the one
that they need to stay on if you go in there.
Q.
You indicated that someone killed an elk and
you made them buy a trespass permit?
A.
That's the one I was selling them, yes.
Q.
What year was that?
A.
It would be '91 or '92.
Q.
You were up there in '72?
A.
Staying in '73. '72 is when we was still
running (INAUDIBLE). I was up there then, but not
living.
Q.
When did you first start to take more of an
active role in dealing with the property?
A.
Well -- Well, what's -- What do you mean
dealing with the property? I guess '73 is when we
started dealing with every inch of the property.
Q.
Do you recall when you started taking a hand
in posting the property, putting signs up saying no
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trespassing on the property?
A.
Yes, after United Sportsman is when I started
taking a bigger hand in there.
Q.
When was that?
A.
Well, the United Sportsman was either '89 and
'90.
Q.
What made you take a bigger hand in starting
to post the property?
A.
United Sportsman is the ones on police
testimony is talking about six yards at the gate.
There's never been anything like that before. And they
posted the ground and they had interior no camping signs.
Thems the ones he's talking about they shot. They took a
shoot and blast -- You can still see the Aspen trees
where they blasted them, but they destroyed -- United
Sportsman's signs lasted one year and they refused to
come back. Said they'd never been in such a hard place
to handle.
Q.
That was in 1990; right?
A.
I believe so. And so then I was left -Mori said, "You, you post the (INAUDIBLE)".
Q.
So that was in 1990?
A.
That's when I came more active role in it.
Q.
Did you personally put up any no trespassing
signs in 1970's?
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A.
In 70's, no.
Q.
In the 1980's?
A.
The 80's, yes.
Q.
Late 1980's?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Not the early 1980's?
A.
No, not yet.
Q.
Did you ever personally put a lock on any of
the gates that give access to these roads?
A.
(INAUDIBLE) interior one.
Q.
Any of the boundary gates did you put a lock
on?
A.
I wasn't the one that put the locks on, that
was help. The interior one I took and put on. They
ripped the whole brace down. I put it to keep our sheep
separate from Lee's. I was tired of it. And that brace
got all ripped out the same year. And I didn't lock it
again. Just, please close the gate. So I -Q.
And this was an interior gate; is that
correct?
A.
Yes, that's the gate I fixed. Metal fence we
call it. It would be on the Ridge Line Road.
Q.
When you were 11 did anybody ask you
permission to use the roads up there?
A.
No. I only seen that one guy. He told me
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how he knew everybody in my family.
Q.
Were you patrolling the roads when you were
up there in the 70's?
A.
No, I was herding sheep.
Q.
When did you buy your Uncle Lee out?
A.
I think '91. Better not -- I said think.
Q.
Did he still own property up there the first
year that United Sportsman came in?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
So that would of been the year before?
A.
I think he -- We also had -- You'll see
on them papers, them trespass permits, we had to divide
that with him. So he was there after. I think only one
year after.
Q.
In the 80's were you -- How old would you
have been?
A.
I graduated from high school in 1980, if that
helps you.
Q.
And in the 80's you worked up there every
summer?
A.
I've never (INAUDIBLE) with my life? Maybe
that's good or bad, but I've always had a job right here.
Q.
Do you have other areas in the state that you
keep sheep or cattle?
A.
Yes.
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Q.
Have you ever worked in any of those areas?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Did you ever herd sheep in any of those areas
during the 70's or the 80's?
A.
70's we was pretty condensed there with
sheep.
Q.
Cattle -A.
Question again?
Q.
During the 70's or 80's did you ever herd
cattle or sheep in any other areas of the state then -A.
Yes.
Q.
So it would be fair to say that you weren't
always in this area?
A.
No, as I said, once we move out of there with
the sheep, when I wasn't herding them (INAUDIBLE) people
that maybe sometimes only once in two weeks.
Q.
Do you have more than one herd of sheep?
A.
When we first started in there we put one
herd of sheep in there in spring. And Lee put one herd
of sheep in there in the spring. And we came back with
two in the fall. And Lee came back with two in the fall.
By the time we bought Lee out we was having one herd on
the spring on the whole thing. And we was coming back in
the fall with one herd. And that's why we started the
hunting thing because of the elk hogging up, taking our
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feed. We'd go to the fish and game and complain and they
said hey, you can market it. And that's when a lot of
the trouble started right there too.
Q.
Prior to that time there wasn't a lot of
trouble?
A.
No, cause the sheep was there and we had
feed. And we didn't have a lot of trouble.
Q.
Is your entire sheep herd kept in that one
herd or do you have other herds in other parts of the
state?
A.
Our entire sheep herd is on the International
Forest, but other parts of the state, yes.
Q.
So sometimes when you'd have a herd of sheep
here would you have another herd of sheep some where else
in the state?
A.
Well, I told you at first Ray would have two
herds and we had a total of four, so it would behalf.
Now, the last two years I haven't put the sheep on it.
In the fall I have, but not the spring.
Q.
My question was during the 1970 -- Now, you
just said you had four herds of sheep at that time; is
that correct?
A.
In the 70's.
Q.
So two herds may have been here, but two
herds may have been some where else?
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A.
Two herds would come from Juab County to
Strawberry, yeah.
Q.
So you would maybe spend sometime during
those summers up with those other herds; is that true?
A.
If I was up there herding I was there every
day. And when I wasn't -- I herd in Juab County too.
In '77 I was in Juab County. That's the only two years I
can give you specifically where I was.
Q.
So the 70's and 80's you weren't always
herding this herd, you might been herding another herd at
other times; is that true?
A.
In the 80's?
Q.
In the 70's or 80's?
A.
In the 80's I mostly over seen the herders.
So I'd be there on a weekly basis just to check on
whoever was there in the 80's.
Q.
I think I already asked you. You indicated
that you never personally put up any no trespassing signs
until the late 80's early 90's?
A.
That's correct.
MR. SWEAT: That's all I have, your Honor.
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Petersen?
MR. PETERSEN: Yeah, just briefly.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETERSEN:
51

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q.
Mr. Okelberry, when you come back in the fall
would you not have all your sheep together and bring them
into that area?
A.
When we come back in the fall we come off the
forest. So we're taking on the feed we'd bring as many,
what sheep we had and bring into that area, that private
area there, yes.
Q.
Sure. So all your sheep came back into that
area in the fall?
A.
No, not all of our sheep.
Q.
Where -- Did you have sheep some where
else?
A.
On the other side of the valley.
Q.
Okay.
A.
What year you on now?
Q.
Well, I'm just talking generally speaking.
A.
Well, in the 70's we wasn't on the other side
of the valley. We was condensed right there.
Q.
Okay. So all your sheep -A.
In the 80's we was on the other side of the
valley (INAUDIBLE). Well, from '77 on we was on the
other side of the valley.
Q.
Now, when you'd come back in the fall would
that require you to be in that area?
A.
Yes.
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Q.
And you were in that area in the spring, were
you not?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And you were in that area during the summer
months as well cause you had cattle up there?
A.
Since '75 we had cattle up there. '74
(INAUDIBLE).
Q.
You indicated that you're aware that locks
were put on gates?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And I -- I gather that the locks on the
exterior were off of your property. You had employees
put those locks on, did you? Interior locks you put on?
A.
I think Ray put the first locks on. Then
when you start renting out to hunting people then they
start putting locks on.
Q.
Very good. Thank you.
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Sweat?
MR. SWEAT: Just briefly, your Honor.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. SWEAT:
Q.
During the time that you were up there in the
70's and 80's did you ever see somebody driving down one
of those roads that you didn't intercept or didn't catch
and just saw them driving on through?
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A.
Did I see anybody I didn't know?
Q.
Yeah, did you ever see a vehicle that you
just saw drive down one of those roads?
A.
The people that's testified in here that they
was driving down them road without permission, I didn't
know them.
Q.
Did -- I'm saying did you ever see a
vehicle driving down those roads that you did not
intercept?
A.
Not to my recollection. I talked to people
that I seen on the road.
Q.
You were always able to talk to every one?
A.
Usually on a horse and either I might be in
-- Yeah, usually so.
Q.
So that would be -A.
I kind of think (INAUDIBLE). I've seen
people I know drive down them roads I didn't stop.
Q.
When, to your recollections, was the first
gates placed or the first locks placed on any of the
boundary gates?
A.
To my recollection. To my recollection the
80's.
MR. SWEAT: No further questions, your Honor.
MR. PETERSEN: I have nothing further, your
Honor.
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THE
MR.
MR.
MR.
THE

COURT: You may step down. Thank you.
PETERSEN: Call Joseph Ford.
SWEAT: Who you calling?
PETERSEN: Joseph Ford.
COURT: What's the last name, Mr.

Petersen?
MR. PETERSEN: Ford.
THE COURT: Ford?
MR. PETERSEN: Yeah.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Ford, come to the
witness stand. Mr. Sweat, did you have -MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, I'm going to object
to Mr. Ford. Mr. Petersen did notify me that he did want
to use him, but he notified me on Friday. It wasn't on
his witness designation list.
MR. PETERSEN: That's true, your Honor, but
the time for designated witnesses for both parties had
come and gone. And they've used witnesses that were not
at the designated time. And they let us know and we have
not objected to it.
THE COURT: Well, what are you going to use
him for?
MR. TENNEY: Just basic background in terms
of the use of the roads for the 1940's and 50's. Mr.
Ford is related to the Ford family. They own the
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property (INAUDIBLE).
THE COURT: Yeah, is it going to be
repetitive of other testimony we've had?
MR. PETERSEN: No.
MR. TENNEY: No, no.
THE COURT: You feel you're prejudice, Mr.
Sweat, because you weren't aware of -- Have you done
any further investigation?
MR. SWEAT: I will admit I probably would not
have taken his deposition, your Honor.
THE COURT: Have you used -- Well, we have
-- The reason we have cut off dates for the designation
of witnesses is to let other people prepare for that. I
-- If you don't -- If he wasn't designated previously
usually I don't permit people to call witnesses if they
haven't been designated. So -MR. SWEAT: Okay.
MR. PETERSEN: (INAUDIBLE) excuse you, Mr.
Ford. Thank you.
THE COURT: You're excused, Mr. Ford.
MR. PETERSEN: Does the Court want to take
the mid morning break at this time, your Honor?
THE COURT: If you think it would be helpful.
MR. PETERSEN: I think it would be.
THE COURT: Okay. We'll take -56
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MR. PETERSEN: (INAUDIBLE).
THE COURT: We'll be in recess until, oh,
let's make it 10:30 then.
(A brief recess was taken.)
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Petersen, you may call
your next witness.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, to revisit the
issue of Mr. Ford. He would be in the nature of a
rebuttal witness.
THE COURT: Rebuttal -- You can't have -You can't call a rebuttal witness.
MR. PETERSEN: Well, to rebut the testimony
that we've heard from the plaintiff.
THE COURT: What particular witness is he
going to rebut?
MR. PETERSEN: Well, he's going to rebut
evidence that would supposedly show that there were roads
up there in the 40's and that they were being used and
what have you.
THE COURT: Who would testify to that?
(INAUDIBLE) members in the 50's.
MR. PETERSEN: I think it was testimony from
Mr. Besendorfer, your Honor, to that effect.
THE COURT: Well, my notes says Mr.
Besendorfer -- I don't see him talking anything about
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the 40's.
MR. PETERSEN: Well, if we're not concerned
about the 40's then that's fine, your Honor, then we
won't need him.
THE COURT: He said his dad acquired an
interest in the West Daniels Land property in the 50's.
He acquired it from his father, his interest. So he's
observed people -- He, himself, has used the property
in the 50's, the 60's, the 70's, and the 80's.
MR. PETERSEN: Okay. Well if we're not
concerned about the 40's then we don't need him. We'll
call Ray Okelberry, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Okelberry, come
forward and take the witness stand and be sworn.
MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, if I may interrupt.
I do think that Mr. Besendorfer did talk about Thorton
Hallow Road in the 1940's, is my recollection.
THE COURT: Well, I have him testifying that
he first used the Thorton Hallow Road when he was 12.
MR. SWEAT: I don't know the math on that,
your Honor.
THE COURT: And so he was born in -MR. SWEAT: But I do think he said he walked
down with the scout troop.
THE COURT: Yeah, when he was 12.
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MR. SWEAT:
THE COURT:

That's correct.
But he didn't drive it when he

was 12.
MR. SWEAT: He did not.
THE COURT: We'll think about it.
MR. PETERSEN: All right.
THE COURT: Be sworn, Mr. Okelberry.
CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the
testimony you shall give in the matter now before this
Court shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Have a seat.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETERSEN:
Q.
Would you state your name, please?
A.
My name is Ray Okelberry and I live in
Goshen, Utah.
Q.
And you're one of the defendants in this
action, are you not?
A.
Yes.
Q.
You're one of the owners of the property and
roads in question, are you not?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And when did you acquire this property?
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A.
We purchased in March, March 23rd of 1957.
Q.
Let me show you, Mr. Okelberry, what's been
marked as Defendant's Exhibit No. 26 and ask you if you
can identify this?
A.
Yes, I do identify it.
Q.
Is that the agreement by which you purchased
the property?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And it was purchased from a Jay Reed Tough
and a Barbra L. Tough?
A.
That's right.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we'd offer Exhibit
26.
THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. SWEAT: No objection.
THE COURT: It's received.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 26
was received into evidence.)
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Mr. Okelberry, I ask you
if you can identify what's been marked as Defendant's
Exhibit 25?
A.
This seems to be the anchorage and
description of the property.
Q.
Is that the deed by where you, by which you
obtained -60
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A.
Well, it says warranty deed. So that's it.
Q.
And this deed is dated the 15th day of
February, 1962, is it not?
A.
Yes, that's -MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we'd offer
Exhibit, Defendant's Exhibit 25.
MR. SWEAT: No objection.
THE COURT: It's received.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 25
was received into evidence.)
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) When you first purchased
this property, Mr. Okelberry, what was it used for?
A.
My father, my brother, our family, we were in
the sheep business. We was out there in Juab County and
it got too hot and dry up there. And we had the
opportunity it buy some property a little higher
elevation. So that's why we purchased the property, so
the sheep would do better. And we also, at that time,
bought permits that joined onto this, the forest permits
for the sheep. And that's how we got it. It was a move
to expand the operation and the sheep would do better.
Q.
Now, it was purchased, was it not, with your
brother, Lee, and your father and yourself?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And you've subsequently, you and your boys
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have purchased their interest out, have you not?
A.
Lee and I acquired dad's interest out of
there, dad and mother's. And since that time Lee sold
-- He had half interest. And my two sons, Brian and
Eric, we purchased Lee's half interest out of there. And
then later on we bought Lee's sheep, but we bought his
property first.
Q.
Now, what is your date of birth?
A.
April the 14th, 1938.
Q.
And you purchased this in 1957. So if my
math is right, would that make you about 19 years old?
A.
19 years old.
Q.
Do you have a recollection of going on the
property in 1957?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Would you describe -- Well, first of all,
was there a fence separating your property on the east
side from the Forest Service property.
A.
Yes, the property is pretty well fenced.
Q.
Were there gates as you came off the Forest
Service property onto your property?
A.
Yes, we joined the cattle and cattle had been
there forever. And, of course, our side was sheep and
their side was cattle. So they had to have a fence.
There was a good fence. And there were gates on all of
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them. Gates on all of the fences and interior fences and
cross fences to keep -Q.
On the -- On the south side of your
property was there a fence between you and the Forest
Service property?
A.
Yes. The end of '57 there was a fence there.
Q.
Was there a gate separating your property and
the -A.
Yes, going into Circle there was a gate
there.
Q.
Likewise, on the north end of your property,
separating you from private property and what have you?
A.
Yes, yes.
Q.
Were there gates on those as well?
A.
Yeah, they were critical gates, the exterior
gates.
Q.
Now, you're familiar with what has been
called the Ridge Line Road during the course of this
trial, were you not?
A.
Yes.
Q.
What was the condition of that in 1957?
A.
Basically they were trails. That's how we
termed it. There's a vast difference in the property.
We've got property that goes down and joins Wallsberg on
the west side.
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Q.
Well, now, we're just talking about the Ridge
Line Road.
A.
Okay. Well, I never did hear it called the
Ridge Line Road till I got a map from these, from the
county. There was just the top -- White Pole Road,
that's all -- I never have heard Ridge Line Road in my
life.
Q.
Now, is it your memory that in 1957 that this
was more or less a trail then?
A.
They were trails. In places that's all they
were.
Q.
No, just the Ridge Line Road, that's all
we're talking about. Was the Ridge Line Road a trail?
A.
It was a trail and an improved trail. You
could drive a vehicle on it, a four-wheel drive vehicle.
Q.
Okay. Was it rocky?
A.
It was definitely rocky.
Q.
Were there trees that would fall down and
cover the road?
A.
Trees were a problem, yes.
Q.
Did you have to remove trees from off the
road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Now, how far did the Ridge Line Road go?
A.
The Ridge Line Road, when we want in there in
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1957 it went to White Pole pass, and that's the head of
the Parker Canyon Road. They was basically a trail down
there. And it hadn't been too many years prior that they
first built that road.
Q.
Okay. Was it after that period of time then
that what is called the Ridge Line Road was built further
onto the north?
A.
I -- It -- When the fish and game built
them or people started using, the fish and game come up
there to fence the boundary line between Okelberry's
property and the fish and game property and West Daniels'
property. And they built those roads in there in the
70's. And after they got them built they went up there
and tried to close them. And the people, they -Q.
Well, okay. That's okay. They're built in
the 70's. Now, in the 50's when you were up there, on
the Ridge Line Road, did you ever see any people that
didn't have business up there using that road?
A.
The first year we was in there my father, he
had one of them Madison Camps and the roads through our
property were better than when you got over -Q.
No, no, no. Just answer the question, Mr.
Okelberry. Did you ever see anybody use -A.
I never did. We camped there at White Pole
pass. And we camped there for a month. And I don't
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recall seeing anything. My father, myself, and finally
dad left and I was there.
ME. SWEAT: When was that?
MR. PETERSEN: This was in 1957.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Now, for the rest of the
50's did you see people using that road?
A.
I saw -- I saw -- The only people I
remember of -- We was in there in the spring and the
West Daniels Land Association had people in there that
came up there with their cattle. And I can't tell you
exactly when I first met them, but they were up in there
checking their cattle. And they rode up there on horses.
They didn't come down Ridge Line Road. They had ridden
up from Boomer or they had ridden up from Parker Canyon
off the highway.
And I think a favorite that Reed Edwards
herded the cattle a lot. I always saw a truck parked
there at Thorton Hallow. And it was easier to ride a
horse up there. And I'm sure I met him. And before that
I met Floyd Boner. Floyd Boner was there in '57. He was
the president of the Cattle Association. But he'd come
in there on a horse.
Q.
Okay. As far as the 60's are concerned, did
you see anybody driving up, using that Ridge Line Road,
that didn't have business up in that area?
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A.
It was primarily business. And Duke Johnson,
and then this was a Lindon Maxfield that I see bring
trucks. And they came through our property. And they
went down close to White Pole to take care of those
cattle. And that's about all I can remember. And then I
did see Dee Sabey. I was up there herding the sheep.
And Dee Sabey, and I don't know if, it was probably '57.
And I think him and his wife came up there. And it was
right around, pretty close to the Glade, but it was on
our property.
And he came there. And he'd been -- He'd
been herding the sheep for the people that owned it
before us. And he, you know, he was real friendly and
real nice. And I was (INAUDIBLE) sheep. But he's the
only one I remember, him and the cow people. In the 60's
and -Q.
When would you go up? And what time of year
would you go?
A.
Well, it was -- Exactly. We never did land
in there till -- The first year we went in there about
the 16th of June. And we're not talking about up on the
high part. We're talking about this piece of ground,
lower elevation. We unloaded down there on the 16th of
June. And to get into that property we had to notify
June Tough to come up and open the gate down there by
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PeeTrees.

What's PeeTree's now?
There was a wire gate there about 4 feet
high, and oh, come in 14 feet wide. And it was all
bordered with wood and had a chain around there. And we
got there with -- We got there to go through there with
our sheep and we couldn't get through. So June came over
and opened that gate and took us up. And right above it
there's a tin shed there. And he had a -- He'd done
some work up there on that bench trying to clean the
sagebrush off. And he had a Cat in that old tin shed.
And he also had it locked. So the gate was locked there.
That was my first encounter with that property.
And then we went from there -- We just -We don't drive the sheep, we just let them feed. And
they dispersed up over onto the top of that area up
there. So it would be -- It was getting around pretty
close time to go onto the forest the 1st of July that
year. But since that time we always try to have sheep in
there around May 1, May 5. And that's the lower
elevation.
And then we never could pull the camps up on
top. We went up on the top. I remember we was up there
on the 13th of June one year, right there by the Glade.
And it was so wet we got stuck. So we couldn't get in
there. But generally you can get in there by the 10th.
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It seems like the last few years, 20 years it's got
drier. But you can't -- The north side doesn't even
stay -- The north side there's some pine trees. And so
it's wet. And I've been stuck in a lot of places along
the Ridge Line Road. And I mean, you had to sleep in the
truck overnight.
Q.
Okay. Mr. Okelberry, that's okay. Generally
speaking then you'd go up there sometime in May; is that
correct?
A.
On the lower end and the higher country in
June.
Q.
And then you'd move your cattle or sheep at
that time to higher ground; would that be correct?
A.
Well, approximately the 1st of July we'd -The permits that was on Forest Service -- We were
allowed to go on the Forest Service. Some years it was a
little drier. And they might let you on a day or two
earlier. But maybe they'd hold you off till the 6th of
July.
Q.
Okay. Now, as to your private ground, when
would you have your sheep on your private ground?
A.
May and June.
Q.
Did you move your sheep off your private
ground onto the Forest Service ground then?
A.
Yes.
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Q.

And then would you bring the sheep back

again?
A.
Yes, in the fall or the last day of September
or the first day of October. Right around the 1st of
October.
Q.
Now, that time from July or when ever you
moved them off onto the Forest Service ground until you
brought them back, would you still be on your property up
there, for any reason?
A.
Yes, the two permits that we purchased there,
the Tough permits, was fairly close to it. So, you know,
we always had straggler sheep. And then you had the
fences. And the wind would blow and the trees would fall
down on the fences, and you had to keep them up to keep
the cows out. And we had ponds of water there that we
were trying to conserve till fall. So we was in there
quite often, you know, just to check to see for
trespassing cattle and -Q.
Okay. Now, in the 70's did you see people
using the Ridge Line Road that didn't have business up
there in the 70's?
A.
Well, I don't think so too much, but as time
passed more people did come. And then they introduced
those elk in there in about -- They introduced them in
'62 or '63. And we never had a problem up to that point.
70
People -- The local people came in to hunt deer. And
most -- The Thompsons was there and they always like to
hunt on the Glade. Taylors was there. They like to hunt
Maple Creek.
Q.
Did those people ever ask permission for you
to -A.
Thompson's never missed a year that they
didn't get permission and neither did Taylors.
Q.
How did it go in the 80's?
A.
Well, I don't -- The 80's, there was
getting more elk. They put -- They introduced 16 elk
down there on that Wallsberg property that they bought
from (INAUDIBLE). Introduced 16 and I don't know how
many more thereafter, but the herd grew. Now it's 800 a
head. And as the herd grew, you know, the anxiety grew
in Wallsberg and Heber and all over.
Q.
Well, just -A.
My God, just terrible.
Q.
Okay. Just answer the questions here, Mr.
Okelberry. Are you familiar with what is known as the
Thorton Canyon Road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Okay. What was the condition of the Thorton
Canyon Road in 1957 when you bought your property?
A.
In 1957 we had two herds of sheep in there.
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And they somewhat got mixed. There was division fences
in there and we -- There was an old corral down, made
out of Aspen in Thorton Hallow. And we had to go down to
that corral. And we had to rebuild the corral somewhat.
And we had to clear the road out to get down there. And
that was my first experience down in there. And then I
think my brother, in '57, took the Caterpillar down in
there and built the pond in Thorton Hallow.
Q.
Okay. Well, prior to your brother building,
working on that road, was it passable by a vehicle?
A.
Well, I'd say it was. It was passable to the
forest fence and -- The forest fence was there. And
the road went through the forest fence, down to an old
trail down there at Thorton Hallow.
Q.
What was the condition of the road?
A.
It was just an improved trail.
Q.
You call it more of a trail than a road?
A.
Yeah, you just get on a trail, you know.
It's already got the two wheels. And all you got to do
is clear the other side up to go down with the other two
wheels.
Q.
Okay. Was it rocky?
A.
It was rocky.
Q.
Was this an area where trees would fall over
onto it?
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A.
There was a big problem there. There was
some big trees there.
Q.
How would you remove those trees back in the
50's and 60's?
A.
Well, back that time you was 19 years old, 20
and you had an ax. We had them big six foot, where one
guy got on one side and one guy got on the other side,
but that had to be two. A lot of times you was there
alone, so you just took an ax. And, you know, an ax
broke you could go get something to put it in. So it was
a very reliable tool.
Q.
Now, was there a gate separating your
property from the Forest Service property on that Thorton
Hallow Road?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Going over to the Parker Canyon Road, are you
familiar with that one?
A.
Yes, I was familiar with it.
Q.
How would you describe that when you
purchased this property in 1957?
A.
Well, it was almost impossible to get there.
I told you in '57 my father and I went down there. And
there was -- Before you get to White Pole pass there's
a steep place along that side, that thick Aspens, and
it's very sidely. So we worked on that road and we -73
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It was terrible to get down in there. And it
was worse to get out, and that's when it was dry. And if
it was dry you couldn't get out, or if it was wet you
couldn't get out. But it was hard to get down in. And
it's still hard today to get down there.
Q.
Was Parker Canyon, is that an area where you
get covered over with trees?
A.
Yes, there's trees there.
Q.
And would you have to remove those trees?
A.
Right, you had to remove them.
Q.
Now, the trees that you would remove, was it
on other times then when you came up there in the May,
June time frame? Would there be other times in the year
when you would have to remove the trees?
A.
The only time you'd have to -- After it was
once cleared out you was all right, unless you got, you
know, a fast moving front in there and a wind storm or
something like that. Sometimes late in the spring it
would snow. And, you know, with full leaves it get, snow
gets on and that's a lot of trees down. I seen that two
or three times.
Q.
Now, are you familiar with what is known as
the Circle Springs?
A.
I know the Circle Springs.
Q.
When you purchased the property there was
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there a gate separating your property from the Forest
Service property?
A.
Yes, it was boundary fence along that fence,
all along there.
Q.
Would you describe that Circle Spring Road?
A.
Yes, where you come onto our property off of
the forest from the Glade. You come from the Glade, you
go onto our property, and it's pretty hard to get there.
I mean, there's some pines and twist and lots of rocks
and quite steep, but you can get there. You can navigate
there. And then you get down there about 200 yards
before our property and there's some mud holes in there.
I've been stuck in them, high centered. A lot of other
people -- Some of the other people have too.
Then you get to our property and it's nothing
but rocks over to where what we call Bear Wallow or the
Circle, or going -- The Bear Wallow comes -- There's
a pond there. We build -- Well, there was a pond that
Toughs built or I don't know who built it, but it was
there when we got there. It's very rough. I mean, it's
hard to even get there in a truck. I never did see a
car. And that's where we camped. And I personally built
that corral area, what I call the Bear Wallow.
And then from there on down it doesn't
improve. It just -- There's a little draw that goes
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down through there. And there's a lot of big rocks in
it. And then when you go through the V, it's -- In '57
we couldn't get clear to Circle. And we didn't -- So
we really didn't cut it out. We went about -- We got
in that V, and that's as far as I pulled the camp wagon.
And -- But there -We did work on that fence and had to put the
fence up. And we had the sheep along that fence. And
there was a gate there at Circle, but it was a dead end.
Circle goes out and it dead ends. Now, a lot of years
ago that funneled all the sheep off from this western
desert out here. They came up Provo Canyon, through
Wallsberg and up Circle Springs up there. That was a
trail for the sheep. And they went there and they
watered on Circle, the next day they'd be over on the
Glade. They'd come up through our property. And that's
where that -Q.
Now, is -- Is this Circle Spring Road, has
it changed much since 1957 to the present time?
A.
I think the Thompsons are probably going down
there to camp and -- Not every year they'd go down
there to camp, but I can't see much change in it.
Q.
Are Thompsons people that you gave permission
to cross your property?
A.
That's right. Thompsons was awfully good
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neighbors, very honorable people. And they had sheep in
there at that time. And they also trailed up that trail,
the old trail. They were the last people to own sheep in
Wallsberg there and use that trail. They trailed from
the mouth of Maple Canyon up Circle. They didn't go up
Maple, they went up Circle. And they brought their camp
wagon around through Main Canyon.
Q.
Now, in regards to all those roads up there,
the Circle Springs, the Ridge, Thorton, Parker, have they
changed much since 1957?
A.
Well, when we went there in 1957 there was a
big fire that came in there in the fall time. I don't
know if a deer hunter set it or what happened. It burned
approximately a third of that property we had up there.
And it did burn some sheep up. And so my brother had
that TD9 Caterpillar or the family had it. And, you
know, we was getting nervous.
The county wasn't doing too much, but they
did make an effort. But we -- We thought the whole
herd of sheep was going to burn up. Well, you know, I
was 19. I was pretty nervous about it. But anyway, my
brother brought that Caterpillar up so we could get up
Maple Creek. And he grade -- That's the first place he
did. He graded up Maple Creek and later he went up onto
the top.
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And what -- Mother nature put the fire out.
It was going towards Heber. And then it turned around
and came back and burnt down to the outskirts of
Wallsberg. And then it snowed or something.
Q.
Your brother testified that he used that TD9
tractor and made some improvements up there. Do you -A.
On them -- On them roads.
Q.
Do you recall that?
A.
That was the same time. That was the first
time we ever had a Caterpillar up there. But he had to
build the road. I'm not saying -- That was a horse
trail up Maple Creek. We went up Maple Creek in '57.
And in the fall we got in there. And I'm not saying that
somebody hadn't brought a vehicle down there prior to
that, but the canyon was washed out.
We couldn't get up there. The county
couldn't get up there. That's why we brought the
Caterpillar in. And I -- You know, he left that fall
and we had it in pretty good shape. But the following
winter of '57 was a very wet year. And I'm not so sure
that it didn't flood out the next year. But -- So we
basically used it for a horse trail.
But it was handy for us to go there. Well,
it was right up through the main, our property. And I
rode it up there two or three -- Well, not two or three
78

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

times, two times a day. And it's a very dry, hot, steep,
rough canyon. On a horse -Q.
Now, your brother testified that he made some
improvements with that TD9. Did you ever make any
improvements yourself?
A.
I think my brother had that TD9 up there
three times in '83. Well, he had that -- Later he came
in there with a D6 the last time my brother was there.
And then I had a Caterpillar there in 1983. And I
cleaned the road out. I was up on top and I cleaned the
ponds out. And I came down Maple Creek Canyon. I didn't
really do a lot, but I made it so, you know -I didn't ever backup, I don't think, to get
maybe one or two big rocks. And I came down and that
made it passable in a vehicle. And I don't know how long
it lasted. I don't know if it was one year or two or
three years before it flooded out again.
Q.
Now, on the Maple Canyon Road, what was the
condition in 1957 when you went up there?
A.
It was nothing more than a horse trail. I
spent a lot of time with an ax cutting out so I could get
the sheep up part of it. I couldn't -- You can't even
drive the sheep it's so thick. And I -- That was a
fast, suppose to be, to get to the top. And the horse up
-- You'd ride down through there. Oak is hard on you,
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you know. It wears out a pair of levis in about a week
up there. So that's why -- That's really one place
cowboys need chaps.
Q.
There was some testimony that that road has
washed out over the years; would that be correct?
A.
Quite frankly, but it's not that much. I
mean, I don't know how often, but we've had the
Caterpillar in there four times. And every time we tried
to improve the road.
Q.
Is it passable right now by an automobile?
A.
Not to my knowledge. I think -- I think a
four-wheeler -- They snuck through there last summer or
tried. And they've tried to go up and down there and
clean out the rocks. It's only four-wheelers.
Q.
Now, on these roads, trails in question, has
the county ever made any improvements at all?
A.
No, not one, not one penny.
Q.
Has the Forest Service ever made any
improvements?
A.
When we first went in there they was putting
the fences up.
Q.
I'm talking about roads.
A.
Not to my knowledge ever had to do anything
on the roads. And I can't get them to do anything.
Q.
Now, you indicate that over the years you've
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given permission to people, for people to use those
roads, have you?
A.
I definitely have. My father was a peaceful
guy. And in 1957 he gave permission to the -- The
first ones was the Youngs. They ride down there at the
base of the hill and they -- Those people up there
really, you know -- They heated their houses with wood.
And so it's a big problem for them. They wanted wood and
my father was very generous with that. He gave them
permission.
But he did not like people to come in there
and abuse what they thought was their authority to say,
"Hey, this is my ground. I'm going to go up there". He
was that kind of a guy. He would give you anything, but
you got permission. So I followed in his foot steps and
so did my brother.
Q.
Was this permission sometimes by oral and
sometimes written?
A.
Right.
Q.
Was it sometimes necessary for you to remove
people from being up there?
A.
At first it wasn't because you had Thompson
and a few -- And Jake Sabey, he always rode his horse
up there. And just the best people in the world. Just
the best people in the world. And you didn't have a
81

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

problem. If they saw your sheep they come and told you.
And if it was dinner time you brought them in and fed
them. And that, that's the way it was when we first we
went there. But it just kept getting worse and worse and
worse.
Q.
Okay. Let me show you what's been marked as
Exhibit 27 and ask you if you can identify that?
A.
Yeah, "This is private property, must leave
now or I will get the law for trespassing".
Q.
Is that a notice?
A.
That's a notice.
Q.
Is that a notice that you left for someone up
there?
A.
I put that on somebody's camp and they left.
They left. When I -- They left me the note. I saw the
people and, you know, but they left. I really didn't
kick them out.
Q.
This is marked as Exhibit 27.
MR. PETERSEN: We would offer 27, your Honor.
THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. SWEAT: Can I look at it one more time?
THE COURT: Does it have a date on it or
anything?
MR. SWEAT: Does it have a date on it?
MR. PETERSEN: I don't think it does.
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MR. SWEAT: Did you say he wrote that?
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Is this in your
handwriting, Mr. Okelberry?
A.
I -- It's in my handwriting and printing.
Q.
Do you know the date when, approximately when
you did this?
A.
No, I don't. It's quite an old piece of
paper. I don't know how long. It's been within the last
20 years.
THE COURT: Well, I'll receive it for -It could be demonstrative of his testimony that he's told
people to leave on occasion.
MR. SWEAT: No objection, your Honor.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 27
was received into evidence.)
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Let me show you what's
been marked as Defendant's Exhibit 28 and ask you if you
can identify that one?
A.
Yeah, that's -- I met Brian Gardner up
there one time. And he was camped next to our property.
And he was -- He liked the area. Let's see, I did date
this one, 8/31/2000. He was camped there next to the
property. And he was worried about getting through
there. I'll read it. And I wrote it on the back of the
check cause I met him in a truck up there.
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It says, "I, Ray Okelberry, give permission
to Brian Gardner and his folks to go through or around my
locked gates, and permission to use my roads to access my
property in Wasatch County. Ray Okelberry". I don't
know how much better you can be than that.
MR. PETERSEN: We'd offer Exhibit 28, your
Honor.
MR. SWEAT: No objection, your Honor
THE COURT: It's received.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 28
was received into evidence.)
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Mr. Okelberry, I show you
what's been marked as Defendant's Exhibit 29 and ask you
if you can identify that?
A.
Well, this is just another one. If somebody
wanted to get permission to go up there and we granted
them permission.
Q.
Is this a letter that you received?
A.
Right. Somebody -- They didn't even know
me. Let's see, "A client of mine and an acquaintance of
yours, Joann Huvard, suggested that I contact you about
hunting on your property. I have recently moved to the
Wasatch front where I work as a personal painter. Joann
comes in and works with me a couple times a week.
She was nice enough to ask your father if he
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knew of any ranchers in the area who may be willing to
allow hunters access to their land and he recognized you.
Finding a good place to hunt is very important to me.
And hunting on your property is a privilege. I wouldn't
take lightly -- I won't take it lightly. Thanks for
your help.
I am originally from Pinedale, Wyoming. And
while growing up there I learned many valuable lessons.
These include the importance of wildlife, the land, the
people who work the land, as well as the use of good
manners while a guest on another person's property.
If you wouldn't mind dropping me a line to
let me know what your feelings and policies are about
having hunters on your land I would greatly appreciate
it. If you are so inclined to let me hunt on your land I
-- I would like to come by sometime so you can conduct
an interview or just get to know me. I would also like
to see your ranch and hear what you have to say as well.
Feel free to call me" -- I don't know, telephone
numbers and addresses.
Q.
This was a letter dated August 11th, 1998?
A.
Whatever it says.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we'd offer Exhibit
29.
MR. SWEAT: No objection.
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THE COURT: It's received.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 29
was received into evidence.)
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Mr. Okelberry, I show you
what's been marked as Defendant's Exhibit 30. It appears
to be photocopies of checks. Did you sometimes charge
people to go on your property?
A.
Oh, let's see. Jack and Kathleen Thompson,
August the 28th, I can't, '90. And then here's Robby D.
Johnson and Anita Johnson, September the 7th, '94. And
they paid $50 for what they call a trespass permit.
Q.
And was that typical of what you would -A.
At this time we had Wayne and Jane Gardner
there. Approximately 1990 -- It started out from '96,
1996 up to -- Well, let me see. Approximately 1990 -We had Bruce Huvard in there and that's when we started
this permission deal. He like to hunt the other area.
We gave him permission. And that's when we first started
out at (INAUDIBLE) down on these permits. And then this
was about '91 that Brian, he mentioned that he let Jane
and Wayne Gardner in. And I don't know if that is one or
two years, it doesn't matter. But anyway they -- They
might have been there two or three years, but all
basically they did is let their friends in. And they -Q.
No, now, the question, Mr. Okelberry, does
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this Exhibit 30 represent people that paid you for going
on your roads and hunting on that property?
A.
That particular year there was probably 50,
50 people of those. And we gave out permits for two
years, it could have been three years.
Q.
Is this a representative of what you did?
A.
Right.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we'd offer Exhibit
30.
MR. SWEAT: No objection.
THE COURT: It's received.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 30
was received into evidence.)
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, I'd like to review
with the witness some pictures, if I may, and have the
witness mark on Exhibit 22 -THE COURT: Where the pictures are at?
MR. PETERSEN: Where they're at.
THE COURT: Okay. That's fine.
UNIDENTIFIED: Your Honor, (INAUDIBLE) 22 is
received.
THE COURT: Yeah -UNIDENTIFIED: (INAUDIBLE).
THE COURT: (INAUDIBLE) offered 22.
MR. PETERSEN: Oh, we'd offer 22.
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THE COURT:

That's the small portion of

Exhibit 2.
MR. SWEAT: Don, would you agree that it's no
different than (INAUDIBLE)?
MR. PETERSEN: Yeah.
MR. SWEAT: No objection, your Honor.
THE COURT: It's received.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 22
was received into evidence.)
MR. PETERSEN: (INAUDIBLE).
THE COURT: (INAUDIBLE).
THE WITNESS: I have, sir.
THE COURT: Okay.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Let me show you what's
marked -MR. SWEAT: If you don't mind showing me each
one. Can you tell me where they are? I guess he can
tell me. If you just want to do one at a time, that way
I can keep track of them.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Mr. Okelberry, let me show
you what's been marked as Defendant's Exhibit 19 and ask
you if you can identify that?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
And what is that?
A.
That's after you go off from the West Daniels
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land onto, off of Parker Canyon Road on the Forest
Service. You know, if the gates right here about, I
don't know how many feet, and there, as the enter the
forest, there's a sign that says no motorized vehicles
with the United States Forest Service sign.
Q.
Is that a fair representation?
THE COURT: Why don't you have him see when
he took the photo.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Do you know when that was
taken?
A.
I'd say at that picture was taken about four
years ago.
Q.
Is that sign still there?
A.
I doubt if it's there. Sabey told me
sometimes when people -Q.
Oh, no, no (INAUDIBLE).
A.
Okay. They just run over them, that's all
they do. Pick them up and throw them away if they can.
Q.
That is a picture going on the Forest Service
property on Parker Canyon Road; is that correct?
A.
Yes, and the Forest Service installed that.
Q.
And is that a fair representation of that
sign that was there?
A.
That's exactly it.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we'd offer Exhibit
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on the Glade on the Forest Service and you come -- Our
border that borders the Forest Service and goes on our
private ground at Circle Springs.
Q.
Okay. Would you mark that on the, on this
exhibit right here?
A.
Yeah, let's get it down here. What number
are you calling that?
Q.
6. I'm showing you what's been marked as
Exhibit 7.
MR. PETERSEN: I think this has been received
as well.
THE WITNESS: That's the same gate and same
area. It could of been a little later. And it just
shows that the gates locked.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Would you mark Exhibit 7
where that's at?
A.
6 and 7.
MR. SWEAT: Don, would you show me 7?
THE COURT: It's the -- It's the lock.
MR. SWEAT: Oh, it's the metal gate on
Circle?
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. SWEAT: Or is it the lock? 7 was the
lock with the cable?
MR. PETERSEN: Yeah.
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MR. SWEAT: No objection.
THE COURT: It's received.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 19
was received into evidence.)
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Would you mark 19, on this
map, where that's at?
A.
You bet I can. It's right -- Do you want
the gate or do you want the -Q.
I want where that picture, what the picture
shows.
A.
Just through the gate, just right there. Do
you want me to mark this No. 19 or something?
Q.
Yes.
A.
Is it 19?
Q.
Yes. I'll show you what's been marked as
Exhibit 6.
MR. PETERSEN: And I think Exhibit 6 has been
received, has it not?
THE COURT: It has.
MR. SWEAT: Can I look at it, just since
you're going to review to it, so I have an idea?
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Where is Exhibit 6, Mr.
Okelberry?
A.
There's no question where that's at. You're
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MR. SWEAT: Okay.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) (INAUDIBLE) marked as
Exhibit 8 and ask you if you can identify that?
A.
Well, that the same area -- If you notice
on this picture the post has been broken off, the gate
was taken out of there, and we replaced it with a big
steel gate.
Q.
So Exhibit 8 shows the replacement gate
(INAUDIBLE)?
A.
Right.
Q.
Okay. Would you put an 8 on there?
MR. SWEAT: Don, are you getting dates on
these pictures? If you're not going to ask dates I'm
going to go back and ask dates on every one. If you want
to ask it might save a little time.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) What is the date on this
picture? Is that when it was taken?
A.
(INAUDIBLE) let's see, 2000 through 2004. It
was either 2003 or 2002.
THE COURT: That's No. 8?
MR. PETERSEN: It has a -- Yes, it has a
date here, 6/15/04.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) So is that the date it was
likely taken?
A.
Well, you sure can't argue with that then.
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Okay.
MR. PETERSEN: It has a date on it 6/15/04.
THE COURT: Thanks.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Mr. Okelberry, let show
you what's been marked as Defendant's Exhibit 9.
MR. PETERSEN: I think that's been admitted,
has it not?
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Can you identify -A.
Does it got a date on it? Some pictures do
and some don't.
Q.
Can you identify where that -A.
I know exactly where it's at. You go down
into White Pole, and instead of going down into Parker
Canyon you make a left and head down towards the fish and
game grounds at the -- That was the White Ledges we
call a rough road that -Q.
Do you know when this picture was taken?
A.
I don't know. I can't remember when all
these pictures were taken.
Q.
But has that -A.
It looks the same today. I think it looks
the same.
Q.
Has that changed at all over the years?
A.
Well, there's been a few more people beat the
machinery up going up them rocks. It might be a little
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smoother than it was.
Q.
But is that a fair representation -A.
Yes.
Q.
-- of those roads?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Okay. Could you put No. 9 on there?
A.
Yeah, it's over here. No. 9 is right there.
Q.
I'm showing you what's marked as Exhibit 15.
Can you identify that?
A.
This is the gate down coming off the Main,
Main Canyon Road there in Wallsberg. It's about 300
feet, 400 feet maybe from Glen Shepard's house. It's the
entrance to our property going up Maple Creek. It goes
up there to a corral. We improved the road up there
about a quarter mile so our sheep corral, we ship all
sheep and a lot of cattle out there in the fall.
MR. PETERSEN: I'm not sure if this got
admitted or not, your Honor, 15?
MR. SWEAT: Can I see it, Don?
CLERK: It has.
MR. SWEAT: Yeah, I got one.
THE COURT: It's received.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 15
was received into evidence.)
THE COURT: Ask him if he knows what date it
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was taken.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Do you know what date that
picture was taken?
A.
There's a date on there I can see. I can't
make it out. It might be '01 or '91, I don't know. It's
been there for approximately 20 years.
Q.
And is that a fair representation?
A.
A very good one.
Q.
I'm showing you what's been marked as
Defendant's Exhibit's 11 and 12 and ask you if you can
identify those?
A.
I don't know where these gates are. They're
-- They're pretty close to the boundary on West Daniels
land. West Daniels land use to be some state land down
in there. It joins on the fish and game. So that would
be the boundary. Basically you go onto that state ground
off of West Daniels ground.
Q.
Do you know when these pictures were taken?
A.
I think it's -- I don't know if they were
taken three or four years ago.
Q.
Is that a fair representation of the way it
looked then when (INAUDIBLE)?
A.
Yes, if you give it to me I'll show you how
they set. This post -- This post right here -- This
post right here, (INAUDIBLE). That post there is the
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same post as this one is right here. And so that oak
tree is the same and they kind of overlap right there.
There's a big gate up there. It's locked,
you can see this thing right here, it's locked. And
right at the side of the gate there's a sign that says,
"Road closed to motorized vehicles. Access restricted to
protect the water shed and to encourage wildlife use.
Please pack out trash. Wild life restoration".
MR. PETERSEN: We'd offer, your Honor,
Exhibit's 11 and 12.
THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. SWEAT: No objection.
THE COURT: It's received.
(Defendant's Exhibit No.'s 11 & 12
was received into evidence.)
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Would you mark that on the
map? Where was that?
A.
It's 11 and 12?
Q.
Yes. Let me show you what's been marked as
Exhibit No. 13 and ask you if you can identify that?
A.
Well, I can. I took this picture the day I
was up there with you and Sabey.
Q.
There's a date on that.
A.
6/15/04 and it shows that we went down to
Thorton Hallow. We got down to Thorton Hallow and made a
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turn and didn't even get out of the car. Took this
picture. And this is the trail that comes from the
closed gate what we call the 1080 gate in the mouth of
Thorton in the pine trees, that we got locked.
And I guess -- It use to be an old cow
trail down there and all the west Daniels cattle trail
along this fence. So this was just -- The
four-wheelers start to use it. And they've made this -And it looked -- It's four-wheelers, but there's two
tracks there again. So it use to be a trail and it's
just what the hunters have done.
Q.
Now, is this a picture on Forest Service
property that -A.
That's on Forest Service.
Q.
-- parallels the fence?
A.
Right, it parallels that forest boundary
(INAUDIBLE).
MR. PETERSEN: We'd offer 13, your Honor.
THE COURT: Have you been having him put
numbers on these last few photos.
THE WITNESS: Oh, yeah, let's see, what's
that number?
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) I think you did. You got
11 and 12 on there?
A.
I got 11 and 12.
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Q.

And this is 13.
THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. SWEAT: No objection, your Honor.
THE COURT: It's received.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 13
was received into evidence.)
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Let me show you what's
been marked as Exhibit 14 and ask you if you can identify
that?
A.
I can. That's right at the 1080 gate. And
it's looking directly north and a long the Forest
Service, Okelberry boundaries. And this is the entrance
to that picture you just had. This is where you start to
go down, come out on that road there.
Q.
Now, when you say the 1080 gate, you mean the
gate that divides your property and the Forest Service
property and the Ridge Line Road?
A.
Yes, and those big pines and Ridge Line Road.
Q.
And does that show that parallel road or
trail or whatever?
A.
The fence goes right alongside of it. Like I
say, it use to be an old cow trial.
THE COURT: This is again at the bottom of
Thorton Hallow?
MR. SWEAT: Can you show us on the -98
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THE WITNESS: It's that -- That picture you
got is where it comes out in Thorton Hallow, right in
Thorton Hallow. This is where you start down. It's
already -- I don't think it's a half mile long, three
eighths of a mile.
THE COURT: Okay. So this is -- This is -THE WITNESS: Where you come off the road you
know -THE COURT: Down -- Down towards the Glade
then.
THE WITNESS: The gate, yeah.
THE COURT: Yeah.
THE WITNESS: That big gate you went through.
And then the gate was locked.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: And this is the trail that
they've used. It use to be a cow trail. I drove cows
along it. And the four-wheelers started using it. I
don't know if anybody went down in a Jeep or not.
MR. SWEAT: Don, I'm just a little confused.
Could you have him point them out just on the map just so
I'm aware?
MR. PETERSEN: Sure.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Would you step up here,
Mr. Okelberry, and show on the map. Or maybe you could
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do it right here on this one (INAUDIBLE). Why don't you
show -A.
This is just the same map, isn't it?
Q.
Yeah, it is.
A.
All right. Right there, you remember where
we went through that gate and we had to saw them trees
out.
MR. SWEAT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: And you went down there with
Don. And Ed, I think, went down there and cut the -Ed and I don't remember who else. But -MR. SWEAT: (INAUDIBLE) 14.
MR. PETERSEN: 14 would be right here looking
at -THE WITNESS: Okay. Right here, right here.
THE COURT: Looking up towards the -THE WITNESS: Thorton. You'd be there and
you just -THE COURT: Along the boundary fence.
THE WITNESS: Just parallel.
MR. SWEAT: (INAUDIBLE) Circle or over here
at Maple?
THE WITNESS: No, no. No, you're right, it's
right here. It goes down to Thorton.
MR. PETERSEN: Put a 14 in there, put a 14.
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THE WITNESS: Okay. That's exactly where
your, it's at. You got it figured out right?
MR. SWEAT: Where's 13 -- You're indicating
that that (INAUDIBLE).
MR. PETERSEN: (INAUDIBLE).
THE WITNESS: Well, it'd be right here. 13
would be right there, right there. Let's get it right.
MR. PETERSEN: Don't mark (INAUDIBLE). Just
put -THE WITNESS: Okay.
MR. PETERSEN: Just put the numbers on there.
THE WITNESS: All right.
MR. SWEAT: So 13 is down in, 14 is
(INAUDIBLE)?
THE WITNESS: Yeah, it's about three eighth
-- No, it says -- It shows that it's less than a half
mile long.
MR. PETERSEN: Okay. Has 14 been received?
THE COURT: It hasn't. Any objections, Mr.
Sweat?
MR. SWEAT: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: It's received.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 14
was received into evidence.)
MR. SWEAT: Did we get dates on those? I
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A.
It's back and off in the, off in the Glade.
Let's see. Here's the Glade, you come off the Glade.
It's right along in here someplace.
Q.
Mark that with a 16.
A.
(INAUDIBLE). It's right where that -- Just
pass where that sheep fence and the cattle fence divides.
So it's right in here someplace. I don't know how to
mark it. We've got too many marks there.
Q.
It's on forest property?
A.
Yeah, it's on forest. Let's call that one
-- What?
Q.
16.
A.
Okay. No. 16. It's close -Q.
South or north or -- Which way (INAUDIBLE)?
A.
Let's see. You're looking -- You'd be
looking like down on Highway 40.
Q.
Okay.
A.
If you took off walking and just kept going
down here you'd end up on Highway 40.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we'd offer 16.
THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. SWEAT: No objection.
THE COURT: It's received.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 16
was received into evidence.)
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MR. PETERSEN: No.
THE COURT: Say 6/15/04.
MR. SWEAT: Thank you.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Now, Mr. Okelberry, let me
show you what's marked as Defendant's Exhibit 16 and ask
you if you can identify that?
A.
Yeah, this is just as you go off the Glade
and you go through them pine trees there (INAUDIBLE).
You go down to -- It's headed down towards Thorton.
It's just this side of Thorton. It's just this side the
1080 gate. There was an old trail that went down there.
Cabin Hallow, I don't know. Cabin -- There's so many
names, but the canyon this side of Thorton Hallow. And
there's an old road -Q.
Does it have a date on it?
A.
Yeah, it says 6/24/04.
Q.
And is there a sign on there?
A.
Right. It's a sign in the middle of that
road or that trail, it went down there. And it's on
Forest Service property. And it says area closed. I
don't know if somebody shot the top of it off, but that's
all it says, it says area closed. I can show you where
it's at on the map.
Q.
Show us on the map.
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MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, I have just a few
other photos (INAUDIBLE).
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) A couple other photos
here. Maybe that's the same one.
A.
Yeah, it's the same one.
MR. PETERSEN: I guess the record ought to
show that Exhibit 16 and 31 are the same. We'll only
used 31.
THE WITNESS: (INAUDIBLE).
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Let me show you what's
been marked -- Mr. Okelberry, let me show you what's
been mark as Exhibit 32.
A.
You've already used this. This is a gate -Q.
(INAUDIBLE).
A.
-- going down towards Big Hallow.
Q.
(INAUDIBLE).
THE COURT: (INAUDIBLE) we don't want to have
any more duplicates.
MR. PETERSEN: And I think we've used 33 too,
have we not?
A.
That's the -- That's Parker Canyon. You've
used that.
Q.
All right. How about 34?
A.
34 is a picture going down into Thorton
Hallow that says no motorized vehicles. Similar to the
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one in Parker Canyon and the one that went down into the
Cabin. And it's just through the fence. There's a
boundary fence right there below the 1080 gate. And it's
a boundary fence that goes along there for about five
miles. And it's just on the forest side.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we'd offer -Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Well, do you know the date
this was taken?
A.
I don't think it's got a date on it. I think
those signs were put up four or five years ago. And I
don't think they're there today.
Q.
Okay. Would you mark that on the exhibit
where 34 is?
MR. PETERSEN: And we would offer 34, your
Honor.
MR. SWEAT: No objection.
THE COURT: It's received.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 34
was received into evidence.)
MR. SWEAT: Can I see where he marked it?
MR. PETERSEN: Yeah. Show him where it is.
THE WITNESS: It's right on Thorton Hallow
right there. Either side, do you want to mark it? What
was the number of that one?
THE COURT: 34.
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Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) I'm showing you what's
been marked as Exhibit 35 and ask you if you can identify
that?
A.
Yeah, that's -- That's below Bear Wallow,
Circle, down towards the Circle Spring Road. Some years
ago these people weren't happy going over to -Q.
No, just identify it.
A.
No, it's a cutoff road that they use down
there with their four-wheelers to get down to Circle.
Q.
Was this a representation of the Circle
Spring Road as we've been referring to it during the
course of this trial?
A.
Pretty close.
Q.
Do you know the date that that was taken?
A.
I don't know. It might of been eight years
ago, it might of been six years ago.
Q.
Is it a fair representation as to the way the
road looks today?
A.
Right. I think that was the trail they was
using.
THE COURT: I don't think -- It's not the
Circle Creek Road.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) That's not Circle Springs
Road then?
A.
Yeah, it's -- What they did instead of
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making -- Circle Springs makes a loop and they made a
cutoff. So it's right -- It's right next to the road.
Q.
Well, for the road, the area you see down
here, these rocks and so fourth, is that a fair
representation of Circle Springs Road?
A.
Yes, that is. That would be a fair
representation.
Q.
Is that a fair representation the way it
looks today?
A.
I haven't seen it today, but it would be a
little greener maybe. That's it.
Q.
Okay.
MR. PETERSEN: We'd offer 35, your Honor.
MR. SWEAT: No objection.
THE COURT: It's received.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 35
was received into evidence.)
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Mr. Okelberry, let me show
you what's been marked as Exhibit 36 and ask you if you
can identify that?
A.
That's pretty close to the Circle Springs
gate. This is a -- It's right by Circle Springs gate.
It's just saying restricted area, keep out, no
trespassing.
Q.
Does it have a gate on it?
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A.
11/6/01. It's part of the Ridge Line Road
that doesn't exist. What you're calling the Ridge Line
don't exist.
Q.
Oh, okay. Would you show the Court what area
(INAUDIBLE)?
A.
Well, I got to get oriented here. This map
you got showing -- The one you sent to me here, you
know, and told us to start with.
Q.
No, we're not talking about this road.
A.
Right here. Yeah, it's this road right
there. It's right there.
MR. SWEAT: Through the fence?
THE WITNESS: Just through the fence.
MR. SWEAT: Into your property?
THE WITNESS: On the map we received you'd
have a mark, but you don't show the two joining one
another.
MR. SWEAT: Can you show me on the big map
just to get a better -THE WITNESS: Yeah, I can show you. It's
this part right here, this road right here. This area
that you don't have joined. You don't have it joined on
this map either, the Circle Springs Road.
MR. SWEAT: We tried to prevent it. It
doesn't show up.
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Q.
the area?
A.

THE WITNESS: Well, that's a good map maker.
MR. SWEAT: (INAUDIBLE).
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Is that representative of

That's representative.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we'd offer 36.
MR. SWEAT: No objection.
THE COURT: It's received.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 36
was received into evidence.)
MR. SWEAT: Can we get a date on 36?
THE COURT: It's '01 also.
MR. SWEAT: Thank you.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Now -A.
I don't think I marked it down here. Did we
get a number?
Q.
Put it on there.
A.
What number did you have?
Q.
36.
A.
Oh, okay.
Q.
I'll show you what's marked as 37. Is that
still in that same area?
A.
Well, that's exactly it. This is shown -This is the road or trail that goes around there. This
is the road or the trail.
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Q.
Is that -- Do you know the date on that?
A.
(INAUDIBLE) it says '04, so 6/14.
Q.
It might show some trees in the road; is that
correct?
A.
Right, that shows -- The logging trees is
when those Youngs, the last people were up there was the
Youngs. And they -- We gave them the logs to build
their barn down there in Wallsberg. And this is -This is kind of the road that they made around there.
Q.
Exhibit 38, is that still in the same area
there?
A.
Yes, that's on the -- That's as you come in
on the Circle. And this is the -- They're showing it
here. And it goes around and hits on that V that hits
onto the 1080 Road, what you're calling the Ridge Line
Road. This is just before you come to that V. That
shows trees on the road.
Q.
Okay. I think Glen testified that he, did he
not, that these trees are not being removed any more; is
that correct? And that road (INAUDIBLE).
A.
Yeah, I use to cut that road out all the
time. I liked kind of -- I didn't want to go back on
the forest and then go around to the 1080 Gate and not
cut across there. But I haven't cut it out for eight or
ten years.
110
MR. PETERSEN:

We'd offer 37 and 38, your

Honor.
MR. SWEAT: No objection.
THE COURT: They're received.
(Defendant's Exhibit's No. 37 & 38
were received into evidence.)
THE WITNESS: I've got quite a few numbers.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN)
Mr. Okelberry, let me
show you what's been marked as Defendant's Exhibit 39 and
ask you if you can identify that?
A.
Well, that's a tree where you turn off from
Ridge Line Road to go down Maple Creek Trail, Maple Creek
Canyon.
Q.
Now, does that -- Do you know what day that
was taken?
A.
No, it looks like mid summer. I don't know.
It says -- Here we go, 8/22/00.
Q.
And is that a fair representation as you -A.
It's right there at that turn where you go
down.
Q.
To go down -- To go down to Maple Canyon?
A.
Right.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we'd offered 39.
MR. SWEAT: No objection
THE COURT: It's received.
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Q.

(Defendant's Exhibit No. 39
was received into evidence.)
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Can you identify Exhibit

40?
A.
Yeah, it's got to be the same trees. I think
there's a -- there's a -- there's a brand there on that
tree and there's a sign that says something. I don't
know, treadmill, trespassing, but it's the same picture
basically. It's right close to -- It's within ten
feet.
MR. SWEAT: Did we mark those on the map?
MR. PETERSEN: Yes.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Did you mark 39 and 40 on
that map?
A.
Yes. I'll give you this picture right here.
Well, it's right there. What did you call them?
Q.
39 and 40.
A.
All right.
MR. SWEAT: Can we have the date on those,
please?
THE COURT: 8/22/2000.
MR. PETERSEN: I think we've offered these,
39 and 40, have we not?
THE COURT: Yes, they're received.
(Defendant's Exhibit's No. 39 & 40
112
were received into evidence.)
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Mr. Okelberry, let me show
you what's marked as Exhibit 41 and ask you if you can
identify that?
A.
Yeah, that's that -- As you head down Maple
Creek that thing -- This is a trail out there that my
brother pushed to get the sheep out to the edge where you
look down on Wallsberg. And we -- It's just a trail.
And you're showing it comes off the Maple Canyon trail in
pink.
Q.
Now, is that the Maple Canyon Road?
A.
No, it's just the side of it. It's just
little -Q.
Is this -- It goes up here?
A.
Yeah, right there. That's what that is.
Q.
Okay.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, what's his
pointing to is -THE WITNESS: You can't get -- You can't
get a truck up it.
MR. PETERSEN: He's pointing to this area,
this area right here.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: See that area right there?
Q.
MR. PETERSEN: Now -113
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THE COURT: Put the number on it.
THE WITNESS: Okay.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) (INAUDIBLE) 41. And it
has a date on it of 8/26/00.
A.
Okay.
Q.
Now, do Exhibit's -A.
That's up a little bit before there.
Q.
Do Exhibit's 42 and 43, is that showing the
same view?
A.
Yeah, that's just basically the same area.
It's just shown as a trail instead of a -- That's what
that is. I don't know how you want to mark it.
Q.
Exhibit's -THE COURT: Well, hold -- If once is good
enough to show them all, why offer three?
THE WITNESS: Well, one just shows it's a
little more brush than the other one. I don't know. It
doesn't matter to me.
MR. PETERSEN: They're taking it different
spots on that trail.
THE COURT: Well, if you want to offer
them -THE WITNESS: The trail is a half of a mile
long, 3/8th.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Okay. The Exhibit 42 has
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a date of 8/25/00, does it not?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And Exhibit 43 does not have a date. Was
that taken approximately the same time, do you know?
A.
I would think it would be about the same
time.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we would offer 41,
42 and 43.
MR. SWEAT: No objections.
THE COURT: They're received.
(Defendant's Exhibit's No. 41, 42 & 43
were received into evidence.)
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) I think we got the same
thing. Is this the same thing then, 44?
A.
The same thing.
MR. PETERSEN: We won't offer 44, your Honor,
it's the same general area.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Mr. Okelberry, let me show
you what's been marked as Defendant's Exhibit 45 and ask
you if you can identify that?
A.
This is the fence as you're coming out of
White Pole back onto Okelberry property. It says keep
out and it's got some barricade there and it shows the
net wire fence goes across the road.
Q.
Where is that on the exhibit?
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A.
It's in those pine or exhibit's -- Let's
Where are we at here? It's right there.
Q.
Would you mark that with a 45? Now, is this
showing leaving your property going onto the West
Daniels' property.
A.
It's -- It's just off to the left. It's
coming backup.
Q.
Okay. So leaving West Daniels going on to
your property?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And is this depicting a gate here and some
kind of a barricade over here?
A.
Yes. Well, it's just a broach. It's really
a brace, braces for the fence and the gate post, that's
what it is.
Q.
It appears to be a sign up here on an old
tire of some sort.
A.
Yeah, it's the same tire system that says
keep out.
Q.
You know how long that signs been up there?
A.
I'd say it's been there approximately 20
years. The rubber tire appeared first. Them was the
first things we started putting up was the -- Well, it
could have been longer than that, the rubber, just the
rubber -- But all the paint and stuff -- The paint
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got heavy the last 10 or 15 years, but the old rubber
tire could have been in there for 30 years, up to 30
years.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we'd offer 45.
THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. SWEAT: No objection to the exhibit, your
Honor, no.
THE COURT: Do you know when that picture was
taken? Does it have (INAUDIBLE)?
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 45
was received into evidence.)
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Do you have any idea when
that picture was taken?
A.
Unless it's on it I don't know (INAUDIBLE).
I'd say it was taken five years ago. It could have been
four years or better, it could have been eight years ago.
Q.
Is it a fair representation of what it looks
now?
A.
Yeah, the pine trees are still there and I
think the fence looks the same. It's in a heavy bunch of
pine trees just before you drop into White Pole pass.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we'd offer that
exhibit.
THE COURT: It's received already.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Let me show you what's
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been marked as Exhibit 46 and ask you if you can identify
that?
A.
Yes, sir, I can. That's -- You go over
down to the gun club and you start up through the fish
and game ground. It's up there about a mile. And
there's a barricade and a locked gate. This picture was
-- I took this picture just the other day. The gate's
locked and you can see up by the grass, there isn't any
traffic on the road.
Q.
That's over on the Forest Service property,
is it?
A.
That's on the fish and game ground.
Q.
That's what I -A.
Could be on some school ground, but it's on
ground that they've got now.
Q.
Could you mark that on the map where it's at?
A.
Well, I don't know where -- You got Big
Hallow here, but I don't know where all the lines are. I
don't know exactly there. It's up that road about less
than a mile I'd say.
Q.
You took that picture recently, did you?
A.
Just the other day.
Q.
Was that gate locked?
A.
Gates locked and there's a big barricade. If
we have any more pictures that show a big barricade
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around it. No way to even get a four-wheel drive around
it, a four-wheel, a four-wheeler or a motorcycle. Well,
I guess you can always invent something. I didn't get
the number of that, your Honor. What's that one?
THE COURT: 46.
THE WITNESS: 46.
THE COURT: You offering it?
MR. PETERSEN: We're offering it, your Honor.
THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. SWEAT: No objection.
THE COURT: It's received.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 46
was received into evidence.)
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) I'm going to show you
what's marked as Exhibit's 48, 49 and 50. Is that in
that same general local?
A.
That's just below the barricade and they put
two big rocks in the road. I think they put them there
-- You can see they've been put there this spring.
Q.
Okay. What is 49?
A.
That's showing the lock that's down in that
round pipe on that gate.
Q.
Okay. And Exhibit 50, what does that show?
A.
50 is -- A month ago this gate was locked.
It's right by the gun club and the others. Anyway I took
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these pictures. The gate there is open. They got it
open. You drive up the road about three quarters of a
mile and then they have this barricade and the gate
closed.
Q.
Will you mark that on the exhibit?
A.
Well, we got three. How do you want to mark
them?
Q.
Where ever they're at.
A.
(INAUDIBLE) Wait a minute. What's it
called, 48?
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we'd offer 48, 49
and 50.
THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. SWEAT: I don't know what rows they are,
but I sure don't have any objection to them, your Honor.
THE COURT: They're received, but they're -(Defendant's Exhibit's No. 48, 49 & 50
were received into evidence.)
MR. SWEAT: I think the Counties made a -UNIDENTIFIED: (INAUDIBLE) 47.
MR. PETERSEN: We're not offering 51. That's
(INAUDIBLE).
THE COURT: Let me -- Mr. Sweat, was the
State part of this lawsuit at one time?
MR. SWEAT: It was, your Honor. And I think
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the Court can take notice of the record that the County
settled with the State. And those roads are going to be
locked at certain times when the, when it's agreed upon.
And other times they're going to be unlocked for public
access.
THE COURT: And that's part of that agreement
as part of the record.
MR. SWEAT: That is correct, your Honor.
MR. PETERSEN: It sure made it difficult to
travel on though.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Let me show you what's
marked as 47, your Honor, or Mr. Okelberry, and see can
you identify that?
A.
I sure can. This is through the 1080 Gate.
Q.
When you say the 1080 Gate, what do you mean
by that?
A.
I don't know what exhibit we call the 1080
Gate, 6 and 7.
THE COURT: That's the -- Isn't it -We're calling that the bottom of Thorton Hallow.
THE WITNESS: Or the entrance of Thorton
Hallow.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. PETERSEN: (INAUDIBLE).
THE WITNESS: It's in those pine trees. But
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anyway, you go through that gate, that gate onto the
Forest Service, you drive about a half mile and here's
this -- This is division, a division fence between
Okel, my brother and me keep two herds of sheep. And
then now he's gone, this is just another division down
along that Ridge Line Road to keep the herds from mixing.
THE COURT: So it's on the Ridge Line Road
then?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: It's not on -- Okay.
THE WITNESS: Yes, it's on the Ridge Line
Road and it's -THE COURT: Just -THE WITNESS: -- basically just ahead of
Maple Creek or ahead of Thorton Hallow.
MR. PETERSEN: It's offered for the purpose
to show that there were gates.
THE WITNESS: Interior gates.
THE COURT: Well, have we ever -- Nobody
has ever said there weren't any gates.
MR. PETERSEN: (INAUDIBLE).
THE COURT: (INAUDIBLE).
THE WITNESS: Well, I didn't write that
picture down. What number was it?
THE COURT: 47.
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UNIDENTIFIED: Is it received?
THE COURT: You offering it?
MR. PETERSEN: Yes, sir.
MR. SWEAT: What number is it?
THE COURT: 47. It's received.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 47
was received into evidence.)
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Mr. Okelberry, let me show
you what's marked as Exhibit 52 and 53 and ask you if you
can identify those pictures?
A.
Well, this picture I think we viewed. It's
part of this road that we told you we'd never cut out
between Circle and Thorton.
Q.
Isn't this Thorton?
A.
Oh, this picture here is the one, the day we
were up there with County Attorney Sweat.
Q.
Right.
A.
And Sabey. And it's -- That's going down
the Parker Canyon Road is what that one is. And so is
this one here is going down Parker Canyon. Both in
Parker Canyon.
Q.
Okay. Both 52 and 53 -A.
They're about halfway down, aren't they?
Q.
And it's showing logs across the road, does
it not?
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A.

Yeah, it shows logs across the road.
MR. PETERSEN: We'd offer 52 and 53.
MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, I find the one with
me in it highly objectionable, but I won't object to it.
THE COURT: Okay. It's received.
(Defendant's Exhibit's No. 52 & 53
was received into evidence.)
THE WITNESS: 53 and 4?
THE COURT: 52 and 3.
MR. PETERSEN: May I consult with the
witness?
THE COURT: You may.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) (INAUDIBLE).
A.
That's what I call 1080 Gate. I don't know.
Have you got a picture of that (INAUDIBLE)?
Q.
I'm sure we do.
THE COURT: I think -- Well, wasn't that
one of the very first ones that -MR. PETERSEN: This is coming -- This is
coming off of Forest Service land onto the Okelberry's
land just above the Circle Springs.
THE COURT: Well, it's the other entrance.
It's -MR. PETERSEN: It's the other end.
THE COURT: It's the other end.
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MR. SWEAT: It's the other entrance. Okay.
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
UNIDENTIFIED: Do you want this little one
too (INAUDIBLE), Mr. Petersen?
MR. PETERSEN: Yes, if you could.
MR. SWEAT: It's the same picture, isn't it?
MR. PETERSEN: I think you're right.
MR. SWEAT: I think it's exactly the same
picture.
THE COURT: Just offer one if it's the same
picture.
MR. PETERSEN: Counsel points that out to me,
your Honor. We're not going to offer 50. We'll offer
55, but not 57.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Can you identify -UNIDENTIFIED: 57 is over.
MR. PETERSEN: Oh, excuse me. What is it?
THE COURT: He's offering 55 not 56.
UNIDENTIFIED: That's 54.
MR. PETERSEN: 54 (INAUDIBLE).
THE COURT: Okay. 54?
MR. PETERSEN: (INAUDIBLE).
THE WITNESS: What -- This number is kind
of smudged. Is it -THE COURT: 55.
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THE WITNESS: It says this picture was taken
10/3 and I can't tell, but it's 0. So it's got to be '00
or '01 or -Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) And the what is that
(INAUDIBLE)?
A.
Is that 55? It looks like a 59.
Q.
Okay. But it's a 55.
A.
Well, that's -- That's the entrance off of
Thor -- You go to the Glade and then you proceed down
to our private property boundary and that's it, right
there. That's the entrance into, in the pines, the 1080
Gate or the, the one before you get to Thorton Hallow.
THE COURT: On the Ridge Line Road.
THE WITNESS: On the Ridge Line Road.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Now, that's depicting a
wire gate.
A.
That's a -- That picture was taken before
they put the steel gate up. And that's the way -Well, when we first went there it shows the cattle guard.
All those cattle guards, they won't head sheep or cows or
horses. They just jump in them. So we have to put a
wire fence across them to keep the livestock in. So all
the gates with cattle guards -- All cattle guards have
a gate across them, unless somebody has hauled them off.
Q.
Okay. Now, this has actually been replaced
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by a metal gate?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
There are some signs on there, are there not?
A.
Yeah. Can you see that rubber tire in them
trees?
Q.
Right. And it looks like there's a sign here
on the gate itself.
A.
Yes.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we'd offer Exhibit
55.
MR. SWEAT: Which one is this again?
THE COURT: 55.
MR. SWEAT: And did we have a date for it?
Cause that's an '01.
MR. PETERSEN: Yeah. It looks like 10/3/0
something.
MR. SWEAT: No, the companion picture may
showed a little bit more. It looks like it's been dated
as '01.
MR. PETERSEN: Actually I think they're two
different pictures. This one shows a little more up
here.
MR. SWEAT: Okay. If you want to substitute
that up here.
MR. PETERSEN: It looks like it's 10/3/01.
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It looks like we would use 50 -- Is that 54?
UNIDENTIFIED: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, it looks like
they're a little bit (INAUDIBLE). We'd offer 54 and 55,
showing a little bit more on one than the other.
THE WITNESS: They're the same gate.
MR. PETERSEN: Same gate. Would you put -Would you mark 54 and 55?
MR. SWEAT: No objection.
THE COURT: They're received.
(Defendant's Exhibit's No. 54 & 55
was received into evidence.)
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Let me show you what's
been marked as 56. Is that showing the same gate?
A.
That's the same gate. It just shows that
somebody has broke the post off and it shows our locks on
it.
MR. PETERSEN: We'd offer 56, your Honor.
MR. SWEAT: What's the gate on that?
MR. PETERSEN: It looks like 10/3/01.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Now, you indicated that
wire gate has now been replaced by a metal gate?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Let me show you what's been marked as Exhibit
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57 and ask you if that's the metal gate?
A.
That's the metal gate.
Q.
When was that replaced, the wire with the
metal?
A.
It was either last year or the year before.
Q.
And this has a date on it of 6/15/04, does it
not?
A.
6/15/04.
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we'd offer Exhibit
57.
THE COURT: It's received.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 57
was received into evidence.)
MR. PETERSEN: I just have a couple more that
I wanted to do.
THE COURT: Do you want to take that noon
recess and you can decide what you want to use?
MR. PETERSEN: (INAUDIBLE) that's Thorton
Hallow and I'm down on (INAUDIBLE). The noon recess will
be fine, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. We'll take a noon recess
at this time. We'll reconvene at 1:15.
(The noon recess was taken.)
THE COURT: Wasatch County verses Okelberry.
Mr. Okelberry, you want to return to the witness stand.
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DIRECT EXAMINATION CONT.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Mr. Okelberry, we only
have two more pictures, 58 and 59. Can you identify
those?
A.
Thorton Hallow.
Q.
Do you know when those pictures were taken?
A.
This one says 6/2/04, but the other is older
than that.
Q.
Any idea when the other one was taken?
A.
No, I don't.
Q.
Now, the Exhibit 58, is that looking into the
Forest Service property?
A.
That's down about 15 feet on the Forest
Service side looking into our property showing a locked
gate and the corral is there on our property.
Q.
And is that a fair representation of what
that area has looked for the last, since you walked
across in '57?
A.
The fence has been built six or eight
different times, but that's the way it looks.
Q.
Are there any signs -- Are there any signs
on there?
THE COURT: Mr. Sweat (INAUDIBLE).
MR. SWEAT: Is he also saying that the lock
was there in '57 on that gate?
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THE WITNESS: No, I didn't say that.
MR. SWEAT: Okay.
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Were any signs on there?
You'll see a yellow marker (INAUDIBLE).
A.
I -- But there's a no trespassing sign
there. And I think the posts are painted red.
Q.
Looking at 59, you're not sure what date that
picture was taken. There's a sign on there. Do you know
if that sign is still there?
A.
No, I don't. I don't think it is, but it
was. There was signs in all them canyons, but no
motorized vehicles.
Q.
Both these pictures, fair representations?
A.
Yeah, I can recognize them.
MR. PETERSEN: We'd offer 58 and 59, your
Honor.
MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, I'd like a little
clarification on I believe it was 58. He's indicated
that there were some signs there. He's saying they're a
fair representation that they are there. Is he thinking
they're a fair representation that those signs were there
in '57?
THE COURT: Why don't you ask him when he, if
he put the sign there or, and if he knows when it was
place.
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Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Looking at Exhibit 59, Mr.
Okelberry, that sign that was there. Do you know if that
sign is still there or not?
A.
No, I don't know if it's there or not, but I
-- I took the picture, the sign was there, and I took
the picture in Parker Canyon, the sign was there. We've
got several pictures showing like the same time in March,
April.
THE COURT: Are we talking about the sign on
the Forest Service that says no motorized vehicles?
THE WITNESS: Yes, that's the one we're
talking about.
MR. SWEAT: That's not the one I'm talking
about, your Honor. I'm talking about -THE COURT: I think Mr. Sweat is talking
about you said there was a no trespassing sign on the
gate.
MR. PETERSEN: Oh -THE WITNESS: There's a -- There's a -There's a no trespassing sign and then a yellow one and
then it's painted red. I can read the sign that says no
trespassing. I know the signs probably been there 18, 20
years, but I can't -- I don't know when we put the
first signs up there, but there's always been a gate
there.
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MR. SWEAT: Thank you, your Honor.
MR. PETERSEN: We'd offer 58 and 59, your
Honor.
THE COURT: Any objection?
THE WITNESS: That picture -- Excuse me.
That picture.
MR. PETERSEN: Which one are you talking
about?
THE WITNESS: With this gate. I think right
next to it that's a cattle guard that my brother said he
put in. But on those cattle guards, we always have to
gate them. All cattle guards are gated, cause the cows
will walk over them and sometimes they jump in them and
you can't get them out, horses likewise.
THE COURT: Any objection if they're
received?
MR. SWEAT: No objection, your Honor.
THE COURT: They're received.
(Defendant's Exhibit's No. 58 & 59
were received into evidence.)
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Mr. Okelberry, let me show
you what's been marked as Exhibit 60 and ask you if
that's a letter that you received from the United States
Department of Agriculture?
A.
Yeah, I received this one.
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Q.
What date does that have?
A.
This was October 8th, 2003. And they was
going down in there -Q.
No, you're just identifying them. Did you
receive this in the mail?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Is that your post office box?
A.
It came to me, Ray Okle -- Box 74. I got a
new one now, it's 415.
Q.
And pursuant to Exhibit 60, are they asking
for permission to access your property?
A.
Let's see. It says, "Ray Okelberry" -Q.
No, no, just -A.
Yeah, they're asking -- "As you have the
soul authority to allow or deny access to your property,
I would like to express my appreciation for your
corporation in this effort. By your allowing our staff
access to conduct the inventory work, our results will
have more complete information for providing forest
estimates in Utah. Sincerely Michael J. Willson, program
manager, Interior West Forest Inventory and Analysis,
U.S. Department of Agriculture".
Q.
I'll show you what's marked as Exhibit 61.
Is that also a letter from the Forest Service?
A.
Yeah, that was a year earlier requesting us
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to let them down there for basically the same thing.
Q.
Did you grant their request?
A.
I sure did. And I think they sent us a
letter -- I think there's a letter thanking us for
letting us go on our property.
MR. PETERSEN: We would offer 60 and 61, your
Honor.
MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, my objection would be
relevance. They're not asking to use the roads. They're
asking to go down in the property and look at two and a
half acres (INAUDIBLE). That would be my only objection.
THE COURT: Well, the Court will receive for
whatever weight the Court can give to them.
(Defendant's Exhibit's No. 60 & 61
was received into evidence.)
Q.
(BY MR. PETERSEN) Mr. Okelberry, you
indicated that there were gates on your property in 1957
when you purchased it going on -A.
Yes.
Q.
-- leaving your property? When did you
start locking those gates.
A.
The two gates -- The Circle Springs and the
1080 Gate and the big pine trees, we started locking them
either the first or second year I was up there. I was up
there herding those sheep myself. And come around about
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the, just about the 1st of July -- We were entitled to
go on the forest on the 1st of July.
Q.
Now, by those two gates are we referring to
the gate going to the Circle Springs Road?
A.
The first gate, yes. That's the first gate I
locked, Circle. I had the sheep ready to go and somebody
left the gate opened and trespassed on the Forest
Service. I brought them back and locked the gate.
Q.
Now, when you say the other gate, was that
the gate that goes -- The 1080 Gate, is that the one
that goes onto the Ridge Line Road?
A.
That's right, and those big pines. I locked
that. We had two bands of sheep, as I stated before.
One was on one side of that fence, the middle division
fence, and one was on the other. It was my
responsibility that, for the ranch and the Okelberrys, to
get the sheep over there. I had had problems and I
wasn't going to have any problems. I locked them.
Q.
As to what is, you refer to as the middle
gate, when did you start locking that one?
A.
Oh, I didn't have to lock that. It was
inside our property. We didn't start locking that until
20 years ago, 18 years ago, 20 years ago.
Q.
And this Maple Canyon, when did you start
locking that?
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A.
20 years ago I'd say, 18, 20 years ago.
Q.
Now, the pictures that we've been referring
to have various signs on them and so fourth. When did
you start putting signs up?
A.
Well, we had trouble. It didn't do any good
to put signs up.
Q.
No, the question is when did you start
putting them up?
A.
I think that I placed some signs in the 50's;
'57, '58, '59. But they didn't stay up. I put some
signs and they -- I don't know what happened. Maybe
the wind blew them away.
Q.
But it's your testimony you started putting
signs up then when?
A.
'57, '58, '59, right in there. I had a
problem, but -- It just continually got worse and as
the years progressed we had to put up more signs.
Q.
Okay. Now, in your opinion were any of those
roads, that we've been discussing here, open continuously
for a ten year period of time?
A.
No. Since we've been in there and Tough -Since '57 those gates have been up all the time. It has
been mentioned they're dropped fences. Up in that higher
elevation it's from 8,000 to 92 or 300 feet, in there
where we join the Forest Service. And then on the -137
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So it's higher elevation. And you have to let the fence
down or the snow tears it apart.
So you put the fence up in there as soon as
you -- Before you get the livestock in there, as soon
as the snow leaves, you stab the fence up. And you have
to repair, take all the trees off the fence, not just the
roads. You take all the trees off. And you have to
bring the fence up to a standard guidelines on the Forest
Service side. It has -- The braces have to be up. You
know, you don't get (INAUDIBLE). It's an endless job to
get the fences up.
And then, like we said, we leave there the
1st of July. And after we left we come maybe back -When I first went in there in '57 or '58 I -- You're
still looking for sheep. So you go back in there off and
on all summer. And the cows, and the trespass problem
with the cows.
And I'm not saying the gate was opened or
locked all summer, but when I was getting ready to get
those sheep out of there I locked those gates. And I've
always had trouble keeping locks there. They might cut
the wire off or they might cut the -- I don't know how
they got these locks off, but they'd get through the
gate. But I didn't -- I didn't make it a personal
endeavor to lock that gate every day in July.
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When I got out of there with the sheep I -When I was there I might of been there a week or ten days
that I had those gates locked. Four or five days on the
one side and four or five days or maybe ten days on the
other side. When I left I didn't make -Q.
Okay. Mr. Okelberry, I think you've answered
the question.
A.
Okay. Thank you.
Q.
Now, let me refer to Exhibit 18 (INAUDIBLE).
It's this exhibit. That is a map. The property that's
indicated in green that's Forest Service property, isn't
it?
A.
Well, it only goes from Utah Lake out to
Duchesne.
Q.
Oh, no, just answer the question. Is the
property in green, that's the Forest Service?
A.
Yes, yes.
Q.
And your property is here in white as far as
(INAUDIBLE).
A.
Yes, yes.
Q.
You're surrounded almost on, well, at least
on two sides, are you not?
A.
I'm completely surrounded by Forest Service
property.
Q.
All right. Now, it's possible to access
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those areas that are on Forest Service property without
going on to your property, isn't it?
A.
That's correct.
Q.
If you wanted to go to Parker Canyon or to
Thorton Hallow you could come up on Highway 40, couldn't
you?
A.
Yes.
Q.
There are trails up there, are there not?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And Circle Springs, there are trails coming
up off Main Canyon, are there not?
A.
From the Main Canyon Road into Circle I've
looked at it, it's between an eighth and quarter mile to
my corner post up there. And there's an old trail and
old road up there.
Q.
Now, if these roads were open to the public
what would that do to your cattle and sheep operation?
A.
In 1957 you had to close all the gates.
Q.
No, just answer the question. What would -A.
Well, it would put you out of business. You
can't -- You can't let all these people -Q.
Okay.
MR. PETERSEN: That's all.
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. -- Mr.
Sweat, cross?
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MR. SWEAT: Thank you, your Honor.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. SWEAT:
Q.
Mr. Okelberry, you indicated that at one
time you owned part of that property and your brother
owned part of that property; is that true?
A.
Yes, that's true.
Q.
Which -- Could you show us on this map
where the dividing line was?
A.
Oh, just down, halfway down from the center.
He owned the north end and I owned the -Q.
Some where down in (INAUDIBLE)?
A.
Yeah, yes. It's -- We had somebody divide
it up and we flipped. So it was an even division.
Q.
You indicated that over the years you've had
more and more people come on your property; is that
correct?
A.
Well, more and more pressure against the
gates, yes.
Q.
When you say pressure, what do you mean by
that?
A.
More vandalism and more destruction, tearing
the gates off, more requests for permission, which we
granted.
MR. SWEAT: Your Honor, where is the stack of
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all those exhibits that just got entered?
THE COURT: Right -- (INAUDIBLE) there and
these are the other ones.
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) Mr. Okelberry, I'm going to
show you what has been marked as Exhibit 59?
A.
Yes.
Q.
I believe you identified that as being
Thorton Hallow; is that correct?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Is this sign placed through the fence in
Thorton Hallow?
A.
It was just through the fence a little ways.
Q.
It wasn't on the fence it was through the
fence a little ways?
A.
It was right next to the road.
Q.
Exhibit No. 40, where did we mark that on the
map?
A.
It's right as you turn down Circle Spring
Trail, right there, 40. Right there, sir.
Q.
Is that inside your property?
A.
Yes. That's right at the side of the Ridge
Line Road.
Q.
Is that where the -- Is that where this
road branches off of Ridge Line Road here?
A.
No, it's a over -- It's farther down on the
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(INAUDIBLE) -- Right -- the other way, sir.
Q.
Right here?
A.
Farther.
Q.
Right here?
A.
Right there. Right there.
Q.
(INAUDIBLE)?
A.
That first picture you showed me, that's
where that is (INAUDIBLE). Off of Ridge Line Road down
to Circle and Maple Canyon.
THE COURT: It's Maple Canyon rather than
Circle.
THE WITNESS: That's right, excuse me. Some
people are calling this Circle Road, but it's Maple,
Maple Creek Canyon. It's not Ridge Line. Some one goes
down -- It's a trail. It goes down to Wallsberg.
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) Would you tell me again where
Exhibit No. 36 is?
A.
That's right at the, just about, less than a
hundred feet north of the Circle Spring gate on the
property off the Forest Service.
Q.
It's out here on this side of the fence?
A.
Uh-huh, right. That's -- It's right there.
That first road you got coming off, first red one.
Q.
Right here?
A.
No.
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Q.
It's right here?
A.
Yes, that's where that's at.
Q.
Does the gate -- Does the -- Is there
only one gate there where Circle Springs goes through?
A.
There's only one gate there, sir.
Q.
And then this road branches up from there; is
that right?
A.
Well, it -- It's closed, that part of it.
You got it there.
Q.
The one that' shown there?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And this is shown going into that area; is
that right?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Mr. Okelberry, you've testified that you're
aware that sheep use to be trailed up what you call
Circle Hallow; is that correct?
A.
Yes, they did -- There was only one herd
when I got there in '57. All those herds have been
stopped. They've gotten trucks. But Thompsons had a
herd there in Wallsberg. And they still used that. And
they went up Circle.
Q.
You went up a time or two with some of those
herds early on, is that true, prior to '57 (INAUDIBLE)?
A.
Right. 1941 my father had some sheep over
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Strawberry Valley. And they was -- They trailed sheep
back from Daniels Summit; from over in Strawberry Valley
around the lake; and they was trailing back to Daniels
Summit; came around to the Glade, or they came to the
Glade and they took this Circle trail that went on down
there. It was a trail. It went down to Circle. Then it
continued on down to Circle. Your maps don't show this
is a trail any more, but it come out down right there by
Young's, right down on the main, let's see, Main Canyon
Road.
Q.
Is it your understanding that prior to that
time there were several herds of sheep that would come up
and back over that trail over the years?
A.
They -- They -- That's exactly right.
There were several herds, but it was before my time. I
-- Let's see. Allens had to come up there. I don't
know. There'd be thousands of sheep that came up there.
There was a lot of sheep in Wallsberg too, but they
didn't all come up that thing.
But that use to be the access into Strawberry
Valley is through, on that Circle Trail. Now these maps
don't even show that. They show it goes to Circle Spring
and dead ends. And that's where it does dead end now,
but after the sheep stop trailing in there they don't use
that.
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Q.
Could you ever of pulled a wagon or camp up
that trail?
A.
I wouldn't of thought so, but that canyon it
is a circle. From Circle Springs and it makes a half a
circle. And it is washed out terrible when I was there.
And it's been -- It's been quite a few years since I
was there. And I herded sheep in there.
And I had dispute with the Forest Service
with a fellow permittee. And I got that Brian Adamson to
come up there and settle that dispute. And I asked him
about that. And he said no, they use to take -- They
use to take sheep camp down that Circle. And I couldn't
believe it. But back in them days it would them
(INAUDIBLE) and the 33. They would only weigh about 1500
pounds. That was the main source rather than -- They
say they went up Maple, but they didn't go up Maple.
Q.
At least you don't believe they went up
Maple?
A.
No, nobody ever told me they went up Maple,
the horse trail.
Q.
Taking your attention to what has been marked
as Exhibit No. 1. Do you recognize the country in that?
A.
I don't recognize one thing with that map,
it's black and white.
THE COURT: Why don't you point out to him
146

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

(INAUDIBLE).
THE WITNESS: Get me oriented. I see what it
looks like the bottom of that highway coming up there.
Q.
Is there a Prove or (INAUDIBLE) Canyon?
Right here would be take off of Parker Canyon. This is
what has been designated as Ridge Line coming down to
here. This is Parker Canyon. Can you tell me about
where your property would end on this?
A.
I can't tell you at all on that. If you've
got another map or a map that, where the highway is -If you got a map coming up from the highway -- There's
a trail that comes up from Parker from the highway.
Q.
No, I'm talking about on your property. Is
White Pole where Parker Canyon and Ridge Line meet? Is
that a big open area there?
A.
Well, you got a highway -- You got a
highway down there.
Q.
(INAUDIBLE)?
A.
Where's your trail? Parker Canyon. I mean,
I can figure it out.
Q.
There's Parker to the forest. Right here
from Parker up?
A.
Where does the forest property?
Q.
Right there.
A.
The forest property goes down and comes out
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of Whiskey Spring. Is that what you're talking about,
whiskey spring down here?
Q.
Not down here, I'm talking about right over
here.
A.
You go -- Well, what you have to do is you
have to go up Daniels Canyon up to here and then come up
on Parker.
Q.
Okay. So it would be up in here some where?
A.
Oh, it's straight down and it goes about
straight east.
Q.
(INAUDIBLE) view it right there.
A.
I can't tell. (INAUDIBLE) you got maps that
you can tell.
MR. SWEAT: I have no further questions if he
can't orient himself on that, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. You may return to your
seat. He's not going to ask you more questions about the
map.
MR. SWEAT: Yeah, sorry about that.
THE COURT: No, no.
THE WITNESS: Oh, (INAUDIBLE).
THE COURT: You're not all the way through.
THE WITNESS: Why don't you get a good map up
here. It's easy. Go up -- You go up Daniels and you
hit Parker Canyon. The Forest Service got a big sign up
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and you just jump out there and run up to the top of the
hill.
Q.
(BY MR. SWEAT) Is your testimony that you
think the fish and game road was built in about the
1970's; is that correct?
A.
I would think so. They bought that property
after we bought ours in '57.
Q.
Could it have been as early as the 60's?
A.
Could have been. I think they brought the
property about '62.
Q.
About '62?
A.
And they built the fences there later after
that. They built the boundary fence up on our north end
of our property. And that's -- Would it be -- Like I
said, there's not no -- It's the 60's and 70's. They
was -- They was about 15, 20 years before they built
the fences, I thought, but my memory could be off. But
they built that fence, part of it, on the north end of
our property.
Q.
You indicated that the first time you came
through the property you entered through the, you said
the Peetrose gate or -A.
Well, it's old Peetree that owns it now.
Q.
Peetree?
A.
But it's down there by Taylors.
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Q.
Can you show me on the map where that is?
I'll bring it to you?
A.
All right. It was down on the Main Canyon
Road, down here. It's about down -- Let's see now.
That's -- That's Youngs. So it's down in here. I
don't know whether it shows it, but anyway that was the
main gate to our property that we went in. I call it
Peetree. Peetree built it. He build a big cat down
there at the entrance. It's still there. That's where
we unloaded the first sheep we had. The first experience
I had in Wallsberg.
MR. SWEAT: I have no further questions, your
Honor.
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Petersen?
MR. PETERSEN: I don't think so, your Honor.
We'll excuse this witness. I think we have a witness out
in the hall. Could I just take a minute?
THE COURT: Yeah. Now you can step down.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
THE COURT: Your witness is not here yet, Mr.
Petersen?
MR. PETERSEN: Just walked in, your Honor,
and my co-counsel is chatting with him right now.
THE COURT: Is this your last witness or do
you have more of them?
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MR. PETERSEN: This will be our last witness,
yes. Just as a matter of procedure, your Honor. Counsel
and I were discussing during the noon lunch hour, is this
a matter that you would like closing arguments on? Would
you prefer a brief, submitted by a brief? What would be
the best and most productive for the Court?
THE COURT: Well, whatever you want to do.
In recent cases I have asked counsels, you know. I could
hear your closing arguments, but sometimes it's more
helpful for the Court if you would prepare (INAUDIBLE)
finding of fact, conclusion of law based upon how you see
the facts that have come into the case, and then apply
what the law is to that and make conclusions of law based
upon the law. The Court will make a decision.
MR. PETERSEN: I think that would be helpful
to the Court. We'd certainly be willing to do that, your
Honor.
MR. SWEAT: I'd certainly be willing to do
that, your Honor. And you're saying you'd want that in
lieu of closing arguments?
THE COURT: That's -- You know, I've found
that to be helpful. (INAUDIBLE) you can make your
argument based upon, based upon (INAUDIBLE). Or you can
file a, you can file a separate memo as closing arguments
(INAUDIBLE).
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MR. PETERSEN: Well, I think maybe findings
the fact, conclusion of law would be, have a little more
meat on the bones. Would this be something we'd submit
simultaneously?
THE COURT: Yes. Could you do that in ten
days?
MR. PETERSEN: With the 4th of July coming up
would it be possible to have a little longer than that?
THE COURT: Well, let's say by the, submit
them by the 16th of July.
MR. PETERSEN: That would be fine, your
Honor.
THE COURT: That's a Friday. Then the Court
would make a decision based there on.
MR. PETERSEN: I hate to delay the Court.
Let me see this. Your Honor, I just want a quick -Just break for five minutes, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. We'll have a five minute.
MR. PETERSEN: Thank you.
THE COURT: Just -- Let me ask you, Mr.
Sweat. Do you anticipate any rebuttal witnesses?
MR. SWEAT: Not at this time, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
(A brief recess was taken.)
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MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor, we have another
witness ready to testify, but we've reviewed his
testimony and I think it's very -- It's somewhat
repetition of what you've already heard. So we'll rest
at this time.
THE COURT: Okay. And Mr. Sweat, you have no
rebuttal witnesses?
MR. SWEAT: I do not, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. So what we've discussed is
that we will -- Each of you will submit simultaneous
proposed findings of fact and conclusion of law in lieu
of closing arguments on or before the 16th of July. Let
me just make comments. This is not the first case like
this that I've tried. In fact, I -- I tried several
when I was in a position similar to Mr. Sweat, trying to
defend the public's right to use roads that go over
private property.
I think we're both aware the reason we're
here is because our state legislature has a statute which
says that based upon certain use of thoroughfares or
whatever you want to call roads over private ground, that
you meet certain requirements it could be declared a
public road.
I grew up in a rural area. I've hunted in
areas very similar to this. You know, I -- Where
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there's public ground and private ground intermixed, and
I can understand those who've testified that, you know,
that they've used these roads in the past. You know,
it's kind of part of growing up in rural Utah is that you
went, you thought you had right on the roads, even if
they crossed private ground.
Most landowners 30 years ago, you know, just
as Mr. Okelberry and his predecessors, they knew most
people and they didn't care, as long as they didn't cause
any damage to them. And as time went on, you know,
society changes and more people come into areas. Clearly
there's been a substantial increase in population in
Wasatch County and also a substantial increase in
recreational use in Wasatch County.
And there puts the private landowner and the
livestock in a difficult position. Do you continue the
old ways or do you permit people to use your roads or at
some point in time you stop them. And that's what's
occurred here. I don't -- You know, based upon the
evidence I've heard, up until the late 80's basically
those roads were open for use. They might of been closed
at certain times. When I mean closed I mean locked.
Clearly the case law is such that a gate,
although some evidence of intent to keep people out as
long as it's not locked and it's not enforced that's -154
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There's case law to the effect that just a gate itself on
the road is not totally cut it off from being considered
a public road. But when those -- When the landowners
started to see that they could also make some money on
hunting rights, it's nearly impossible to prevent people
from not paying to go hunting on your property if you
have open roads. That was a time period when this
started.
And, you know, the Court's just going to have
to determine based upon the evidence that I've heard and
the law that's out there, as to whether or not prior to
the stopping of the public on those roads, whether
they've been established a public road. And it's an
interesting question to me if -- Can you have a public
road? Let's say you met the criteria back in the 40's
and 50's and then there was cut off in the, but it was
never officially declared a public road by Court
declaration or otherwise determination. Can it be
stopped through none use?
Clearly I don't think it's been a public road
since 1990. That's when the Okelberrys, and it's clear
evidence that that's when they started preventing public
individuals from using that road. Most everybody used
it, their described use was prior to 19, the early 90's.
And that's the testimony of the Okelberrys is that's when
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they really started to enforce their exclusion of others
from their lands.
But can there be an abandonment of what was
once a public road by -- This lawsuits was not filed
until 2001. That's more than ten years after, but cane
there be an abandonment of that? So whether -- There's
interesting legal questions.
MR. SWEAT: Was you indicating you wanted
briefs on those, your Honor?
THE COURT: Well, you know, I don't know -I don't know if -- I don't know if our -- There might
be case law out there, but I haven't seen any in any
other cases that you've had unless it -- I don't think
there's any in Utah, unless it's something that I've
overlooked before. But there can be an abandonment of an
easement.
Let's say that -- Let's say if Mr.
Besendorfer had established that he had a personal
easement to cross this property based upon his use over a
period of 20 years, clearly the law is that if he felt he
used that for a period of time he can abandon a
prescriptive easement. Can the -- Can the public
abandon a public easement?
Those are difficult questions. Those are
like -- They're more like public policy type questions
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than legal questions. But we'll make a decision based
upon the law and the evidence. I appreciate counsel,
your courtesies. And it's nice getting to know all you
people. Thank you.
MR. SWEAT: Thank you, your Honor.
(Where upon court concluded.)
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Reporter in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify:
That this proceeding was transcribed by me from the
transmitter records made of these proceedings.
That this transcript is full, true, correct and
contains all of the evidence and all matters to which the
same relate which were audible throughout said recording.
That I am not of kin or otherwise associated with
any of the parties herein or their counsel, and that I am
not interested of the events thereof.
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record, and therefore, the name associated with the
statement may not be the correct name as to the speaker.
WITNESS my hand at Midvale, Utah, the 1st day of
September, 2005.
Jennifer Hermansen France, RPR, CSR
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May 21, 2003

Mel Price
1449 S. Industrial Parkway
Heber City, UT 84032
j,r •- ;

To Whom It May Concern:

I Ray Okelbeny give Mel Price permission to set bear bait on my
property and he also has the right to access all of my roads on my
private land.

Mel Price has been getting permission to use my

roads and land for the past 28 years.

Respectfully,

Ray Okelberry

T

* DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT

